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The	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  
Goods:	  Should	  Developing	  Nations	  Such	  As	  Iran	  Adopt	  the	  CISG?	  
Mona	  Ahadi	  
Abstract	  	  
The	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  (CISG)	  
was	  agreed	  in	  1980.	  It	  has	  been	  ratified	  by	  79	  states.	  Despite	  a	  declaration	  in	  the	  
Preamble	  that	  it	  seeks	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  achievement	  of	  a	  New	  International	  
Economic	  Order	  (NIEO)	  and	  to	  promote	  the	  development	  of	  international	  trade	  on	  the	  
basis	  of	  equality	  and	  mutual	  benefit,	  a	  disproportionate	  number	  of	  developing	  
countries,	  including	  Iran,	  have	  not	  ratified	  it.	  This	  thesis	  investigates	  the	  link	  between	  
the	  NIEO	  and	  the	  CISG	  in	  relation	  to	  both	  the	  process	  of	  making	  international	  sales	  law	  
and	  the	  substance	  of	  that	  law.	  While	  the	  broader	  remit	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  investigate	  
why	  developing	  countries	  have	  failed	  to	  adopt	  the	  CISG,	  its	  primary	  focus	  is	  on	  Iran	  
and	  whether	  it	  should	  adopt	  the	  CISG.	  To	  that	  end,	  the	  author	  will	  thoroughly	  study	  
the	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages	  of	  ratification	  put	  forward	  by	  different	  nations.	  The	  
position	  taken	  on	  the	  CISG	  by	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  will	  also	  be	  examined,	  since	  the	  UK	  
has	  avoided	  ratifying	  the	  CISG.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  study	  is	  to	  show	  that	  Iran	  is	  not	  in	  a	  
comparable	  position	  to	  the	  UK	  with	  regard	  to	  justifying	  its	  non-­‐ratification.	  	  
	  
A	  comparison	  of	  the	  legal	  provisions	  of	  the	  CISG	  and	  their	  counterparts	  under	  Iranian	  
law	  is	  the	  ultimate	  aim	  of	  this	  thesis.	  To	  better	  understand	  the	  Iranian	  law	  governing	  
contracts	  of	  sale,	  a	  brief	  overview	  will	  be	  provided	  of	  Iran’s	  position	  in	  the	  world	  
economy	  and	  of	  its	  legal	  environment.	  A	  careful	  investigation	  will	  then	  be	  conducted	  
into	  the	  rights,	  duties,	  and	  remedies	  under	  the	  CISG	  and	  corresponding	  ones	  under	  the	  
Iranian	  domestic	  law	  of	  sale.	  The	  study	  reveals	  that	  the	  rights	  and	  duties	  under	  the	  
CISG	  resemble	  those	  under	  Iranian	  law.	  There	  are	  certain	  remedies	  in	  the	  CISG	  that	  do	  
not	  have	  a	  counterpart	  in	  Iranian	  law.	  In	  such	  cases,	  the	  practical	  effect	  of	  these	  
differences	  will	  be	  discussed.	  This	  will	  lead	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  Iran	  should	  adopt	  the	  
CISG,	  and	  that	  is	  where	  the	  author’s	  fieldwork	  in	  Iran	  concerning	  the	  practical	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The	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  was	  
agreed	  on	  11	  April	  1980	  in	  Vienna.	  It	  has	  been	  ratified	  by	  79	  states1	  that	  account	  for	  a	  
significant	  proportion	  of	  world	  trade.	  Despite	  the	  declaration	  in	  the	  Preamble	  about	  
contributing	  to	  the	  achievement	  of	  a	  New	  International	  Economic	  Order	  (NIEO)	  and	  
promoting	  the	  development	  of	  international	  trade	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  equality	  and	  mutual	  
benefit,	  a	  disproportionate	  number	  of	  developing	  countries,	  including	  Iran,	  have	  not	  
ratified	  it.	  While	  the	  broader	  aim	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  investigate	  why	  developing	  
countries	  have	  failed	  to	  adopt	  the	  CISG,	  the	  primary	  focus	  is	  on	  Iran	  and	  whether	  or	  
not	  it	  should	  adopt	  the	  CISG.	  
1.2	  The	  Need	  for	  Legal	  Harmonisation	  in	  International	  Trade	  
International	  trade	  saw	  tremendous	  growth	  during	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  This	  was	  the	  
result	  of	  the	  development	  of	  the	  market	  economy,	  the	  expansion	  of	  markets	  for	  
manufactured	  goods,	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  markets	  for	  raw	  products	  from	  
developing	  nations.	  Modern	  means	  of	  communication	  facilitated	  more	  reliable	  
transactions	  for	  traders	  throughout	  the	  world,	  and	  technological	  advancement	  
provided	  easier	  and	  faster	  transport	  of	  goods	  worldwide.	  Economic	  isolation	  is	  no	  
longer	  viable	  for	  any	  state	  in	  this	  modern	  world	  owing	  to	  the	  interdependence	  of	  
commercial	  markets.	  Therefore,	  international	  trade	  is	  seen	  as	  absolutely	  essential	  in	  
the	  modern	  economic	  world.2	  	  
	  
Alongside	  the	  growth	  of	  international	  commerce,	  problems	  have	  begun	  to	  emerge	  
between	  countries.	  These	  have	  concerned	  how	  to	  regulate	  international	  trade	  when	  
individual	  states	  enter	  into	  a	  contract	  that	  can	  be	  governed	  by	  different	  standards	  and	  
usages.	  Therefore,	  a	  need	  has	  developed	  for	  harmonised	  global	  trade	  rules	  and	  
standards.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  As	  of	  5	  March	  2013,	  UNCITRAL	  reported	  that	  79	  states	  have	  adopted	  the	  CISG.	  
‘CISG:	  Table	  of	  Contracting	  States’	  <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries.html>	  
accessed	  1	  July	  2013.	  
2	  See	  Alison	  E	  Williams,	  ‘Forecasting	  the	  Potential	  Impact	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Sales	  Convention	  on	  
International	  Sales	  Law	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom’	  (2000–2001)	  Kluwer	  Law	  International	  9.	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In	  response	  to	  the	  changes	  to	  practices	  in	  the	  field	  of	  international	  trade,	  and	  to	  
remove	  legal	  barriers	  in	  global	  transactions,	  two	  leading	  international	  organisations	  
were	  founded:	  the	  International	  Institute	  for	  the	  Unification	  of	  Private	  Law	  
(UNIDROIT)3	  and	  the	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  International	  Trade	  Law	  
(UNCITRAL).4	  These	  organisations	  symbolise	  the	  recognition	  made	  by	  nations	  that	  a	  
unified	  body	  of	  law	  is	  required	  to	  promote	  global	  commerce.	  
	  
The	  importance	  of	  a	  uniform	  international	  sales	  law,	  however,	  necessitates	  more	  in-­‐
depth	  discussion	  of	  the	  subject.	  The	  CISG,	  which	  was	  adopted	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  
UNCITRAL,	  has	  attracted	  criticism	  in	  this	  regard.	  Some	  argue	  that	  the	  benefits	  of	  
uniform	  international	  business	  law	  are	  minimal.5	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that,	  although	  the	  
possibility	  of	  complete	  substantive	  uniformity	  of	  CISG	  application	  is	  unlikely,	  it	  is	  not	  
the	  case	  either	  that	  the	  CISG	  has	  completely	  failed	  to	  remove	  legal	  barriers	  in	  
international	  law.	  It	  is	  the	  middle	  approach,	  relative	  uniformity,	  that	  has	  been	  the	  
source	  of	  development	  of	  the	  CISG’s	  jurisprudence.6	  The	  CISG	  has	  succeeded	  in	  
reducing	  legal	  impediments	  to	  trade	  by	  ensuring	  a	  relative	  level	  of	  uniformity.	  A	  
standard	  of	  relative	  uniformity	  in	  the	  application	  of	  the	  CISG	  has	  been	  envisioned	  in	  
Article	  7,	  which	  mandates	  that	  ‘regard	  is	  to	  be	  had.’	  It	  further	  states	  ‘the	  need	  to	  
promote	  uniformity	  in	  its	  application’	  rather	  than	  use	  of	  words	  such	  as	  establish	  or	  
create.	  It	  is	  true	  that	  there	  have	  been	  judgements	  that	  have	  shown	  a	  homeward	  trend.	  
This,	  however,	  cannot	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  failure	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  CISG.	  Ulrich	  Magnus	  has	  
rightly	  pointed	  out	  that	  ‘the	  divergences	  are	  less	  than	  one	  could	  expect	  bearing	  in	  
mind	  that	  no	  central	  CISG	  court	  exists.’7	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  It	  is	  an	  independent	  intergovernmental	  organisation	  which	  was	  originally	  set	  up	  in	  1926	  as	  an	  auxiliary	  
organ	  of	  the	  League	  of	  Nations.	  The	  fruits	  of	  its	  labour	  were	  the	  1964	  Hague	  Conventions:	  a	  Convention	  
relating	  to	  a	  Uniform	  Law	  on	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods,	  July	  1,	  1964;	  and	  a	  Convention	  Relating	  to	  
a	  Uniform	  Law	  on	  the	  Formation	  of	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods,	  July	  1,	  1964.	  
<http://www.unidroit.org/>	  accessed	  1	  July	  2013.	  
4	  It	  was	  established	  by	  the	  General	  Assembly	  in	  1966	  (GA	  Resolution	  2205	  (XXI)	  of	  17	  December	  1966).	  
United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  (CISG),	  11	  April	  1980,	  was	  
the	  result	  of	  a	  legislative	  effort	  by	  the	  UNCITRAL.	  
<http://www.uncitral.org/>	  accessed	  1	  July	  2013.	  
5	  Paul	  B	  Stephan,	  ‘The	  Futility	  of	  Unification	  and	  Harmonisation	  in	  International	  Commercial	  Law’	  (1999)	  
39	  Virginia	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  743.	  
6	  Larry	  A	  Dimatteo,	  Lucien	  Dhooge,	  Stephanie	  Greene,	  Virginia	  Maurer,	  and	  Marisa	  Pagnattaro,	  ‘The	  
Interpretive	  Turn	  in	  International	  Sales	  Law:	  An	  Analysis	  of	  Fifteen	  Years	  of	  CISG	  Jurisprudence’	  (2004)	  
34	  Northwestern	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  and	  Business	  299.	  
7	  Ulrich	  Magnus,	  ‘Tracing	  Methodology	  in	  the	  CISG:	  Dogmatic	  Foundations’	  in	  Andre	  Janssen	  and	  Olaf	  
Meyer	  (eds),	  CISG	  Methodology	  (Sellier	  European	  Law	  Publisher	  2009).	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1.3	  Context	  of	  the	  Research	  
Unification	  in	  the	  field	  of	  international	  commerce	  has	  now	  witnessed	  worldwide	  
growth.	  The	  World	  Trade	  Organization	  (WTO)	  and	  the	  World	  Customs	  Organization	  
(WCO)	  are	  the	  main	  examples	  of	  further	  stimulus	  behind	  the	  unification	  movement.8	  
This	  unifying	  trend	  is	  seen	  as	  the	  evolution	  of	  a	  modern	  lex	  mercatoria.9	  Professor	  
Schmitthoff	  described	  ‘the	  emergence	  of	  a	  transnational	  law	  of	  international	  trade	  as	  a	  
new	  lex	  mercatoria.’10	  This	  new	  lex	  mercatoria	  is	  having	  a	  growing	  impact	  on	  
international	  trade	  and	  in	  particular	  on	  international	  arbitration.11	  
	  
In	  1966,	  UNCITRAL	  was	  established	  by	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly12	  and	  was	  given	  a	  
general	  mandate	  to	  promote	  the	  progressive	  harmonisation	  and	  unification	  of	  
international	  trade	  law.	  The	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  
International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  (CISG)	  is	  the	  product	  of	  that	  endeavour.13	  This	  thesis	  will	  
use	  the	  terms	  ‘CISG’	  and	  ‘the	  Convention’	  interchangeably.	  On	  11	  April	  1980,	  the	  CISG	  
was	  adopted	  during	  a	  diplomatic	  conference	  in	  Vienna.	  
	  
The	  Preamble	  of	  the	  CISG	  sets	  out	  its	  purpose	  in	  stating	  that:	  
	  
The	  adoption	  of	  uniform	  rules	  which	  govern	  contracts	  for	  the	  international	  sale	  
of	  goods	  and	  take	  into	  account	  the	  different	  social,	  economic	  and	  legal	  systems	  
would	  contribute	  to	  the	  removal	  of	  legal	  barriers	  in	  international	  trade	  and	  
promote	  the	  development	  of	  international	  trade.	  
	  	  
The	  CISG	  is	  divided	  into	  four	  parts:	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  See	  Sieg	  Eiselen,	  ‘Adopting	  the	  Vienna	  Sales	  Convention:	  Reflections	  Eight	  Years	  down	  the	  Line’	  (2007)	  
19	  SA	  Mercantile	  Law	  Journal	  14.	  
9	  See	  Aleksandar	  Goldstajn,	  ‘Usages	  of	  Trade	  and	  Other	  Autonomous	  Rules	  of	  International	  Trade	  
According	  to	  the	  UN	  (1980)	  Sales	  Convention’	  in	  Petar	  Sarcevic	  and	  Paul	  Volken	  (eds),	  International	  Sale	  
of	  Goods:	  Dubrovnik	  Lectures	  (Oceana	  1986)	  ch	  3,	  55;	  See	  Aleksandar	  Goldstajn,	  ‘Lex	  Mercatoria	  and	  the	  
CISG:	  The	  Global	  Law	  Merchant’	  in	  Petar	  Sarcevic	  and	  Paul	  Volken	  (eds),	  The	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  
Revisited	  (2001)	  241,	  241–2.	  
10	  Clive	  M	  Schmitthoff	  and	  Norbert	  Home,	  ‘Nature	  and	  Evolution	  of	  the	  Transnational	  Law	  of	  
Commercial	  Transactions’	  (1982)	  Kluwer	  Law	  International	  19.	  
11	  Goldstajn,	  ‘Lex	  Mercatoria	  and	  the	  CISG’	  (n	  9)	  243.	  
12	  GA	  Resolution	  2205	  (XXI).	  
13	  <http://www.uncitral.org/>	  accessed	  1	  July	  2013.	  
22	  
Part	  I	  (Articles	  1–13)	  considers	  the	  sphere	  of	  application	  and	  general	  provisions.	  	  
Part	  II	  (Article	  14–	  24)	  governs	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  contract.	  	  
Part	  III	  (Articles	  25–	  88)	  establishes	  conditions	  for	  the	  sale	  of	  goods,	  which	  include	  the	  
obligations	  of	  the	  buyer	  and	  the	  seller	  and	  remedies	  available	  to	  them,	  and	  the	  passing	  
of	  risk.	  	  
Part	  IV	  (Article	  89–101),	  which	  contains	  the	  final	  provisions	  and	  discusses	  the	  
administrative	  provisions	  and	  the	  declarations	  or	  reservations	  that	  are	  available	  to	  
signatory	  states.	  	  
	  
The	  domestic	  commercial	  laws	  of	  signatory	  states	  are	  not	  harmonised	  by	  the	  CISG.	  The	  
Convention	  seeks	  to	  isolate	  international	  sale	  from	  the	  remit	  of	  domestic	  law	  and	  to	  
establish	  unified	  rules	  for	  international	  sale.14	  Therefore,	  the	  CISG	  is	  a	  comprehensive	  
body	  of	  law,	  which	  regulates	  formation	  and	  performance	  of	  contracts	  of	  sale,	  provided	  
that	  they	  fall	  within	  its	  scope	  of	  application.	  It	  also	  governs	  the	  remedies	  available	  to	  
parties.	  Where	  the	  domestic	  law	  of	  member	  states	  with	  regard	  to	  an	  issue	  is	  covered	  
in	  the	  CISG,	  the	  CISG	  supersedes	  national	  law.	  Having	  said	  that,	  national	  law	  is	  not	  
excluded	  in	  its	  entirety,	  as	  the	  CISG	  allows	  for	  several	  matters	  to	  be	  decided	  under	  the	  
applicable	  national	  law.15	  
	  
Supporting	  the	  autonomy	  of	  contracting	  parties	  is	  one	  of	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  CISG.	  
Article	  6	  specifies,	  subject	  to	  Article	  12,	  that	  parties	  are	  permitted	  to	  exclude	  the	  
application	  of	  the	  CISG	  to	  their	  contract,	  or	  to	  deviate	  from	  or	  vary	  the	  effect	  of	  any	  of	  
its	  provisions.	  The	  provisions	  of	  the	  CISG	  are	  legally	  binding	  between	  signatory	  states,	  
unless	  its	  provisions	  are	  varied	  or	  excluded	  in	  part	  or	  in	  entirety	  by	  the	  parties.	  It	  is	  
possible	  to	  exclude	  its	  provisions	  either	  explicitly	  or	  implicitly.16	  If	  the	  provisions	  are	  to	  
be	  excluded	  implicitly,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  ascertain	  the	  intent	  of	  the	  parties.	  In	  doing	  
this,	  Article	  817	  of	  the	  CISG	  has	  to	  be	  applied.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Arthur	  Rosett,	  ‘Critical	  Reflections	  on	  the	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  
International	  Sale	  of	  Goods’	  (1984)	  45	  Ohio	  State	  Law	  Journal	  265.	  
15	  These	  issues	  are	  covered	  in	  Article	  2–5	  of	  the	  CISG.	  
16	  Parev	  Prods	  Co	  v	  I	  Rokeach	  &	  Sons	  Inc	  124	  F	  2d	  147,	  149	  (2d	  Cir	  1941).	  
17	  Article	  8	  of	  the	  CISG	  states:	  
(1)	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  Convention	  statements	  made	  by	  and	  other	  conduct	  of	  a	  party	  are	  to	  
be	  interpreted	  according	  to	  his	  intent	  where	  the	  other	  party	  knew	  or	  could	  not	  have	  been	  
unaware	  what	  that	  intent	  was.	  
(2)	  If	  the	  preceding	  paragraph	  is	  not	  applicable,	  statements	  made	  by	  and	  other	  conduct	  of	  a	  party	  
23	  
	  
Article	  1(1)	  of	  the	  CISG,	  which	  deals	  with	  the	  scope	  of	  its	  application,	  states:	  
	  
This	  Convention	  applies	  to	  contracts	  of	  sale	  of	  goods	  between	  parties	  whose	  
places	  of	  business	  are	  in	  different	  States:	  (a)	  when	  the	  States	  are	  Contracting	  
States;	  or	  (b)	  when	  the	  rules	  of	  private	  international	  law	  lead	  to	  the	  application	  
of	  the	  law	  of	  a	  Contracting	  State.	  
	  
It	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  nationality	  of	  parties	  is	  unimportant	  under	  the	  CISG.	  
Where	  a	  party	  to	  the	  contract	  has	  a	  place	  of	  business	  both	  abroad	  and	  in	  the	  same	  
country	  as	  the	  other	  party,	  the	  place	  of	  business	  is	  the	  one	  with	  the	  closest	  relation	  to	  
the	  contract	  and	  its	  performance.18	  In	  accordance	  with	  Article	  95	  of	  the	  CISG,	  a	  state	  
may	  decide	  that	  it	  will	  not	  be	  bound	  by	  Article	  1(1)(b).19	  
	  
The	  CISG	  has	  been	  ratified	  by	  leading	  trading	  states20	  worldwide	  whose	  combined	  
economies	  make	  up	  nearly	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  all	  world	  trade.21	  The	  most	  notable	  trading	  
nation	  that	  has	  not	  acceded	  to	  the	  CISG	  is	  the	  United	  Kingdom.22	  On	  5	  March	  2013,	  
UNCITRAL	  reported	  that	  Brazil23	  had	  acceded	  to	  the	  CISG.24	  	  
	  
Many	  developing	  countries	  have	  not	  yet	  ratified	  the	  CISG,	  and	  Iran	  is	  one	  of	  them.	  The	  
Iranian	  Civil	  Code	  is	  the	  main	  source	  of	  Iranian	  sale	  of	  goods	  law.	  It	  has	  its	  basis	  in	  the	  
ideas	  of	  Islamic	  law.	  Islamic	  law	  is	  grounded	  on	  divine	  principles	  that	  cannot	  be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
are	  to	  be	  interpreted	  according	  to	  the	  understanding	  that	  a	  reasonable	  person	  of	  the	  same	  kind	  
as	  the	  other	  party	  would	  have	  had	  in	  the	  same	  circumstances.	  
(3)	  In	  determining	  the	  intent	  of	  a	  party	  or	  the	  understanding	  a	  reasonable	  person	  would	  have	  
had,	  due	  consideration	  is	  to	  be	  given	  to	  all	  relevant	  circumstances	  of	  the	  case	  including	  the	  
negotiations,	  any	  practices	  which	  the	  parties	  have	  established	  between	  themselves,	  usages	  and	  
any	  subsequent	  conduct	  of	  the	  parties.	  
18	  Article	  10	  of	  the	  CISG.	  
19	  Article	  1(1)(b)	  of	  the	  CISG	  states:	  
‘1)	  This	  Convention	  applies	  to	  contracts	  of	  sale	  of	  goods	  between	  parties	  whose	  places	  of	  business	  are	  in	  
different	  States:	  
(b)	  when	  the	  rules	  of	  private	  international	  law	  lead	  to	  the	  application	  of	  the	  law	  of	  a	  Contracting	  State.’	  
20	  ‘CISG:	  Table	  of	  Contracting	  States’	  (n	  1).	  
21	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  statistics	  published	  by	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  in	  1996.	  As	  stated	  in	  Michael	  P	  
Van	  Alstine,	  ‘Dynamic	  Treaty	  Interpretation’	  (1998)	  146	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania	  Law	  Review	  687.	  
22	  United	  Kingdom	  does	  not	  see	  ratification	  of	  the	  CISG	  as	  a	  legislative	  priority.	  See	  Sally	  Moss,	  ‘Why	  the	  
United	  Kingdom	  Has	  Not	  Ratified	  the	  CISG’	  (2005–06)	  25	  Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Commerce	  483.	  
23	  Brazil	  became	  the	  79th	  state	  Party	  to	  the	  Convention.	  The	  Convention	  will	  come	  into	  force	  for	  Brazil	  
on	  1	  April	  2014.	  
24	  <http://www.uncitral.org/>	  accessed	  1	  July	  2013.	  
24	  
compromised,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  it	  is	  inflexible.	  However,	  where	  appropriate,	  adjustments	  
have	  been	  made	  to	  the	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code	  to	  bring	  it	  more	  up	  to	  date.	  Such	  
modifications	  to	  the	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code	  were	  influenced	  by	  European	  codes	  such	  as	  the	  
French	  and	  Swiss	  codes.25	  The	  language	  of	  the	  Code	  and	  its	  terms	  are	  not	  suitable	  for	  
international	  sales	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  there	  are	  elements	  of	  ambiguity	  and	  uncertainty	  
in	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code.	  On	  top	  of	  that,	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  not	  a	  well-­‐
established	  and	  well-­‐known	  body	  of	  law	  might	  discourage	  Iran’s	  trading	  partners	  from	  
adhering	  to	  the	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code.	  This	  could	  put	  Iranian	  commercial	  traders	  in	  a	  
disadvantageous	  position	  at	  the	  time	  of	  choice	  of	  applicable	  law	  during	  contract	  
drafting.	  While	  each	  contractual	  party	  typically	  wishes	  to	  apply	  its	  national	  law,	  this	  
may	  lead	  to	  choosing	  the	  law	  of	  Iran’s	  trading	  partner	  (owing	  to	  the	  unpopularity	  of	  
the	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code	  and/or	  unfamiliarity	  with	  it).	  In	  that	  case,	  if	  a	  dispute	  should	  
arise,	  additional	  research	  at	  significant	  cost	  would	  be	  necessary	  to	  ascertain	  the	  actual	  
content	  of	  the	  law	  chosen.26	  That	  is	  where	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  CISG	  might	  be	  
beneficial	  to	  Iran	  and	  any	  other	  developing	  country.	  
	  
Lord	  Hobhouse	  has	  noted	  that	  the	  CISG	  provides	  model	  codes	  for	  nations	  with	  no	  
developed	  legal	  systems,	  in	  particular	  those	  that	  do	  not	  have	  either	  the	  experience	  or	  
the	  traditions	  to	  establish	  their	  own	  laws.27	  This	  is	  indeed	  of	  great	  value	  from	  the	  
political	  point	  of	  view,	  since	  it	  might	  not	  be	  in	  the	  political	  interests	  of	  some	  countries	  
to	  apply	  the	  law	  of	  a	  particular	  jurisdiction	  (such	  as	  the	  Uniform	  Commercial	  Code	  
(UCC)	  or	  the	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  Act	  1979	  (SOGA))	  as	  the	  model	  law	  for	  a	  revision	  of	  their	  
own	  domestic	  sales	  law.	  
	  
However,	  the	  suitability	  of	  the	  CISG	  for	  developing	  nations	  goes	  beyond	  even	  this.	  The	  
CISG	  was	  also	  intended	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  achievement	  of	  a	  New	  International	  
Economic	  Order	  (NIEO).	  The	  Preamble	  refers	  to	  the	  NIEO	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  
developing	  trade	  ‘on	  the	  basis	  of	  equality	  and	  mutual	  benefit.’	  These	  objectives	  
reflected	  the	  desire	  to	  create	  a	  structure	  for	  international	  trade	  that	  would	  be	  fairer	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Text	  to	  n	  611	  in	  ch	  6.	  
26	  ‘CISG-­‐Brazil	  interview	  with	  UNCITRAL	  Legal	  Officer	  Luca	  Castellani’	  (April	  2010).	  
27	  John	  S	  Hobhouse,	  ‘International	  Conventions	  and	  Commercial	  Law:	  The	  Pursuit	  of	  Uniformity’	  (1990)	  
106	  Law	  Quarterly	  Review	  530.	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developing	  nations.28	  That	  is	  why	  this	  study	  focuses	  on	  how	  NIEO	  came	  to	  be	  linked	  
with	  the	  CISG,	  and	  whether	  any	  meaning	  is	  attached	  to	  it.	  
	  
The	  importance	  of	  Iran’s	  position	  regarding	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  CISG	  has	  thus	  become	  
pertinent.	  This	  is	  subject	  to	  parliamentary	  approval,	  however.	  In	  accordance	  with	  the	  
Iranian	  Constitution,	  the	  law	  on	  sales	  cannot	  be	  changed,	  nor	  can	  the	  CISG	  be	  ratified,	  
unless	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  no	  conflict	  exists	  between	  the	  proposed	  law	  (in	  this	  case	  
the	  CISG)	  and	  the	  principles	  of	  Islamic	  law.29	  This	  study	  therefore	  examines	  the	  
possibility	  of	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  CISG	  by	  the	  Iranian	  Government.	  Similarities	  and	  
dissimilarities	  will	  be	  discussed	  under	  both	  systems.	  Where	  the	  CISG	  is	  different	  from	  
the	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code	  and	  has	  no	  counterpart	  in	  Iranian	  law,	  analyses	  will	  be	  
undertaken	  to	  determine	  whether	  such	  a	  discrepancy	  can	  be	  overcome	  or	  whether	  it	  is	  
a	  threat	  to	  legal	  stability	  in	  Iran.30	  
	  
This	  study	  will	  suggest	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  CISG	  as	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  problems	  and	  
uncertainties	  that	  exist	  under	  Iranian	  law	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  international	  sale	  of	  
goods.	  The	  view	  exists	  that	  the	  case	  for	  ratification	  of	  the	  CISG	  by	  Iran	  is	  strong.	  There	  
are	  eight	  main	  points,	  which	  examine	  both	  the	  supporting	  and	  the	  opposing	  
arguments	  on	  its	  adoption.31	  Key	  factors	  supporting	  ratification	  are:	  
	  
a)	  The	  wide	  acceptance	  of	  the	  CISG	  worldwide,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  states	  that	  have	  
adopted	  the	  CISG	  represent	  Iran’s	  major	  trading	  partners;	  
b)	  The	  growing	  rate	  of	  acceptance	  of	  the	  CISG;32	  	  
c)	  The	  states	  that	  have	  ratified	  the	  CISG	  represent	  every	  continent,	  every	  major	  legal	  
background,	  and	  the	  main	  political	  systems	  in	  the	  world;	  and	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  See	  generally	  ch	  2.	  
29	  Articles	  71	  and	  72	  of	  Iranian	  Constitution	  state:	  
Article	  71:	  
‘The	  Islamic	  Consultative	  Assembly	  [Majlis	  (Parliament)]	  can	  establish	  laws	  on	  all	  matters,	  within	  the	  
limits	  of	  its	  competence	  as	  laid	  down	  in	  the	  Constitution.’	  
Article	  72:	  
‘The	  Islamic	  Consultative	  Assembly	  [Majlis	  (Parliament)]	  cannot	  enact	  laws	  contrary	  to	  the	  usual	  and	  
ahkam	  of	  the	  official	  religion	  of	  the	  country	  or	  to	  the	  Constitution.	  It	  is	  the	  duty	  of	  the	  Guardian	  Council	  
to	  determine	  whether	  a	  violation	  has	  occurred,	  in	  accordance	  with	  Article	  96.’	  	  
30	  See	  generally	  ch	  7.	  
31	  See	  generally	  ch	  4.	  
32	  As	  of	  5	  March	  2013,	  79	  states	  have	  adopted	  the	  CISG.	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d)	  By	  way	  of	  analogy,	  the	  CISG	  may	  already	  be	  applicable	  to	  contracts	  entered	  into	  by	  
Iranian	  entities	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  private	  international	  law.	  
	  
This	  last	  argument	  is	  important	  for	  Iran.	  That	  is	  because	  an	  Iranian	  court	  may	  be	  called	  
upon	  to	  apply	  the	  CISG	  when	  it	  is	  ascertained	  that	  the	  Convention	  governs	  the	  
contract	  of	  sale.	  The	  impact	  of	  the	  CISG	  will	  thus	  be	  felt	  in	  Iran	  in	  spite	  of	  Iran’s	  non-­‐
accession.	  
1.4	  Structure	  and	  Goals	  of	  the	  Research	  
This	  thesis	  will	  begin	  with	  a	  thorough	  synopsis	  of	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  New	  
International	  Economic	  Order	  under	  the	  CISG	  (chapter	  two).	  This	  will	  be	  followed	  by	  a	  
discussion	  of	  the	  legal	  importance	  of	  the	  Preamble	  to	  the	  CISG	  and	  a	  legislative	  study	  
of	  the	  north–south	  debates	  (chapter	  three).	  The	  purpose	  of	  chapters	  two	  and	  three	  is	  
to	  investigate	  the	  link	  between	  the	  NIEO	  and	  the	  CISG,	  and	  to	  see	  how	  the	  CISG	  was	  
presented	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  development,	  and	  why	  it	  has	  perhaps	  failed	  to	  deliver	  on	  this	  
promise.	  This	  is	  because	  developing	  nations	  have	  been	  much	  more	  reluctant	  to	  ratify	  
the	  CISG	  than	  the	  developed	  nations.	  It	  is	  disappointing	  that	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  as	  the	  
commercial	  and	  political	  concerns	  that	  led	  to	  the	  NIEO	  also	  contributed	  to	  the	  
negotiation	  and	  drafting	  of	  the	  CISG.	  Earlier	  attempts	  at	  unification	  –	  the	  ULIS	  and	  ULF	  
–	  failed	  partly	  because	  it	  was	  felt	  that	  Western	  European	  nations	  in	  the	  civilian	  
tradition	  had	  dominated	  the	  drafting	  process.	  As	  the	  thesis	  will	  show,	  the	  question	  of	  
influence	  on	  the	  development	  of	  international	  commercial	  law	  was	  particularly	  
important	  to	  the	  developing	  nations.	  Their	  voice	  in	  international	  commercial	  law	  was	  
becoming	  stronger,	  and	  they	  were	  successful	  in	  obtaining	  more	  influence	  in	  UNCITRAL	  
and	  on	  the	  Vienna	  Convention	  that	  agreed	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  CISG.	  This	  gave	  the	  CISG	  
greater	  political	  acceptability	  among	  the	  developing	  nations,	  and	  helped	  to	  counter	  
any	  argument	  that	  the	  CISG	  was	  drafted	  in	  order	  to	  improve	  the	  trading	  position	  of	  the	  
developed	  nations.	  	  
	  
The	  thesis	  also	  shows	  that	  this	  is	  particularly	  important	  in	  the	  specific	  case	  of	  Iran.	  The	  
current	  political	  context	  in	  Iran	  means	  that	  the	  ratification	  of	  any	  commercial	  treaty	  
that	  is	  identified	  with	  a	  Western	  nation,	  such	  as	  the	  United	  States,	  would	  be	  opposed	  
by	  some	  groups.	  In	  Iran,	  the	  case	  for	  the	  CISG	  would	  be	  strengthened	  if	  it	  could	  be	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proved	  that	  the	  CISG	  were	  a	  truly	  international	  convention.	  In	  particular,	  it	  would	  be	  
important	  to	  show	  that	  it	  was	  drafted	  with	  the	  participation	  of	  developing	  nations	  and	  
that	  it	  reflects	  many	  of	  their	  concerns.	  
	  
The	  author	  therefore	  considers	  the	  NIEO	  in	  relation	  to	  both	  the	  process	  of	  making	  
international	  sales	  law	  and	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  law.	  The	  impact	  of	  the	  NIEO	  on	  the	  
substantive	  content	  of	  uniform	  law	  necessitates	  the	  study	  of	  debates	  at	  the	  Vienna	  
Conference	  between	  the	  developed	  and	  the	  developing	  nations.	  These	  debates	  raised	  
specific	  issues	  during	  the	  drafting	  of	  the	  CISG,33	  which	  will	  be	  examined	  accordingly.	  
Finally,	  a	  case-­‐law	  analysis	  will	  be	  conducted	  with	  regard	  to	  specific	  drafting	  matters	  to	  
see	  how	  developing	  countries	  have	  been	  affected.34	  
	  
The	  author	  will	  then	  focus	  on	  an	  analysis	  of	  reasons	  in	  favour	  of	  and	  against	  the	  
adoption	  of	  the	  CISG	  (chapter	  four).	  Although	  these	  reasons	  may	  vary	  from	  nation	  to	  
nation,	  the	  experiences	  and	  logic	  of	  each	  nation	  serve	  as	  a	  useful	  guide	  when	  
evaluating	  the	  specific	  challenges	  that	  exist	  in	  Iran	  or	  any	  other	  country	  in	  connection	  
with	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  CISG.	  A	  comparative	  analysis	  will	  also	  be	  made	  to	  consider	  
the	  position	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  CISG	  (chapter	  five).	  
This	  is	  important	  because	  of	  the	  UK’s	  refusal	  to	  ratify	  the	  CISG	  to	  date	  despite	  its	  active	  
role	  during	  the	  drafting	  process	  and	  negotiation	  of	  the	  CISG.35	  Lord	  Denning	  once	  
stated	  ‘	  .	  .	  .	  where	  we	  lead,	  others	  may	  follow	  .	  .	  .	  ’;36	  Therefore,	  an	  overview	  of	  
arguments	  against	  ratification	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  the	  UK	  may	  become	  relevant	  to	  
other	  non-­‐signatory	  states	  to	  CISG	  such	  as	  Iran.	  This	  will	  lead,	  however,	  to	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Four	  major	  Convention	  issues	  were	  discussed:	  (1)	  Non-­‐Conforming	  Procedures;	  (2)	  Suspension	  of	  
Performance;	  (3)	  Passing	  of	  Risk	  of	  Goods	  in	  Transit;	  and	  (4)	  Trade	  Usages.	  See	  generally	  ch	  3,	  Part	  Two.	  
34	  See	  generally	  ch	  3,	  Part	  Three.	  
35	  Bruno	  Zeller,	  ‘The	  Development	  of	  Uniform	  Laws	  –	  A	  Historical	  Perspective’	  (2002)	  14	  Pace	  
International	  Law	  Review	  163,	  168;	  Nathalie	  Hofmann,	  ‘Interpretation	  Rules	  and	  Good	  Faith	  as	  
Obstacles	  to	  the	  UK’s	  Ratification	  of	  the	  CISG	  and	  to	  the	  Harmonization	  of	  Contract	  Law	  in	  Europe’	  
(2010)	  22	  Pace	  International	  Law	  Review	  145.	  
For	  example,	  Professor	  Clive	  M	  Schmitthoff	  of	  the	  City	  of	  London	  College	  was	  requested	  to	  prepare	  a	  
preliminary	  report	  for	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  on	  the	  creation	  of	  UNCITRAL.	  See	  ‘DOCUMENTS	  A/6396	  
AND	  ADD.	  1	  AND	  2;	  Report	  of	  the	  Secretary-­‐General’	  (September	  1966)	  <A/6396	  -­‐	  Report	  to	  the	  
Secretary	  General	  ("The	  Schmitthoff	  Study")	  (document	  ultimately	  was	  support	  for	  the	  creation	  
of	  UNCITRAL)>	  accessed	  2	  August	  2013.	  	  
Barry	  Nicholas	  represented	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  in	  the	  drafting	  of	  the	  Convention.	  See	  Barry	  Nicholas,	  
‘The	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  the	  Vienna	  Sales	  Convention:	  Another	  Case	  of	  Splendid	  Isolation?’	  (1993)	  
Centro	  di	  Studi	  e	  Ricerche	  di	  Diritto	  Comparator	  e	  Straniero.	  
36	  James	  Buchanan	  &	  Co	  Ltd	  v	  Babco	  Forwarding	  and	  Shipping	  (UK)	  Ltd	  [1977]	  1	  All	  ER	  518	  (CA),	  [1977]	  2	  
WLR	  107	  (CA).	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conclusion	  that	  Iran	  is	  by	  no	  means	  in	  a	  comparable	  position	  to	  that	  of	  the	  United	  
Kingdom.	  For	  example,	  Iran	  has	  no	  economic	  justification	  for	  not	  adopting	  the	  CISG.37	  
The	  ultimate	  aim	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  compare	  the	  CISG	  with	  Iranian	  law	  governing	  
contracts	  of	  sale.	  To	  that	  end,	  the	  author	  will	  first	  provide	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  position	  
of	  Iran	  in	  the	  world	  economy,	  its	  volume	  of	  trade	  and	  its	  trading	  partners.	  This	  will	  be	  
followed	  by	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  legal	  environment	  in	  Iran	  (chapter	  six)	  and	  a	  
comparison	  of	  the	  rights,	  duties	  and	  remedies	  available	  to	  contracting	  parties	  under	  
each	  system	  of	  law	  (chapter	  seven).	  To	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  CISG	  should	  be	  
ratified	  in	  Iran,	  it	  will	  be	  essential	  to	  examine	  whether	  it	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  Iranian	  
law	  of	  sale.	  It	  is	  highly	  important	  to	  create	  a	  climate	  of	  legal	  stability	  in	  Iran.	  Conflicting	  
laws	  regarding	  sale	  transactions	  will	  threaten	  legal	  certainty.	  The	  rights,	  duties	  and	  
remedies	  provided	  for	  in	  the	  CISG	  will	  therefore	  be	  compared	  with	  their	  counterparts	  
in	  Iranian	  law.	  Where	  there	  are	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  legal	  systems,	  a	  critical	  
analysis	  will	  be	  conducted	  to	  ascertain	  whether	  the	  conflict	  is	  resolvable	  and,	  if	  so,	  
how.	  As	  far	  as	  this	  study	  is	  concerned,	  the	  rights	  and	  duties	  enshrined	  in	  the	  CISG	  and	  
Iranian	  law	  bear	  some	  degree	  of	  resemblance.	  However,	  the	  CISG	  contains	  certain	  
remedies	  that	  do	  not	  exist	  in	  Iranian	  law.	  In	  such	  cases,	  the	  practical	  effect	  of	  these	  
differences	  will	  be	  discussed.	  
	  
The	  study	  will	  conclude	  with	  a	  recommendation	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  Iran	  should	  adopt	  
the	  CISG.	  It	  seeks	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  practical	  difficulties	  involved	  in	  adopting	  the	  
CISG,	  including	  the	  obstacles	  to	  a	  smooth	  transition	  to	  the	  CISG.	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  the	  
writer	  conducted	  a	  survey	  in	  Iran	  to	  measure	  the	  level	  of	  familiarity	  with	  the	  CISG,	  the	  
knowledge	  of	  the	  CISG	  and	  the	  attitude	  of	  Iranian	  academics/lawyers,	  the	  business	  
community	  and	  Government	  officials	  to	  the	  CISG.	  This	  survey	  forms	  the	  basis	  of	  
chapter	  eight.	  The	  fieldwork	  included	  unstructured	  interviews	  with	  leading	  figures	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  One	  of	  the	  reasons	  put	  forward	  by	  the	  business	  community	  against	  ratification	  of	  the	  CISG	  was	  that	  
‘there	  was	  a	  danger	  that	  London	  would	  lose	  its	  edge	  in	  international	  arbitration	  and	  litigation.’	  See	  
Moss,	  ‘Why	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  Has	  Not	  Ratified	  the	  CISG’	  (n	  22).	  
Law	  Reform	  Committee's	  argument	  against	  ratification	  is:	  	  
If	  the	  Convention	  were	  ratified	  by	  the	  UK	  and	  .	  .	  .	  came	  to	  be	  widely	  applied	  to	  international	  
sales,	  with	  or	  without	  a	  connection	  with	  this	  country,	  the	  role	  of	  English	  law	  in	  the	  settlement	  of	  
international	  trading	  matters	  would	  obviously	  be	  diminished.	  A	  consequential	  effect	  might	  well	  
be	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  number	  of	  international	  arbitrations	  coming	  to	  this	  country.’	  	  
See	  Law	  Reform	  Committee	  in	  reply	  to	  the	  Department	  of	  Trade	  and	  Industry's	  1980	  inquiry.	  
See	  Angelo	  Forte,	  ‘The	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  	  Sale	  of	  Goods:	  
Reason	  or	  Unreason	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom’	  (1997)	  26	  University	  of	  Baltimore	  Law	  Review	  51.	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business,	  law	  and	  Government	  in	  Iran	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  area	  of	  international	  trade.	  
The	  goal	  was	  to	  determine:	  (i)	  whether	  they	  are	  familiar	  with	  the	  CISG;	  (ii)	  whether	  
they	  support/oppose	  its	  introduction,	  with	  reasons	  why;	  and	  (iii)	  whether	  there	  are	  
any	  other	  insights/observations	  on	  the	  potential	  difficulties	  of	  implementation.	  	  
	  
To	  this	  end,	  the	  author	  will	  provide	  an	  overview	  of	  her	  fieldwork	  in	  Iran	  concerning	  the	  
practical	  difficulties	  that	  may	  arise	  in	  implementing	  the	  CISG	  in	  Iran	  (chapter	  eight).	  	  	  
1.5	  Summary	  
This	  research	  has	  been	  undertaken	  to	  provide	  an	  answer	  to	  what	  has	  been	  discussed	  
above.	  Iran	  needs	  to	  enhance	  its	  position	  in	  the	  international	  trade	  market	  and	  
become	  a	  more	  active	  member	  of	  the	  international	  community.	  Although	  there	  have	  
been	  some	  studies	  that	  suggest	  that	  Iran	  should	  ratify	  the	  CISG,	  the	  Government	  has	  
to	  date	  never	  seriously	  investigated	  accession	  to	  the	  CISG.	  The	  Government’s	  failure	  to	  
analyse	  the	  likely	  outcome	  of	  ratifying	  the	  CISG	  in	  Iran	  necessitates	  the	  conducting	  of	  
research	  in	  this	  field.	  It	  must	  be	  established	  whether	  Iran	  will	  benefit	  from	  accession	  to	  
the	  CISG	  and	  whether	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  predict	  the	  likely	  challenges	  posed	  by	  
ratification.	  Iran	  needs	  to	  boost	  its	  national	  economy	  through	  foreign	  trade	  and	  
exports.	  If	  adoption	  of	  the	  CISG	  helps	  to	  achieve	  this	  end	  by	  opening	  up	  new	  trade	  
opportunities,	  then	  it	  should	  be	  ratified.	  This,	  however,	  is	  subject	  to	  its	  providing	  no	  
major	  obstacles.	  
	  
The	  initial	  approach	  is	  that	  Iran	  should	  ratify	  the	  CISG	  in	  order	  to	  develop	  a	  climate	  of	  
trust	  through	  which	  stronger	  commercial	  relations	  may	  be	  formed	  with	  foreign	  
nations.	  International	  trading	  contracts	  are	  often	  fulfilled	  over	  long	  distances	  and	  
mostly	  via	  sea	  transport.	  This	  provides	  plenty	  of	  possibilities	  for	  breach	  of	  contract	  to	  
take	  place.	  In	  such	  cases,	  trading	  partners	  may	  find	  it	  more	  satisfactory	  and	  convenient	  
to	  deal	  with	  a	  country	  that	  is	  subject	  to	  the	  same	  law	  that	  they	  are.	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  
study	  is	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  CISG	  bears	  similarities	  to	  Iranian	  law	  and	  that	  any	  
differences	  can	  be	  resolved.	  It	  should	  be	  noted,	  however,	  that	  Iran	  might	  be	  required	  
to	  sacrifice	  some	  of	  the	  convenience	  of	  its	  national	  law	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  legal	  
certainty	  with	  regard	  to	  international	  sales	  transactions.	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Chapter	  Two	  
The	  Establishment	  of	  a	  New	  International	  Economic	  Order	  
Under	  the	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  
International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  
2.1	  Introduction	  
The	  CISG	  is	  an	  instrumental	  treaty	  unifying	  the	  law	  on	  international	  sales	  contracts.	  It	  
has	  been	  ratified	  by	  79	  states,38	  among	  them	  most	  of	  the	  great	  trading	  nations	  of	  the	  
world.	  These	  include	  the	  USA,	  Russia,	  China	  and	  most	  of	  the	  states	  of	  the	  European	  
Union.	  The	  major	  absentees	  from	  the	  CISG	  are	  India,	  South	  Africa	  and	  the	  United	  
Kingdom.	  Many	  developing	  countries	  have	  also	  not	  yet	  ratified	  the	  CISG.	  For	  instance,	  
adoption	  of	  the	  CISG	  in	  Africa,39	  the	  Caribbean	  and	  the	  Pacific	  and	  by	  Arab	  countries40	  
has	  happened	  ‘on	  a	  leopard	  skin	  pattern.’41	  As	  far	  as	  a	  uniform	  law	  is	  concerned,	  the	  
growing	  list	  of	  states	  that	  have	  ratified	  the	  CISG	  is	  more	  impressive	  than	  those	  of	  its	  
precursors,	  the	  Convention	  on	  a	  Uniform	  Law	  on	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  (ULIS)	  
and	  the	  Convention	  on	  a	  Uniform	  Law	  on	  the	  Formation	  of	  Contracts	  for	  the	  
International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  (ULF).	  As	  explained	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  the	  acceptance	  
of	  the	  CISG	  in	  Iran	  and	  other	  developing	  countries	  depends	  partly	  on	  political	  factors.	  If	  
the	  CISG	  is	  regarded	  as	  a	  truly	  international	  convention,	  with	  benefits	  for	  developing	  
countries	  as	  well	  as	  developed	  ones,	  it	  is	  less	  likely	  to	  encounter	  resistance.	  This	  
chapter	  argues	  that	  the	  history	  and	  content	  of	  the	  CISG	  show	  that	  it	  should	  be	  
regarded	  in	  this	  way.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  ‘CISG:	  Table	  of	  Contracting	  States’	  (n	  1).	  
39	  From	  African	  countries,	  only	  Burundi,	  Egypt,	  Gabon,	  Guinea,	  Lesotho,	  Liberia,	  Mauritania,	  Uganda	  and	  
Zambia	  have	  ratified	  the	  CISG.	  See	  ‘CISG:	  Table	  of	  Contracting	  States’	  (n	  1).	  
40	  Among	  Arab	  countries,	  only	  Egypt,	  Iraq,	  Lebanon	  and	  Syria	  have	  ratified	  the	  CISG.	  See	  ‘CISG:	  Table	  of	  
Contracting	  States’	  (n	  1).	  
41	  Luca	  G	  Castellani,	  ‘Promoting	  the	  Adoption	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  
International	  Sale	  of	  Goods’	  (2009)	  13	  Vindobona	  Journal	  of	  International	  Commercial	  Law	  and	  
Arbitration	  241,	  246.	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2.1.1 Earlier	  Attempts	  at	  Unification	  of	  Sales	  Law	  
The	  International	  Institute	  for	  the	  Unification	  of	  Private	  Law	  (UNIDROIT)42	  decided	  that	  
work	  towards	  a	  uniform	  international	  sale	  of	  goods	  law	  should	  proceed	  under	  the	  
auspices	  of	  the	  League	  of	  Nations.43	  The	  crucial	  factor	  in	  this	  movement	  was	  the	  
feasibility	  and	  desirability	  of	  unification.44	  The	  unifying	  movement	  of	  the	  1930s	  led	  to	  
the	  submission	  of	  a	  draft	  text	  to	  the	  Hague	  Conference	  and	  it	  was	  finally	  tabled	  at	  the	  
1964	  Hague	  Conference.45	  The	  result	  of	  this	  diplomatic	  conference,	  which	  had	  28	  
participating	  states,	  was	  the	  adoption	  of	  two	  uniform	  laws:	  (i)	  the	  Uniform	  Law	  on	  the	  
International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  (ULIS);	  and	  (ii)	  the	  Uniform	  Law	  on	  the	  Formation	  of	  
Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  (ULF).	  
	  
The	  Hague	  Conventions	  came	  into	  force	  in	  1972,	  though	  they	  were	  ratified	  by	  only	  
nine	  states.	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  two	  non-­‐European	  nations,	  the	  signatory	  states	  
were	  all	  from	  Western	  Europe.46	  The	  limited	  number	  of	  accessions	  to	  the	  1964	  Hague	  
Conventions	  led	  the	  United	  Nations	  Commission	  for	  International	  Trade	  Law	  
(UNCITRAL)47	  to	  review	  the	  unification	  project.	  	  
2.1.2 Establishment	  of	  UNCITRAL	  and	  the	  Unification	  of	  Sales	  Law	  
UNCITRAL	  was	  established	  by	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  in	  1966	  ‘to	  promote	  the	  
progressive	  harmonisation	  and	  unification	  of	  the	  law	  of	  international	  trade.’48	  The	  first	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  The	  purpose	  of	  UNIDROIT	  is	  to	  ‘study	  needs	  and	  methods	  for	  modernising,	  harmonising	  and	  co-­‐
ordinating	  private	  and	  in	  particular	  commercial	  law	  as	  between	  States	  and	  groups	  of	  States.’	  
<http://www.unidroit.org/dynasite.cfm?dsmid=103284>	  accessed	  1	  July	  2013.	  
43	  Kazuaki	  Sono,	  ‘The	  Vienna	  Sales	  Convention:	  History	  and	  Perspective’	  in	  Petar	  Sarcevic	  and	  Paul	  
Volken	  (eds),	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods:	  Dubrovnik	  Lectures	  (Oceana	  1986)	  ch	  1,	  1,	  2.	  See	  Sieg	  Eiselen,	  
‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  (the	  CISG)	  in	  South	  Africa’	  (1999)	  
116	  South	  African	  Law	  Journal	  323,	  334.	  
44	  Sono,	  ibid.	  
45	  Eiselen,	  ‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  (n	  43).	  
46	  Belgium,	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany,	  Israel,	  Italy,	  the	  Netherlands,	  San	  Marino,	  The	  Gambia	  and	  
the	  United	  Kingdom	  ratified	  the	  1964	  Hague	  Convention.	  Israel	  ratified	  only	  ULIS.	  See	  Muna	  Ndulo,	  ‘The	  
Vienna	  Sales	  Convention	  1980	  and	  The	  Hague	  Uniform	  Laws	  on	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  1964:	  A	  
Comparative	  Analysis’	  (1989)	  38	  International	  and	  Comparative	  Law	  Quarterly	  1,	  2–4.	  
47	  ‘In	  establishing	  the	  Commission,	  the	  General	  Assembly	  recognized	  that	  disparities	  in	  national	  laws	  
governing	  international	  trade	  created	  obstacles	  to	  the	  flow	  of	  trade,	  and	  it	  regarded	  the	  Commission	  as	  
the	  vehicle	  by	  which	  the	  United	  Nations	  could	  play	  a	  more	  active	  role	  in	  reducing	  or	  removing	  these	  
obstacles	  .	  .	  .	  The	  General	  Assembly	  gave	  the	  Commission	  the	  general	  mandate	  to	  further	  the	  
progressive	  harmonization	  and	  unification	  of	  the	  law	  of	  international	  trade.	  The	  Commission	  has	  since	  
come	  to	  be	  the	  core	  legal	  body	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  system	  in	  the	  field	  of	  international	  trade	  law.’	  
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about/origin.html>	  accessed	  1	  July	  2013.	  
48	  GA	  Resolution	  2205	  (XXI).	  
32	  
session	  of	  UNCITRAL,	  in	  1968,	  was	  given	  over	  to	  the	  consideration	  of	  ways	  of	  
encouraging	  wider	  adherence	  to	  the	  Hague	  Conventions.49	  At	  that	  time,	  the	  Hague	  
Conventions	  were	  not	  yet	  in	  force50	  and	  ULIS	  and	  ULF	  had	  been	  ratified	  by	  three	  and	  
two	  states	  respectively.51	  In	  1968,	  during	  its	  first	  session,	  the	  Commission	  found	  it	  
desirable	  to	  consider	  the	  intentions	  of	  countries	  towards	  adopting	  the	  Hague	  
Conventions.	  Therefore,	  the	  Commission	  requested	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  to	  send	  a	  
questionnaire	  to	  member	  states	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  or	  any	  of	  its	  specialised	  
agencies.	  In	  the	  event	  of	  their	  having	  no	  intention	  of	  adopting	  the	  Conventions,	  they	  
wanted	  to	  know	  the	  reasons	  for	  this.	  The	  two	  substantive	  sessions	  in	  1969	  and	  1970	  
analysed	  the	  feedback	  submitted	  to	  UNCITRAL.52	  The	  two	  main	  reasons	  for	  non-­‐
ratification	  were	  as	  follows:	  (i)	  lack	  of	  international	  representation	  in	  the	  law-­‐making	  
process	  53	  of	  ULIS	  and	  ULF	  (for	  example,	  Latin	  America,	  Asia	  and	  Africa	  each	  had	  only	  
one	  representative54);	  and	  (ii)	  lack	  of	  ‘material	  stipulations	  of	  the	  conventions.’	  The	  
deficiencies	  in	  material	  stipulations	  included	  lack	  of	  attention	  to	  international	  
shipments,	  not	  maintaining	  the	  balance	  between	  the	  rights	  of	  sellers	  and	  those	  of	  
buyers,	  and	  not	  paying	  attention	  to	  commercial	  practice	  and	  the	  scope	  of	  their	  
application.55	  It	  was	  also	  stated	  that	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  Conventions,	  which	  were	  
drafted	  primarily	  by	  the	  developed	  nations,	  were	  mistrusted	  by	  the	  developing	  and	  
socialist	  bloc	  countries.56	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  Working	  Group	  II,	  1968–1978:	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods,	  1st	  session,	  5–16	  January	  1970,	  New	  York	  
A/CN.9/31	  -­‐	  Analysis	  of	  replies	  and	  comments	  by	  governments	  on	  the	  Hague	  Conventions	  of	  1964,	  160.	  
<	  http://daccess-­‐dds-­‐ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NL6/900/23/PDF/NL690023.pdf?OpenElement>	  	  
50	  UNITED	  NATIONS	  CONVENTION	  ON	  CONTRACTS	  FOR	  THE	  INTERNATIONAL	  SALE	  OF	  GOODS	  in	  the	  
United	  Nations	  Audiovisual	  Library	  of	  International	  Law.	  
	  <http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/pdf/ha/ccisg/ccisg_ph_e.pdf>	  	  
51	  ULIS	  was	  ratified	  by	  Belgium,	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  and	  San	  Marino.	  ULF	  was	  ratified	  by	  the	  United	  
Kingdom	  and	  San	  Marino.	  	  
Working	  Group	  II,	  1968–1978:	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods,	  1st	  session,	  5–16	  January	  1970,	  New	  York	  (n	  
49)	  161.	  
52	  ibid.	  
53	  See	  Loukas	  Mistelis,	  ‘Is	  Harmonisation	  a	  Necessary	  Evil?	  The	  Future	  of	  Harmonisation	  and	  New	  
Sources	  of	  International	  Trade	  Law’	  in	  Ian	  Fletcher,	  Loukas	  Mistelis,	  and	  Marise	  Cremona	  (eds),	  
Foundations	  and	  Perspectives	  of	  International	  Trade	  Law	  (London:	  Sweet	  &	  Maxwell	  2001)	  3.	  
Dr	  Mistelis	  states:	  ‘[A]	  great	  deal	  of	  “harmonised	  law”	  was	  negotiated	  and	  drafted	  without	  participation	  
of	  the	  majority	  of	  emerging	  markets,	  or	  at	  least,	  before	  the	  majority	  of	  these	  States	  (in	  the	  former	  
Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  large	  number	  of	  ex-­‐colonies)	  assumed	  legal	  personality	  in	  public	  international	  law.’	  
54	  Sono,	  ‘The	  Vienna	  Sales	  Convention:	  History	  and	  Perspective’	  (n	  43)	  3.	  
55	  Eiselen,	  ‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  (n	  43)	  335.	  
56	  ibid.	  
33	  
A	  lack	  of	  support	  for	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Hague	  Conventions	  was	  thus	  apparent.	  
Having	  said	  that,	  UNCITRAL	  did	  not	  give	  up	  on	  unification,	  but	  instead	  decided	  to	  make	  
another	  attempt	  at	  drafting	  an	  acceptable	  text.	  Unification	  in	  the	  field	  of	  international	  
sales	  law	  had	  a	  high	  priority	  on	  UNCITRAL’s	  agenda.	  Therefore,	  a	  Working	  Group,	  
comprising	  1457	  members	  from	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  political,	  legal	  and	  economic	  
backgrounds,	  was	  created	  by	  UNCITRAL	  to	  take	  over	  this	  project.58	  	  
	  
ULIS	  and	  ULF	  formed	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  Working	  Group’s	  further	  proceedings.59	  The	  
Working	  Group	  held	  nine	  sessions	  in	  total	  between	  1970	  and	  1977.60	  The	  first	  seven	  
sessions	  were	  allocated	  to	  considering	  ULIS,	  and	  the	  last	  two	  to	  considering	  ULF.61	  The	  
Working	  Group’s	  drafts	  were	  debated	  at	  the	  annual	  meetings	  of	  UNCITRAL.	  In	  1978,	  
UNCITRAL	  combined	  the	  Working	  Group’s	  drafts	  on	  Sales	  and	  Formation	  into	  a	  single	  
document:	  the	  1978	  Draft	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  
Goods.62	  UNCITRAL	  also	  recommended	  that	  the	  General	  Assembly	  hold	  a	  diplomatic	  
conference	  to	  consider	  its	  1978	  draft	  text.63	  This	  draft,	  which	  was	  open	  to	  comment	  by	  
all	  members	  of	  the	  UN,	  along	  with	  the	  comments	  received,	  formed	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  
1980	  Vienna	  Diplomatic	  Conference.64	  The	  CISG	  was	  agreed	  by	  6265	  states	  at	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  The	  original	  representatives	  were	  from	  Brazil,	  France,	  Ghana,	  Hungary,	  India,	  Iran,	  Japan,	  Kenya,	  
Mexico,	  Norway,	  Tunisia,	  the	  USSR,	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  	  
Working	  Group	  II,	  1968–1978:	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods,	  1st	  session,	  5–16	  January	  1970,	  New	  York	  
A/CN.9/35	  -­‐	  Report	  of	  the	  Working	  Group	  on	  the	  international	  sale	  of	  goods,	  first	  session	  	  
<http://daccess-­‐dds-­‐ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NL7/001/02/PDF/NL700102.pdf?OpenElement>	  
Representatives	  from	  Austria,	  Czechoslovakia,	  the	  Philippines,	  and	  Sierra	  Leone	  were	  added	  later,	  in	  
Clayton	  P	  Gillette	  and	  Robert	  E	  Scott,	  ‘The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  International	  Sales	  Law’	  (2005)	  25	  
International	  Review	  of	  Law	  and	  Economics	  446,	  450.	  
58	  Gillette	  and	  Scott,	  ibid.	  See	  Sono,	  ‘The	  Vienna	  Sales	  Convention:	  History	  and	  Perspective’	  (n	  43)	  4.	  
59	  Eiselen,	  ‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  (n	  43)	  336;	  Sono,	  ibid	  6,	  stating:	  ‘many	  of	  their	  [ULIS	  and	  
ULF]	  substantive	  approaches	  have	  indeed	  been	  retained	  in	  the	  Vienna	  Sales	  Convention	  in	  a	  simplified	  
and	  practical	  fashion.’	  
60	  See	  <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/2Sale_of_Good.html>	  
accessed	  1	  July	  2013.	  
61	  UNITED	  NATIONS	  CONVENTION	  ON	  CONTRACTS	  FOR	  THE	  INTERNATIONAL	  SALE	  OF	  GOODS	  (n	  50).	  
62	  ‘Summary	  of	  UNCITRAL	  legislative	  history	  of	  the	  CISG.’	  
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/linkd.html>	  accessed	  1	  July	  2013.	  
63	  ibid.	  See	  Peter	  Winship,	  ‘The	  Scope	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	  International	  Sales	  Contracts’	  in	  Nina	  
M	  Galston	  and	  Hans	  Smit	  (eds),	  International	  Sales:	  The	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  
International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  (Juris	  1984)	  ch	  1,	  1,	  14.	  
64	  Eiselen,	  ‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  (n	  43)	  337.	  
65	  Argentina,	  Australia,	  Austria,	  Belgium,	  Bolivia,	  Brazil,	  Bulgaria,	  Burma,	  Byelorussian	  Soviet	  Socialist	  
Republic,	  Canada,	  Chile,	  China,	  Colombia,	  Costa	  Rica,	  Cyprus,	  Czechoslovakia,	  Denmark,	  Ecuador,	  Egypt,	  
Finland,	  France,	  German	  Democratic	  Republic,	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany,	  Ghana,	  Greece,	  Hungary,	  
India,	  Iran,	  Iraq,	  Ireland,	  Israel,	  Italy,	  Japan,	  Kenya,	  Libyan	  Arab	  Jamahiriya,	  Luxembourg,	  Mexico,	  the	  
Netherlands,	  Nigeria,	  Norway,	  Pakistan,	  Panama,	  Peru,	  the	  Philippines,	  Poland,	  Portugal,	  the	  Republic	  of	  
Korea,	  Romania,	  Singapore,	  Spain,	  Sweden,	  Switzerland,	  Thailand,	  Tunisia,	  Turkey,	  Ukrainian	  Soviet	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Vienna	  Conference.	  After	  receiving	  its	  tenth	  ratification,	  it	  came	  into	  force	  on	  1	  
January	  1988.66	  
2.1.3	  Adoption	  of	  the	  CISG	  and	  the	  NIEO	  
It	  has	  been	  claimed	  that	  the	  CISG	  promotes	  international	  trade	  by	  facilitating	  the	  
buying	  and	  selling	  of	  raw	  materials,	  commodities	  and	  manufactured	  goods.67	  It	  is	  also	  
said	  that	  it	  reduces	  uncertainty	  and	  legal	  disputes.68	  Given	  the	  unequal	  bargaining	  
position	  of	  traders	  in	  developing	  countries,	  it	  is	  more	  than	  likely	  that	  a	  foreign	  law	  will	  
be	  applied	  to	  their	  contracts.	  Whether	  the	  CISG	  provides	  any	  solution	  to	  this	  problem	  
and/or	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  position	  of	  developing	  countries	  is	  of	  considerable	  
importance.	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  answer	  this	  question,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  find	  out	  what	  the	  CISG	  provides	  for	  
the	  countries	  (primarily	  developing	  ones)	  that	  ratify	  it.	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  discover	  
whether	  the	  CISG	  intended	  to	  include	  the	  developing	  nations	  in	  the	  international	  
trading	  system.	  
	  
A	  study	  of	  the	  legislative	  history	  of	  the	  CISG	  shows	  that	  it	  was	  drafted	  to	  include	  more	  
developing	  countries	  in	  global	  commerce	  and	  in	  the	  development	  of	  international	  
commercial	  law.	  This	  should	  be	  clear	  from	  the	  Preamble,69	  the	  first,	  second	  and	  third	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Socialist	  Republic,	  the	  Union	  of	  Soviet	  Socialist	  Republics,	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  of	  Great	  Britain	  and	  
Northern	  Ireland,	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America,	  Uruguay,	  Yugoslavia	  and	  Zaire.	  Venezuela	  sent	  an	  
observer,	  in	  Gillette	  and	  Scott,	  ‘The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  International	  Sales	  Law’	  (n	  57)	  450.	  
66	  According	  to	  Article	  99	  of	  the	  CISG,	  the	  Convention	  was	  to	  enter	  into	  force	  on	  the	  first	  day	  of	  the	  
month	  following	  the	  expiration	  of	  twelve	  months	  after	  the	  date	  of	  deposit	  of	  the	  tenth	  instrument	  of	  
ratification,	  acceptance,	  approval	  or	  accession.	  China,	  Italy,	  and	  the	  United	  States	  were	  the	  9th,	  10th,	  
and	  11th	  Contracting	  states	  in	  December	  1986.	  
67	  John	  P	  McMahon,	  ‘Applying	  the	  CISG	  Guides	  for	  Business	  Managers	  and	  Counsel’	  (2010).	  
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/guides.html>	  accessed	  1	  July	  2013.	  
68	  ibid.	  
69	  The	  Preamble	  to	  the	  CISG	  states:	  
THE	  STATES	  PARTIES	  TO	  THIS	  CONVENTION,	  
BEARING	  IN	  MIND	  the	  broad	  objectives	  in	  the	  resolutions	  adopted	  by	  the	  sixth	  special	  session	  of	  
the	  General	  Assembly	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  on	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  New	  International	  
Economic	  Order,	  
CONSIDERING	  that	  the	  development	  of	  international	  trade	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  equality	  and	  mutual	  
benefit	  is	  an	  important	  element	  in	  promoting	  friendly	  relations	  among	  States,	  
BEING	  OF	  THE	  OPINION	  that	  the	  adoption	  of	  uniform	  rules	  which	  govern	  contracts	  for	  the	  
international	  sale	  of	  goods	  and	  take	  into	  account	  the	  different	  social,	  economic	  and	  legal	  systems	  
would	  contribute	  to	  the	  removal	  of	  legal	  barriers	  in	  international	  trade	  and	  promote	  the	  
development	  of	  international	  trade.	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paragraphs	  of	  which	  refer,	  respectively,	  to:	  (i)	  the	  ‘establishment	  of	  a	  New	  
International	  Economic	  Order’;	  (ii)	  ‘equality	  and	  mutual	  benefit’;	  and	  (iii)	  ‘different	  
social,	  economic	  and	  legal	  systems’	  and	  ‘removal	  of	  legal	  barriers	  in	  international	  
trade.’	  Such	  allusions	  were	  seen	  to	  include	  more	  developing	  nations,	  firstly	  at	  the	  time	  
of	  drafting	  and	  secondly	  upon	  receiving	  ratifications.	  
	  
It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  understand	  what	  the	  New	  International	  Economic	  Order	  is.	  The	  
concept	  was	  established	  by	  a	  different	  UN	  Resolution	  in	  order	  to	  help	  developing	  
countries	  achieve	  larger	  shares	  of,	  and	  incomes	  in,	  the	  world’s	  markets.	  At	  first	  glance,	  
this	  allusion	  in	  the	  Preamble	  to	  the	  CISG	  may	  sound	  very	  promising	  in	  terms	  of	  
attracting	  a	  higher	  rate	  of	  participation	  from	  the	  developing	  world;	  closer	  examination	  
reveals,	  however,	  that	  the	  transformation	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  NIEO	  into	  legally	  
binding	  rules	  poses	  a	  considerable	  challenge.	  The	  mere	  allusion	  in	  the	  Preamble	  raises	  
the	  question	  of	  whether	  any	  meaning	  is	  attached	  to	  it	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  CISG	  was	  
intended	  to	  further	  it.	  
	  
To	  investigate	  this	  question,	  this	  chapter	  will	  carry	  out	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  NIEO.	  
Part	  One	  will	  examine	  the	  nature,	  emergence	  and	  development	  of	  the	  NIEO	  from	  its	  
origin	  to	  its	  establishment	  by	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly.	  Part	  Two	  continues	  with	  the	  
development	  of	  the	  NIEO	  and	  how	  it	  became	  linked	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  Commission	  
on	  International	  Trade	  Law.	  	  
Part	  One	  
2.2	  A	  New	  International	  Economic	  Order:	  An	  Overview	  
2.2.1	  Introduction	  
It	  was	  during	  and	  shortly	  after	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  that	  a	  new	  liberal	  international	  
economic	  system	  emerged	  under	  the	  hegemony	  of	  developed	  nations	  in	  North	  
America	  and	  Western	  Europe.	  This	  system	  was	  based	  on	  three	  main	  institutions:	  (i)	  
The	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (IMF);	  (ii)	  The	  World	  Bank;	  and	  (iii)	  The	  General	  
Agreement	  on	  Tariffs	  and	  Trade	  (GATT).	  As	  the	  developed	  nations	  dominated	  these	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institutions,	  they	  held	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  power	  to	  run	  the	  world	  economy.	  
Although	  underdeveloped	  regions	  such	  as	  Asia,	  the	  Middle	  East,	  Africa	  and	  Latin	  
America	  were	  all	  part	  of	  the	  world	  economy,	  they	  were	  unable	  to	  offer	  a	  ‘challenge	  to	  
the	  economic	  dominance	  of	  the	  west.’70	  On	  top	  of	  that,	  they	  were	  unable	  to	  take	  part	  
in	  decisions	  that	  influenced	  the	  distribution	  of	  resources.	  The	  emphasis	  on	  the	  removal	  
of	  trade	  barriers,	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  capital	  across	  borders,	  and	  the	  establishment	  
of	  a	  monetary	  system	  that	  was	  formed	  by	  North	  America,	  Western	  Europe	  and	  Japan,	  
as	  a	  post-­‐war	  international	  economic	  system,	  benefited	  them	  and	  scarcely	  considered	  
Third-­‐World	  interests.71	  Not	  surprisingly,	  the	  Third	  World	  became	  enormously	  
‘dissatisfied	  with	  the	  system	  that	  affected	  their	  economies	  but	  excluded	  them	  from	  its	  
management.’72	  In	  their	  view,	  their	  exclusion	  from	  the	  management	  of	  the	  world	  
economy	  resulted	  in	  an	  unequal	  distribution	  of	  resources	  and	  the	  growth	  of	  
dependent	  economies.	  
	  
Therefore,	  developing	  nations,	  which	  accounted	  for	  70%	  of	  the	  entire	  population	  of	  
the	  world,73	  attempted	  to	  increase	  their	  input	  into	  the	  management	  of	  the	  
international	  economic	  system.	  Some	  developing	  countries,	  taking	  a	  more	  pragmatic	  
approach	  to	  multilateral	  management,	  insisted	  on	  playing	  a	  more	  important	  role	  
within	  the	  existing	  dominant	  regime.	  Others	  completely	  disagreed	  with	  the	  liberal	  
foundation	  of	  international	  management,	  since	  such	  open	  monetary	  trading	  and	  
financial	  systems	  ensured	  their	  underdevelopment	  and	  subordination	  to	  the	  
developed	  countries.	  In	  order	  to	  develop	  their	  economies,	  these	  countries	  tried	  to	  
protect	  themselves	  from	  international	  economic	  dominance	  and	  to	  make	  their	  
development	  a	  major	  objective	  and	  responsibility	  of	  the	  system.	  The	  oil	  crisis	  of	  the	  
1970s	  resulted	  in	  an	  effort	  on	  the	  part	  of	  developing	  countries	  to	  change	  the	  rules	  of	  
the	  game	  and	  to	  create	  this	  so-­‐called	  New	  International	  Economic	  Order.74	  
	  
Before	  turning	  to	  the	  next	  section	  and	  examining	  the	  development	  of	  the	  NIEO	  and	  
how	  it	  eventually	  became	  linked	  to	  UNCITRAL,	  it	  is	  worth	  mentioning	  that	  the	  NIEO’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  Adeoye	  Akinsanya	  and	  Arthur	  Davies,	  ‘Third	  World	  Quest	  for	  a	  New	  International	  Economic	  Order:	  An	  
Overview’	  (1984)	  33	  International	  and	  Comparative	  Law	  Quarterly	  208.	  
71	  ibid.	  
72	  Joan	  E	  Spero,	  The	  Politics	  of	  International	  Economic	  Relations	  (3rd	  edn,	  1977)	  29.	  
73	  Akinsanya	  and	  Davies,	  ‘Third	  World	  Quest	  for	  a	  New	  International	  Economic	  Order’	  (n	  70).	  
74	  Joan	  E	  Spero	  and	  Jeffrey	  A	  Hart,	  The	  Politics	  of	  International	  Economic	  Relations	  (6th	  edn,	  2003)	  6.	  
37	  
demands	  are	  still	  being	  put	  forward	  today	  by	  the	  Head	  of	  UNCTAD.75	  In	  2011,	  UNCTAD	  
published	  a	  report,	  Development-­‐led	  globalization:	  Towards	  sustainable	  and	  inclusive	  
development	  paths.76	  This	  report,	  which	  favours	  ‘development-­‐led	  globalization’	  as	  
opposed	  to	  ‘finance-­‐driven	  globalization,’	  emphasises	  the	  adverse	  effect	  of	  
liberalisation	  and	  deregulation	  on	  the	  potential	  gains	  from	  trade	  for	  developing	  
countries.	  It	  continues	  that	  ‘stable	  monetary	  and	  financial	  arrangements	  are	  a	  pre-­‐
condition	  for	  making	  trade	  and	  investment	  work	  for	  inclusive	  growth	  and	  
development.’77	  UNCTAD	  criticises	  the	  policies	  advocated	  by	  the	  International	  
Monetary	  Fund	  and	  the	  World	  Bank	  in	  favour	  of	  unregulated	  financial	  markets.	  This	  is	  
very	  much	  in	  line	  with	  the	  view	  put	  forward	  by	  Joseph	  Stiglitz	  in	  his	  important	  book	  
Globalization	  and	  Its	  Discontents.78	  He	  suggests	  that	  globalisation	  should	  be	  embraced,	  
as	  long	  as	  the	  characteristics	  of	  each	  individual	  country	  (including	  its	  own	  terms,	  
history,	  culture	  and	  traditions)	  are	  taken	  into	  account.	  According	  to	  Stiglitz,	  problems	  
arise	  when	  globalisation	  is	  imposed	  unfairly	  and	  implemented	  too	  fast,	  in	  the	  wrong	  
order	  and	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  inadequate	  and	  faulty	  economic	  analysis.	  He	  adds	  that	  this	  is	  
what	  we	  are	  witnessing	  today,	  which	  has	  resulted	  in	  destitution,	  frustration	  and	  
conflict.	  He	  believes	  that	  the	  worldwide	  economic	  reform	  that	  was	  launched	  by	  the	  
IMF	  and	  the	  World	  Bank	  in	  the	  1990s	  has	  caused	  this	  global	  meltdown.	  He	  holds	  that	  
sequencing	  and	  pace	  of	  reform	  were	  ignored	  when	  designing	  reform	  packages.	  
Moreover,	  capital	  account	  liberalisation	  was	  a	  mistake	  too.	  He	  argues	  that,	  if	  things	  
had	  been	  done	  differently	  (with	  sequencing,	  pace	  of	  reform	  and	  capital	  account	  
liberalisation	  in	  mind),	  the	  outcome	  as	  regards	  social	  conditions	  would	  have	  been	  
better.79	  It	  is	  true	  that	  ‘industrial	  development	  remains	  a	  priority	  for	  many	  developing	  
countries	  because	  of	  the	  big	  opportunities	  it	  provides	  to	  raise	  productivity	  and	  
incomes,	  and	  to	  get	  the	  most	  from	  international	  trade.’80	  With	  the	  importance	  of	  NIEO	  
demands	  in	  mind,	  the	  author	  now	  returns	  to	  the	  main	  theme	  of	  this	  chapter,	  which	  is	  
the	  development	  of	  the	  NIEO.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  Mark	  Tran,	  ‘UN	  calls	  for	  overhaul	  of	  global	  financial	  system	  to	  benefit	  the	  poor’	  (2012)	  
<http://www.theguardian.com/global-­‐development/2012/feb/07/un-­‐urges-­‐overhaul-­‐global-­‐financial-­‐
system>	  accessed	  6	  February	  2014.	  
76	  Report	  of	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  of	  UNCTAD	  to	  UNCTAD	  XIII,	  ‘Development-­‐led	  globalization:	  Towards	  
sustainable	  and	  inclusive	  development	  paths’	  (2011)	  <http://unctad.org/en/docs/tdxiii_report_en.pdf>	  
accessed	  6	  February	  2014.	  
77	  ibid.	  
78	  Joseph	  E	  Stiglitz,	  Globalization	  and	  Its	  Discontents	  (Penguin	  2002).	  
79	  ibid.	  
80	  Report	  of	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  of	  UNCTAD	  to	  UNCTAD	  XIII	  (n	  76).	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2.2.2 The	  Nature	  of	  the	  New	  International	  Economic	  Order	  
The	  very	  first	  question	  that	  comes	  to	  mind	  is	  what	  the	  New	  International	  Economic	  
Order	  means	  and	  what	  it	  implies.	  It	  has	  been	  argued81	  that	  this	  term	  is	  one	  of	  those	  
‘propaganda	  slogans’	  that	  have	  emerged	  in	  today’s	  politics.	  It	  does	  indeed	  comprise	  a	  
series	  of	  purposely	  ambiguous	  or	  vaguely	  defined	  objectives.	  What	  the	  phrase	  implies	  
is	  the	  feeling	  that	  those	  unfamiliar	  with	  it	  are	  ‘one	  down’	  on	  those	  who	  use	  it,	  and	  
those	  familiar	  with	  it	  are	  privileged.	  The	  term	  has	  three	  major	  points	  of	  significance:	  
first,	  it	  concedes	  the	  malfunctioning	  of	  existing	  international	  economic	  relations,	  which	  
are	  in	  need	  of	  amendment,	  replacement	  or	  updating	  via	  a	  new	  system;	  second,	  the	  
inappropriate	  policies	  of	  the	  developed	  countries,	  past	  and	  present,	  should	  be	  
compensated	  for	  by	  accepting	  the	  obligations	  of	  the	  New	  International	  Economic	  
Order;	  and,	  finally,	  these	  changes	  in	  the	  international	  order	  are	  substantially	  subject	  to	  
the	  transfer	  of	  political	  power	  from	  the	  major	  countries.82	  
2.2.3 The	  Emergence	  of	  Third-­‐World	  Demands	  
The	  emergence	  of	  a	  New	  International	  Economic	  Order	  dates	  from	  the	  1960s,	  when	  
the	  United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly	  instituted	  a	  ‘Development	  Decade.’83	  This	  
Development	  Decade	  aimed	  to	  assist	  the	  less	  developed	  nations	  by	  obtaining	  5%	  
annual	  growth	  in	  national	  income	  via	  expanded	  international	  commerce,	  the	  
movement	  of	  international	  capital,	  and	  the	  assistance	  of	  1%	  of	  the	  developed	  nations’	  
national	  income.	  The	  developing	  nations’	  spokesmen	  condemned	  ‘the	  existing	  
international	  economic	  system	  which	  had	  a	  structural	  bias	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  developed	  
countries	  while	  relegating	  the	  developing	  countries	  to	  the	  status	  of	  mere	  primary	  
producers	  for	  the	  factories	  in	  the	  developed	  countries.’84	  	  
	  
It	  was	  Raul	  Prebisch85	  who	  eloquently	  expressed	  the	  developing	  nations’	  viewpoints.	  
He	  claimed	  that	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  GATT	  was	  beneficial	  only	  to	  the	  developed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81	  Harry	  G	  Johnson,	  ‘The	  New	  International	  Economic	  Order’	  The	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Graduate	  School	  
of	  Business,	  Selected	  Papers	  No	  49.	  	  
82	  ibid.	  
83	  GA	  Resolution	  1710	  (XVI)	  of	  19	  December	  1961.	  
84	  Akinsanya	  and	  Davies,	  ‘Third	  World	  Quest	  for	  a	  New	  International	  Economic	  Order’	  (n	  70).	  
85	  Secretary-­‐General	  of	  UNCTAD	  (1965–1969),	  and	  executive	  secretary	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Economic	  
Commission	  for	  Latin	  America	  (ECLAC)	  (1948–1963).	  
<http://unctad.org/Sections/wcmu/docs/prebisch2009_lectures_en.pdf>	  accessed	  2	  August	  2013.	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nations,	  and	  proposed	  a	  comprehensive	  international	  programme	  that	  would	  make	  
the	  developed	  nations	  compensate	  the	  less	  developed	  ones	  for	  their	  
‘disproportionate’	  earnings	  from	  international	  commerce.	  To	  that	  end,	  he	  suggested	  
that	  the	  developed	  nations	  should	  make	  trade	  concessions	  to	  the	  developing	  nations.	  
He	  further	  proposed	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  compensatory	  scheme	  of	  finance	  through	  
which	  the	  developing	  countries	  would	  receive	  capital	  grants	  whenever	  there	  was	  a	  
downward	  trend	  in	  their	  foreign	  exchange	  gains	  (as	  a	  result	  of	  fluctuations	  in	  the	  
international	  market).	  ‘Prebisch	  advocated	  a	  united	  front	  on	  the	  part	  of	  developing	  
countries	  with	  a	  view	  to	  applying	  sustained	  political	  pressure	  in	  the	  conduct	  of	  their	  
relations	  with	  the	  developed	  countries.’86	  However,	  the	  UN	  did	  not	  support	  such	  a	  
complete	  and	  radical	  change	  to	  the	  old	  norms	  governing	  international	  economic	  
relations.	  The	  United	  Nations	  Conference	  on	  Trade	  and	  Development87	  in	  particular	  
was	  not	  in	  favour	  of	  it.88	  
2.2.4 The	  United	  Nations	  Conference	  on	  Trade	  and	  Development	  and	  
the	  NIEO	  
The	  United	  Nations	  Conference	  on	  Trade	  and	  Development	  (UNCTAD)	  was	  founded	  as	  
a	  consequence	  of	  demands	  made	  by	  the	  developing	  member	  states	  of	  the	  UN.	  They	  
used	  their	  numerically	  superior	  voting	  power	  in	  the	  General	  Assembly	  to	  found	  a	  
permanent	  international	  institution	  to	  safeguard	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  less	  developed	  
countries	  against	  the	  GATT’s	  inadequacies.89	  	  
	  
UNCTAD	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  a	  locus	  of	  reform	  of	  the	  international	  economic	  system	  for	  
the	  developing	  nations.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  was	  regarded	  as	  an	  ‘important	  intervener	  on	  
behalf	  of	  less	  developed	  countries	  in	  their	  relations	  with	  advanced	  industrial	  States.’90	  
Within	  UNCTAD,	  the	  most	  influential	  group	  was	  known	  as	  the	  Group	  of	  77.91	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86	  Akinsanya	  and	  Davies,	  ‘Third	  World	  Quest	  for	  a	  New	  International	  Economic	  Order’	  (n	  70).	  
87	  UNCTAD	  is	  a	  forum	  used	  by	  the	  developing	  nations	  to	  echo	  their	  quest	  for	  a	  New	  International	  
Economic	  Order.	  
88	  Akinsanya	  and	  Davies,	  ‘Third	  World	  Quest	  for	  a	  New	  International	  Economic	  Order’	  (n	  70).	  
89	  Robert	  F	  Meagher,	  An	  International	  Redistribution	  of	  Wealth	  and	  Power:	  A	  Study	  of	  Economic	  Rights	  
and	  Duties	  of	  States	  (1979)	  30.	  
90	  Robert	  S	  Walters,	  ‘UNCTAD:	  Intervener	  Between	  Poor	  and	  Rich	  States’	  (1973)	  7	  Journal	  of	  World	  
Trade	  Law	  528.	  
91	  The	  process	  of	  decision-­‐making	  in	  UNCTAD	  takes	  place	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  group	  system.	  The	  
member	  states	  of	  UNCTAD	  are	  divided	  into	  four	  groups:	  A,	  B,	  C	  and	  D.	  The	  formal	  purpose	  of	  such	  a	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The	  Group	  of	  77	  consisted	  of	  developing	  countries	  in	  America,	  the	  Middle	  East,	  Asia	  
and	  Africa.	  UNCTAD,	  as	  a	  vehicle	  for	  negotiations	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  developing	  
countries’	  economic	  desires	  and	  for	  communication	  and	  ‘interest-­‐articulation’	  
between	  the	  North	  and	  the	  South,	  was	  successful	  because	  it	  was	  able	  to	  substitute	  an	  
alternative	  for	  the	  old	  theory	  of	  liberal	  international	  trade.92	  The	  main	  focus	  of	  the	  
Group	  of	  77	  was	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  ‘General	  Preference	  Scheme’	  through	  which	  
the	  countries	  of	  North	  America,	  Western	  Europe	  and	  Japan	  gave	  special	  trade	  
preferences	  to	  less	  developed	  countries	  exporting	  manufactured	  and	  semi-­‐
manufactured	  goods.93	  An	  ‘Integrated	  Programme	  for	  Commodities’	  was	  also	  
proposed,	  as	  a	  mechanism	  by	  which	  the	  prices	  of	  exports	  could	  be	  stabilised	  at	  an	  
equitable	  level	  for	  the	  less	  developed	  countries.94	  
	  
Repayment	  of	  debt	  was	  also	  a	  key	  concern	  for	  UNCTAD.	  As	  part	  of	  the	  quest	  for	  a	  new	  
and	  fairer	  international	  economic	  order,	  the	  Group	  of	  77	  started	  campaigning	  for	  a	  
generalised	  cancellation	  of	  official	  debts.	  In	  addition,	  compensation	  was	  discussed	  for	  
the	  developing	  nations	  for	  the	  deterioration	  in	  their	  terms	  of	  trade	  with	  the	  developed	  
nations.	  UNCTAD	  was	  unable	  to	  go	  beyond	  the	  study	  of	  problems	  concerning	  the	  
‘transfer	  of	  technology	  to	  the	  developing	  nations	  and	  formulation	  of	  a	  code	  of	  conduct	  
against	  the	  restrictive	  business	  practices	  of	  multinational	  corporations.’	  Therefore,	  
concern	  was	  raised	  that	  UNCTAD	  served	  merely	  as	  a	  ‘forum	  where	  less	  developed	  
countries	  can	  share	  information	  and	  propose	  unified	  action	  to	  deal	  with	  their	  common	  
concern	  as	  weak	  States	  playing	  host	  to	  multinational	  corporations.’95	  
	  
While	  UNCTAD	  acted	  as	  an	  advocate	  for	  Third-­‐World	  member	  states,	  its	  influence	  was	  
limited	  for	  several	  reasons.	  First,	  like	  the	  General	  Assembly’s	  decisions,	  the	  decisions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
division	  was	  the	  election	  of	  representatives	  to	  the	  Trade	  and	  Development	  Board	  (TDB)	  according	  to	  
geographical	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  criteria.	  Group	  A	  included	  African	  and	  Asian	  state	  members	  and	  
Yugoslavia	  and	  was	  allocated	  22	  seats	  in	  the	  TDB.	  Group	  B	  included	  market-­‐economy	  countries,	  with	  22	  
seats.	  Group	  C	  included	  Latin	  American	  and	  Caribbean	  countries	  with	  nine	  seats.	  Group	  D	  included	  the	  
socialist	  countries	  of	  Eastern	  Europe	  with	  six	  seats.	  Also,	  at	  UNCTAD	  I,	  77	  developing	  countries	  with	  
common	  interests	  formed	  the	  Group	  of	  77	  (G-­‐77)	  as	  an	  effective	  political	  group.	  The	  Group	  of	  77	  
consists	  of	  the	  developing	  countries	  of	  Groups	  A	  and	  C.	  
See	  ‘UNCTAD:	  A	  BRIEF	  HISTORICAL	  OVERVIEW’	  (UNCTAD/GDS/2006/1).	  
<http://www.transnational.deusto.es/IP2011/docs/unctad%20history.pdf>	  accessed	  2	  August	  2013.	  
92	  Akinsanya	  and	  Davies,	  ‘Third	  World	  Quest	  for	  a	  New	  International	  Economic	  Order’	  (n	  70).	  
93	  ‘UNCTAD:	  A	  BRIEF	  HISTORICAL	  OVERVIEW’	  (n	  91).	  
94	  Akinsanya	  and	  Davies,	  ‘Third	  World	  Quest	  for	  a	  New	  International	  Economic	  Order’	  (n	  70).	  
95	  D	  H	  Blake	  and	  R	  S	  Walters,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Global	  Economic	  Relations	  (1976)	  186.	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taken	  by	  UNCTAD	  had	  no	  legally	  binding	  effect	  on	  members,	  and	  were	  regarded	  
merely	  as	  recommendations.	  Second,	  the	  disparate	  demands	  of	  developing	  nations	  
had	  not	  been	  harmonised	  to	  provide	  a	  basis	  for	  a	  bargaining	  position	  in	  negotiations	  
between	  developed	  and	  developing	  nations.	  This	  would	  have	  been	  one	  way	  of	  
ensuring	  equitable	  distribution	  of	  new	  economic	  earnings	  among	  the	  developing	  
nations.	  Therefore,	  it	  led	  to	  conflicts	  and	  frustrations.	  Lastly,	  a	  lack	  of	  political	  will	  on	  
the	  part	  of	  the	  developed	  nations	  to	  accept	  dramatic	  concessions	  (since	  doing	  so	  could	  
and	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  transfer	  of	  their	  wealth	  and	  international	  political	  power	  to	  the	  
less	  developed	  nations)	  made	  the	  developing	  nations’	  efforts	  seem	  absurd.96	  For	  all	  
these	  reasons,	  the	  developing	  nations	  realised	  that	  UNCTAD	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  
obtain	  any	  real	  concessions	  from	  the	  developed	  nations.97	  
2.2.5 The	  United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly	  and	  the	  NIEO	  
The	  Third	  World	  soon	  realised	  that	  UNCTAD	  was	  more	  of	  a	  forum	  for	  the	  articulation	  
of	  interests	  and	  ideas	  than	  an	  organisation	  that	  was	  ‘action-­‐oriented.’	  This	  led	  to	  the	  
adoption	  of	  a	  new	  strategy	  through	  which	  an	  alteration	  of	  the	  norms	  conducting	  
international	  economic	  relations	  might	  be	  achieved.	  They	  also	  urged	  the	  codification	  
of	  these	  norms	  in	  a	  legal	  document.98	  
	  
Putting	  pressure	  on	  the	  developed	  nations	  through	  the	  United	  Nations	  was	  first	  
suggested	  by	  the	  Mexican	  president,99	  who	  emphasised	  that	  the	  developing	  nations	  
would	  need	  to	  ‘remove	  economic	  co-­‐operation	  from	  the	  realm	  of	  good	  will	  and	  
crystallize	  it	  in	  the	  field	  of	  international	  law	  .	  .	  .	  A	  just	  order	  and	  a	  stable	  world	  are	  not	  
possible	  as	  long	  as	  obligations	  and	  rights	  which	  protect	  the	  weak	  States	  are	  not	  
created.’100	  He	  further	  emphasised	  the	  need	  for	  the	  codification	  of	  facets	  of	  
international	  economic	  relations	  into	  a	  legal	  document.	  These	  included,	  among	  other	  
things:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96	  Akinsanya	  and	  Davies,	  ‘Third	  World	  Quest	  for	  a	  New	  International	  Economic	  Order’	  (n	  70).	  
97	  G	  Williams,	  Third	  World	  Political	  Organization	  (1981)	  35.	  
98	  Akinsanya	  and	  Davies,	  ‘Third	  World	  Quest	  for	  a	  New	  International	  Economic	  Order’	  (n	  70).	  
99	  President	  Luis	  Echeverria,	  President	  of	  Mexico	  1970–1976.	  See	  ‘Proceedings	  of	  United	  Nations	  
Conference	  on	  Trade	  and	  Development,	  Third	  Session’	  (1972)	  vol	  1,	  30.	  TD/180,	  Vol	  I	  
<http://unctad.org/en/Docs/td180v011_en.pdf>	  accessed	  2	  August	  2013.	  
100	  ibid.	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a.	  The	  freedom	  to	  dispose	  of	  natural	  resources;	  	  
b.	  The	  subjection	  of	  foreign	  capital	  to	  domestic	  laws;	  and	  	  
c.	  The	  transfer	  of	  technology.101	  
	  
The	  developing	  nations	  were	  strongly	  of	  the	  opinion	  that,	  if	  the	  above-­‐listed	  norms	  
were	  codified	  in	  a	  legally	  binding	  document,	  an	  equitable	  distribution	  of	  global	  natural	  
resources	  and	  wealth	  would	  be	  achieved.102	  
	  
A	  more	  thorough	  economic	  co-­‐operation	  among	  the	  developing	  nations	  was	  suggested	  
during	  the	  fourth	  Summit	  Conference	  of	  Non-­‐Aligned	  Groups	  in	  1973	  (they	  shared	  the	  
view	  of	  Luis	  Echeverria).	  The	  outcome	  of	  this	  conference	  was	  the	  Programme	  of	  Action	  
which	  established	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  New	  International	  Economic	  Order;	  this	  
included	  the	  recommendation	  that	  sovereignty	  over	  natural	  resources	  and	  also	  
national	  control	  over	  private	  foreign	  investment	  in	  developing	  countries	  should	  be	  
increased.103	  
	  
Therefore,	  demands	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  New	  International	  Economic	  Order	  
shifted	  to	  the	  agenda	  of	  the	  General	  Assembly.	  The	  General	  Assembly	  adopted	  a	  
Declaration	  and	  a	  Programme	  of	  Action	  on	  the	  Establishment	  of	  a	  New	  International	  
Economic	  Order	  in	  May	  1974104	  and	  the	  Charter	  of	  Economic	  Rights	  and	  Duties	  of	  
States	  in	  December	  1974.105	  The	  Resolutions	  accepted	  the	  basic	  principles	  of	  the	  
Declaration	  and	  the	  Programme	  of	  Action	  on	  the	  Establishment	  of	  a	  New	  International	  
Economic	  Order,	  which	  read	  as	  follows:	  
	  
The	  need	  to	  secure	  progress	  towards	  equality	  of	  nations	  through	  an	  equitable	  
sharing	  of	  world	  resources,	  transfer	  of	  technology,	  and	  a	  just	  and	  equitable	  
relationship	  between	  the	  prices	  of	  raw	  materials	  exported	  from	  and	  the	  
manufactured	  goods	  imported	  by	  the	  developing	  countries,	  and	  full	  exercise	  of	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  ‘Proceedings	  of	  United	  Nations	  Conference	  on	  Trade	  and	  Development,	  Third	  Session’	  (n	  99).	  
102	  Akinsanya	  and	  Davies,	  ‘Third	  World	  Quest	  for	  a	  New	  International	  Economic	  Order’	  (n	  70).	  
103	  ibid.	  
104	  GA	  Resolution	  3201	  (S-­‐VI)	  of	  1	  May	  1974.	  A/RES/S-­‐6/3201.	  
GA	  Resolution	  3202	  (S-­‐VI)	  of	  1	  May	  1974.	  A/RES/S-­‐6/3202.	  
105	  GA	  Resolution	  3281	  (XXIX)	  of	  12	  December	  1974.	  A/RES/29/3281.	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sovereignty	  over	  natural	  resources	  and	  other	  economic	  activities,	  including	  the	  
control	  of	  transnational	  corporations.106	  	  
	  
Moreover,	  the	  attempts	  necessary	  for	  the	  realisation	  of	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  goals	  
were	  described	  in	  the	  Programme	  of	  Action.	  This	  highlighted	  the	  need	  for	  a	  complete	  
change	  in	  the	  international	  monetary	  system	  and	  called	  for	  a	  new	  international	  
economic	  structure,	  which	  should	  increase	  the	  developing	  countries’	  share	  in	  world	  
industrial	  production.107	  
	  
The	  Charter	  of	  Economic	  Rights	  and	  Duties	  of	  States	  (Resolution	  3281	  (XXVIII)	  of	  12	  
December	  1974)	  stressed	  some	  of	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Declaration	  and	  the	  
Programme	  of	  Action.	  In	  very	  general	  language,	  it	  called	  for	  the	  indexation	  of	  prices	  
and	  the	  acceptance	  of	  cartelisation.	  Article	  2(C)	  of	  the	  Charter	  called	  for	  the	  
expropriation	  of	  foreign	  property	  on	  payment	  of	  ‘appropriate	  compensation.’108	  These	  
issues	  were	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  debate.	  More	  generally,	  the	  member	  states	  were	  
encouraged	  to	  collaborate	  in	  order	  to	  ‘strengthen	  and	  continuously	  improve	  the	  
efficiency	  of	  international	  organisations	  in	  implementing	  measures	  to	  stimulate	  the	  
general	  economic	  progress	  of	  all	  countries,	  particularly	  of	  developing	  countries	  .	  .	  .	  ’109	  
It	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  the	  Resolutions	  never	  explained	  how	  the	  interests	  of	  developing	  
countries	  would	  be	  advanced	  through	  the	  unification	  of	  private	  commercial	  law.	  
Nevertheless,	  the	  United	  Nations	  Commission	  on	  International	  Trade	  Law	  (UNCITRAL),	  
which	  was	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  preparation	  of	  the	  CISG,	  saw	  unification	  as	  a	  key	  element	  in	  
a	  programme	  of	  development.	  This	  leads	  on	  to	  Part	  Two,	  in	  which	  this	  issue	  will	  be	  
further	  explored.	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  World	  Quest	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  International	  Economic	  Order’	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  .	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  [t]o	  nationalise,	  expropriate	  or	  transfer	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  of	  foreign	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  case	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compensation	  should	  be	  paid	  by	  the	  State	  adopting	  such	  measures,	  taking	  into	  account	  its	  
relevant	  laws	  and	  regulations	  and	  all	  circumstances	  that	  the	  State	  considers	  pertinent.	  In	  any	  
case	  where	  the	  question	  of	  compensation	  gives	  rise	  to	  a	  controversy,	  it	  shall	  be	  settled	  under	  the	  
domestic	  law	  of	  the	  nationalising	  State	  and	  by	  its	  tribunals,	  unless	  it	  is	  freely	  and	  mutually	  agreed	  
by	  all	  States	  concerned	  that	  other	  peaceful	  means	  be	  sought	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  sovereign	  equality	  of	  
States	  and	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  choice	  of	  means.	  
109	  Article	  11	  of	  GA	  Resolution	  3281	  (XXIX)	  (n	  105).	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Part	  Two	  
2.3	  The	  United	  Nations	  Commission	  on	  International	  Trade	  Law	  and	  the	  
NIEO	  
The	  study	  of	  the	  NIEO	  so	  far	  has	  shown	  that	  it	  was	  mainly	  about	  public	  trade	  law.	  The	  
questions	  that	  need	  to	  be	  answered	  are:	  how	  did	  the	  NIEO	  come	  to	  be	  linked	  with	  
UNCITRAL,	  and	  how	  did	  it	  become	  relevant	  to	  private	  trade	  law?	  These	  will	  be	  
answered,	  firstly,	  by	  describing	  the	  Commission	  and	  its	  origins;	  secondly,	  by	  
considering	  the	  Commission’s	  programme	  of	  work	  and	  its	  relationship	  with	  the	  
international	  sale	  of	  goods;	  and,	  finally,	  by	  considering	  why	  the	  NIEO	  was	  included	  in	  
the	  programme	  of	  work	  of	  the	  Commission,	  in	  particular	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  
international	  sale	  of	  goods.	  
2.3.1	  Origins	  of	  the	  Commission	  
The	  United	  Nations	  Commission	  on	  International	  Trade	  Law	  (UNCITRAL),	  the	  fruits	  of	  
whose	  labour	  is	  the	  CISG,	  was	  established	  by	  General	  Assembly	  Resolution	  2205(XXI)	  
of	  17	  December	  1966110	  in	  order	  to	  make	  it	  possible	  for	  the	  United	  Nations	  to	  be	  more	  
actively	  involved	  in	  reducing	  and	  removing	  legal	  impediments	  to	  the	  flow	  of	  
international	  trade.	  In	  establishing	  UNCITRAL,	  the	  General	  Assembly	  recognised	  that	  
conflicts	  and	  divergences	  arising	  from	  the	  laws	  of	  different	  states	  in	  relation	  to	  
international	  trade	  can	  act	  as	  an	  obstacle	  to	  its	  development.	  It	  also	  recognised	  that	  
the	  interests	  of	  all	  peoples,	  in	  particular	  those	  of	  developing	  countries,	  require	  a	  high	  
degree	  of	  development	  of	  international	  trade.	  Therefore,	  the	  General	  Assembly	  
considered	  ‘it	  desirable	  that	  the	  process	  of	  harmonization	  and	  unification	  of	  the	  law	  of	  
international	  trade	  be	  substantially	  co-­‐ordinated,	  systematized	  and	  accelerated	  and	  
that	  a	  broader	  participation	  by	  States	  be	  secured	  .	  .	  .’111	  
	  
The	  events	  that	  resulted	  in	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Commission	  began	  with	  the	  
placement	  of	  an	  item	  entitled	  ‘Consideration	  of	  steps	  to	  be	  taken	  for	  progressive	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110	  ‘UNITED	  NATIONS	  COMMISSION	  ON	  INTERNATIONAL	  TRADE	  LAW,	  YEARBOOK	  VOLUME	  I:	  1968–
1970’	  A/CN.9/SER.A/1970,	  Part	  One,	  ch	  II,	  sect	  E.	  <http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/yearbooks/yb-­‐
1968–70-­‐e/yb_1968–1970_e.pdf>	  accessed	  1	  July	  2013.	  
111	  ibid.	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development	  in	  the	  field	  of	  private	  international	  law	  with	  a	  particular	  view	  to	  
promoting	  international	  trade’	  on	  the	  agenda	  of	  the	  twentieth	  session	  (1965)	  of	  the	  
General	  Assembly,	  in	  pursuance	  of	  an	  initiative	  taken	  by	  the	  Hungarian	  government.112	  
In	  relation	  to	  this	  agenda	  item,	  a	  preliminary	  survey	  on	  the	  unification	  of	  international	  
trade	  law	  was	  prepared	  by	  the	  UN	  Secretariat	  for	  the	  Sixth	  Committee	  of	  the	  General	  
Assembly.113	  The	  survey	  reflected	  the	  problems	  with	  which	  parties	  to	  international	  
trade	  transactions	  were	  faced	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  great	  variety	  of	  and	  disparities	  
between	  different	  national	  laws.	  It	  also	  included	  a	  review	  of	  some	  means	  by	  which	  a	  
unification	  of	  the	  laws	  of	  international	  trade	  might	  be	  achieved.	  In	  line	  with	  the	  
recommendations	  of	  the	  survey,	  the	  General	  Assembly114	  requested	  that	  a	  
comprehensive	  report	  on	  the	  progressive	  development	  of	  international	  trade	  law	  be	  
conveyed	  by	  the	  Secretariat.	  
	  
Professor	  Clive	  Schmitthoff	  of	  the	  City	  of	  London	  College	  was	  commissioned	  by	  the	  
Secretariat	  to	  provide	  a	  preliminary	  study	  of	  the	  subject	  as	  an	  antecedent	  to	  its	  own	  
report.	  The	  Secretariat	  also	  conferred	  with	  the	  secretariats	  of	  relevant	  United	  Nations	  
organs	  and	  regional	  economic	  commissions,	  specialised	  agencies	  and	  other	  
international	  governmental	  and	  non-­‐governmental	  organisations.	  The	  report	  stated	  
that	  some	  progress	  had	  been	  achieved	  towards	  unification	  and	  harmonisation	  of	  
international	  trade	  law	  in	  certain	  areas.	  However,	  it	  also	  noted	  certain	  deficiencies.	  
First,	  given	  the	  time	  and	  effort	  already	  put	  into	  unification,	  progress	  had	  been	  only	  
gradual.	  Second,	  given	  the	  recent	  independence	  of	  many	  developing	  countries,	  they	  
had	  had	  only	  a	  small	  degree	  of	  participation	  in	  those	  efforts.	  Third,	  non-­‐governmental	  
agencies	  active	  in	  the	  field	  had	  a	  membership	  that	  typified	  all	  of	  the	  principal	  
geographic	  regions	  or	  all	  of	  the	  major	  economic	  systems	  around	  the	  globe.	  Fourth,	  
there	  had	  been	  a	  lack	  of	  co-­‐operation	  and	  co-­‐ordination	  among	  active	  agencies	  in	  the	  
field.115	  The	  report	  suggested	  the	  establishment	  by	  the	  General	  Assembly	  of	  a	  new	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  ‘UNITED	  NATIONS	  COMMISSION	  ON	  INTERNATIONAL	  TRADE	  LAW,	  YEARBOOK	  VOLUME	  I:	  1968–
1970’	  (no	  110)	  Part	  One,	  ch	  I,	  sect	  A.	  
113	  ibid	  Part	  One,	  ch	  I,	  sect	  C.	  
114	  ibid	  Part	  One,	  ch	  II,	  sect	  A.	  
115	  ibid	  Part	  One,	  ch	  II,	  sect	  B.	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United	  Nations	  organ	  to	  systematise	  and	  accelerate	  the	  unification	  and	  harmonisation	  
process	  of	  international	  trade	  law	  and	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  shortcomings.116	  
At	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  session	  (1966)	  of	  the	  General	  Assembly,	  the	  Sixth	  Committee	  
considered	  the	  report.117	  Professor	  Schmitthoff’s	  recommendations	  were	  approved.	  In	  
accordance	  with	  the	  recommendations	  and	  deliberations	  of	  the	  Sixth	  Committee,	  the	  
establishment	  of	  the	  Commission	  was	  adopted	  by	  the	  General	  Assembly.118	  
2.3.1 Progamme	  of	  Work	  
The	  General	  Assembly	  did	  not	  assign	  UNCITRAL	  specific	  tasks;	  instead,	  at	  the	  first	  
session	  of	  the	  Commission	  in	  1968,	  after	  taking	  into	  account	  a	  number	  of	  
recommendations	  by	  member	  states,	  nine	  topics	  were	  adopted	  by	  the	  Commission	  as	  
the	  essence	  of	  its	  prospective	  programme	  of	  work.	  These	  were:	  the	  international	  sale	  
of	  goods,	  international	  commercial	  arbitration,	  transportation,	  insurance,	  international	  
payments,	  intellectual	  property,	  the	  elimination	  of	  discrimination	  in	  laws	  affecting	  
international	  trade,	  agency,	  and	  legalisation	  of	  documents.119	  The	  international	  sale	  of	  
goods	  was	  among	  those	  topics	  given	  priority.120	  UNCITRAL	  explained	  that	  it	  deserved	  
priority	  because	  ‘divergencies	  arising	  from	  the	  laws	  of	  different	  States	  in	  matters	  
relating	  to	  international	  trade	  law	  constitute	  one	  of	  the	  obstacles	  to	  the	  development	  
of	  world	  trade.’121	  However,	  it	  noted	  that	  progress	  on	  unification	  had	  been	  
disappointing,	  owing	  partly	  to	  ‘the	  small	  degree	  of	  participation	  in	  this	  field	  on	  the	  part	  
of	  many	  developing	  countries.’122	  
2.3.2.1 International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  
Given	  the	  wide	  scope	  and	  complex	  nature	  of	  this	  topic,	  the	  Commission	  decided	  to	  
focus	  on	  specific	  aspects	  of	  the	  international	  sale	  of	  goods:	  time	  limits	  and	  limitations	  
on	  the	  international	  sale	  of	  goods,	  and	  the	  two	  1964	  Hague	  Conventions.123	  The	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  NATIONS	  COMMISSION	  ON	  INTERNATIONAL	  TRADE	  LAW,	  YEARBOOK	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1970’	  (no	  110)	  Part	  One,	  ch	  II,	  sect	  B.	  	  
117	  ibid	  Part	  One,	  ch	  II,	  sect	  D.	  
118	  ibid	  Part	  One,	  ch	  II,	  sect	  E.	  
119	  ibid	  Part	  Two,	  ch	  I,	  sect	  A,	  para	  40.	  
120	  ibid.	  
121	  GA	  Resolution	  2205	  (XXI).	  	  
122	  ibid.	  	  
123	  ‘UNITED	  NATIONS	  COMMISSION	  ON	  INTERNATIONAL	  TRADE	  LAW,	  YEARBOOK	  VOLUME	  I:	  1968–
1970’	  (no	  110)	  Part	  Two,	  ch	  I,	  sect	  A,	  para	  48.	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Convention	  on	  the	  Limitation	  Period	  in	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  (New	  York,	  
1974)	  and	  the	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  
Goods	  (Vienna,	  1980)	  resulted	  from	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Commission	  in	  these	  areas.	  	  
2.3.2.2 Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  
As	  mentioned	  above,	  UNIDROIT	  had	  begun	  work	  in	  1930	  on	  the	  unification	  of	  the	  laws	  
on	  the	  international	  sale	  of	  goods.	  The	  two	  Hague	  Conventions	  were	  concluded	  in	  
1964,	  although	  they	  were	  not	  yet	  in	  force	  by	  the	  time	  of	  UNICITRAL’s	  first	  session	  in	  
1968.	  The	  Commission	  therefore	  began	  by	  assessing	  the	  position	  of	  states	  with	  regard	  
to	  the	  Hague	  Conventions.	  At	  the	  Commission’s	  request,	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  sent	  a	  
questionnaire	  to	  member	  states	  of	  the	  UN	  and	  its	  specialised	  agencies.	  This	  
questionnaire	  aimed	  to	  discover	  whether	  states	  intended	  to	  adhere	  to	  the	  Hague	  
Conventions,	  and,	  if	  not,	  to	  debate	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  these	  Conventions.	  In	  the	  
interim,	  the	  Commission	  also	  called	  upon	  states	  to	  submit	  their	  studies	  on	  the	  1964	  
Hague	  Conventions.124	  
	  
The	  second	  (1969)	  and	  third	  (1970)	  sessions	  of	  the	  Commission	  were	  devoted	  to	  the	  
analysis	  of	  replies	  and	  studies	  received.125	  At	  the	  second	  session,	  the	  suitability	  and	  
practicality	  of	  the	  uniform	  laws	  annexed	  to	  the	  Hague	  Convention	  were	  defended	  by	  
various	  representatives,	  who	  argued	  that	  there	  was	  no	  need	  for	  their	  revision	  at	  that	  
time.	  Other	  representatives	  held	  a	  different	  view.	  They	  questioned	  the	  suitability	  of	  
ULF	  and	  ULIS	  for	  worldwide	  acceptance.	  For	  example,	  the	  Union	  of	  Soviet	  Socialist	  
Republics	  noted	  that	  the	  1964	  Hague	  Conference	  included	  only	  28	  states,	  among	  
which	  only	  three	  were	  socialist	  and	  two	  were	  developing.	  Therefore,	  the	  Hague	  
Conventions	  were	  not	  the	  product	  of	  the	  all-­‐embracing	  vision	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  states	  
that	  was	  to	  be	  expected	  from	  international	  instruments	  of	  such	  a	  kind.	  The	  United	  
Arab	  Republic	  also	  expressed	  the	  view	  that	  developing	  countries	  were	  concerned	  with	  
some	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  uniform	  sales	  laws.126	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  ibid.	  
125	  ibid	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  Three,	  ch	  I,	  sect	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  ‘UNITED	  NATIONS	  COMMISSION	  ON	  INTERNATIONAL	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  LAW,	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  Three,	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In	  the	  light	  of	  its	  analysis,	  the	  Commission	  decided	  to	  set	  up	  a	  Working	  Group	  on	  the	  
International	  Sale	  of	  Goods,	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  uniform	  laws	  could	  be	  revised	  
in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  would	  attract	  wider	  acceptance	  by	  countries	  with	  different	  social,	  
legal	  and	  economic	  systems,	  or	  whether	  it	  would	  be	  better	  to	  produce	  a	  new	  text.	  It	  
advised	  considering	  methods	  that	  would	  make	  a	  revised	  text	  more	  widely	  
acceptable.127	  The	  Uniform	  Law	  on	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  (ULIS)	  and	  the	  
Uniform	  Law	  on	  Formation	  of	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  (ULF)	  
provided	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  the	  revised	  text.128	  
	  
By	  1975,	  revisions	  of	  a	  number	  of	  articles	  of	  ULIS	  had	  been	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  Working	  
Group,	  and	  it	  was	  decided	  that	  the	  revised	  text	  should	  not	  be	  drafted	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  
uniform	  law	  annexed	  to	  a	  convention,	  but	  as	  an	  integrated	  convention.129	  In	  1976,	  the	  
Working	  Group	  accepted	  the	  draft	  text	  of	  the	  Convention	  on	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  
Goods.130	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  draft,	  the	  Commission	  also	  approved	  the	  Convention	  on	  
the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  in	  1977.131	  
	  
After	  completion	  of	  the	  revision	  of	  ULIS,	  the	  eighth	  and	  ninth	  sessions	  of	  the	  Working	  
Group	  were	  devoted	  to	  a	  consideration	  and	  revision	  of	  the	  formation	  and	  validity	  of	  
contracts	  for	  the	  international	  sale	  of	  goods.	  The	  basis	  of	  such	  a	  revision	  was	  the	  1964	  
Hague	  Uniform	  Law	  on	  Formation	  and	  the	  UNDROIT	  draft	  law	  for	  the	  unification	  of	  
certain	  rules	  regarding	  the	  validity	  of	  contracts	  for	  the	  international	  sale	  of	  goods.	  The	  
draft	  text	  of	  the	  Convention	  on	  the	  Formation	  of	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  
Goods	  was	  approved	  by	  the	  Working	  Group	  in	  1977.132	  At	  the	  request	  of	  the	  Working	  
Group,	  a	  commentary	  on	  the	  Draft	  Convention	  was	  produced	  by	  the	  Secretariat.133	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<http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/yearbooks/yb-­‐1975-­‐e/yb_1975_e.pdf>	  accessed	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  July	  2013.	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  sect	  1.	  
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/yearbooks/yb-­‐1976-­‐e/yb_1976_e.pdf>	  accessed	  1	  July	  2013.	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  ‘UNITED	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  1977’	  
A/CN.9/SER.A/1977,	  Part	  One,	  ch	  II,	  sect	  A,	  para	  34.	  
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/yearbooks/yb-­‐1977-­‐e/yb_1977_e.pdf>	  accessed	  1	  July	  2013.	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  ‘UNITED	  NATIONS	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A/CN.9/SER.A/1978,	  Part	  Two,	  ch	  I,	  sect	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  accessed	  1	  July	  2013.	  
133	  ibid	  Part	  Two,	  ch	  I,	  sect	  D.	  
49	  
Draft	  Convention	  on	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  and	  the	  Draft	  Convention	  on	  the	  
Formation	  of	  Contracts	  were	  then	  integrated	  into	  one	  text,134	  which	  formed	  the	  Draft	  
Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods.135	  
	  
The	  Commission	  recommended	  that	  the	  General	  Assembly	  hold	  a	  diplomatic	  
conference	  to	  consider	  its	  Draft	  Convention.136	  This	  conference	  was	  held	  in	  Vienna	  in	  
1980,	  and	  the	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  
Goods	  (CISG)	  was	  adopted	  by	  representatives	  of	  the	  62	  countries	  that	  participated	  in	  
the	  Conference	  on	  10	  April	  1980	  in	  Vienna.137	  
2.3.3 Legal	  Implications	  of	  the	  New	  International	  Economic	  Order	  
It	  was	  not	  obvious	  that	  the	  United	  Nations	  had	  any	  jurisdiction	  in	  relation	  to	  private	  
transactions	  for	  the	  sale	  of	  goods.	  Hence,	  it	  is	  worth	  asking	  how	  it	  came	  about	  that	  
international	  sales	  became	  the	  subject	  of	  an	  UNCITRAL	  study	  and	  a	  UN	  convention.	  
As	  stated	  earlier,	  the	  comments	  of	  some	  of	  the	  respondents	  to	  the	  questionnaire	  
circulated	  by	  UNCITRAL	  concentrated	  on	  the	  lack	  of	  participation	  by	  the	  developing	  
nations.	  The	  situation	  was	  different	  during	  the	  drafting	  of	  the	  CISG,	  however,	  as	  
countries	  with	  different	  economic,	  political	  and	  legal	  systems	  were	  present	  and	  62	  
states	  participated	  in	  the	  proceedings.	  This	  is	  reflected	  even	  in	  the	  Preamble	  to	  the	  
CISG,	  which	  emphasises	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  developing	  world	  by	  including:	  
	  
THE	  STATES	  PARTIES	  TO	  THIS	  CONVENTION,	  BEARING	  IN	  MIND	  the	  broad	  
objectives	  in	  the	  resolutions	  adopted	  by	  the	  sixth	  special	  session	  of	  the	  General	  
Assembly	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  on	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  New	  International	  
Economic	  Order	  .	  .	  .	  	  
	  
How	  this	  New	  International	  Economic	  Order	  came	  to	  be	  linked	  with	  UNCITRAL	  and	  
how	  it	  became	  relevant	  to	  private	  trade	  law	  lead	  us	  to	  the	  next	  section.	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  accessed	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  July	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In	  1974	  and	  1975,	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  at	  its	  sixth	  and	  seventh	  special	  sessions	  
adopted	  Resolutions	  3494	  (XXX)	  and	  31/99,	  which	  dealt	  with	  economic	  development	  
and	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  New	  International	  Economic	  Order.	  The	  Commission,	  as	  
one	  of	  the	  organs	  of	  the	  UN,	  was	  called	  upon	  to	  take	  account	  of	  the	  relevant	  
provisions	  of	  these	  Resolutions.	  In	  response	  to	  this,	  the	  Commission	  included	  in	  its	  
programme	  of	  work	  the	  topic	  of	  the	  legal	  implications	  of	  the	  New	  International	  
Economic	  Order,138	  and	  took	  into	  account	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  it	  could	  effectively	  
achieve	  the	  goals	  introduced	  in	  the	  Resolutions	  by	  the	  General	  Assembly.	  	  
	  
A	  Working	  Group	  on	  the	  New	  International	  Economic	  Order	  was	  established	  by	  the	  
Commission	  and	  assigned	  the	  task	  of	  recommending	  specific	  topics	  that	  could	  become	  
part	  of	  the	  Commission’s	  programme	  of	  work.	  In	  order	  to	  assist	  the	  Working	  Group,	  
the	  Secretariat	  was	  asked	  to	  provide	  the	  Commission	  with	  a	  report	  that	  would	  set	  
forth	  subject	  areas	  that	  were	  relevant	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  development	  of	  the	  NIEO	  
and	  which	  would	  be	  suitable	  for	  consideration,	  accompanied	  by	  background	  studies	  
where	  appropriate.	  In	  addition,	  governments	  were	  invited	  to	  submit	  their	  proposals	  
and	  visions	  on	  subject	  areas	  that	  might	  be	  covered	  by	  the	  Commission.139	  
The	  review	  of	  the	  subject	  areas	  as	  set	  forth	  in	  the	  report	  of	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  
revealed	  divergent	  visions	  for	  the	  sphere	  of	  competence	  of	  the	  Commission	  and	  the	  
interpretation	  of	  its	  mandate.	  One	  view	  held	  that	  the	  Commission	  had	  achieved	  
valuable	  work	  in	  different	  areas	  within	  the	  context	  of	  existing	  legal	  systems.	  However,	  
supporters	  of	  this	  view	  argued	  that	  the	  need	  to	  establish	  a	  New	  International	  
Economic	  Order	  required	  the	  Commission	  to	  take	  a	  wider	  approach	  to	  legal	  matters,	  
including	  legal	  relationships	  that	  had	  a	  public	  law	  character.140	  According	  to	  this	  view,	  
the	  Commission	  was	  required	  to	  identify	  and	  consider	  the	  principles	  of	  international	  
public	  law	  that	  influence	  the	  structure	  of	  international	  private	  law.	  It	  was	  also	  held	  
that	  the	  Commission	  should	  carry	  on	  with	  its	  logical	  approach	  to	  dealing	  with	  specific	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  NATIONS	  COMMISSION	  ON	  INTERNATIONAL	  TRADE	  LAW,	  YEARBOOK	  VOLUME	  X:	  1979’	  (no	  
136)	  Part	  One,	  ch	  II,	  sect	  A,	  para	  100.	  
140	  ‘UNITED	  NATIONS	  COMMISSION	  ON	  INTERNATIONAL	  TRADE	  LAW,	  YEARBOOK	  VOLUME	  XI:	  1980’	  (no	  
137)	  Part	  Two,	  ch	  V,	  sect	  A,	  para	  11.	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topics	  involving	  harmonisation,	  unification	  and	  the	  progressive	  development	  of	  
international	  trade	  law.	  Reference	  was	  even	  made	  to	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Commission	  in	  
the	  field	  of	  the	  carriage	  of	  goods	  by	  sea,	  formulated	  by	  the	  Asian-­‐African	  Consultative	  
Committee.	  The	  UN	  Convention	  of	  1978	  (Hamburg	  Rules),	  which	  established	  an	  
equitable	  balance	  of	  interests	  between	  the	  rights	  and	  obligations	  of	  the	  carrier	  and	  the	  
shipper,	  had	  made	  a	  significant	  contribution	  towards	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  New	  
International	  Economic	  Order,	  and	  this	  approach	  could	  be	  followed	  in	  other	  specific	  
subject	  areas	  that	  were	  of	  special	  importance	  to	  developing	  countries.141	  
	  
The	  report	  of	  the	  Working	  Group	  showed	  that	  the	  harmonisation,	  unification	  and	  
review	  of	  contractual	  provisions	  governing	  international	  contracts	  in	  the	  area	  of	  
industrial	  development,	  such	  as	  contracts	  on	  research	  and	  development,	  consulting	  
and	  engineering,	  contracts	  for	  the	  supply	  and	  construction	  of	  large	  industrial	  works,	  
transfer	  of	  technology,	  service	  and	  maintenance,	  technical	  assistance,	  leasing,	  joint	  
ventures,	  and	  industrial	  co-­‐operation	  in	  general	  would	  be	  of	  great	  significance	  to	  
developing	  countries	  and	  the	  Commission’s	  programme	  of	  work	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  New	  
International	  Economic	  Order.142	  
	  
However,	  what	  is	  still	  unclear	  is	  how	  the	  international	  sale	  of	  goods,	  which	  was	  not	  
included	  in	  the	  list	  of	  suggested	  topics,	  became	  relevant	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  New	  
International	  Economic	  Order.	  The	  answer,	  in	  this	  writer’s	  opinion,	  could	  include	  the	  
following	  reasons:	  (i)	  the	  international	  sale	  of	  goods	  is	  of	  great	  relevance	  to	  the	  
establishment	  of	  a	  New	  International	  Economic	  Order	  because	  international	  sales	  
involve	  parties	  from	  developing	  countries	  as	  well	  as	  developed	  countries,	  and	  the	  
developing	  countries	  had	  already	  expressed	  dissatisfaction	  with	  their	  position	  with	  
regard	  to	  the	  1964	  Hague	  Conventions;	  (ii)	  the	  international	  sale	  of	  goods	  was	  already	  
included	  in	  the	  Commission’s	  programme	  of	  work	  with	  a	  high	  priority	  attached	  to	  it.	  
However,	  whether	  one	  can	  interpret	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  UN	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  
for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  New	  International	  
Economic	  Order	  in	  line	  with	  the	  view	  that	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  ibid.	  
142	  ibid	  paras	  31	  (4)	  and	  32.	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the	  need	  to	  establish	  a	  new	  international	  economic	  order,	  the	  Commission	  
should	  now	  take	  a	  broader	  approach	  to	  legal	  matters	  .	  .	  .	  the	  Commission	  should	  
consider	  and	  identify	  the	  principles	  of	  international	  public	  law	  that	  underlay	  the	  
structure	  of	  international	  private	  law.143	  
	  	  
is	  still	  not	  very	  evident.	   	  
2.4	  Conclusion	  
The	  campaign	  for	  the	  NIEO	  was	  the	  result	  of	  the	  Third	  World’s	  dissatisfaction	  with	  a	  
system	  that	  governed	  their	  economies	  but	  forbade	  them	  to	  manage	  them.	  The	  two	  
General	  Assembly	  Resolutions,	  the	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Establishment	  of	  a	  New	  
International	  Economic	  Order144	  and	  the	  associated	  Programme	  of	  Action	  on	  the	  
Establishment	  of	  a	  New	  International	  Economic	  Order,145	  were	  the	  fruit	  of	  pressure	  on	  
the	  part	  of	  developing	  nations.	  
	  
Equity,	  sovereign	  equality,	  interdependence,	  common	  interest	  and	  co-­‐operation	  
among	  all	  states,	  irrespective	  of	  their	  economic	  and	  social	  systems,	  along	  with	  terms	  of	  
trade,	  international	  monetary	  policy,	  foreign	  investment	  and	  the	  conduct	  of	  
multinational	  corporations,	  the	  transfer	  of	  technology,	  and	  the	  control	  and	  ownership	  
of	  natural	  resources,	  were	  the	  common	  themes	  addressed	  in	  UN	  Resolutions.	  These	  
Resolutions	  failed	  to	  explain	  how	  the	  unification	  of	  private	  commercial	  law	  would	  
advance	  the	  interests	  of	  developing	  countries.	  Therefore,	  UNCITRAL	  identified	  
unification	  as	  a	  key	  element	  in	  a	  programme	  of	  development.	  UNCITRAL	  was	  set	  up	  in	  
1966,	  under	  a	  General	  Assembly	  Resolution	  declaring	  that	  the	  ‘interests	  of	  all	  peoples,	  
and	  particularly	  those	  of	  the	  developing	  countries’	  demanded	  better	  conditions	  for	  the	  
development	  of	  international	  trade.146	  
	  
This	  study	  has	  made	  an	  attempt	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  the	  NIEO	  became	  linked	  to	  the	  
CISG.	  A	  historical	  overview	  of	  the	  NIEO	  shows	  that	  it	  was	  initially	  developed	  to	  address	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  ‘UNITED	  NATIONS	  COMMISSION	  ON	  INTERNATIONAL	  TRADE	  LAW,	  YEARBOOK	  VOLUME	  XI:	  1980’	  (no	  
137)	  Part	  Two,	  ch	  V,	  sect	  A,	  para	  10.	  
144	  GA	  Resolution	  3201	  (S-­‐VI).	  
145	  GA	  Resolution	  3202	  (S-­‐VI).	  
146	  GA	  Resolution	  2205	  (XXI).	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public	  law	  issues.	  The	  question	  of	  how	  the	  NIEO	  was	  ever	  introduced	  within	  the	  remit	  
of	  private	  law	  is	  still	  a	  mystery,	  since	  the	  examination	  of	  UNCITRAL’s	  mandate	  and	  
programme	  of	  work	  does	  not	  provide	  an	  answer.	  However,	  it	  became	  evident	  from	  the	  
outset	  that	  there	  was	  a	  low	  rate	  of	  participation	  in	  international	  trade	  on	  the	  part	  of	  
developing	  nations	  and	  also	  disparities	  in	  this	  field.	  These	  were	  seen	  as	  obstacles	  to	  
the	  development	  of	  trade;	  therefore,	  international	  sales	  law	  was	  identified	  as	  an	  area	  
requiring	  attention.	  UNCITRAL	  set	  up	  a	  Working	  Group	  with	  responsibility	  for	  
preparing	  a	  proposal	  for	  new	  uniform	  laws	  on	  international	  sales.	  The	  Group	  met	  in	  
nine	  sessions	  between	  1970	  and	  1978,	  and	  produced	  a	  draft	  treaty	  in	  1978.	  The	  United	  
Nations	  called	  a	  diplomatic	  conference	  and	  in	  1980	  the	  text	  of	  the	  CISG	  was	  agreed.	  
It	  is	  worth	  mentioning	  that	  the	  CISG	  is	  suitable	  for	  developing	  countries,	  such	  as	  Iran.	  A	  
study	  of	  the	  legislative	  history	  of	  the	  CISG	  suggests	  that	  developing	  countries	  should	  
feel	  that	  their	  inclusion	  in	  the	  process	  of	  drafting	  and	  agreeing	  it	  might	  give	  them	  
confidence	  that	  their	  interests	  were	  being	  considered.	  
	  
The	  Preamble	  to	  the	  CISG	  refers	  to	  the	  ‘New	  International	  Economic	  Order.’	  Whether	  
any	  meaning	  or	  importance	  is	  attached	  to	  this	  allusion	  to	  the	  NIEO	  in	  the	  specific	  
provisions	  of	  the	  CISG	  will	  be	  discussed	  next.	  The	  next	  chapter	  will	  examine	  the	  
importance	  of	  the	  preamble	  to	  conventions	  in	  general,	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  




A	  New	  International	  Economic	  Order:	  The	  Legal	  Importance	  of	  
Preambles	  and	  a	  Legislative	  Study	  of	  the	  North–South	  Debates	  
3.1	  Introduction	  
The	  previous	  chapter	  described	  the	  general	  background	  to	  the	  political	  debates	  on	  
international	  commercial	  law	  and	  trade	  at	  the	  time	  that	  the	  CISG	  was	  drafted.	  This	  
chapter	  takes	  this	  forward	  by	  making	  a	  detailed	  study	  of	  the	  CISG	  itself.	  This	  is	  crucial	  
for	  an	  understanding	  of	  whether	  the	  CISG	  does	  in	  fact	  reflect	  the	  needs	  of	  developing	  
countries	  such	  as	  Iran.	  As	  part	  of	  this,	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  understand	  the	  issues	  
relating	  to	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  CISG,	  and	  whether	  the	  CISG	  continues	  to	  reflect	  
the	  interests	  of	  both	  developing	  and	  developed	  nations.	  	  
	  
Iran	  supported	  the	  drafting	  of	  the	  CISG	  during	  its	  early	  stages.	  It	  was	  among	  the	  14	  
states	  comprising	  a	  Working	  Group	  established	  by	  the	  United	  Nations	  Commission	  on	  
International	  Trade	  Law	  (UNCITRAL)	  in	  1969.147	  As	  explained	  in	  chapter	  two,148	  the	  
Working	  Group	  was	  authorised	  to	  prepare	  revisions	  of	  the	  1964	  Conventions	  or	  to	  
develop	  a	  new	  text	  that	  would	  be	  more	  widely	  accepted	  by	  countries	  with	  different	  
legal,	  political	  and	  economic	  backgrounds.	  As	  a	  developing	  country,	  Iran	  did	  not	  feel	  
threatened	  by	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  uniform	  law	  as	  such,	  but	  there	  were	  concerns	  among	  the	  
developing	  countries	  that	  a	  uniform	  law	  might	  not	  reflect	  their	  interests.	  	  
	  
UNCITRAL	  laid	  the	  foundations	  for	  discussing	  certain	  changes	  within	  international	  
trade.	  An	  investigation	  into	  the	  events	  and	  provisions	  of	  the	  1980	  Diplomatic	  
Conference,	  held	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  UNCITRAL,	  enables	  a	  fuller	  understanding	  of	  
the	  impact	  of	  North–South	  relations	  on	  the	  final	  stages	  of	  the	  drafting	  of	  the	  CISG.	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  ‘UNITED	  NATIONS	  COMMISSION	  ON	  INTERNATIONAL	  TRADE	  LAW,	  YEARBOOK	  VOLUME	  VI:	  1975’	  (n	  
129)	  Part	  Two,	  ch	  I,	  sect	  1.	  
148	  See	  ch	  2,	  2.1.2.	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Developing	  countries	  accounted	  for	  46.8%	  of	  the	  nations	  in	  attendance149	  and	  as	  a	  
result	  they	  influenced	  the	  actual	  agreement	  on	  international	  trade.150	  At	  the	  most	  
fundamental	  level,	  they	  differed	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  core	  principle	  of	  freedom	  of	  
contract.	  The	  developing	  countries	  demanded	  greater	  protection	  for	  their	  traders	  in	  
transactions	  with	  parties	  from	  the	  industrialised	  nations.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  developed	  
nations	  wanted	  more	  freedom	  of	  contract	  for	  their	  traders	  in	  all	  transactions,	  whether	  
with	  parties	  from	  developed	  or	  developing	  countries.151	  	  
	  
The	  negotiations	  over	  the	  CISG	  illustrate	  how	  North–South	  relations	  were	  perceived	  
within	  the	  context	  of	  international	  trade	  law.	  Although	  the	  conference	  was	  not	  
completely	  dominated	  by	  the	  issues	  dividing	  the	  developed	  and	  developing	  nations,	  
the	  debates	  and	  discussions	  between	  the	  two	  groups	  reflected	  the	  conflicting	  points	  of	  
view	  of	  the	  competing	  economic	  systems.	  The	  study	  and	  analysis	  of	  these	  debates	  
provides	  important	  insight	  into	  North–South	  trade	  relations	  and	  also	  into	  
arrangements	  for	  contracts	  between	  countries	  with	  different	  expectations.	  	  
	  
There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  differences	  between	  developing	  and	  developed	  countries	  
were	  important.152	  Professor	  Farnsworth,	  an	  American	  representative	  at	  the	  Vienna	  
Conference,	  stated:153	  	  
	  
While	  there	  are	  differences	  between	  the	  common	  law	  and	  civil	  countries	  among	  
the	  developed	  nations,	  it	  has	  been	  somewhat	  surprising	  to	  me	  that	  the	  
developing	  nations	  are	  primarily	  “developing”	  and	  only	  very	  secondarily	  by	  
tradition	  divided	  into	  common	  law	  or	  civil	  law.	  
	  
During	  the	  Conference	  it	  was	  suggested	  that	  influential	  developed	  countries	  must	  
agree	  on	  a	  balance	  of	  power	  with	  the	  whole	  world;	  otherwise,	  the	  unification	  of	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commerce	  and	  contract	  law	  would	  be	  restricted	  to	  the	  developed	  world.154	  Also,	  to	  
ensure	  that	  the	  new	  system	  functioned,	  all	  parties	  were	  required	  to	  be	  flexible,	  open	  
and	  perceptive	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  other	  trading	  parties	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  globe.155	  
The	  North–South	  debates	  over	  the	  CISG	  coincided	  with	  changes	  in	  international	  
markets.156	  The	  financial,	  capital	  and	  commercial	  markets	  were	  becoming	  increasingly	  
integrated	  at	  the	  global	  level.	  This	  was	  accompanied	  by	  changes	  in	  the	  bargaining	  
position	  of	  nations	  as	  market	  participants.157	  During	  the	  1970s,	  Asian	  countries	  such	  as	  
Hong	  Kong,	  Singapore,	  South	  Korea	  and	  Taiwan,	  emerging	  as	  a	  capital	  market,	  became	  
almost	  new	  strong	  nations.	  The	  wealth	  of	  OPEC	  countries	  stood	  in	  opposition	  to	  their	  
relative	  underdevelopment,158	  meaning	  that	  the	  traditional	  formula	  that	  a	  country	  
receiving	  technology	  had	  a	  weaker	  bargaining	  position	  was	  no	  longer	  always	  true.159	  
On	  top	  of	  that,	  the	  Third-­‐World	  quest	  for	  a	  New	  International	  Economic	  Order	  strongly	  
demanded	  an	  equal	  distribution	  of	  economic	  power.160	  The	  previous	  chapter	  
considered	  the	  historical	  development	  of	  the	  NIEO	  and	  the	  role	  of	  UNCITRAL	  in	  its	  
implementation.	  	  
	  
This	  chapter	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  investigate	  the	  link	  between	  the	  NIEO	  and	  the	  CISG.	  One	  
of	  the	  intentions	  behind	  the	  CISG	  was	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  achievement	  of	  an	  NIEO.	  
Indeed,	  the	  Preamble	  refers	  to	  the	  NIEO	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  developing	  trade	  ‘on	  
the	  basis	  of	  equality	  and	  mutual	  benefit.’	  These	  objectives	  reflected	  the	  desire	  to	  
create	  a	  structure	  for	  international	  trade	  that	  would	  be	  fairer	  to	  developing	  nations.	  A	  
study	  of	  these	  questions	  is	  important	  for	  Iran	  as	  a	  non-­‐signatory	  state.	  This	  is	  because	  
the	  perception	  may	  still	  exist	  that	  the	  CISG	  tends	  to	  favour	  sellers	  of	  manufactured	  
goods	  in	  the	  industrialised	  countries	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  buyers	  in	  developing	  countries	  
such	  as	  Iran.	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  Iran	  lacks	  bargaining	  power	  compared	  with	  its	  trading	  
partners	  in	  developed	  countries.	  It	  is	  not	  important	  whether	  Iran	  is	  at	  the	  selling	  or	  the	  
buying	  end	  of	  an	  international	  contract.	  As	  sellers	  of	  commodities,	  Iranian	  traders	  are	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‘confronted	  with	  a	  powerful	  world	  market	  of	  buyers,	  and,	  as	  buyers	  of	  industrial	  
products,	  they	  encounter	  the	  know-­‐how	  and	  economic	  power	  of	  their	  co-­‐
contractor.’161	  Therefore,	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  made	  clear	  that	  this	  chapter	  is	  more	  about	  the	  
present	  importance	  of	  these	  questions	  for	  Iran,	  rather	  than	  their	  historical	  importance.	  	  
To	  that	  end,	  Part	  One	  of	  this	  chapter	  provides	  information	  on	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  
preamble	  to	  a	  convention	  in	  general,	  what	  the	  Preamble	  to	  the	  CISG	  is	  used	  for,	  and	  
how	  this	  might	  affect	  the	  position	  of	  Iran	  in	  deciding	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  adopt	  the	  CISG.	  
Part	  Two	  then	  examines	  four	  major	  issues	  and	  the	  related	  provisions	  of	  the	  CISG	  in	  
which	  the	  developing	  nations	  sought	  to	  protect	  their	  interests.	  The	  negotiations	  over	  
these	  matters	  were	  of	  great	  importance	  to	  the	  developing	  nations,	  and	  indeed	  to	  the	  
developed	  nations	  too,	  as	  a	  failure	  to	  take	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  developing	  nations	  into	  
account	  had	  contributed	  to	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  ULIS	  and	  ULF.	  Part	  Three	  analyses	  case	  
law	  on	  the	  CISG,	  the	  post-­‐ratification	  effect	  of	  the	  CISG	  on	  developing	  countries,	  and	  
whether	  an	  analysis	  of	  CISG	  case	  law	  reveals	  evidence	  of	  any	  of	  those	  concerns	  raised	  
by	  developing	  countries	  during	  negotiations.	  This	  will	  enable	  a	  conclusion	  to	  be	  
reached	  on	  whether	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  CISG,	  as	  drafted	  and	  interpreted,	  should	  be	  
regarded	  as	  furthering	  the	  interests	  of	  developing	  countries	  such	  as	  Iran.	  	  
Part	  One	  
3.2	  Preamble	  to	  the	  UN	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  
Sale	  of	  Goods	  and	  Import	  of	  NIEO	  
The	  Preamble	  to	  the	  CISG	  states	  the	  following:	  
	  
The	  States	  Parties	  to	  this	  Convention,	  	  
Bearing	  in	  mind	  the	  broad	  objectives	  in	  the	  resolutions	  adopted	  by	  the	  sixth	  
special	  session	  of	  the	  General	  Assembly	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  on	  the	  
establishment	  of	  a	  New	  International	  Economic	  Order,	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Considering	  that	  the	  development	  of	  international	  trade	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  equality	  
and	  mutual	  benefits	  is	  an	  important	  element	  in	  promoting	  friendly	  relations	  
among	  States,	  
Being	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  the	  adoption	  of	  uniform	  rules	  which	  govern	  contracts	  
for	  the	  international	  sale	  of	  goods	  and	  take	  into	  account	  the	  different	  social,	  
economic	  and	  legal	  systems	  would	  contribute	  to	  the	  removal	  of	  legal	  barriers	  in	  
international	  trade	  and	  promote	  the	  development	  of	  international	  trade,	  
Have	  agreed	  as	  follows:	  .	  .	  .	  	  
	  
The	  Preamble	  to	  the	  CISG	  thus	  refers	  to	  an	  important	  concept:	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  
New	  International	  Economic	  Order	  (NIEO).	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  CISG	  might	  have	  
something	  more	  to	  offer	  developing	  nations	  than	  the	  ULIS	  and	  ULF.	  This	  fact	  might	  
have	  been	  the	  driving	  force	  behind	  the	  desire	  of	  the	  developing	  countries	  to	  
participate	  in	  the	  drafting	  process.	  But	  does	  the	  Preamble,	  on	  its	  own,	  have	  any	  impact	  
on	  interpretation?	  A	  study	  of	  the	  Commission’s	  programme	  of	  work	  has	  failed	  to	  
reveal	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  drafters	  in	  making	  this	  allusion	  to	  the	  NIEO.	  It	  is	  therefore	  
important	  to	  examine	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  an	  interpretative	  role	  and	  significance	  are	  
given	  to	  the	  Preamble,	  and	  whether	  it	  is	  given	  this	  role	  to	  interpret	  other	  provisions	  of	  
the	  CISG.	  If	  so,	  can	  one	  interpret	  other	  provisions	  of	  the	  CISG	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  NIEO?	  
To	  answer	  these	  questions,	  the	  general	  principles	  governing	  the	  relevance	  of	  a	  
preamble	  to	  a	  convention	  will	  be	  considered	  first.	  A	  brief	  overview	  of	  the	  Preamble	  to	  
the	  CISG	  will	  then	  be	  provided,	  followed	  by	  a	  consideration	  of	  what	  this	  Preamble	  is	  
used	  for.	  The	  relationship	  between	  the	  CISG	  and	  the	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  
Treaties	  (VCLT)	  will	  then	  be	  examined,	  since	  the	  VCLT	  influences	  the	  interpretation	  of	  
the	  CISG.	  Finally,	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  Preamble	  to	  the	  CISG	  will	  be	  considered.	  
3.2.1	  The	  Preamble	   	  
What	  needs	  to	  be	  clarified	  is	  what	  the	  preamble	  of	  a	  treaty	  denotes	  and	  what	  its	  
functions	  are.	  Treviranus	  argues	  that	  the	  preamble	  sets	  out	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  
conclusion	  of	  the	  treaty	  by	  representing	  the	  shared	  principles	  of	  and	  defining	  the	  
retrospective,	  current	  and	  prospective	  state	  of	  relations	  among	  the	  contracting	  
parties.	  As	  long	  as	  the	  bilateral	  relations,	  which	  stipulate	  contractual	  commitments,	  
are	  defined	  as	  preconditions	  for	  the	  conclusion	  and	  implementation	  of	  a	  treaty,	  such	  a	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clause	  is	  regarded	  as	  legally	  significant	  for	  implementation	  and	  termination	  purposes.	  
In	  addition	  to	  these	  reasons,	  the	  object	  and	  purpose	  of	  the	  concluded	  treaty	  is	  set	  
forth	  in	  its	  preamble.162	  
	  
Article	  31(2)	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  Treaties	  1969	  states	  that	  the	  text	  
and	  all	  components	  of	  a	  treaty,	  including	  the	  preamble,	  can	  be	  used	  for	  the	  purposes	  
of	  interpretation.163	  The	  preamble	  is	  a	  part	  of	  the	  context	  and	  primary	  source	  of	  
interpretation;	  the	  decisions	  of	  international	  courts	  and	  tribunals	  affirm	  such	  
importance	  being	  attached	  to	  the	  preamble.164	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  preamble	  is	  the	  
essence	  of	  a	  treaty,	  since	  it	  establishes	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  provisions	  of	  that	  treaty	  
and	  makes	  clear	  their	  purpose.	  This	  applies	  particularly	  to	  preambles	  that	  establish	  a	  
certain	  regime	  or	  close	  co-­‐operation.165	  
3.2.2 Overview	  	  
The	  background,	  nature,	  general	  purposes	  and	  approaches	  of	  the	  CISG	  are	  laid	  out	  in	  
the	  Preamble	  to	  the	  Convention.	  It	  opens	  with	  the	  statement	  that	  parties	  to	  the	  
Convention	  are	  states,	  and	  closes	  by	  declaring	  that	  the	  Convention	  is	  an	  agreement	  
between	  those	  states.	  There	  are	  three	  principal	  clauses	  in	  between,	  the	  first	  two	  of	  
which	  position	  the	  CISG	  in	  the	  context	  of	  broader	  international	  programmes	  and	  goals,	  
while	  the	  third	  specifies	  the	  specific	  purposes	  and	  methods	  of	  the	  Convention.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162	  Hans-­‐Dietrich	  Treviranus,	  ‘Preamble’	  in	  Encyclopaedia	  of	  Public	  International	  Law	  Volume	  7	  (1992)	  
393–394.	  
163	  This	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  later	  in	  this	  chapter.	  See	  Part	  One,	  3.2.4.	  
164	  See	  Asante	  Technologies	  v	  PMC-­‐Sierra	  [2001]	  Federal	  District	  Court	  [California].	  
<	  http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cases/010727u1.html>	  accessed	  5	  August	  2013;	  CLOUT	  case	  No	  433	  
[Federal	  District	  Court,	  Northern	  District	  of	  California,	  United	  States,	  30	  July	  2001].	  	  
In	  order	  to	  show	  an	  intent	  that	  the	  CISG	  should	  supersede	  internal	  domestic	  law	  on	  matters	  within	  its	  
scope,	  the	  court	  cited	  language	  from	  the	  second	  main	  clause	  of	  the	  Preamble	  (‘the	  development	  of	  
international	  trade	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  equality	  and	  mutual	  benefit’)	  and	  the	  third	  main	  clause	  of	  the	  
Preamble	  (‘the	  adoption	  of	  uniform	  rules	  which	  govern	  contracts	  for	  the	  international	  sale	  of	  goods	  and	  
take	  into	  account	  the	  different	  social,	  economic	  and	  legal	  systems	  would	  contribute	  to	  the	  removal	  of	  
legal	  barriers	  in	  international	  trade	  and	  promote	  the	  development	  of	  international	  trade’).	  
See	  Geneva	  Pharmaceuticals	  Tech	  Corp	  v	  Barr	  Labs	  Inc	  [2002]	  Federal	  District	  Court	  [New	  York].	  
<	  http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cases/020510u1.html>	  accessed	  5	  August	  2013;	  CLOUT	  case	  No	  579	  
[Federal	  District	  Court,	  Southern	  District	  of	  New	  York,	  United	  States,	  May	  10,	  2002].	  	  
The	  court	  cited	  language	  from	  the	  third	  main	  clause	  of	  the	  Preamble	  (‘the	  adoption	  of	  uniform	  rules	  
which	  govern	  contracts	  for	  the	  international	  sale	  of	  goods	  and	  take	  into	  account	  the	  different	  social,	  
economic	  and	  legal	  systems	  would	  contribute	  to	  the	  removal	  of	  legal	  barriers	  in	  international	  trade	  and	  
promote	  the	  development	  of	  international	  trade’)	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  that	  the	  CISG	  superseded	  
contract	  claims	  based	  on	  internal	  domestic	  law.	  
165	  Treviranus,	  ‘Preamble’	  (n	  162)	  393–394.	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The	  first	  clause	  (‘Bearing	  in	  mind	  .	  .	  .	  ’)	  recommends	  that	  the	  CISG	  comply	  with	  the	  
‘broad	  objectives’	  of	  UN	  Resolutions	  to	  establish	  a	  ‘New	  International	  Economic	  
Order.’	  The	  second	  clause	  signifies	  that	  promoting	  ‘friendly	  relations	  among	  States’	  
through	  ‘the	  development	  of	  international	  trade	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  equality	  and	  mutual	  
benefit’	  is	  the	  general	  purpose	  of	  the	  CISG.	  In	  the	  third	  clause,	  the	  particular	  purposes	  
are	  indicated:	  ‘the	  development	  of	  international	  trade’	  and	  ‘the	  removal	  of	  legal	  
barriers	  in	  international	  trade’	  that	  is	  in	  line	  with	  harmonisation	  of	  law.	  The	  third	  
clause	  further	  mentions	  particular	  aspects	  of	  the	  CISG	  as	  a	  set	  of	  ‘uniform	  rules’	  which	  
‘takes	  into	  account	  the	  different	  social,	  economic	  and	  legal	  systems.’166	  In	  Article	  7(1)	  
of	  the	  CISG,	  emphasis	  is	  added	  on	  the	  uniformity	  and	  no	  superiority	  of	  particular	  legal	  
and	  socio-­‐economic	  traditions.	  This	  article	  mandates	  the	  need	  to	  interpret	  the	  
Convention	  with	  regard	  ‘to	  its	  international	  character	  and	  to	  promote	  uniformity	  in	  its	  
application.’167	  	  
3.2.3	  What	  Is	  the	  Preamble	  to	  the	  CISG	  Used	  For?	  
The	  main	  question	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Preamble	  is	  whether	  any	  interpretative	  role	  is	  
given	  to	  it.168	  There	  are	  two	  schools	  of	  thoughts	  on	  this	  subject.	  Schlechtriem	  argues	  
that	  ‘[t]he	  Preamble	  to	  the	  Convention	  .	  .	  .	  refers	  to	  the	  public	  international	  law	  
obligations	  and	  goals	  of	  the	  signatory	  states	  and	  may	  not	  be	  used	  for	  the	  
interpretation	  and	  gap-­‐filling	  of	  the	  substantive	  legal	  provisions	  .	  .	  .	  ’169	  Evans	  takes	  a	  
similar	  view,	  suggesting	  that:	  ‘	  .	  .	  .	  the	  character	  of	  the	  Convention	  is	  essentially	  
technical	  and	  that	  rules	  of	  interpretation	  are	  already	  to	  be	  found	  in	  Article	  7(1).	  In	  
consequence,	  the	  scope	  for	  interpretation	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  Preamble	  may	  not	  be	  very	  
wide	  .	  .	  .	  ’170	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  CISG,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  
its	  Preamble	  and	  Article	  7	  lack	  ‘any	  specific	  methodology’	  for	  how	  to	  interpret	  it.	  In	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166	  Loukas	  Mistelis,	  ‘Preamble’	  in	  Stefan	  Krol,	  Loukas	  Mistelis	  and	  Pilar	  Perales	  Viscasillas	  (eds),	  UN	  
Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  (CISG)	  (2011).	  	  
167	  ‘UNCITRAL	  Digest	  of	  Case	  Law	  on	  the	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods’	  
(2008).	  
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/clout/08–51939_Ebook.pdf>	  accessed	  2	  July	  2013.	  
168	  Mistelis,	  ‘Preamble’	  (n	  166).	  
169	  Peter	  Schlechtriem,	  Uniform	  Sales	  Law	  –	  The	  UN	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  
Goods	  (Manz:	  Vienna	  1986)	  as	  stated	  in	  footnote	  no	  111.	  
170	  Malcolm	  Evans,	  ‘Preamble’	  in	  Bianca	  and	  Bonell	  (eds),	  Commentary	  on	  the	  International	  Sales	  Law	  
(Giuffré:	  Milan	  1987)	  25.	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fact,	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  Convention,	  inter	  alia	  to	  promote	  a	  New	  International	  
Economic	  Order,	  as	  laid	  out	  in	  the	  Preamble,	  do	  not	  provide	  such	  practical	  utility.171	  
	  
Against	  these	  views,	  Kastely	  argues	  that	  the	  Preamble	  ‘informs	  many	  other	  
provisions.’172	  Enderlein	  and	  Maskow	  maintain	  that	  the	  Preamble	  cannot	  be	  dismissed:	  
	  	  
The	  principles	  it	  contains	  can	  be	  referred	  to	  in	  interpreting	  terms	  or	  rules	  of	  the	  
Convention,	  such	  as	  the	  terms	  of	  “good	  faith”	  (article	  7,	  paragraph	  1)	  or	  the	  
rather	  frequent	  and	  vague	  term	  “reasonable.”	  It	  could	  also	  be	  used	  to	  fill	  gaps	  
because	  those	  principles	  can	  be	  counted	  among,	  or	  have	  an	  influence	  on,	  the	  
basic	  rules	  underlying	  the	  Convention	  (article	  7,	  paragraph	  2).	  The	  spirit	  of	  the	  
Preamble	  should	  also	  be	  taken	  account	  of	  when	  agreed	  texts	  of	  sales	  contracts	  
are	  to	  be	  interpreted.173	  	  
	  
A	  study	  of	  case	  law	  suggests	  that	  references	  are	  indeed	  made	  to	  the	  Preamble	  to	  the	  
CISG.	  For	  example,	  in	  2002,	  the	  court	  found	  that	  ‘[t]he	  intent	  of	  the	  contracting	  parties	  
to	  the	  CISG	  can	  be	  discerned	  from	  the	  introductory	  text.’174	  In	  another	  case,	  in	  2001,	  
the	  issue	  was	  how	  to	  decide	  whether	  state	  law	  or	  the	  CISG	  governed	  the	  sales	  
contract.	  The	  court	  held	  that	  the	  CISG’s	  ‘expressly	  stated	  goal	  of	  developing	  uniform	  
international	  contract	  law	  to	  promote	  international	  trade	  indicates	  the	  intent	  of	  the	  
parties	  to	  the	  treaty	  to	  have	  the	  treaty	  pre-­‐empt	  state	  law	  causes	  of	  action.’175	  	  
	  
Mistelis176	  argues	  that:	  
	  
‘despite	  the	  character	  of	  the	  Preamble	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  political	  declaration	  of	  
the	  Contracting	  States	  which	  may	  well	  contrast	  with	  the	  technical/normative	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171	  Michael	  Maggi,	   Review	   of	   the	   Convention	   on	   Contracts	   for	   the	   International	   Sale	   of	   Goods	   (CISG)	  
2002–2003	  (Kluwer	  Law	  International	  2004)	  25.	  
172	  Kastely,	  ‘Unification	  and	  Community’	  (n	  150)	  594.	  
173	  Fritz	  Enderlein	  and	  Dietrich	  Maskow,	  International	  Sales	  Law	  (Oceana	  1992)	  20.	  
174	  See	  Geneva	  Pharmaceuticals	  Tech	  Corp	  v	  Barr	  Labs	  Inc	  [2002]	  Federal	  District	  Court	  [New	  York].	  
<	  http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cases/020510u1.html>	  accessed	  5	  August	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  No	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[Federal	  District	  Court,	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  York,	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  States,	  May	  10,	  2002].	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  v	  PMC-­‐Sierra	  [2001]	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  Court	  [California].	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  accessed	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  Mistelis,	  ‘Preamble’	  (n	  166).	  
62	  
nature	  of	  the	  substantive	  provisions	  of	  the	  Conventions,	  it	  may	  be	  used	  for	  the	  
compliance	  of	  possible	  interpretations	  with	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  Convention,	  
especially	  in	  legal	  cultures	  where	  the	  Preamble	  is	  looked	  at	  customarily.	  
3.2.4	  The	  Relationship	  Between	  the	  CISG	  and	  the	  VCLT	  
The	  suggestion	  that	  the	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  Treaties	  is	  also	  applicable	  in	  
the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  CISG	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  how	  connected	  these	  two	  sets	  of	  
conventions	  are.	  One	  can	  argue	  that	  the	  CISG	  is	  primarily	  a	  private	  law	  convention,	  
since	  it	  deals	  with	  the	  rights	  and	  obligations	  of	  buyers	  and	  sellers,	  rather	  than	  a	  public	  
law	  convention,	  which	  deals	  with	  the	  rights	  and	  obligations	  of	  states;	  therefore,	  how	  
did	  the	  VCLT	  become	  relevant	  to	  the	  interpretation	  of	  a	  private	  law	  convention	  (in	  this	  
case	  the	  CISG)?	  As	  the	  CISG	  lacks	  any	  tools	  or	  methods	  for	  interpreting	  the	  
interpretative	  article,	  it	  cannot	  interpret	  itself.177	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  suggested	  that	  this	  
should	  be	  left	  to	  the	  VCLT	  or	  to	  the	  ‘rule	  of	  customary	  public	  international	  rules,’178	  
and,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  the	  VCLT	  can	  be	  used	  for	  pragmatic	  purposes	  (such	  as	  
determining	  the	  meaning	  of	  ‘principle’	  under	  CISG	  Article	  7(2)).179	  	  
	  
According	  to	  Roth	  and	  Happ,	  in	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  CISG	  Articles	  31	  to	  33	  of	  the	  
VCLT	  should	  be	  taken	  into	  account.180	  They	  argue	  that	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  VCLT	  and	  valid	  
customary	  international	  law	  are	  consistent:181	  
	  
There	  is	  no	  convincing	  argument	  against	  interpreting	  all	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  
CISG	  according	  to	  international	  law	  rules.	  Since	  the	  CISG	  is	  a	  treaty	  governed	  by	  
international	  law,	  it	  must	  be	  interpreted	  according	  to	  rules	  of	  international	  law	  as	  
set	  forth	  in	  Art	  31–33	  of	  the	  VCLT.182	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  Joseph	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  Tightrope	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  CISG	  and	  Domestic	  Law’	  (2005–06)	  25	  
Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Commerce	  87.	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  M	  Roth	  and	  R	  Happ,	  ‘Interpretation	  of	  the	  CISG	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  to	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  of	  International	  Law’	  (1999)	  
vol	  IV	  International	  Trade	  and	  Business	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  Annual	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  ibid.	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  Roth	  and	  Happ,	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  (n	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But	  to	  what	  extent	  does	  the	  VCLT	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  CISG?	  In	  
other	  words,	  does	  the	  VCLT	  still	  apply	  to	  interpretations	  of	  the	  CISG	  if	  a	  state	  has	  not	  
ratified	  it	  but	  has	  ratified	  the	  CISG?	  Although	  the	  VCLT	  cannot	  be	  used	  if	  it	  is	  not	  
ratified,183	  in	  public	  international	  law,	  ‘when	  a	  meaning	  in	  a	  provision	  is	  unclear	  courts	  
employ	  VCLT	  as	  the	  method	  of	  interpreting	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  questionable	  
provision.’184	  Articles	  31	  and	  32	  of	  the	  VCLT	  have	  been	  adopted	  by	  international	  courts	  
as	  customary	  international	  law	  and,	  pursuant	  to	  this	  status	  of	  customary	  international	  
law,	  are	  used	  to	  interpret	  public	  treaties	  almost	  universally	  in	  international	  courts.185	  	  
As	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  the	  Preamble	  to	  the	  CISG	  could	  be	  also	  
interpreted	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  VCLT,	  Article	  31(2)	  of	  which	  pays	  regard	  to	  the	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  treaty	  in	  accordance	  with	  its	  context,	  including	  its	  Preamble.	  
Therefore,	  one	  could	  argue	  that	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  New	  International	  Economic	  
Order,	  as	  contained	  in	  the	  Preamble	  to	  the	  CISG,	  is	  given	  an	  interpretative	  role,	  even	  if	  
the	  scope	  for	  interpretation	  may	  not	  be	  very	  wide.	  
3.2.5 The	  Significance	  of	  the	  Preamble	  to	  the	  CISG	  
In	  order	  to	  assess	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  Preamble,	  it	  might	  be	  particularly	  pertinent	  to	  
indicate	  the	  driving	  forces	  behind	  the	  inclusion	  of	  a	  mention	  of	  the	  NIEO	  in	  the	  
Preamble,	  and	  whether	  the	  CISG	  contributes	  towards	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  NIEO.	  
Finally,	  it	  is	  worth	  asking:	  should	  such	  an	  inclusion	  of	  the	  NIEO	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  CISG?	  
	  
So	  far,	  it	  has	  been	  established	  that	  the	  Preamble	  to	  the	  Convention	  indicates	  the	  aim	  
and	  underlying	  objective	  of	  the	  Convention,	  and,	  more	  generally,	  the	  motivation	  for	  
creating	  this	  set	  of	  uniform	  laws	  on	  the	  international	  sale	  of	  goods.186	  As	  Felemegas	  
argues,	  ‘the	  Preamble	  to	  the	  CISG	  seems	  to	  describe	  the	  character	  of	  the	  union	  among	  
the	  States	  who	  have	  authored	  the	  text	  with	  those	  who	  read	  it.	  The	  words	  of	  the	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  (2008)	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  See	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  Concerning	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  of	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  Serbia	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  v	  Portugal	  [2004]	  ICJ	  LEXIS	  14	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  Court	  will	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  interpretation	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  .	  .	  of	  the	  Statute,	  and	  will	  do	  so	  in	  accordance	  with	  
customary	  international	  law,	  reflected	  in	  Article	  31	  of	  the	  1969	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  
Treaties.’	  
186	  Peter	  Schlechtriem	  and	  Ingeborg	  Schwenzer,	  Commentary	  on	  the	  UN	  Convention	  on	  the	  International	  
Sale	  of	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  (2nd	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  OUP	  2005)	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64	  
Preamble	  seem	  to	  emphasise	  the	  conscious	  act	  of	  agreement	  by	  the	  member	  
States.’187	  And:188	  
	  
The	  wording	  used	  in	  the	  Preamble	  indicates	  that	  the	  union	  of	  nations	  by	  CISG	  is	  
the	  result	  of	  careful	  consideration	  and	  express	  agreement	  .	  .	  .	  However,	  the	  fact	  
that	  most	  of	  this	  is	  in	  standard	  treaty	  language	  clearly	  undercuts	  the	  strength	  of	  
any	  proposal	  to	  attach	  greater	  meaning	  or	  importance	  to	  the	  CISG	  Preamble	  .	  .	  .	  	  
	  
Therefore,	  it	  is	  fair	  to	  say	  that,	  among	  other	  things,	  contributing	  to	  a	  new	  international	  
order	  is	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  CISG.	  The	  writing	  and	  reading	  of	  the	  CISG,	  along	  with	  the	  
actual	  political	  and	  economic	  community,	  determine	  the	  relationship	  among	  the	  states	  
that	  have	  already	  joined	  or	  will	  join	  this	  Convention.	  	  
	  
Professor	  Kastely	  argues	  that	  the	  Preamble	  to	  the	  CISG	  forms	  a	  community	  that	  is	  
‘both	  consensual	  and	  motivated	  by	  self-­‐interest’	  and	  the	  main	  focus	  of	  which	  is	  ‘on	  the	  
possibility	  of	  encouraging	  international	  trade,	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  both	  industrialised	  and	  
the	  developing	  nations.’189	  Professor	  Winship,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  argues	  that	  the	  text	  
of	  the	  Preamble	  contains	  altruistic	  elements	  and	  is	  free	  from	  any	  self-­‐interest.190	  He	  
emphasises	  certain	  phrases	  in	  the	  Preamble	  to	  the	  CISG	  that	  for	  the	  first	  time	  
recognise	  specific	  concerns	  of	  developing	  nations.	  
	  
Felemegas	  argues	  that	  ‘the	  act	  of	  joining	  the	  community	  formed	  by	  CISG’	  is	  ‘an	  apt	  
recognition	  of	  the	  equal	  status	  of	  less	  developed	  countries.’	  He	  continues	  that	  a	  
danger	  exists	  that	  analysing	  the	  ‘unification	  on	  equal	  terms,’	  which	  created	  relief	  and	  
euphoria	  after	  its	  official	  introduction	  to	  the	  world,	  may	  obscure	  the	  benefits	  that	  
were	  granted	  to	  the	  developing	  countries.	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  the	  developing	  nations	  
cannot	  ascertain	  the	  real	  benefits	  that	  can	  be	  achieved	  from	  the	  CISG,	  it	  may	  turn	  into	  
‘a	  symbolic	  gesture.’	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  only	  the	  correct	  interpretation	  and	  uniform	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application	  of	  the	  text	  that	  can	  protect	  it.191	  Professor	  Bonell	  argues	  that	  the	  preamble	  
to	  an	  international	  agreement	  indicates	  ‘the	  aim	  of	  the	  agreement	  and	  any	  specific	  
considerations	  underlying	  it.’	  He	  then	  concludes	  that	  the	  CISG	  has	  a	  more	  advanced	  
preamble	  than	  other	  Conventions	  developed	  within	  UNCITRAL.192	  The	  Preamble	  to	  the	  
United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  the	  Limitation	  Period	  in	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  
(1975)	  has	  similarities	  with	  the	  Preamble	  to	  the	  CISG.	  It	  states	  that:	  
	  
Considering	  that	  international	  trade	  is	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  the	  promotion	  of	  
friendly	  relations	  among	  States;	  
Believing	  that	  the	  adoption	  of	  uniform	  rules	  governing	  the	  limitation	  period	  in	  
international	  sale	  of	  goods	  would	  facilitate	  the	  development	  of	  world	  trade	  .	  .	  .	  	  
	  
Whether	  this	  similarity	  in	  the	  repetition	  of	  clauses	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  reconfirmation	  
of	  notions	  and	  principles,	  or	  merely	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  stylistic	  formula	  and	  nothing	  more,	  
is	  still	  an	  open	  question.193	  	  
	  
Kastely	  states	  that	  ‘the	  use	  of	  [such]	  form	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  dispute	  reflects	  the	  broad	  
acceptance	  of	  the	  principles	  underlying	  the	  Preamble,’194	  while	  Winship	  suggests	  that	  
‘the	  language	  in	  paragraphs	  two	  and	  three,	  which	  is	  also	  found	  in	  prior	  treaties,	  could	  
reflect	  indifference	  to	  the	  use	  of	  language	  that	  has	  become	  familiar	  and	  considered	  
innocuous.’195	  Felemegas	  also	  believes	  that	  such	  a	  standard	  form	  of	  language	  in	  the	  
CISG	  Preamble	  limits	  the	  intrinsic	  importance	  attached	  to	  it.196	  Having	  said	  that,	  the	  
incorporation	  of	  certain	  ideas	  derived	  from	  the	  concerns	  of	  Third-­‐World	  countries,	  
which	  had	  previously	  never	  been	  addressed,	  makes	  this	  preamble	  unique.197	  The	  
significance	  of	  the	  wording	  of	  the	  Preamble	  to	  the	  CISG	  and	  the	  weight	  that	  one	  can	  
place	  on	  it	  can	  be	  determined	  by	  the	  VCLT.	  As	  discussed	  earlier,	  Article	  31(2)	  of	  the	  
VCLT,	  which	  regards	  the	  preamble	  of	  a	  treaty	  as	  part	  of	  the	  context	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  treaty,	  should	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191	  Felemegas,	  ‘The	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods’	  (n	  187).	  
192	  Michael	  J	  Bonell,	  ‘Introduction	  to	  the	  Convention’	  in	  Bianca	  and	  Bonell	  (eds),	  Commentary	  on	  the	  
International	  Sales	  Law	  (Giuffré:	  Milan	  1987)	  1.	  
193	  Felemegas,	  ‘The	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods’	  (n	  187).	  
194	  Kastely,	  ‘Unification	  and	  Community’	  (n	  150).	  
195	  Winship,	  ‘Commentary	  on	  Professor	  Kastely’s	  Rhetorical	  Analysis’	  (n	  190).	  	  
196	  Felemegas,	  ‘The	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods’	  (n	  187).	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  ibid.	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CISG.	  However,	  the	  problem	  is	  that	  the	  rules	  for	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  CISG	  are	  
accommodated	  in	  Article	  7	  of	  the	  Convention.	  Bonell198	  has	  stated	  in	  this	  regard	  that:	  
	  
The	  scope	  for	  interpretation	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  Preamble	  may	  not	  be	  very	  wide	  
and	  it	  will	  be	  of	  interest	  to	  see	  how	  far	  the	  case	  law	  may	  accord	  its	  provisions	  the	  
status	  of	  something	  more	  than	  general	  declarations	  of	  political	  principle.	  
	  
This	  author	  is	  of	  the	  opinion,	  however,	  that	  such	  an	  interpretive	  role	  exists	  for	  the	  
Preamble	  to	  the	  Convention,	  in	  particular	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  NIEO;	  
however,	  such	  a	  role	  has	  a	  very	  limited	  scope.	  Therefore,	  given	  the	  important	  
diplomatic	  conference	  and	  textual	  compromises	  that	  were	  accommodated	  in	  the	  
Convention,	  the	  value	  of	  the	  Preamble	  to	  the	  CISG	  should	  not	  be	  entirely	  disregarded.	  
Nevertheless,	  no	  expansive	  interpretive	  role	  is	  justified	  for	  the	  Preamble.	  
	  
Many	  commercial	  lawyers	  in	  the	  developed	  world	  believed	  that	  the	  NIEO	  was	  all	  about	  
process	  and	  inclusion	  and	  that	  it	  lacked	  substance.	  But	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  NIEO	  had	  an	  
impact	  on	  the	  substantive	  content	  of	  the	  private	  law	  governing	  international	  trade	  is	  
an	  important	  point,	  which	  leads	  on	  to	  a	  study	  of	  the	  specific	  drafting	  issues	  that	  arose	  
during	  the	  most	  important	  round	  of	  negotiations	  in	  the	  legislative	  history	  of	  the	  CISG,	  
that	  between	  the	  developed	  and	  the	  developing	  countries	  of	  the	  world.	  
Part	  Two	  
3.3	  Specific	  Drafting	  Issues	  
The	  widespread	  participation	  of	  nations	  with	  various	  orientations	  and	  ties	  suggested	  
that	  negotiations	  over	  the	  CISG	  would	  be	  difficult.	  The	  debates	  were	  divided	  not	  only	  
between	  common	  law	  and	  civil	  law,	  but	  also	  along	  North–South	  or	  developed–
developing	  lines.	  Having	  said	  that,	  the	  delegates	  from	  developing	  countries	  did	  not	  
challenge	  the	  general	  principles	  of	  international	  commercial	  law	  as	  unsuitable	  to	  their	  
countries’	  conditions.	  Instead,	  they	  concentrated	  on	  three	  practical	  matters.	  First,	  
their	  economies	  relied	  on	  the	  export	  of	  raw	  materials,	  unfinished	  goods	  and	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  Bonell,	  ‘Introduction	  to	  the	  Convention’	  (n	  192).	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commodities.	  Of	  course,	  there	  have	  been	  occasions	  when	  exporting	  countries	  have	  
taken	  advantage	  of	  their	  economic	  power	  as	  commodity	  exporters	  (the	  1973	  OPEC	  
boycott	  is	  one	  example),	  but	  generally	  most	  commodity-­‐exporting	  countries	  are	  not	  in	  
such	  a	  strong	  position	  to	  establish	  effective	  cartels.	  Instead,	  it	  has	  been	  in	  the	  
developed	  world	  that	  the	  prices	  in	  commodity	  markets	  have	  been	  determined.	  In	  
addition,	  trade	  associations	  have	  more	  power	  in	  deciding	  standard	  contractual	  terms.	  
Therefore,	  the	  importers	  of	  finished	  goods	  in	  developing	  countries	  had	  to	  negotiate	  
those	  contractual	  terms	  with	  powerful	  manufacturers	  in	  better	  bargaining	  positions.	  
This	  question	  of	  how	  to	  protect	  the	  exporters	  of	  commodities	  and	  importers	  of	  
manufactured	  goods	  was	  a	  key	  concern	  of	  developing	  nations	  at	  the	  Vienna	  
Conference.199	  	  
	  
The	  second	  point	  concerned	  the	  network	  of	  banking,	  insurance,	  shipping,	  legal	  and	  
other	  sorts	  of	  expert	  service	  that	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  international	  trade.	  These	  services	  
tend	  to	  be	  concentrated	  in	  the	  developed	  countries,	  and	  indeed	  in	  a	  small	  number	  of	  
important	  international	  centres,	  such	  as	  London,	  New	  York	  and	  Paris.	  Therefore,	  
provisions	  that	  fail	  to	  take	  account	  of	  such	  inequalities	  could	  function	  to	  the	  detriment	  
of	  traders	  in	  developing	  countries.200	  Finally,	  there	  was	  a	  feeling	  that	  developing	  
nations	  frequently	  mistrusted	  the	  developed	  world.201	  
	  
These	  three	  concerns	  were	  raised	  with	  regard	  to	  four	  specific	  issues	  that	  divided	  the	  
delegates	  on	  North–South	  lines:	  (i)	  the	  procedures	  for	  notifying	  the	  seller	  of	  non-­‐
conformity;	  (ii)	  the	  circumstances	  that	  would	  allow	  a	  party	  to	  suspend	  its	  performance;	  
(iii)	  the	  rules	  governing	  the	  risk	  of	  loss	  of	  goods	  sold	  in	  transit;	  and	  (iv)	  the	  role	  trade	  
usages	  should	  play	  in	  international	  sales.	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  S	  K	  Date-­‐Bah,	  ‘Vienna	  Sales	  Convention	  1980	  –	  Developing	  Countries’	  Perspectives’	  in	  Rao	  Penna	  et	  al	  
(eds),	  Current	  Developments	  in	  International	  Transfers	  of	  Goods	  and	  Services	  (Butterworths	  1994)	  87,	  
92;	  Eorsi,	  ‘A	  Propos	  the	  1980	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods’	  (n	  
149)	  350.	  
200	  Eorsi,	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3.3.1 The	  North–South	  Issues:	  The	  Non-­‐Conforming	  Procedures	  (Articles	  
37–38	  (Draft	  Convention)	  –	  Article	  39	  (CISG))	  
Part	  III	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention	  deals	  with	  the	  substantive	  obligations	  of	  buyers	  and	  
sellers.	  This	  includes	  the	  provisions	  for	  giving	  notification	  of	  lack	  of	  conformity	  of	  
goods	  by	  the	  buyer	  to	  the	  seller	  as	  contained	  in	  Article	  39.	  Therefore,	  a	  study	  of	  the	  
issue	  of	  non-­‐conforming	  goods	  is	  important,	  as	  it	  was	  closely	  linked	  with	  the	  concerns	  
of	  developing	  countries	  at	  the	  time	  of	  negotiation.	  The	  developing	  countries	  were	  not	  
confident	  that	  traders	  would	  have	  the	  expertise	  or	  infrastructure	  to	  give	  prompt	  and	  
accurate	  notice	  according	  to	  the	  standards	  of	  some	  developed	  countries.	  In	  the	  
preparation	  of	  the	  CISG,	  procedures	  for	  non-­‐conformity	  were	  considered	  to	  be	  one	  of	  
the	  most	  disputed	  areas.202	  	  
	  
Delegates	  from	  developing	  countries	  at	  the	  Vienna	  Conference	  were	  particularly	  
concerned	  about	  (i)	  being	  penalised	  unjustifiably	  when	  the	  jurisdiction	  has	  no	  notice-­‐
requirement	  regime;203	  and	  (ii)	  its	  being	  burdensome	  to	  specify	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  lack	  
of	  conformity,	  in	  particular	  when	  this	  requires	  hiring	  an	  expert	  to	  specify	  it.204	  
Therefore,	  the	  next	  section	  considers	  the	  drafting	  history	  of	  the	  provisions	  of	  lack	  of	  
conformity,	  as	  this	  provided	  a	  very	  good	  basis	  for	  the	  Vienna	  Diplomatic	  Conference	  to	  
reflect	  the	  developing	  countries’	  concerns	  in	  the	  CISG.	  
A.	  Drafting	  History	  
Article	  38(1)	  of	  the	  CISG	  states:	  ‘The	  buyer	  must	  examine	  the	  goods,	  or	  cause	  them	  to	  
be	  examined,	  within	  as	  short	  a	  period	  as	  is	  practicable	  in	  the	  circumstances.’	  CISG	  
Article	  39(1)	  also	  provides	  that:	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  Records	  of	  Meetings	  of	  the	  First	  
Committee,	  16th	  meeting.’	  <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/firstcommittee/Meeting16.html>	  
accessed	  2	  July	  2013.	  
204	  S	  K	  Date-­‐Bah,	  ‘The	  Convention	  on	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  from	  the	  Perspective	  of	  the	  
Developing	  Countries’	  in	  La	  Vendita	  Internazionale	  –	  La	  Convenzione	  Di	  Vienna	  Dell’	  11	  Aprile	  1980	  (26–
28	  Settembre	  1980)	  24.	  	  
69	  
[T]he	  buyer	  loses	  the	  right	  to	  rely	  on	  a	  lack	  of	  conformity	  of	  the	  goods	  if	  he	  does	  
not	  give	  notice	  to	  the	  seller	  specifying	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  conformity	  within	  
a	  reasonable	  time	  after	  he	  has	  discovered	  it	  or	  ought	  to	  have	  discovered	  it.	  
	  
For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  section,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  explain	  why	  the	  examination	  of	  
goods,	  as	  specified	  in	  CISG	  Article	  38,	  becomes	  relevant	  to	  the	  procedures	  of	  non-­‐
conformity.	  As	  Professor	  Date-­‐Bah,	  Ghanaian	  representative	  at	  the	  UN	  Conference,	  
states,	  Article	  39(1)	  of	  the	  CISG	  should	  be	  read	  in	  conjunction	  with	  Article	  38(1).	  This	  is	  
because,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  determining	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  conformity	  ought	  to	  have	  been	  
discovered	  by	  a	  buyer,	  the	  ‘relativistic’	  language	  of	  Article	  38(1)	  should	  be	  taken	  into	  
consideration.205	  Moreover,	  Article	  38	  is	  prefatory	  to	  Article	  39.206	  
	  
Therefore,	  this	  section	  first	  considers	  the	  duty	  to	  examine	  the	  goods	  and	  then	  turns	  to	  
the	  duty	  to	  give	  notice	  of	  lack	  of	  conformity.	  
a)	  The	  Duty	  to	  Examine	  the	  Goods	  Under	  Article	  38	  
ULIS	  was	  prepared	  by	  countries	  whose	  legal	  systems	  had	  a	  strict	  notice	  requirement.	  
Consequently,	  Article	  38	  of	  ULIS207	  in	  its	  first	  paragraph	  provided	  that	  ‘the	  buyer	  shall	  
examine	  the	  goods,	  or	  cause	  them	  to	  be	  examined,	  promptly.’	  Promptness	  was	  further	  
defined	  in	  Article	  11208	  of	  ULIS	  as	  ‘within	  as	  short	  a	  period	  as	  possible,	  in	  the	  
circumstances.’	  Article	  39	  of	  ULIS	  also	  provided	  that	  notice	  had	  to	  be	  given	  ‘promptly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205	  Date-­‐Bah,	  ‘The	  Convention	  on	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  from	  the	  Perspective	  of	  the	  Developing	  
Countries’	  (n	  204).	  
206	  ‘Guide	  to	  CISG	  Article	  38,	  Secretariat	  Commentary.’	  
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-­‐38.html>	  accessed	  10	  February	  2014.	  
207	  Article	  38	  of	  ULIS	  states:	  
1.	  The	  buyer	  shall	  examine	  the	  goods,	  or	  cause	  them	  to	  be	  examined,	  promptly.	  
2.	  In	  case	  of	  carriage	  of	  the	  goods	  the	  buyer	  shall	  examine	  them	  at	  the	  place	  of	  destination.	  
3.	  If	  the	  goods	  are	  redespatched	  by	  the	  buyer	  without	  transhipment	  and	  the	  seller	  knew	  or	  ought	  
to	  have	  known,	  at	  the	  time	  when	  the	  contract	  was	  concluded,	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  such	  
redespatch,	  examination	  of	  the	  goods	  may	  be	  deferred	  until	  they	  arrive	  at	  the	  new	  destination.	  
4.	  The	  methods	  of	  examination	  shall	  be	  governed	  by	  the	  agreement	  of	  the	  parties	  or,	  in	  the	  
absence	  of	  such	  agreement,	  by	  the	  law	  or	  usage	  of	  the	  place	  where	  the	  examination	  is	  to	  be	  
effected.	  
208	  Article	  11	  of	  ULIS	  states:	  	  
‘Where	  under	  the	  present	  Law	  an	  act	  is	  required	  to	  be	  performed	  “promptly,”	  it	  shall	  be	  performed	  
within	  as	  short	  a	  period	  as	  possible,	  in	  the	  circumstances,	  from	  the	  moment	  when	  the	  act	  could	  
reasonably	  be	  performed.’	  
70	  
after	  [the	  buyer]	  has	  discovered	  the	  lack	  of	  conformity	  or	  ought	  to	  have	  discovered	  it.’	  
In	  other	  words,	  notice	  had	  to	  be	  given	  within	  as	  short	  a	  period	  as	  possible.209	  
As	  a	  result	  of	  ‘a	  broader	  array	  of	  legal	  systems’	  during	  UNCITRAL	  work,	  several	  
amendments	  were	  made	  to	  the	  strict	  notice	  requirement	  of	  ULIS	  Articles	  38	  and	  39.210	  
For	  example,	  the	  Canadian	  delegate	  held	  that	  the	  requirement	  to	  examine	  the	  goods	  
‘within	  as	  short	  a	  period	  as	  is	  practical’	  was	  too	  severe,	  and	  proposed	  replacing	  the	  
original	  wording	  with	  ‘within	  a	  reasonable	  period	  of	  time.’211	  It	  was	  also	  stated	  that,	  
given	  the	  pace	  usual	  in	  Third-­‐World	  countries,	  promptness	  was	  ‘too	  exacting	  a	  
standard.’212	  In	  addition,	  the	  examination	  of	  technologically	  sophisticated	  goods	  
requires	  highly	  skilled	  people,	  and	  the	  scarcity	  of	  experts	  in	  the	  developing	  world	  
makes	  prompt	  examination	  of	  goods	  rather	  unlikely.	  For	  instance,	  if	  a	  Third-­‐World	  
country	  has	  imported	  a	  computer,	  it	  will	  be	  inappropriate	  to	  consider	  inspection	  by,	  
for	  instance,	  the	  managing	  director	  of	  the	  enterprise	  buying	  it	  as	  equal	  to	  a	  thorough	  
examination.	  Such	  an	  examination	  requires	  expertise	  in	  the	  field	  of	  computer	  science,	  
and	  this	  may	  not	  be	  promptly	  available.213	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  UNCITRAL	  Working	  Group	  
decided	  that	  the	  word	  ‘reasonable’	  was	  too	  vague	  and	  the	  majority	  of	  delegates	  were	  
against	  the	  revised	  Canadian	  proposal;214	  therefore,	  it	  was	  decided	  that	  the	  
examination	  should	  be	  conducted	  ‘within	  as	  short	  a	  period	  as	  is	  practicable	  in	  the	  
circumstances’215	  (as	  required	  by	  Article	  38(1)	  of	  the	  CISG).	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  
modification,	  during	  the	  1980	  Diplomatic	  Conference,	  there	  was	  no	  major	  discussion	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209	  It	  was	  only	  Article	  40	  of	  ULIS	  that	  moderated	  this	  strict	  regime.	  It	  provided:	  ‘The	  seller	  shall	  not	  be	  
entitled	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  provisions	  of	  Articles	  38	  and	  39	  if	  the	  lack	  of	  conformity	  relates	  to	  facts	  of	  which	  
he	  knew,	  or	  of	  which	  he	  could	  not	  have	  been	  unaware,	  and	  which	  he	  did	  not	  disclose.’	  
210	  CISG	  Advisory	  Council	  Opinion	  No	  2,	  ‘Examination	  of	  the	  Goods	  and	  Notice	  of	  Non-­‐Conformity’	  (n	  
202).	  
211	  Mr	  Shore,	  delegate	  from	  Canada.	  
‘LEGISLATIVE	  HISTORY	  1980	  Vienna	  Diplomatic	  Conference,	  Summary	  Records	  of	  Meetings	  of	  the	  First	  
Committee,	  14th	  meeting.’	  	  
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/firstcommittee/Meeting14.html>	  accessed	  10	  February	  2014.	  
212	  Date-­‐Bah,	  ‘The	  Convention	  on	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  from	  the	  Perspective	  of	  the	  Developing	  
Countries’	  (n	  204).	  
213	  ibid.	  
214	  ‘LEGISLATIVE	  HISTORY	  1980	  Vienna	  Diplomatic	  Conference’	  (n	  211).	  	  
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/firstcommittee/Meeting14.html>	  accessed	  10	  February	  2014.	  
215	  Working	  Group	  II,	  1968–1978:	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods,	  6th	  session,	  27	  January–7	  February	  1975,	  
New	  York.	  
A/CN.9/100	  -­‐	  Report	  of	  the	  Working	  Group	  on	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  on	  the	  work	  of	  its	  sixth	  
session	  para	  59.	  <http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/yearbooks/yb-­‐1975-­‐e/v016-­‐p49–62-­‐e.pdf>	  
accessed	  2	  July	  2013.	  
71	  
relation	  to	  what	  is	  today	  Article	  38;216	  however,	  ‘the	  discussions	  on	  [what	  is	  today]	  
article	  39	  were	  intense.’217	  
b)	  The	  Duty	  to	  Give	  Notice	  of	  Non-­‐Conformity	  Under	  Article	  39	  
Article	  39	  of	  ULIS	  originally	  required	  prompt	  notice	  to	  be	  given,	  for	  example,	  within	  as	  
short	  a	  period	  as	  possible.	  But	  this	  was	  later	  amended	  so	  that	  notice	  had	  to	  be	  given	  
‘within	  a	  reasonable	  time’	  after	  the	  buyer	  had	  discovered	  the	  lack	  of	  conformity	  or	  
ought	  to	  have	  discovered	  it.	  It	  was	  also	  said	  that	  ‘what	  is	  a	  “reasonable	  time”	  was,	  of	  
course,	  a	  question	  that	  depended	  on	  the	  circumstances	  of	  each	  case.’218	  
CISG	  Article	  39	  provides	  that:	  	  
	  
(1)	  The	  buyer	  loses	  the	  right	  to	  rely	  on	  a	  lack	  of	  conformity	  of	  the	  goods	  if	  he	  
does	  not	  give	  notice	  to	  the	  seller	  specifying	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  conformity	  
within	  a	  reasonable	  time	  after	  he	  has	  discovered	  it	  or	  ought	  to	  have	  discovered	  
it.	  
(2)	  In	  any	  event,	  the	  buyer	  loses	  the	  right	  to	  rely	  on	  a	  lack	  of	  conformity	  of	  the	  
goods	  if	  he	  does	  not	  give	  the	  seller	  notice	  thereof	  at	  the	  latest	  within	  a	  period	  of	  
two	  years	  from	  the	  date	  on	  which	  the	  goods	  were	  actually	  handed	  over	  to	  the	  
buyer,	  unless	  this	  time	  limit	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  a	  contractual	  period	  of	  
guarantee.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216	  Article	  38	  of	  the	  CISG	  states:	  	  
(1)	  The	  buyer	  must	  examine	  the	  goods,	  or	  cause	  them	  to	  be	  examined,	  within	  as	  short	  a	  period	  as	  
is	  practicable	  in	  the	  circumstances.	  
(2)	  If	  the	  contract	  involves	  carriage	  of	  the	  goods,	  examination	  may	  be	  deferred	  until	  after	  the	  
goods	  have	  arrived	  at	  their	  destination.	  
(3)	  If	  the	  goods	  are	  redirected	  in	  transit	  or	  redispatched	  by	  the	  buyer	  without	  a	  reasonable	  
opportunity	  for	  examination	  by	  him	  and	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  contract	  the	  seller	  
knew	  or	  ought	  to	  have	  known	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  such	  redirection	  or	  redispatch,	  examination	  
may	  be	  deferred	  until	  after	  the	  goods	  have	  arrived	  at	  the	  new	  destination.	  
217	  CISG	  Advisory	  Council	  Opinion	  No	  2,	  ‘Examination	  of	  the	  Goods	  and	  Notice	  of	  Non-­‐Conformity’	  (n	  
202).	  
218	  Working	  Group	  II,	  1968–1978:	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods,	  3rd	  session,	  17–28	  January	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  Geneva	  
A/CN.9/62/Add.1	  -­‐	  Progress	  report	  of	  the	  Working	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  on	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  on	  the	  
work	  of	  its	  third	  session,	  held	  in	  Geneva	  from	  17	  to	  28	  January	  1972	  para	  78.	  
<http://daccess-­‐dds-­‐ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NL7/200/38/PDF/NL720038.pdf?OpenElement>	  
accessed	  2	  July	  2013.	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The	  discussions	  were	  divided	  between	  representatives	  from	  developing	  nations	  and	  
those	  from	  the	  developed	  nations.219	  Professor	  Eorsi,	  chairman	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  
delegation,	  who	  was	  elected	  president	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Conference	  on	  International	  
Sales,220	  describes	  the	  atmosphere	  in	  debates	  on	  Article	  39	  as	  ‘sometimes	  rather	  
harsh.’221	  Those	  who	  put	  forward	  arguments	  for	  more	  modifications	  in	  the	  notice	  
requirement	  were	  concerned	  about	  unacceptable	  consequences	  for	  buyers	  from	  
developing	  countries.222	  The	  Ghanaian	  delegate,	  Professor	  Date-­‐Bah,	  made	  an	  
unsuccessful	  attempt	  to	  introduce	  an	  amendment	  to	  eliminate	  the	  provision	  requiring	  
notice	  to	  be	  given	  within	  a	  reasonable	  time	  and	  the	  sanction	  for	  the	  buyer	  when	  he	  
fails	  to	  give	  notice.223	  The	  concerns	  of	  delegates	  from	  developing	  countries	  were	  partly	  
related	  to	  purchases	  of	  ‘complex	  and	  manufactured’	  goods	  from	  outsiders	  that	  sell	  
‘shoddy’	  goods,	  where	  it	  is	  only	  after	  delivery	  to	  unsophisticated	  buyers	  that	  flaws	  
become	  apparent.224	  More	  importantly,	  their	  other	  concern	  was	  rooted	  in	  their	  
inability	  to	  give	  notice	  in	  a	  ‘reasonable	  time’	  because	  of	  their	  developing	  
infrastructures.	  Furthermore,	  ‘submitting	  the	  written	  declaration	  within	  a	  reasonable	  
time’	  would	  be	  a	  problem	  for	  uneducated	  tradesmen,	  especially	  as	  countries	  need	  to	  
run	  tests	  on	  ‘imported,	  complicated	  machinery,’	  bearing	  in	  mind	  that,	  ‘not	  
infrequently,	  delivered	  goods	  remain	  unpacked	  in	  the	  harbour	  for	  more	  than	  two	  years	  
or	  that	  delivery	  to	  their	  final	  destination	  was	  frequently	  delayed.’225	  This	  in	  fact	  
suggested	  that	  such	  requirements	  for	  notification	  of	  non-­‐conformity	  within	  a	  
reasonable	  time	  are	  often	  rather	  difficult	  and	  sometimes	  impossible	  to	  comply	  with.	  	  
	  
The	  Ghanaian	  delegate	  also	  argued	  that	  the	  obligation	  to	  specify	  the	  nature	  of	  non-­‐
conformity	  was	  too	  ‘onerous’;	  especially	  when	  it	  involved	  the	  need	  to	  hire	  the	  services	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219	  CISG	  Advisory	  Council	  Opinion	  No	  2,	  ‘Examination	  of	  the	  Goods	  and	  Notice	  of	  Non-­‐Conformity’	  (n	  
202).	  
220	  See	  Schlechtriem,	  Uniform	  Sales	  Law	  (n	  169).	  
221	  Eorsi,	  ‘A	  Propos	  the	  1980	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods’	  (n	  149)	  
349.	  
222	  CISG	  Advisory	  Council	  Opinion	  No	  2,	  ‘Examination	  of	  the	  Goods	  and	  Notice	  of	  Non-­‐Conformity’	  (n	  
202).	  
223	  Mr	  Date-­‐Bah,	  delegate	  from	  Ghana.	  
‘LEGISLATIVE	  HISTORY	  1980	  Vienna	  Diplomatic	  Conference’	  (n	  203).	  	  
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/firstcommittee/Meeting16.html>	  accessed	  10	  February	  2014.	  
224	  Rosett,	  ‘Critical	  Reflections	  on	  the	  United	  Nations	  Convention’	  (n	  14).	  
225	  Mr	  Date-­‐Bah,	  delegate	  from	  Ghana,	  at	  the	  August	  1979	  Potsdam	  colloquium	  of	  the	  International	  
Association	  of	  Legal	  Science	  on	  the	  proposed	  Convention	  in	  Eorsi,	  ‘A	  Propos	  the	  1980	  Vienna	  
Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods’	  (n	  149)	  350.	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of	  an	  expert	  to	  specify	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  conformity.226	  In	  a	  hypothetical	  
example	  given	  by	  Professor	  Date-­‐Bah,	  a	  school	  orders	  a	  photocopying	  machine,	  and	  
the	  machine	  is	  examined	  by	  the	  headmaster.	  He	  realises	  that	  it	  does	  not	  work,	  but	  
since	  he	  does	  not	  have	  the	  technical	  expertise	  to	  find	  out	  why	  it	  does	  not	  work,	  he	  
may	  merely	  give	  a	  notice	  of	  lack	  of	  conformity	  without	  being	  able	  to	  specify	  the	  nature	  
of	  that	  non-­‐conformity.	  Since	  it	  is	  the	  seller	  who	  is	  in	  breach,	  it	  should	  suffice	  that	  his	  
goods	  are	  defective,	  and	  ascertaining	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  conformity	  should	  be	  
his	  responsibility.227	  
	  
The	  delegate	  from	  Ghana	  sought	  to	  introduce	  a	  second	  proposal,	  which	  retained	  the	  
requirement	  of	  notice	  within	  a	  reasonable	  time,	  but	  softened	  the	  drastic	  loss	  of	  
remedy	  for	  failure	  to	  give	  notice.228	  Although	  this	  second	  proposal	  was	  widely	  
discussed,	  a	  substantial	  majority	  of	  delegates	  were	  against	  such	  an	  amendment.	  The	  
debate	  also	  concerned	  the	  consequences	  of	  a	  failure	  to	  give	  due	  notice.	  In	  many	  
countries,	  whether	  developing	  or	  developed,	  the	  consequences	  are	  not	  necessarily	  
severe.	  In	  common	  law,	  for	  example,	  the	  usual	  rule	  is	  that	  a	  failure	  to	  reject	  goods	  
within	  a	  reasonable	  time	  is	  deemed	  to	  signify	  acceptance;	  however,	  it	  does	  not	  
necessarily	  follow	  that	  the	  buyer	  may	  not	  claim	  damages	  for	  a	  breach.	  Under	  Article	  
39(2),	  the	  buyer	  loses	  the	  right	  to	  rely	  on	  non-­‐conformity,	  even	  in	  a	  claim	  for	  damages.	  
Professor	  Date-­‐Bah,	  who	  was	  strongly	  in	  favour	  of	  amendments	  to	  the	  notification	  
requirement,	  was	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  those	  in	  jurisdictions	  with	  no	  such	  rules	  would	  be	  
penalised	  ‘unduly,’	  as	  they	  might	  not	  be	  aware	  of	  such	  requirements,	  and	  
consequently,	  by	  not	  following	  them,	  they	  would	  lose	  their	  rights.	  He	  further	  stated	  
that,	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  not	  giving	  notice	  of	  non-­‐conformity	  within	  a	  reasonable	  
time,	  instead	  of	  ‘complete	  forfeiture	  of	  rights,’229	  mitigation	  of	  damages	  should	  
occur.230	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226	  Date-­‐Bah,	  ‘The	  Convention	  on	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  from	  the	  Perspective	  of	  the	  Developing	  
Countries’	  (n	  204).	  
227	  ibid.	  
228	  Mr	  Date-­‐Bah,	  delegate	  from	  Ghana.	  
‘LEGISLATIVE	  HISTORY	  1980	  Vienna	  Diplomatic	  Conference’	  (n	  203).	  	  
<	  http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/firstcommittee/Meeting16.html>	  accessed	  10	  February	  2014.	  
229	  Gabrielle	  S	  Brussel,	  ‘The	  1980	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  Of	  
Goods:	  A	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  Study	  of	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  North-­‐South	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  6	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  York	  International	  Law	  Review	  53.	  	  
230	  Mr	  Date-­‐Bah,	  delegate	  from	  Ghana.	  
‘LEGISLATIVE	  HISTORY	  1980	  Vienna	  Diplomatic	  Conference’	  (n	  203).	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This	  opinion	  met	  with	  some	  consensus	  from	  the	  developing	  countries	  (including	  Kenya,	  
Pakistan,	  Nigeria,	  Mexico,	  Singapore	  and	  Libya)231,	  one	  socialist	  country	  (China)232	  and	  
one	  developed	  country	  (the	  UK).	  The	  delegate	  from	  the	  UK	  held	  that	  it	  seemed	  severe	  
to	  deprive	  the	  buyer	  of	  his	  right	  to	  damages	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  non-­‐conformity	  of	  goods	  
merely	  owing	  to	  his	  failure	  to	  give	  notification	  of	  non-­‐conforming	  goods	  within	  a	  
reasonable	  time.233	  
	  
Many	  delegates	  from	  the	  developed	  world	  took	  a	  different	  view.	  For	  example,	  the	  
Danish	  representative234	  criticised	  and	  questioned	  the	  proposal,	  since	  this	  would	  
favour	  the	  buyer	  and	  the	  buyer:	  
	  
would	  be	  able	  to	  speculate	  at	  the	  risk	  of	  the	  seller.	  If	  he	  found	  a	  lack	  of	  
conformity,	  he	  could	  simply	  watch	  the	  market	  for	  the	  goods	  so	  as	  to	  keep	  them	  if	  
the	  price	  rose.	  If	  the	  price	  fell,	  he	  would	  invoke	  non-­‐conformity	  to	  avoid	  the	  
contract	  and	  buy	  the	  goods	  he	  required	  more	  cheaply	  elsewhere.	  	  
	  
Moreover,	  from	  the	  Swedish	  delegate’s	  point	  of	  view,235	  the	  Ghanaian	  proposal	  was	  
short-­‐sighted	  and	  unreasonable.	  He	  stated	  that:	  
	  
reduction	  of	  damages	  was	  an	  unsatisfactory	  remedy,	  and	  was	  as	  hard	  on	  the	  
seller	  as	  on	  the	  buyer.	  The	  main	  purpose	  of	  the	  rule	  was	  in	  fact	  to	  secure	  
evidence	  in	  the	  case	  of	  dispute.	  If	  the	  seller	  were	  to	  establish	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  
defects	  complained	  of,	  he	  would	  need	  to	  know	  of	  them	  at	  an	  early	  stage.	  It	  
would	  not	  help	  him	  to	  know	  that	  at	  some	  later	  stage	  damages	  might	  be	  reduced.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231	  Mr	  Waititu,	  delegate	  from	  Kenya;	  Mr	  Mehdi,	  delegate	  from	  Pakistan;	  Mr	  Osah,	  delegate	  from	  
Nigeria;	  Mr	  Mantilla-­‐Molina,	  delegate	  from	  Mexico;	  Mr	  Khoo,	  delegate	  from	  Singapore;	  and	  Mr	  Elhurvi,	  
delegate	  from	  Libya.	  
‘United	  Nations	  Conference	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods,	  Vienna,	  10	  March–11	  April	  
1980,	  Official	  Records’	  A/CONF.97/19,	  321,	  paras	  42,	  46,	  48,	  50,	  51;	  322,	  para	  59.	  
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/a-­‐conf-­‐97–19-­‐ocred-­‐e.pdf>	  accessed	  2	  July	  2013.	  
232	  Mr	  Li	  Chih-­‐min,	  delegate	  from	  China,	  stated:	  ‘A	  buyer	  who	  failed	  to	  give	  notice	  to	  the	  seller	  in	  due	  
time	  should	  not	  forfeit	  his	  right	  to	  rely	  on	  a	  lack	  of	  conformity	  of	  the	  goods.	  The	  Ghanaian	  proposal	  
maintained	  a	  proper	  balance	  between	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  buyer	  and	  of	  the	  seller.’	  	  
‘Official	  Records’	  A/CONF.97/19	  (n	  231)	  321,	  para	  47.	  	  
233	  Miss	  O’Flynn,	  delegate	  from	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	  
‘Official	  Records’	  A/CONF.97/19	  (n	  231)	  321,	  para	  49.	  
234	  Mr	  Tronning,	  delegate	  from	  Denmark.	  
235	  Mr	  Hjerner,	  delegate	  from	  Sweden.	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The	  developed	  nations	  also	  approached	  the	  requirement	  for	  notification	  of	  non-­‐
conformity	  within	  a	  reasonable	  time	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  own	  infrastructure	  and	  
educational	  expertise.	  It	  was	  ‘the	  speedy	  settlement	  of	  disputes’	  that	  carried	  more	  
weight	  with	  them	  than	  protecting	  the	  buyers’	  right	  to	  damages	  regarding	  the	  non-­‐
conforming	  goods.236	  Furthermore,	  the	  maintenance	  of	  equal	  bargaining	  power	  
between	  buyers	  and	  sellers,	  from	  the	  developed	  nations’	  viewpoint,	  was	  a	  reflection	  of	  
sellers’	  concerns.	  	  
	  
Such	  strong	  opposition	  resulted	  in	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  the	  Ghanaian	  proposal.	  But,	  as	  a	  
result	  of	  informal	  consultations	  between	  representatives,	  it	  became	  apparent	  that	  a	  
satisfactory	  compromise	  was	  necessary237	  between	  those	  who	  considered	  a	  two-­‐year	  
notice	  limitation	  to	  be	  too	  short	  (as	  contained	  in	  current	  CISG	  Article	  39(2)),	  and	  those	  
who	  considered	  it	  adequate.238	  It	  was	  also	  necessary	  to	  reconcile	  those	  who	  would	  use	  
the	  absence	  of	  timely	  notice	  of	  non-­‐conformity	  as	  an	  impediment	  to	  recovery	  with	  
those	  who	  would	  use	  it	  to	  mitigate	  charges.239	  
	  
As	  a	  result,	  Professor	  Date-­‐Bah	  introduced	  a	  joint	  proposal	  by	  Finland,	  Ghana,	  Kenya,	  
Nigeria,	  Pakistan	  and	  Sweden.240	  Two	  important	  elements	  were	  maintained:	  (i)	  the	  
requirement	  to	  give	  notice	  of	  non-­‐conformity	  to	  the	  seller	  within	  a	  reasonable	  time	  (as	  
appears	  in	  Article	  39(1)	  of	  the	  Final	  Vienna	  Convention);	  and	  (ii)	  the	  requirement	  that	  
notifying	  the	  seller	  take	  place	  within	  two	  years	  from	  ‘the	  date	  on	  which	  goods	  were	  
actually	  handed	  over	  to	  the	  buyer’	  (as	  appears	  in	  Article	  39(2)	  of	  the	  Final	  Vienna	  
Convention).	  It	  would	  not	  be	  possible,	  however,	  to	  rely	  on	  Articles	  36	  or	  37	  of	  the	  Draft	  
Convention	  if	  the	  seller	  knew	  or	  should	  have	  known	  of	  non-­‐conformity.241	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236	  Mr	  Hosokawa,	  delegate	  from	  Japan.	  
‘Official	  Records’	  A/CONF.97/19	  (n	  231)	  322,	  para	  61.	  
237	  Date-­‐Bah,	  ‘Vienna	  Sales	  Convention	  1980	  –	  Developing	  Countries’	  Perspectives’	  (n	  199)	  92.	  
238	  Jacob	  S	  Ziegel,	  ‘Report	  to	  the	  Uniform	  Law	  Conference	  of	  Canada	  on	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  
International	  Sale	  of	  Goods’	  (1981).	  
239	  John	  Honnold,	  Documentary	  History	  of	  the	  Uniform	  Law	  for	  International	  Sales:	  The	  Studies,	  
Deliberations	  and	  Decisions	  that	  Led	  to	  the	  1988	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  (Deventer:	  Kluwer	  1989).	  
240	  Mr	  Date-­‐Bah,	  delegate	  from	  Ghana.	  
‘Official	  Records’	  A/CONF.97/19	  (n	  231)	  345,	  para	  1.	  
241	  John	  O	  Honnold,	  Uniform	  Law	  for	  International	  Sales	  under	  the	  1980	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  (3rd	  
edn,	  Kluwer	  Law	  International	  1999).	  	  
76	  
In	  addition,	  it	  provided	  that,	  in	  the	  event	  that	  the	  buyer	  has	  a	  reasonable	  excuse	  for	  
not	  giving	  the	  notice	  required,	  he	  does	  not	  lose	  all	  his	  rights	  to	  rely	  on	  non-­‐conformity.	  
In	  particular,	  it	  stated:	  ‘[T]he	  buyer	  may	  declare	  the	  price	  reduced242	  .	  .	  .	  or	  claim	  
damages	  for	  loss	  of	  profit	  if	  he	  has	  a	  reasonable	  excuse	  for	  his	  failure	  to	  give	  the	  
required	  notice	  .	  .	  .	  ’243	  
	  
Although	  there	  were	  both	  developing	  and	  developed	  countries	  that	  supported	  this	  
proposal,	  some	  representatives	  who	  spoke	  on	  the	  matter	  held	  that	  it	  was	  vague,	  ‘left	  
too	  many	  issues	  unresolved’244	  and	  ‘sacrificed	  clarity	  for	  compromise.’245	  They	  further	  
criticised	  the	  omission	  of	  a	  requirement	  to	  specify	  ‘the	  nature	  of	  lack	  of	  conformity’246	  
by	  the	  buyer,	  and	  the	  usage	  of	  new	  technical	  terms	  that	  were	  not	  yet	  defined.247	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242	  See	  in	  particular	  Article	  50	  of	  the	  CISG,	  which	  states:	  	  
If	  the	  goods	  do	  not	  conform	  with	  the	  contract	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  price	  has	  already	  been	  
paid,	  the	  buyer	  may	  reduce	  the	  price	  in	  the	  same	  proportion	  as	  the	  value	  that	  the	  goods	  actually	  
delivered	  had	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  delivery	  bears	  to	  the	  value	  that	  conforming	  goods	  would	  have	  
had	  at	  that	  time.	  However,	  if	  the	  seller	  remedies	  any	  failure	  to	  perform	  his	  obligations	  in	  
accordance	  with	  article	  37	  or	  article	  48	  or	  if	  the	  buyer	  refuses	  to	  accept	  performance	  by	  the	  
seller	  in	  accordance	  with	  those	  articles,	  the	  buyer	  may	  not	  reduce	  the	  price.	  
See	  Jacob	  S	  Ziegel	  and	  Claude	  Samson,	  ‘Report	  to	  the	  Uniform	  Law	  Conference	  of	  Canada	  on	  Convention	  
on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods’	  (1981).	  
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/articles/english2.html>	  accessed	  2	  July	  2013.	  
Professor	  Ziegel	  notes:	  	  
Art.	  50	  confers	  on	  the	  buyer	  a	  right	  to	  reduce	  the	  price	  of	  non-­‐conforming	  goods	  in	  lieu	  of	  
claiming	  damages	  (assuming	  there	  is	  a	  right	  to	  damages)	  .	  .	  .	  Art.	  50	  is	  based	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  it	  
is	  unjust	  to	  require	  the	  buyer	  to	  pay	  the	  full	  price	  for	  non-­‐conforming	  goods,	  and	  the	  right	  to	  
claim	  a	  price	  reduction	  must	  be	  carefully	  distinguished	  from	  the	  right	  to	  claim	  damages.	  
See	  Eric	  E	  Bergsten	  and	  A	  J	  Miller,	  ‘The	  Remedy	  of	  Reduction	  of	  Price’	  (1979)	  27	  American	  Journal	  of	  
Comparative	  Law	  255.	  
See	  ‘Annotated	  Text	  of	  CISG	  Article	  50’	  Match-­‐ups	  with	  Continental	  and	  Common	  Law	  domestic	  rules,	  
doctrine	  and	  jurisprudence	  
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/comparison50.html#pec>	  accessed	  2	  July	  2013.	  
	  It	  notes	  that,	  when	  the	  non-­‐performance	  is	  not	  excused,	  the	  common	  law	  approach	  would	  be	  ‘where	  
goods	  are	  defective	  the	  prima	  facie	  rule	  is	  that	  the	  buyer	  can	  recover	  as	  damages	  the	  difference	  
between	  the	  value	  of	  the	  goods	  actually	  delivered	  and	  the	  value	  which	  the	  goods	  would	  have	  had	  if	  they	  
had	  been	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  contract.’	  
243	  21st	  meeting.	  
‘Official	  Records’	  A/CONF.97/19	  (n	  231)	  345.	  
244	  Mr	  Farnsworth,	  delegate	  from	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America.	  
‘Official	  Records’	  A/CONF.97/19	  (n	  231)	  346,	  para	  11.	  
245	  Mr	  Olivencia	  Ruiz,	  delegate	  from	  Spain.	  
‘Official	  Records’	  A/CONF.97/19	  (n	  231)	  346,	  para	  13.	  
246	  Mr	  Ghestin,	  delegate	  from	  France;	  and	  Mr	  Rognlien,	  delegate	  from	  Norway.	  
‘Official	  Records’	  A/CONF.97/19	  (n	  231)	  346,	  paras	  14,	  15.	  
247	  Mr	  Farnsworth,	  delegate	  from	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America.	  
‘Official	  Records’	  A/CONF.97/19	  (n	  231)	  346,	  para	  13.	  
77	  
In	  the	  end,	  ‘in	  an	  effort	  to	  satisfy	  the	  concerns	  that	  had	  been	  expressed,’248	  it	  was	  
decided	  that	  the	  major	  aspects	  of	  this	  proposal	  would	  be	  adopted	  in	  a	  separate	  
article.249	  That	  took	  the	  form	  of	  Article	  44	  of	  the	  CISG,	  which	  provides	  that,	  if	  there	  is	  a	  
‘reasonable	  excuse’	  for	  not	  giving	  notice,	  the	  buyer	  may	  mitigate	  damages	  to	  reduce	  
the	  price.	  Professor	  Date-­‐Bah	  viewed	  the	  insertion	  of	  Article	  44	  as	  a	  success	  for	  the	  
delegations	  of	  some	  developing	  countries,	  and	  a	  triumph	  of	  the	  spirit	  of	  co-­‐operation	  
with	  thoughtful	  delegations	  from	  some	  developed	  countries.250	  	  
	  
This	  author	  agrees	  with	  the	  view	  that	  Article	  39,	  along	  with	  Article	  44,	  maintains	  a	  
sensible	  balance	  between	  the	  duties	  of	  sellers	  and	  those	  of	  buyers,	  as	  was	  the	  view	  of	  
the	  developing	  countries.	  In	  a	  way,	  the	  core	  element	  of	  compromise	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  
reasonableness	  (such	  as	  reasonable	  time	  and/or	  reasonable	  excuse)	  has	  improved	  the	  
position	  of	  the	  buyer	  in	  developing	  countries,	  in	  particular	  when	  a	  dispute	  arises	  in	  
international	  sales	  of	  manufactured	  goods.251	  Given	  the	  pattern	  of	  international	  trade	  
in	  developing	  countries	  at	  the	  time	  of	  drafting	  (and	  even	  today),	  which	  involved	  the	  
export	  of	  raw	  materials	  and	  import	  of	  manufactured	  goods,	  their	  vulnerability	  
regarding	  the	  notification	  of	  non-­‐conforming	  goods	  to	  the	  seller	  was	  recognised,	  and	  
appropriate	  and	  effective	  remedies	  were	  subsequently	  fashioned	  in	  Articles	  39	  and	  44.	  
This	  certainly	  makes	  the	  CISG	  more	  attractive	  to	  a	  developing	  country	  such	  as	  Iran.	  	  
3.3.2 North–South	  Issues:	  Suspension	  of	  Performance	  in	  Anticipation	  of	  
Breach	  (Articles	  62–63	  (Draft	  Convention)	  –	  Articles	  71,	  72	  (CISG))	  
Another	  area	  of	  concern	  to	  developing	  countries	  was	  the	  doctrine	  of	  anticipatory	  
repudiation.	  The	  doctrine,	  contained	  in	  CISG	  Article	  72,	  stipulates:	  
	  
(1)	  If	  prior	  to	  the	  date	  for	  performance	  of	  the	  contract	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  one	  of	  the	  
parties	  will	  commit	  a	  fundamental	  breach	  of	  contract,	  the	  other	  party	  may	  
declare	  the	  contract	  voided.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248	  CISG	  Advisory	  Council	  Opinion	  No	  2,	  ‘Examination	  of	  the	  Goods	  and	  Notice	  of	  Non-­‐Conformity’	  (n	  
202).	  Jacob	  S	  Ziegel,	  ‘Report	  to	  the	  Uniform	  Law	  Conference	  of	  Canada’	  (n	  238).	  
249	  Date-­‐Bah,	  ‘Vienna	  Sales	  Convention	  1980	  –	  Developing	  Countries’	  Perspectives’	  (n	  199)	  93.	  
250	  ibid.	  
251	  ibid	  94.	  
78	  
(2)	  If	  time	  allows,	  the	  party	  intending	  to	  declare	  the	  contract	  voided	  must	  give	  
reasonable	  notice	  to	  the	  other	  party	  in	  order	  to	  permit	  him	  to	  provide	  adequate	  
assurance	  of	  his	  performance.	  
(3)	  The	  requirements	  of	  the	  preceding	  paragraph	  do	  not	  apply	  if	  the	  other	  party	  
has	  declared	  that	  he	  will	  not	  perform	  his	  obligations.	  
	  
Moreover,	  CISG	  Article	  71	  in	  paragraphs	  1	  and	  3	  provides	  that:	  	  
	  
(1)	  A	  party	  may	  suspend	  the	  performance	  of	  his	  obligations	  if,	  after	  the	  
conclusion	  of	  the	  contract,	  it	  becomes	  apparent	  that	  the	  other	  party	  will	  not	  
perform	  a	  substantial	  part	  of	  his	  obligations	  as	  a	  result	  of:	  
(a)	  a	  serious	  deficiency	  in	  his	  ability	  to	  perform	  or	  in	  his	  creditworthiness;	  or	  
(b)	  his	  conduct	  in	  preparing	  to	  perform	  or	  in	  performing	  the	  contract.	  
(3)	  A	  party	  suspending	  performance,	  whether	  before	  or	  after	  dispatch	  of	  the	  
goods,	  must	  immediately	  give	  notice	  of	  the	  suspension	  to	  the	  other	  party	  and	  
must	  continue	  with	  performance	  if	  the	  other	  party	  provides	  adequate	  assurance	  
of	  his	  performance.	  
	  
The	  developing	  countries	  criticised	  the	  CISG’s	  suspension	  and	  avoidance	  provisions	  for	  
two	  reasons:	  (i)	  the	  repudiating	  party	  would	  be	  severely	  penalised,252	  as	  the	  provisions	  
deny	  a	  right	  to	  prior	  notice	  as	  well	  as	  the	  opportunity	  to	  give	  adequate	  assurances	  of	  
performance.	  In	  addition,	  even	  in	  the	  event	  that	  adequate	  assurances	  were	  given	  
promptly,	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  brief	  suspension	  could	  be	  seriously	  damaging;	  in	  many	  
cases,	  the	  party	  might	  breach	  onward	  contracts	  with	  third	  parties;	  and	  (ii)	  the	  grounds	  
for	  exercising	  the	  right	  should	  be	  as	  objective	  as	  possible.253	  The	  subjective	  assessment	  
contained	  in	  the	  provisions	  of	  suspension	  could	  allow	  abuse	  by	  a	  party	  who	  is	  seeking	  
merely	  to	  get	  out	  of	  an	  unprofitable	  contract	  because	  of,	  for	  example,	  a	  rising	  market;	  
or,	  in	  bad	  faith,	  a	  party	  may	  use	  the	  provision	  to	  exploit	  ‘the	  other	  party’s	  unstable	  
state.’254	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From	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  developing	  countries,	  these	  provisions	  of	  anticipatory	  
breach	  could	  ‘hold	  some	  danger	  for	  financially	  weaker	  parties’255	  in	  international	  
trade.	  It	  is	  therefore	  useful	  to	  examine	  the	  course	  of	  the	  debate,	  to	  see	  whether	  their	  
concerns	  were	  addressed.	  	  
A.	  Drafting	  History	  
Suspension	  of	  Performance	  and	  Avoidance	  of	  Contract	  in	  Anticipatory	  
Breach	  
The	  1978	  Draft	  Convention	  by	  UNCITRAL	  provides	  in	  its	  Article	  62:	  
	  
(1)	  A	  party	  may	  suspend	  the	  performance	  of	  his	  obligations	  if	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  
do	  so	  because,	  after	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  contract,	  a	  serious	  deterioration	  in	  the	  
ability	  to	  perform	  or	  in	  the	  creditworthiness	  of	  the	  other	  party	  or	  his	  conduct	  in	  
preparing	  to	  perform	  or	  in	  actually	  performing	  the	  contract	  gives	  good	  grounds	  
to	  conclude	  that	  the	  other	  party	  will	  not	  perform	  a	  part	  of	  his	  obligations.	  
(2)	  If	  the	  seller	  has	  already	  dispatched	  the	  goods	  before	  the	  grounds	  described	  in	  
paragraph	  (1)	  of	  this	  article	  become	  evident,	  he	  may	  prevent	  the	  handing	  over	  of	  
the	  goods	  to	  the	  buyer	  even	  though	  the	  buyer	  holds	  a	  document	  which	  entitles	  
him	  to	  obtain	  them.	  This	  paragraph	  relates	  only	  to	  the	  rights	  in	  the	  goods	  as	  
between	  the	  buyer	  and	  the	  seller.	  
(3)	  A	  party	  suspending	  performance,	  whether	  before	  or	  after	  dispatch	  of	  the	  
goods,	  must	  immediately	  give	  notice	  to	  the	  other	  party	  thereof	  and	  must	  
continue	  with	  performance	  if	  the	  other	  party	  provides	  adequate	  assurance	  of	  his	  
performance.	  
	  
At	  the	  first	  committee	  meeting	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Diplomatic	  Conference,	  the	  Federal	  
Republic	  of	  Germany	  submitted	  an	  amendment256	  to	  Paragraph	  1	  of	  Article	  62	  (Draft	  
Convention)	  as	  follows:	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A	  party	  may	  suspend	  the	  performance	  of	  his	  obligations	  if	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  do	  
so	  because,	  after	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  contract,	  it	  becomes	  apparent	  that	  a	  
serious	  deficiency	  in	  the	  ability	  to	  perform	  or	  in	  the	  creditworthiness	  of	  the	  other	  
party	  or	  his	  conduct	  in	  preparing	  to	  perform	  or	  in	  actually	  performing	  the	  
contract	  gives	  good	  grounds	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  other	  party	  will	  not	  perform	  a	  
substantial	  part	  of	  his	  obligations.	  
	  
After	  this	  amendment	  was	  adopted	  at	  the	  twenty-­‐sixth	  meeting	  by	  18	  votes	  in	  
favour,257	  the	  Egyptian	  delegate	  opened	  the	  debate	  on	  Draft	  Convention	  Articles	  62	  
and	  63.	  He	  explained	  that	  he	  considered	  them	  vitally	  important	  to	  developing	  
countries.258	  His	  new	  proposal	  on	  Article	  62	  was	  as	  follows:	  
	  
(1)	  If,	  prior	  to	  the	  date	  for	  performance	  of	  the	  contract,	  it	  becomes	  apparent	  that	  
one	  of	  the	  parties	  will	  commit	  a	  fundamental	  breach	  of	  contract,	  the	  other	  party	  
may	  notify	  him	  of	  his	  intention	  to	  suspend	  performance	  of	  his	  obligations	  if	  the	  
first	  party	  fails	  to	  provide	  adequate	  assurances,	  within	  a	  reasonable	  period	  of	  
time,	  of	  properly	  performing	  his	  obligations.	  
(2)	  If	  the	  party	  which	  has	  been	  notified	  fails	  to	  provide	  the	  assurances	  described	  
under	  paragraph	  (1)	  of	  this	  article,	  the	  other	  party	  may	  declare	  the	  contract	  
avoided.	  
	  
He	  further	  explained	  that	  his	  concern	  was	  rooted	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  suspension	  of	  
performance	  should	  be	  permitted	  when	  ‘good	  grounds’	  existed	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  
other	  party	  was	  unable	  to	  perform	  a	  substantial	  part	  of	  his	  obligations.	  In	  his	  view,	  ‘it	  
was	  extremely	  dangerous	  to	  empower	  the	  parties	  to	  withdraw	  from	  their	  obligations	  
solely	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  such	  a	  purely	  subjective	  assessment	  of	  the	  situation	  and	  without	  
any	  supervision	  by	  the	  courts.’259	  Clearly,	  he	  had	  concerns	  regarding	  buyers	  in	  
developing	  countries,	  who	  could	  face	  suspension	  of	  performance	  by	  sellers	  from	  the	  
developed	  nations	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  subjective	  determination.	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The	  Egyptian	  proposal	  was	  a	  combination	  of	  elements	  contained	  in	  Articles	  62	  and	  63	  
of	  the	  1978	  Draft	  Convention,	  combined	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  the	  objective	  test	  included	  
in	  Article	  63	  was	  imported	  into	  Article	  62.	  On	  this	  basis,	  the	  aggrieved	  party	  was	  
required	  to	  give	  notice	  of	  suspension	  of	  performance	  before	  he	  could	  exercise	  such	  a	  
right	  to	  avoid	  the	  contract.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  right	  to	  avoid	  the	  contract	  no	  longer	  
took	  automatic	  effect.	  
	  
The	  1978	  Draft	  Convention	  provided	  in	  its	  Article	  63	  that	  ‘if	  prior	  to	  the	  date	  for	  
performance	  of	  the	  contract	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  one	  of	  the	  parties	  will	  commit	  a	  
fundamental	  breach,	  the	  other	  party	  may	  declare	  the	  contract	  avoided.’	  
The	  Egyptian	  delegate’s	  proposal260	  was	  that	  such	  provisions	  in	  Article	  63	  be	  replaced	  
with:	  
	  
(1)	  If	  the	  seller	  has	  already	  dispatched	  the	  goods	  before	  the	  grounds	  described	  in	  
paragraph	  (1)	  of	  article	  62	  become	  evident,	  he	  may	  prevent	  the	  handing	  over	  of	  
the	  goods	  to	  the	  buyer	  even	  though	  the	  buyer	  holds	  a	  document	  which	  entitles	  
him	  to	  obtain	  them.	  This	  paragraph	  relates	  only	  to	  the	  rights	  in	  the	  goods	  as	  
between	  the	  buyer	  and	  the	  seller.	  
(2)	  The	  seller	  who	  prevents	  the	  handing	  over	  of	  the	  goods	  to	  the	  buyer	  under	  
paragraph	  (1)	  of	  this	  article	  must	  immediately	  give	  notice	  to	  the	  buyer	  of	  his	  
intention	  to	  declare	  the	  contract	  avoided	  should	  the	  buyer	  fail,	  within	  a	  
reasonable	  time,	  to	  provide	  adequate	  assurances	  of	  properly	  performing	  his	  
obligations.	  
	  
As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  combined	  consideration	  of	  Articles	  62	  and	  63,	  the	  debates	  about	  
anticipatory	  breach	  coincided	  with	  discussions	  on	  suspension	  of	  performance	  and	  
avoidance	  of	  anticipatory	  breach.261	  
	  
The	  developing	  nations	  were	  in	  favour	  of	  adopting	  this	  proposal.	  They	  argued	  that	  the	  
amendment	  maintained	  a	  fairer	  balance	  between	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  developing	  and	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82	  
the	  developed	  countries	  because	  the	  economically	  weaker	  party	  is	  protected	  by	  being	  
granted	  an	  opportunity	  to	  give	  adequate	  assurances	  before	  entitling	  the	  injured	  party	  
to	  either	  suspend	  or	  avoid	  a	  contract.262	  	  
	  
Some	  delegates	  from	  the	  developed	  nations	  opposed	  the	  Egyptian	  proposal	  requiring	  
adequate	  assurances	  from	  the	  party	  who	  was	  likely	  to	  breach	  the	  contract.263	  For	  
example,	  the	  Swedish	  delegate	  stated	  that	  establishing	  such	  ‘an	  obligatory	  procedure	  
of	  waiting	  for	  adequate	  assurances	  might	  prove	  too	  stringent,	  because	  in	  such	  a	  
situation	  quick	  action	  might	  be	  necessary.’264	  While	  this	  proposal	  on	  suspension	  of	  
performance	  was	  considered	  inadequate	  by	  some,	  others,	  such	  as	  the	  French	  
delegate,265	  preferred	  it,	  for	  two	  reasons:	  	  
	  
First,	  the	  criteria	  it	  offered	  were	  more	  objective	  than	  in	  the	  adopted	  text;	  and	  
secondly,	  the	  system	  of	  obligatory	  notification	  gave	  the	  non-­‐performing	  party	  an	  
opportunity	  to	  defend	  its	  position.	  The	  proposed	  article	  62	  (2),	  however,	  seemed	  
somewhat	  too	  stringent	  in	  creating	  automatic	  avoidance	  when	  the	  party	  in	  
default	  had	  failed	  to	  provide	  assurances.	  
	  
Turkey	  and	  Romania	  also	  supported	  this	  proposal;	  they	  held	  respectively	  that	  it	  ‘would	  
make	  for	  a	  fairer	  balance	  between	  the	  interests	  of	  buyer	  and	  seller’266	  and	  that	  its	  
provisions	  would	  protect	  the	  non-­‐performing	  party	  against	  the	  consequences	  of	  
avoidance	  of	  contract.267	  Moreover,	  the	  objective	  test	  would	  assist	  courts	  in	  
adjudicating	  disputes	  in	  jurisdictions	  that	  have	  no	  equivalent	  to	  the	  anticipatory	  
repudiation	  doctrine	  under	  their	  national	  law.268	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83	  
The	  Egyptian	  amendments	  were	  put	  to	  the	  vote	  and	  rejected	  by	  19	  votes	  for	  and	  19	  
votes	  against.	  Those	  who	  were	  in	  favour	  of	  rejection	  stated	  that	  in	  some	  circumstances	  
it	  would	  be	  too	  burdensome	  on	  the	  non-­‐defaulting	  party	  to	  give	  mandatory	  
notification	  to	  suspend	  the	  contract	  when	  the	  deficiency	  is	  so	  serious	  and	  quick	  action	  
is	  essential.269	  There	  was	  also	  resistance	  to	  combining	  the	  remedies:	  suspension	  is	  
merely	  a	  precautionary	  measure	  and	  is	  meant	  to	  be	  temporary,	  whereas	  avoidance	  is	  a	  
complete	  remedy	  that	  a	  party	  can	  resort	  to	  when	  non-­‐performance	  is	  imminent.270	  
However,	  it	  was	  decided	  that	  a	  new	  text	  for	  Articles	  62	  and	  63	  should	  be	  drafted	  by	  an	  
ad	  hoc	  Working	  Group	  comprising	  Argentina,	  Egypt,	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany,	  
Finland,	  France,	  the	  German	  Democratic	  Republic,	  Iraq,	  Mexico,	  the	  Republic	  of	  Korea	  
and	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America.271	  
	  
The	  desired	  outcome	  was	  to	  reach	  a	  compromise	  that	  was	  not	  completely	  objective	  
but	  which	  was	  less	  subjective	  than	  the	  1978	  Draft	  Convention.272	  The	  Working	  Group	  
submitted273	  that	  Paragraph	  (1)	  be	  replaced	  by	  the	  following:	  	  
	  
(1)	  A	  party	  may,	  if	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  do	  so,	  suspend	  the	  performance	  of	  his	  
obligations	  when,	  after	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  contract,	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  other	  
party	  will	  not	  perform	  a	  substantial	  part	  of	  his	  obligations	  as	  a	  result	  of:	  
(a)	  a	  serious	  deficiency	  in	  his	  ability	  to	  perform	  or	  in	  his	  creditworthiness,	  or	  
(b)	  his	  conduct	  in	  preparing	  to	  perform	  or	  in	  performing	  the	  contract.	  
	  
When	  the	  proposal	  was	  discussed,	  it	  was	  agreed	  that	  (i)	  the	  words	  ‘it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  
do	  so’	  be	  deleted;	  (ii)	  ‘if,	  after	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  contract’	  to	  replace	  ‘when,	  after	  
the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  contract’;	  and	  (iii)	  ‘it	  becomes	  apparent’	  to	  replace	  ‘it	  
appears.’274	  Finally,	  it	  was	  agreed	  that	  this	  amended	  paragraph	  be	  combined	  with	  the	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84	  
original	  Paragraphs	  2	  and	  3	  of	  Article	  62	  of	  the	  1978	  Draft	  Convention.	  This	  is	  now	  CISG	  
Article	  71.	  
	  
In	  the	  end,	  the	  phrase	  ‘gives	  good	  grounds	  to	  conclude’	  in	  the	  1978	  Draft	  Convention	  
was	  replaced	  with	  ‘it	  becomes	  apparent’	  in	  the	  CISG,	  which	  makes	  such	  an	  assessment	  
of	  ability	  to	  perform	  less	  subjective.275	  
	  
With	  regard	  to	  Article	  63,	  it	  was	  suggested276	  by	  the	  Working	  Group	  that	  the	  following	  
paragraphs	  (as	  Paragraphs	  2	  and	  3)	  be	  added	  to	  it:	  
	  
(2)	  If	  time	  allows,	  the	  party	  intending	  to	  declare	  the	  contract	  avoided	  must	  give	  
notice	  reasonably	  in	  advance	  to	  the	  other	  party	  in	  order	  to	  permit	  him	  to	  provide	  
adequate	  assurance	  of	  his	  performance.	  
(3)	  The	  requirements	  of	  the	  preceding	  paragraph	  do	  not	  apply	  if	  the	  other	  party	  
has	  declared	  that	  he	  will	  not	  perform	  his	  obligations.	  
	  
It	  was	  agreed	  that	  the	  phrase	  ‘give	  notice	  reasonably	  in	  advance’	  be	  replaced	  with	  
‘give	  reasonable	  notice.’	  It	  was	  also	  decided	  that	  the	  original	  text	  of	  Article	  63	  of	  the	  
1978	  Draft	  Convention	  be	  adopted	  as	  Paragraph	  1	  of	  the	  new	  Article	  63.	  Finally,	  this	  
Paragraph	  1,	  along	  with	  amended	  Paragraphs	  2	  and	  3,	  were	  adopted	  as	  CISG	  Article	  
72.	  Therefore,	  the	  CISG	  makes	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  right	  to	  suspend	  the	  contract	  
and	  the	  right	  to	  avoid	  the	  contract.	  Article	  71,	  dealing	  with	  suspension	  of	  performance,	  
requires	  a	  less	  draconian	  test	  of	  ‘it	  becomes	  apparent,’	  while	  Article	  72,	  dealing	  with	  
avoidance	  of	  contract,	  requires	  a	  more	  stringent	  test	  of	  ‘it	  is	  clear.’	  This	  is	  what	  the	  
delegate	  from	  Norway	  put	  forward:	  ‘It	  must	  be	  easier	  for	  one	  of	  the	  parties	  to	  suspend	  
performance	  of	  his	  obligations	  than	  to	  declare	  the	  contract	  avoided.’277	  
	  
The	  notion	  of	  giving	  notice	  to	  the	  non-­‐performing	  party	  of	  the	  other	  party’s	  intention	  
to	  avoid	  the	  contract	  so	  that	  adequate	  assurances	  of	  performance	  could	  be	  offered	  (as	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85	  
proposed	  by	  the	  Egyptian	  delegate),278	  along	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  significance	  of	  
quick	  action	  in	  a	  situation	  to	  offer	  adequate	  assurances	  (as	  noted	  by	  the	  Swedish	  
delegate),279	  provided	  the	  basis	  for	  finding	  a	  compromise	  in	  Article	  72	  of	  the	  CISG.	  
The	  outcome	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  intervention	  therefore	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  greater	  
protection	  for	  the	  financially	  weaker	  parties	  in	  international	  trade	  than	  would	  have	  
been	  achieved	  under	  the	  1978	  Draft	  Convention.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  interests	  of	  
developing	  countries	  were	  reflected,	  to	  some	  extent,	  in	  the	  CISG’s	  revised	  provisions.	  
Having	  said	  that,	  the	  provisions	  did	  not	  satisfy	  all	  interests;280	  as	  the	  French	  delegate	  
stated:	  ‘The	  provisions	  of	  article	  62	  [CISG	  Article	  71]	  were	  dangerous	  because	  they	  
would	  jeopardize	  still	  further	  the	  situation	  of	  enterprises	  in	  difficulties.’281	  
3.3.3 The	  North–South	  Issues:	  Passing	  of	  Risk	  of	  Goods	  in	  Transit	  (Article	  
80	  (Draft	  Vienna	  Convention)	  –	  Article	  68	  (CISG))	  
Another	  matter	  relating	  to	  North–South	  trade	  concerned	  the	  allocation	  of	  risk	  of	  loss	  
or	  damage	  to	  goods	  in	  transit.282	  According	  to	  Article	  80	  of	  the	  Draft	  Convention,	  the	  
risk	  passes	  to	  the	  buyer	  from	  ‘the	  time	  the	  goods	  are	  handed	  over	  to	  the	  carrier	  who	  
issues	  the	  documents	  controlling	  their	  deposition.’283	  
	  
The	  developing	  countries	  stated	  that	  a	  retroactive	  passing	  of	  the	  risk	  would	  be	  
disadvantageous	  to	  buyers	  in	  emerging	  countries.284	  That	  is	  because	  buyers	  would	  take	  
responsibility	  for	  the	  purchased	  goods	  and	  would	  also	  bear	  the	  risk	  from	  the	  time	  of	  
handing	  the	  goods	  to	  the	  carrier,	  when	  the	  buyers	  were	  not	  and	  could	  not	  be	  
responsible	  for	  them.285	  The	  delegates	  argued	  that	  the	  risk	  should	  transfer	  to	  the	  
buyers	  at	  the	  time	  of	  conclusion	  of	  the	  contract.286	  Only	  at	  that	  time	  could	  the	  buyers	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  Article	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  put	  too	  much	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  A/CONF.97/19	  (n	  231)	  220,	  paras	  16,	  17.	  
281	  Mr	  Plantard.	  
‘Official	  Records’	  A/CONF.97/19	  (n	  231)	  220,	  para	  14.	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  (n	  149)	  
352.	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  Honnold,	  Documentary	  History	  of	  the	  Uniform	  Law	  for	  International	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  (n	  239).	  
284	  Garro,	  ‘Reconciliation	  of	  Legal	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  (n	  152)	  475.	  
285	  Honnold,	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286	  Mr	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  from	  Ghana.	  
86	  
take	  responsibility	  for	  the	  goods	  ‘in	  a	  reasonable	  and	  economically	  efficient	  way,’	  as	  
the	  goods	  then	  belong	  to	  them.287	  The	  retroactive	  provision	  was,	  according	  to	  the	  
Pakistani	  delegate,	  ‘unjust.’288	  	  
	  
The	  developed	  countries	  did	  not	  accept	  this	  criticism.	  For	  example,	  the	  Swedish	  
delegate	  referred	  to	  ‘common	  maritime	  transport	  of	  bulk	  commodities,’	  whose	  sales	  
are	  mainly	  based	  on	  documents.	  As	  the	  buyer	  would	  normally	  either	  ‘take	  out	  
separate	  insurance’	  or	  have	  general	  policy	  coverage,	  ‘the	  provision	  in	  question	  would	  
thus	  in	  no	  way	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  penalizing	  him.’289	  The	  Norwegian	  delegate	  argued	  in	  
support	  of	  the	  proposal,	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  it	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  specify	  when	  the	  
damage	  to	  goods	  had	  occurred	  or	  even	  to	  establish	  the	  goods’	  condition	  when	  they	  
were	  sold.290	  
	  
The	  Ghanaian	  delegate	  supported	  the	  Pakistani	  criticism,	  however,	  pointing	  out	  that	  
he	  ‘was	  not	  concerned	  that	  the	  established	  practice	  should	  outweigh	  all	  consideration	  
of	  logic	  in	  the	  matter.	  Before	  the	  goods	  were	  sold	  to	  him,	  the	  buyer	  had	  no	  interest	  to	  
protect,	  i.e.	  no	  insurable	  interest.’	  He	  further	  stated	  that	  in	  Ghana	  it	  was	  not	  feasible	  
to	  ‘take	  out	  insurance	  against	  risk,’291	  owing	  to	  the	  differences	  between	  an	  established	  
system	  and	  a	  practical	  system.	  
	  
The	  position	  of	  the	  developing	  countries	  was	  rejected	  at	  first,292	  with	  the	  Pakistani	  
delegate	  expressing	  his	  regret	  that	  ‘a	  large	  majority	  of	  the	  members	  of	  committee	  had	  
not	  seen	  fit	  .	  .	  .	  for	  unconvincing	  reasons	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  legitimate	  interest	  of	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289	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  Mr	  Rognlien,	  delegate	  from	  Norway.	  ‘LEGISLATIVE	  HISTORY	  1980	  Vienna	  Diplomatic	  Conference’	  (n	  
286).	  
291	  Mr	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  (n	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292	  ‘LEGISLATIVE	  HISTORY	  1980	  Vienna	  Diplomatic	  Conference’	  (n	  286).	  
‘Observing	  that	  the	  Indian	  amendment	  (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.244)	  commanded	  only	  limited	  support,	  he	  
said	  that	  if	  there	  were	  no	  objections	  he	  would	  take	  it	  that	  the	  Committee	  wished	  to	  reject	  it	  and	  adopt	  
article	  80	  [became	  CISG	  Article	  68]	  with	  the	  change	  proposed	  by	  the	  United	  States.’	  
87	  
sellers	  of	  bulk	  commodities	  in	  developing	  countries.’293	  However,	  in	  the	  plenary	  
session	  of	  the	  Convention,	  the	  Pakistani	  proposal	  was	  accommodated	  as	  the	  first	  
sentence	  of	  the	  compromise,294	  which	  stated	  that,	  from	  the	  time	  of	  conclusion	  of	  the	  
contract,	  the	  risk	  passes	  from	  the	  seller	  to	  the	  buyer.	  However,	  with	  a	  proviso	  that	  ‘if	  
the	  circumstances	  so	  indicate,’	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  the	  buyer	  will	  bear	  the	  retroactive	  
risk	  from	  the	  time	  the	  goods	  are	  handed	  over	  to	  the	  carrier.295	  
Article	  68	  of	  the	  CISG	  now	  reads	  as	  follows:	  
	  
The	  risk	  in	  respect	  of	  goods	  sold	  in	  transit	  passes	  to	  the	  buyer	  from	  the	  time	  of	  
the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  contract.	  However,	  if	  the	  circumstances	  so	  indicate,	  the	  risk	  
is	  assumed	  by	  the	  buyer	  from	  the	  time	  the	  goods	  were	  handed	  over	  to	  the	  
carrier	  who	  issued	  the	  documents	  embodying	  the	  contract	  of	  carriage.	  
Nevertheless,	  if	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  contract	  of	  sale	  the	  seller	  
knew	  or	  ought	  to	  have	  known	  that	  the	  goods	  had	  been	  lost	  or	  damaged	  and	  did	  
not	  disclose	  this	  to	  the	  buyer,	  the	  loss	  or	  damage	  is	  at	  the	  risk	  of	  the	  seller.	  
	  
This	  compromise	  is	  regarded	  by	  some	  commentators	  as	  ‘failing	  to	  provide	  a	  workable	  
rule’296and	  to	  be	  a	  ‘failure	  of	  uniform	  law.’297	  It	  is	  indeed	  argued	  that	  ascertaining	  ‘if	  
the	  circumstances	  so	  indicate’	  is	  not	  an	  easy	  task,298	  and	  that	  ‘an	  irreconcilable	  
position’	  has	  been	  masked	  behind	  ‘an	  illusory	  compromise.’299	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  
developing	  countries	  did	  not	  have	  an	  entirely	  effective	  voice	  on	  this	  issue.	  However,	  it	  
seems	  that	  the	  outcome	  of	  this	  compromise	  has	  not	  been	  a	  negative	  result	  for	  
developing	  nations.	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  (n	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  Eorsi,	  ‘A	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298	  Garro,	  ‘Reconciliation	  of	  Legal	  Traditions’	  (n	  152)	  475.	  
299	  ibid	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88	  
3.3.4 The	  North–South	  Issues:	  Trade	  Usages	  (Article	  8	  (Draft	  Vienna	  
Convention)	  –	  Article	  9	  (CISG))	  
Another	  issue	  that	  was	  part	  of	  the	  North–South	  debate	  and	  was	  characterised	  as	  
‘fiercely	  debated’300	  and	  ‘sharply	  divided’301	  related	  to	  the	  incorporation	  of	  trade	  
usages	  into	  the	  contract.302	  The	  industrialised	  nations	  were	  strongly	  in	  favour	  of	  this	  
incorporation,	  even	  where	  there	  was	  no	  explicit	  agreement	  between	  contracting	  
parties,	  ‘provided	  that	  an	  objective,	  reasonable	  person	  would	  consider	  the	  usages	  
applicable.’303	  The	  developing	  nations	  and	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc	  were	  opposed	  to	  the	  
incorporation	  of	  usages,	  except	  where	  the	  contracting	  parties	  had	  agreed304	  to	  their	  
application	  and	  also	  where	  they	  did	  not	  infringe	  the	  statutory	  provisions	  of	  contracting	  
parties.305	  
	  
As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  the	  call	  for	  a	  New	  International	  Economic	  Order	  echoed	  the	  
inequality	  in	  the	  existing	  economic	  order;306	  therefore,	  developing	  and	  Eastern	  Bloc	  
nations	  had	  taken	  this	  into	  account	  when	  they	  opposed	  the	  developed	  nations’	  
demands	  regarding	  trade	  usages.307	  As	  trade	  usages	  usually	  arose	  in	  transactions	  
between	  parties	  from	  the	  developed	  nations,	  they	  were	  ‘likely	  to	  reflect	  the	  interests	  
of	  such	  countries.’308	  Therefore,	  the	  usages	  were	  regarded	  as	  ‘neo-­‐colonialist’309	  by	  
many	  developing	  and	  socialist	  countries.	  The	  Yugoslavian	  delegate	  stated	  that	  
‘commercial	  usages	  to	  date	  had	  been	  formed	  by	  a	  restricted	  group	  of	  countries	  only	  
whose	  position	  did	  not	  express	  worldwide	  opinion.’310	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  held	  that	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  July	  2013.	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‘usages	  were	  often	  devices	  established	  by	  monopolies.’311	  The	  delegate	  from	  
Czechoslovakia	  expressed	  his	  ‘grave	  doubts	  about	  its	  [Article	  8	  of	  the	  Draft	  
Convention]	  content	  and	  principles	  it	  set	  forth.’	  He	  further	  stated	  that	  sellers	  and	  
buyers	  from	  many	  countries,	  particularly	  developing	  countries,	  had	  no	  role	  in	  the	  
establishment	  of	  trade	  usages	  and	  yet	  they	  would	  apply	  to	  them.	  He	  continued	  that	  
their	  application	  should	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  contracting	  parties’	  will.312	  
	  
The	  opposing	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  developing	  and	  Eastern	  Bloc	  countries	  on	  trade	  
usages	  were	  based	  on	  foreseeability	  and	  security,313	  whereas	  the	  developed	  nations	  
were	  favouring	  flexibility,	  which	  results	  in	  economic	  efficiency	  instead	  of	  fairness.314	  
The	  vague	  wording	  of	  Article	  9(2)	  of	  ULIS,	  ‘usages	  which	  reasonable	  persons	  in	  the	  
same	  situation	  as	  the	  parties	  usually	  considered	  to	  be	  applicable	  to	  their	  contract,’	  was	  
a	  matter	  of	  concern.315	  This	  article	  was	  criticised	  both	  generally	  and	  politically	  and	  was	  
regarded	  as	  ‘one-­‐sided	  as	  to	  their	  content	  and	  in	  favour	  of	  those	  created	  them.’316	  The	  
debate	  did	  not	  lead	  to	  much	  change	  and	  mostly	  emphasised	  ‘systemic	  differences	  of	  
opinions.’317	  Several	  amendments	  were	  proposed:	  (i)	  in	  order	  to	  make	  the	  usages	  
qualified,	  the	  word	  ‘reasonable’	  to	  be	  included;	  (ii)	  a	  limitation	  to	  be	  included	  which	  
expressed	  that	  ‘implied	  usage	  covered	  were	  not	  contrary	  to	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’;	  
and	  (iii)	  to	  be	  specified	  if	  the	  contract	  and	  its	  formation	  should	  be	  covered	  by	  the	  
article.	  It	  was	  only	  this	  final	  amendment	  that	  gained	  acceptance.318	  The	  Soviet	  Union’s	  
delegate	  stated	  that	  ‘the	  present	  formulation	  of	  [Draft]	  article	  of	  8(2)	  represented	  a	  
hard-­‐won	  compromise	  which	  .	  .	  .	  would	  be	  undesirable	  to	  change	  at	  this	  stage.’319	  
That	  the	  usage	  is	  to	  be	  ‘widely	  known’320	  is	  a	  reminder	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  ‘	  .	  .	  .	  there	  
would	  be	  new	  countries	  and	  enterprises	  entering	  the	  international	  market	  which	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
311	  Kastely,	  ‘Unification	  and	  Community’	  (n	  150)	  609.	  
312	  Mr	  Kopac,	  delegate	  from	  Czechoslovakia.	  ‘LEGISLATIVE	  HISTORY	  1980	  Vienna	  Diplomatic	  Conference’	  
(n	  310).	  
313	  Eorsi,	  ‘A	  Propos	  the	  1980	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods’	  (n	  149)	  
342.	  
314	  ibid	  343.	  See	  Garro,	  ‘Reconciliation	  of	  Legal	  Traditions’	  (n	  152)	  478.	  
315	  C	  M	  Bianca	  and	  M	  J	  Bonell,	  Commentary	  on	  the	  International	  Sales	  Law:	  The	  1980	  Vienna	  Sales	  
Convention	  (Giuffré:	  Milan	  1987).	  
316	  ibid.	  
317	  Winship,	  ‘The	  Scope	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	  International	  Sales	  Contracts’	  (n	  63).	  
318	  Honnold,	  Documentary	  History	  of	  the	  Uniform	  Law	  for	  International	  Sales	  (n	  239).	  
319	  ibid.	  
320	  Honnold,	  Uniform	  Law	  for	  International	  Sales	  (n	  241).	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would	  not	  be	  familiar	  with	  the	  usages	  of	  international	  trade.’321	  Article	  9	  also	  supports	  
the	  developed	  nations’	  viewpoint	  with	  regard	  to	  usages	  as	  flexible	  customs,	  since	  this	  
may	  be	  used	  to	  cover	  contracting	  issues	  that	  parties	  have	  failed	  to	  agree	  on.322	  
The	  Draft	  Convention	  suggests	  that	  ‘usages	  will	  prevail	  in	  a	  conflict	  between	  an	  
applicable	  usage	  and	  Uniform	  Law	  unless	  otherwise	  agreed	  by	  the	  parties.’323	  The	  final	  
draft	  is	  a	  compromise	  that	  stemmed	  from	  the	  input	  of	  different	  political	  and	  economic	  
systems	  and	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  clear	  answer	  on	  the	  role	  of	  usage.324	  Nevertheless,	  
despite	  the	  strong	  representations	  of	  the	  socialist	  and	  developing	  countries,	  the	  
proposal	  made	  it	  through	  to	  the	  final	  text	  without	  significant	  alteration.	  
3.3.5	  Summary	  
An	  examination	  of	  North–South	  issues	  shows	  that	  many	  compromises	  were	  made	  
during	  negotiations.	  This	  led	  to	  some	  gaps	  and	  inconsistencies,	  but	  did	  not	  affect	  the	  
overall	  usefulness	  of	  the	  CISG.	  As	  Professor	  Winship	  has	  stated,	  ‘No	  legal	  text	  is	  
perfect,’325	  but	  the	  CISG	  has	  certainly	  been	  an	  improvement	  on	  its	  precursors	  (ULIS	  
and	  ULF).	  The	  Vienna	  Conference,	  and	  the	  Working	  Groups	  that	  produced	  the	  Draft	  
Convention,	  therefore	  did	  provide	  a	  forum	  for	  developing	  countries	  to	  raise	  their	  
concerns	  and	  make	  the	  developed	  nations	  listen.	  As	  a	  result,	  international	  economic	  
relations	  were	  brought	  into	  better	  balance.	  The	  CISG	  begins	  with	  the	  statement	  that	  
state	  parties	  to	  the	  Convention	  have	  agreed	  to	  the	  broad	  objectives	  of	  the	  New	  
International	  Economic	  Order.326	  As	  Professor	  Winship	  stated,	  the	  signatories’	  
agreement	  ‘to	  join	  the	  community	  formed	  by	  the	  Sales	  Convention	  is	  to	  recognize	  the	  
equal	  status	  of	  less	  developed	  countries,	  to	  remove	  barriers	  to	  self-­‐development,	  and	  
to	  create	  a	  “New	  International	  Economic	  Order”.’327	  In	  short,	  the	  CISG	  has	  gone	  
beyond	  the	  mere	  identification	  of	  conflicts	  between	  North	  and	  South;	  it	  is	  indeed	  a	  
substantial	  assurance	  that	  these	  inequalities	  will	  be	  changed	  and	  a	  new	  and	  balanced	  
order	  will	  be	  established.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
321	  Mr	  Goldstajn,	  delegate	  from	  Yugoslavia.	  ‘LEGISLATIVE	  HISTORY	  1980	  Vienna	  Diplomatic	  Conference’	  
(n	  310).	  
322	  Eorsi,	  ‘A	  Propos	  the	  1980	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods’	  (n	  149)	  
343.	  
323	  Honnold,	  Documentary	  History	  of	  the	  Uniform	  Law	  for	  International	  Sales	  (n	  239).	  
324	  Garro,	  ‘Reconciliation	  of	  Legal	  Traditions’	  (n	  152)	  479.	  
325	  Peter	  Winship,	  ‘New	  Rules	  for	  International	  Sales’	  (1982)	  68	  American	  Bar	  Association	  Journal	  1230,	  
1234.	  	  
326	  Preamble	  to	  the	  CISG.	  
327	  Winship,	  ‘Commentary	  on	  Professor	  Kastely’s	  Rhetorical	  Analysis’	  (n	  190)	  652.	  
91	  
Part	  Three	  
3.4	  CISG	  Case-­‐Law	  Analysis	  and	  Its	  Likely	  Effect	  on	  Developing	  Countries	  
As	  the	  previous	  section	  shows,	  the	  developing	  countries	  expressed	  their	  apprehension	  
in	  relation	  to	  a	  number	  of	  drafting	  issues.	  Changes	  were	  made	  that	  reflected	  at	  least	  
some	  of	  their	  concerns.	  However,	  whether	  CISG	  case-­‐law	  analysis	  of	  these	  articles	  is	  
still	  keeping	  track	  of	  developing	  countries’	  concerns	  is	  a	  matter	  requiring	  closer	  
examination.	  	  
	  
A	  review	  of	  records	  shows	  that	  the	  developing	  countries	  have	  played	  little	  part	  in	  the	  
development	  of	  interpretation	  or	  gap-­‐filling	  of	  the	  CISG.	  The	  Pace	  University	  database	  
of	  reports	  on	  CISG	  judgements	  and	  arbitrations328	  and	  UNCITRAL’s	  reporting	  system	  
for	  case	  law	  on	  UNCITRAL	  texts	  (CLOUT)329	  reveal	  that	  the	  developing	  nations	  have	  
been	  largely	  unrepresented	  in	  the	  development	  of	  a	  body	  of	  judicial	  interpretation.	  If	  
China	  and	  those	  European	  countries	  that	  are	  defined	  as	  developing	  countries330	  are	  
excluded,	  it	  will	  be	  seen	  that	  the	  number	  of	  cases	  in	  the	  database	  reported	  by	  
developing	  nations	  forms	  less	  than	  2%	  of	  the	  total	  cases.331	  Such	  statistics	  do	  not	  come	  
as	  a	  surprise	  when	  one	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  low	  rate	  of	  ratification	  by	  the	  developing	  
countries	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  jurisdiction	  clauses	  require	  the	  courts	  or	  arbitral	  
panels	  to	  be	  in	  developed	  nations.	  What	  this	  suggests	  is	  that	  neither	  in	  the	  
development	  of	  a	  body	  of	  comparative	  law	  nor	  in	  the	  promotion	  of	  uniformity	  have	  
the	  developing	  countries	  had	  a	  significant	  role.	  Having	  said	  that,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  
cases	  that	  raise	  those	  matters	  that	  were	  of	  concern	  to	  the	  developing	  world.	  	  
	  
The	  review	  of	  case	  law	  on	  Article	  39	  demonstrates	  that,	  among	  the	  abundance	  of	  
reports	  on	  this	  article	  (mainly	  from	  the	  developed	  world),	  evidence	  justifying	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
328	  ‘CISG	  Database,	  Country	  Case	  Schedule.’	  <www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/casecit.html>	  accessed	  2	  
July	  2013.	  
329	  Since	  1988,	  UNCITRAL	  has	  established	  a	  reporting	  system	  for	  case	  law	  on	  UNCITRAL	  texts	  (CLOUT)	  in	  
order	  to	  assist	  judges,	  arbitrators,	  lawyers,	  and	  parties	  to	  business	  transactions,	  by	  making	  available	  
decisions	  of	  courts	  and	  arbitral	  tribunals	  interpreting	  UNCITRAL	  texts;	  and,	  in	  so	  doing,	  to	  further	  the	  
uniform	  interpretation	  and	  application	  of	  those	  texts.	  
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/case_law.html>	  accessed	  16	  February	  2014.	  
330	  ‘World	  Economic	  Outlook’	  (April	  2011)	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  174,	  175,	  Table	  E.	  
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/pdf/text.pdf>	  accessed	  3	  August	  2013.	  
331	  As	  of	  2	  July	  2013.	  ‘CISG	  Database,	  Country	  Case	  Schedule’	  (n	  328).	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concerns	  of	  the	  developing	  world	  on	  the	  matter	  of	  lack	  of	  conformity	  is	  almost	  non-­‐
existent.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  Baby	  beef	  hide	  case332	  between	  a	  Yugoslav/Serbian	  seller	  
and	  a	  German	  buyer,	  the	  Arbitral	  Tribunal	  held	  that	  a	  period	  of	  over	  20	  days	  is	  not	  a	  
reasonable	  time	  for	  giving	  notice	  of	  non-­‐conformity	  of	  the	  goods.	  The	  buyer	  lost	  his	  
right	  to	  rely	  on	  a	  lack	  of	  conformity,	  as	  he	  failed	  to	  give	  notice	  thereof	  within	  a	  
reasonable	  period	  of	  time,	  as	  required	  by	  Article	  39	  of	  the	  CISG.	  In	  the	  Crystal	  Sugar	  
Case,333	  the	  contract,	  which	  was	  concluded	  between	  a	  Serbian	  seller	  and	  a	  German	  
buyer,	  required	  the	  sugar	  to	  be	  of	  Yugoslav	  origin.	  Otherwise,	  the	  buyer	  had	  to	  pay	  
customs	  for	  the	  import	  of	  the	  sugar.	  The	  seller	  delivered	  Polish	  sugar	  instead	  of	  
Yugoslav.	  The	  court	  held	  that	  the	  plaintiff	  (buyer)	  had	  lost	  his	  right	  to	  rely	  on	  Article	  
39(1)	  of	  the	  CISG,	  as	  he	  had	  failed	  to	  notify	  the	  seller	  of	  lack	  of	  conformity	  of	  the	  
goods,	  specifying	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  non-­‐conformity,	  within	  a	  reasonable	  time	  from	  the	  
moment	  he	  had	  discovered	  it	  or	  ought	  to	  have	  discovered	  it.	  The	  court	  found	  that	  a	  
simple	  examination	  of	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  goods	  could	  have	  revealed	  to	  the	  buyer	  that	  
they	  were	  of	  Polish	  origin.	  Therefore,	  he	  could	  have	  made	  timely	  notice	  of	  non-­‐
conformity,	  which	  he	  failed	  to	  do.	  Additionally,	  in	  the	  Barcel	  S	  A	  de	  C	  V	  v	  Steve	  Kliff	  
case,334	  an	  American	  seller	  and	  a	  Mexican	  buyer	  entered	  into	  an	  oral	  agreement	  for	  
the	  purchase	  of	  foil	  trading	  cards.	  The	  delivered	  goods	  were	  toxic	  and	  malodorous,	  
which	  made	  them	  unsuitable	  for	  use	  in	  food	  packaging.	  Therefore,	  the	  buyer	  brought	  
an	  action	  against	  the	  seller	  owing	  to	  non-­‐conformity	  of	  the	  goods.	  The	  court	  held	  that	  
the	  buyer	  had	  failed	  to	  notify	  the	  seller	  of	  lack	  of	  conformity	  of	  the	  goods	  within	  a	  
reasonable	  time,	  as	  required	  by	  Article	  39	  of	  the	  CISG.	  The	  court	  thus	  declined	  the	  
case.	  Also,	  in	  another	  case,	  that	  of	  Waste	  container,335	  a	  Hungarian	  seller	  and	  an	  
Austrian	  buyer	  signed	  a	  contract	  for	  the	  sale	  of	  containers.	  The	  buyer	  paid	  for	  only	  part	  
of	  the	  delivered	  goods,	  and	  refused	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  rest	  owing	  to	  their	  poor	  quality.	  The	  
arbitral	  court	  held	  that	  the	  buyer	  had	  failed	  to	  notify	  the	  seller	  of	  defects	  in	  the	  goods,	  
as	  required	  by	  Article	  39(1)	  of	  the	  CISG;	  and	  held	  that	  discovery	  of	  lack	  of	  conformity	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
332	  Serbia	  12	  July	  1994	  Foreign	  Trade	  Court	  of	  Arbitration	  attached	  to	  the	  Yugoslav	  Chamber	  of	  
Commerce.	  
	  <http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cases/940712sb.html>	  accessed	  5	  August	  2013.	  	  
333	  Serbia	  28	  June	  2006	  Commercial	  Court	  in	  Cacak.	  
<http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cases/060628sb.html>	  accessed	  5	  August	  2013.	  
334	  Mexico	  3	  October	  2006	  Juzgado	  Primero	  Civil	  de	  Primera	  Instancia	  [Court	  of	  First	  Instance]	  de	  Lerma	  
de	  Villada.	  
<http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cases/061003m1.html>	  accessed	  5	  August	  2013.	  
335	  Hungary	  5	  December	  1995	  Budapest	  Arbitration	  proceeding	  Vb	  94131.	  
<http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/951205h1.html>	  accessed	  5	  August	  2013.	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within	  a	  time	  frame	  of	  32	  days	  was	  not	  reasonable.	  Therefore,	  the	  buyer	  had	  to	  make	  
payment	  of	  the	  outstanding	  balance.	  The	  interpretation	  of	  Article	  39	  thus	  reveals	  that	  
no	  clear	  evidence	  exists	  to	  support	  the	  concerns	  of	  developing	  countries,	  such	  as	  over	  
being	  unjustifiably	  penalised.	  In	  addition,	  this	  article	  strikes	  a	  correct	  balance	  between	  
the	  interests	  of	  both	  developed	  and	  developing	  nations.	  Indeed,	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  
to	  suggest	  that	  buyers	  from	  developing	  countries	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  lose	  their	  rights	  for	  
not	  giving	  prompt	  and	  accurate	  notice	  within	  a	  reasonable	  time	  than	  are	  parties	  
elsewhere.	  	  
	  
A	  review	  of	  case	  law	  on	  Articles	  71	  and	  72	  also	  reveals	  that	  their	  fears	  were	  largely	  
misplaced.	  There	  are	  very	  few	  cases	  that	  raise	  the	  specific	  queries	  on	  suspension	  that	  
concerned	  the	  delegates	  from	  the	  developing	  countries.	  The	  case	  law	  shows	  that,	  
where	  a	  simple	  example	  of	  non-­‐payment	  occurs,	  without	  evidence	  of	  insolvency	  or	  a	  
deterioration	  in	  the	  financial	  condition	  of	  the	  buyer,	  sellers	  sometimes	  invoke	  the	  right	  
to	  suspension	  of	  performance.	  Suspension	  is	  justified	  under	  Article	  71(1)(b),	  where	  a	  
pattern	  of	  conduct	  indicates	  that	  there	  will	  be	  further	  serious	  breaches.	  Having	  said	  
that,	  suspension	  of	  delivery	  has	  been	  used	  in	  some	  cases	  to	  force	  payment	  of	  other	  
debts,	  or	  of	  the	  performance	  of	  unrelated	  obligations,	  or	  where	  there	  is	  little	  evidence	  
that	  breaches	  are	  likely	  to	  happen	  in	  future.	  For	  example,	  in	  Société	  Mim	  v	  Société	  
YSLP336	  and	  in	  Prodema	  S	  A	  v	  Michon	  B	  V,337	  suspension	  of	  performance	  was	  cited	  to	  
compel	  the	  payment	  of	  debts	  or	  performance	  unassociated	  with	  the	  contract,	  with	  no	  
proof	  that	  breaches	  would	  happen	  in	  the	  future.	  This	  type	  of	  conduct	  on	  the	  part	  of	  
the	  industrialised	  world	  was	  what	  the	  representatives	  from	  the	  developing	  nations	  
were	  concerned	  about.	  But	  this	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  only	  parties	  from	  the	  developed	  
world	  engage	  in	  such	  behaviour,	  or	  even	  that	  these	  outcomes	  are	  due	  to	  suspicion	  of	  
traders	  in	  developing	  countries.	  More	  importantly,	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  
unreasonable	  suspensions	  have	  had	  more	  adverse	  consequences	  for	  buyers	  from	  the	  
developing	  nations	  than	  from	  elsewhere.	  Therefore,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  
interpretation	  of	  Articles	  71	  and	  72,	  the	  expectations	  of	  the	  developing	  world	  are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
336	  France	  20	  February	  2007	  Supreme	  Court	  (Perfume	  case).	  
<http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cases/070220f1.html>	  accessed	  5	  August	  2013.	  
337	  Netherlands	  18	  July	  2007	  Rechtbank	  [District	  Court]	  Utrecht.	  
<http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cases/070718n1.html>	  accessed	  5	  August	  2013.	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sometimes	  not	  met,	  but	  this	  deficiency	  and	  inadequacy	  does	  not	  relate	  to	  their	  original	  
concerns.	  	  
	  
The	  study	  of	  case	  law	  on	  Article	  68	  suggests	  that	  the	  grounds	  for	  the	  apprehension	  of	  
the	  delegates	  from	  the	  developing	  world	  were	  not	  as	  serious	  as	  they	  believed.	  Very	  
few	  cases	  raise	  the	  specific	  concerns	  about	  the	  passing	  of	  risk	  for	  goods	  in	  transit	  that	  
were	  worrying	  the	  delegates	  from	  developing	  countries.	  The	  case	  law	  shows	  that	  the	  
court	  has	  indeed	  ruled	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  buyer	  where	  the	  seller	  did	  not	  prove	  or	  submit	  
that	  the	  goods	  were	  damaged	  after	  the	  passing	  of	  risk	  to	  the	  buyer.338	  Yet	  again,	  there	  
is	  no	  evidence	  to	  show	  that	  the	  developing	  world	  has	  been	  unfairly	  affected	  by	  either	  
the	  provisions	  of	  Article	  68	  or	  its	  interpretation.	  Indeed,	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  
specify	  when	  the	  damage	  to	  the	  goods	  has	  occurred	  and	  consequently	  to	  establish	  
whether	  the	  risk	  has	  passed	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  concern	  solely	  for	  the	  developing	  world,	  
but	  is	  rather	  of	  concern	  to	  all	  countries	  of	  the	  world.	  
	  
Examination	  of	  case	  law	  on	  Article	  9	  shows	  that,	  for	  instance,	  in	  W	  T	  GmbH	  v	  P	  AG,339	  
domestic	  law	  was	  regarded	  as	  the	  source	  of	  a	  usage	  by	  a	  Swiss	  court	  in	  a	  case	  between	  
a	  Swiss	  buyer	  and	  an	  Austrian	  seller.	  The	  decision	  was	  criticised,340	  but	  an	  American	  
court	  applied	  it	  in	  a	  case	  between	  an	  American	  seller	  and	  a	  Mexican	  buyer.341	  This	  
suggests	  that	  the	  concerns	  of	  the	  developing	  countries	  were	  justified,	  as	  a	  preference	  
for	  the	  home	  state	  could	  work	  to	  the	  disadvantage	  of	  their	  traders.	  This	  can	  be	  partly	  
refuted,	  however,	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  not	  only	  reflects	  the	  concerns	  of	  the	  developing	  
world,	  but	  also	  in	  a	  broader	  context	  reflects	  the	  concerns	  of	  all	  countries	  of	  the	  world	  
that	  concluding	  practices	  and	  rules	  at	  a	  domestic	  level	  can	  be	  raised	  to	  the	  level	  of	  
global	  usages.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
338	  See	  The	  Furniture	  Case.	  
Germany	  23	  June	  1998	  Appellate	  Court	  Hamm	  
	  <http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cases/980623g1.html>	  accessed	  5	  August	  2013.	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  Zivilgericht	  Kanton	  Basel-­‐Stadt	  21	  December	  1992.	  
<http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cases/921221s1.html>	  accessed	  2	  July	  2013.	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  Albert	  H	  Kritzer,	  Cross-­‐References	  and	  Editorial	  Analysis.	  
<http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cisg/text/cross/crosspreamble.html#fn0.html>	  accessed	  2	  July	  2013.	  	  
341	  Barbara	  Berry	  S	  A	  de	  C	  V	  v	  Ken	  M	  Spooner	  Farms	  Inc.	  
United	  States	  13	  April	  2006	  Federal	  District	  Court	  [State	  of	  Washington]	  	  
<http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cases/060413u1.html>	  accessed	  2	  July	  2013.	  
Reversed	  on	  appeal,	  see	  United	  States	  8	  November	  2007	  Federal	  Appellate	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  [9th	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  accessed	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As	  far	  as	  Article	  9	  is	  concerned,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  not	  all	  the	  
concerns	  of	  the	  developing	  countries	  were	  reflected	  in	  it,	  it	  seems	  that	  those	  concerns	  
may	  have	  been	  misguided.	  It	  is,	  however,	  evident	  that	  no	  active	  participation	  is	  taking	  
place	  on	  the	  developing	  countries’	  side	  in	  law-­‐making	  based	  on	  the	  CISG.	  
So	  far,	  as	  this	  study	  of	  the	  legislative	  history	  of	  the	  CISG	  and	  exploration	  of	  CISG	  case	  
law	  have	  shown,	  where	  appropriate	  the	  CISG	  took	  into	  account	  conditions	  in	  the	  
developing	  world.	  The	  aims	  of	  the	  NIEO	  were	  incorporated	  into	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  
CISG	  when	  the	  developing	  countries	  raised	  their	  concerns.	  Compromises	  and	  
concessions	  were	  made	  where	  their	  concerns	  were	  not	  in	  conflict	  with	  principles	  of	  
international	  commercial	  law.	  The	  case-­‐law	  analysis	  also	  reveals	  that	  the	  developing	  
countries	  had	  less	  to	  worry	  about	  than	  they	  initially	  believed.	  This	  is	  perhaps	  in	  
agreement	  with	  Professor	  Schmitthoff’s	  view	  that	  the	  three	  fundamental	  principles	  of	  
international	  trade	  law	  do	  not	  change	  in	  substance	  throughout	  the	  globe.342	  Values,	  
customs	  and	  local	  conditions	  are	  important	  only	  to	  a	  degree	  that	  does	  not	  require	  a	  
fundamental	  rearrangement	  of	  substantive	  law.	  	  
3.5	  Conclusion	  	  
This	  chapter	  has	  attempted	  to	  make	  a	  close	  examination	  of	  why	  developing	  countries	  
might	  wish	  to	  adopt	  the	  CISG.	  What	  the	  Convention	  offers	  in	  terms	  of	  suitability	  for	  
developing	  countries	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  a	  neutral	  law	  by	  nature,	  and	  no	  party	  obtains	  
a	  particular	  advantage	  from	  its	  application.	  The	  writer	  is	  also	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  the	  
CISG	  provides	  model	  codes	  for	  nations	  with	  no	  developed	  legal	  systems,	  in	  particular	  
those	  that	  do	  not	  have	  either	  the	  experience	  or	  the	  traditions	  to	  establish	  their	  own	  
laws.	  This	  is	  indeed	  of	  great	  value	  from	  the	  political	  point	  of	  view,	  since	  it	  might	  not	  be	  
in	  the	  political	  interests	  of	  some	  countries	  to	  apply	  the	  law	  of	  a	  particular	  jurisdiction	  
(especially	  the	  Uniform	  Commercial	  Code	  (UCC)	  or	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  Act	  1979)	  as	  the	  
model	  for	  a	  revision	  of	  their	  own	  domestic	  sales	  law.	  	  
	  
A	  study	  of	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  Hague	  Conventions	  (ULIS	  and	  ULF)	  offers	  a	  salutary	  
warning	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  non-­‐participation	  of	  the	  developing	  world	  in	  the	  legislative	  
process.	  This	  experience	  of	  non-­‐participation	  would	  have	  resulted	  in	  even	  greater	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disappointment	  if	  it	  had	  been	  ignored	  during	  UNCITRAL’s	  efforts	  to	  develop	  the	  CISG.	  
The	  CISG	  was	  fashioned	  to	  avoid	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  Hague	  Conventions	  precisely	  by	  
reflecting	  the	  interests	  and	  concerns	  of	  the	  developing	  world	  on	  different	  matters.	  
These	  included	  notifying	  the	  seller	  of	  non-­‐conforming	  goods,	  passing	  of	  risk	  of	  goods	  in	  
transit,	  suspension	  of	  performance	  in	  anticipation	  of	  breach,	  and	  incorporation	  of	  
trade	  usages.	  	  
	  
The	  concerns	  expressed	  were	  partially,	  if	  not	  fully,	  reflected	  in	  revised	  or	  new	  
provisions.	  Obviously,	  the	  CISG	  could	  not	  be	  optimal	  for	  any	  one	  group	  of	  countries,	  
since	  such	  a	  diverse	  range	  of	  participating	  states	  necessitated	  compromise	  during	  
negotiations.	  However,	  what	  matters	  is	  whether	  a	  reasonable	  balance	  has	  been	  
maintained	  between	  the	  rights	  and	  obligations	  of	  buyers	  and	  sellers.	  In	  so	  far	  as	  this	  
chapter	  has	  looked	  at	  specific	  drafting	  issues	  (in	  this	  case	  procedures	  for	  non-­‐
conformity),	  a	  reasonable	  balance	  is	  kept	  between	  the	  duties	  of	  the	  buyer	  and	  those	  of	  
the	  seller.	  It	  is	  thus	  the	  writer’s	  view	  that	  the	  UN	  Convention	  satisfies	  the	  interests	  of	  
developing	  countries.	  	  
	  
Whether	  or	  not	  all	  these	  efforts	  by	  delegations	  to	  the	  Diplomatic	  Conference	  have	  
been	  a	  success	  depends	  upon	  its	  ratification	  by	  developing	  countries,	  since,	  in	  the	  end,	  
it	  is	  up	  to	  each	  individual	  country	  to	  decide	  whether	  the	  CISG	  is	  compatible	  with	  their	  
national	  law	  and	  meets	  the	  demands	  of	  their	  business	  community.	  Obviously,	  this	  
cannot	  be	  determined	  until	  a	  close	  examination	  of	  other	  specific	  drafting	  issues	  has	  
been	  made.	  Owing	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  strong	  trading	  nations	  are	  signatories	  to	  the	  CISG,	  it	  
is	  necessary	  to	  consider	  the	  reasons	  for	  and	  against	  ratifying	  this	  Convention	  so	  as	  to	  




Reasons	  For	  and	  Against	  the	  Adoption	  of	  the	  CISG	  with	  Specific	  
Relevance	  to	  Developing	  Countries	  
4.1	  Introduction	  	  
Previous	  chapters	  have	  reviewed	  the	  history	  of	  the	  CISG,	  and	  shown	  that	  the	  claim	  
that	  it	  was	  drafted	  solely	  by	  developing	  countries	  is	  not	  sustainable.	  This	  should	  
counter	  any	  arguments	  that	  might	  be	  made	  against	  adoption	  of	  the	  CISG.	  This	  chapter	  
concentrates	  on	  the	  positive	  arguments	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  CISG,	  especially	  in	  relation	  to	  
Iran	  and	  other	  developing	  countries	  that	  have	  not	  ratified	  it.	  
	  
With	  this	  in	  mind,	  scholarly	  assessments	  of	  the	  CISG	  will	  be	  examined.	  Many	  critics	  
emphasise	  its	  failure	  to	  achieve	  its	  objectives,	  while	  others	  take	  a	  different	  approach	  
and	  regard	  the	  CISG	  as	  a	  success	  in	  terms	  of	  achieving	  a	  unified	  international	  law	  of	  
sales.	  Both	  schools	  of	  thought	  have	  been	  supported	  by	  different	  reasoning.	  For	  the	  
purposes	  of	  this	  paper	  it	  is	  important	  to	  consider	  both	  the	  opposing	  and	  the	  
supporting	  views,	  since	  ratification	  requires	  a	  thorough	  examination	  of	  the	  positions	  of	  
countries	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  CISG.	  This	  chapter	  also	  examines	  a	  specific	  concern	  of	  
countries	  that	  are	  considering	  ratification,	  namely	  incompatibility	  of	  the	  CISG	  with	  
their	  national	  law,	  which	  is	  a	  likely	  impediment	  that	  definitely	  requires	  closer	  
attention.	  The	  conflict	  between	  the	  CISG	  and	  their	  national	  law	  has	  been	  resolved	  by	  
many	  countries	  that	  have	  decided	  to	  adhere	  to	  the	  CISG.	  Their	  experiences	  thus	  offer	  
considerable	  guidance	  in	  assessing	  the	  challenges	  that	  lie	  ahead.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  writing	  
this	  paper,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  world’s	  leading	  trading	  countries	  had	  adopted	  the	  
CISG,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  which	  has	  to	  date	  failed	  to	  ratify	  it.	  
On	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  scale	  is	  Germany,	  which	  has	  gone	  a	  step	  beyond	  adoption	  and	  
actually	  based	  its	  domestic	  law	  reforms	  on	  the	  CISG.	  Therefore,	  the	  reasoning	  behind	  
one	  nation’s	  favourable	  position	  towards	  the	  CISG	  and	  another’s	  resistance	  can	  be	  a	  
highly	  useful	  source	  of	  information	  for	  others	  (in	  particular	  developing	  countries)	  in	  
deciding	  whether	  to	  adopt	  it.	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Since	  this	  chapter	  focuses	  on	  adoption	  of	  the	  CISG	  primarily	  by	  developing	  countries,	  it	  
is	  important	  to	  describe	  what	  criteria	  have	  been	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  defining	  
‘developing	  nations.’	  According	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  Statistics	  Division,	  ‘[t]here	  is	  no	  
established	  convention	  for	  the	  designation	  of	  “developed”	  and	  “developing”	  countries	  
or	  areas	  in	  the	  United	  Nations	  system.’343	  It	  further	  states	  that	  ‘[t]he	  designations	  
“developed”	  and	  “developing”	  are	  intended	  for	  statistical	  convenience	  and	  do	  not	  
necessarily	  express	  a	  judgement	  about	  the	  stage	  reached	  by	  a	  particular	  country	  or	  
area	  in	  the	  development	  process.’344	  The	  World	  Bank,	  however,	  which	  classifies	  the	  
countries	  into	  four	  income	  groups	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  Gross	  National	  Income	  (GNI)	  per	  
capita,	  refers	  to	  all	  low-­‐	  and	  middle-­‐income	  countries	  as	  developing	  economies	  but	  
notes	  that	  ‘the	  use	  of	  the	  term	  is	  convenient;	  it	  is	  not	  intended	  to	  imply	  that	  all	  
economies	  in	  the	  group	  are	  experiencing	  similar	  development	  or	  that	  other	  economies	  
have	  reached	  a	  preferred	  or	  final	  stage	  of	  development.	  Classification	  by	  income	  does	  
not	  necessarily	  reflect	  development	  status.’345	  Although	  the	  measure	  and	  concept	  of	  
development	  differs	  from	  country	  to	  country,	  the	  criteria,	  which	  the	  writer	  has	  taken	  
into	  account	  when	  referring	  to	  developing	  countries,	  are	  often	  those	  that	  were	  
referred	  to	  during	  the	  CISG’s	  drafting	  process:	  developing	  countries	  are	  generally	  
exporters	  of	  commodities	  and	  importers	  of	  manufactured	  goods,	  as	  was	  the	  case	  at	  
the	  Vienna	  Conference.	  They	  also	  have	  developing	  infrastructures,	  which	  include	  the	  
network	  of	  banking,	  insurance,	  shipping,	  legal	  and	  other	  sorts	  of	  expert	  service	  that	  
form	  the	  basis	  of	  international	  trade.	  Some	  of	  these	  criteria	  might	  still	  apply	  to	  a	  
country	  such	  as	  Iran.	  For	  example,	  although	  there	  is	  manufacturing	  industry	  in	  Iran,	  it	  
is	  not	  yet	  strong	  enough	  to	  meet	  domestic	  demand;	  hence,	  Iran	  is	  an	  importer.	  But	  the	  
level	  of	  development	  in	  Iran	  is	  much	  more	  advanced	  than	  in	  many	  of	  the	  developing	  
countries	  in	  Africa.	  At	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  scale,	  Iran	  is	  not	  as	  developed	  as	  some	  of	  
the	  developing	  countries	  in	  East	  Asia.	  But	  all	  the	  existing	  viewpoints	  on	  the	  adoption	  of	  
the	  CISG	  by	  the	  developing	  countries	  are	  being	  considered,	  regardless	  of	  their	  degree	  
of	  industrialisation.	  The	  writer	  is	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  this	  is	  because	  the	  majority	  of	  
these	  viewpoints	  are	  shared	  by	  these	  countries,	  and	  there	  are	  lessons	  that	  can	  be	  
learned	  on	  how	  to	  surmount	  the	  challenges	  that	  lie	  ahead.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
343	  <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm#ftnc>	  accessed	  16	  February	  2014.	  
344	  ‘Standard	  Country	  or	  Area	  Codes	  for	  Statistical	  Use.’	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  accessed	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  accessed	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With	  this	  in	  mind,	  this	  chapter	  will	  examine	  the	  reasons	  for	  and	  against	  adoption	  of	  
the	  CISG.	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  arguments	  are	  listed	  under	  eight	  main	  headings:	  	  
	  
• The	  CISG	  is	  simpler	  than	  private	  international	  law,	  as	  it	  offers	  certainty	  about	  
applicable	  law,	  legal	  efficiency	  and	  convenience	  in	  agreeing	  upon	  governing	  law;	  
• The	  CISG	  brings	  the	  contracting	  state	  into	  harmony	  with	  its	  trading	  partners	  that	  
have	  adopted	  the	  CISG	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  trade;	  
• The	  CISG	  offers	  simplicity	  and	  clarity	  as	  a	  law	  for	  international	  trade	  owing	  to	  the	  
nature	  of	  its	  rules,	  its	  increased	  level	  of	  predictability	  and	  its	  role	  as	  an	  aid	  in	  
negotiation;	  
• The	  CISG	  is	  consistent	  with	  general	  principles	  of	  international	  commercial	  law	  and	  
trade	  practices,	  as	  it	  recognises	  party	  autonomy	  and	  pacta	  sunt	  servanda	  and	  
international	  trade	  usages;	  
• The	  CISG	  is	  adaptable	  to	  future	  changes,	  as	  it	  offers	  stability	  through	  its	  fair	  and	  
detailed	  provisions;	  
• The	  CISG	  eases	  assimilation	  into	  domestic	  law	  and	  practice	  through	  its	  
compatibility	  with	  national	  laws,	  its	  domesticity	  and	  popularity,	  and	  the	  extent	  of	  
its	  international	  acceptance;	  
• The	  CISG	  is	  beneficial	  to	  domestic	  law,	  as	  it	  is	  more	  suitable	  for	  modern	  
international	  trade	  and	  could	  lead	  to	  domestic	  reform;	  
• The	  CISG	  protects	  national	  sovereignty	  through	  its	  flexible	  nature,	  the	  participative	  
process	  of	  its	  creation,	  and	  the	  opportunities	  it	  provides	  to	  integrate	  regionally,	  to	  
influence	  its	  interpretation,	  to	  promote	  arbitration,	  and	  to	  build	  expertise	  in	  
comparative	  and	  international	  law.	  
	  
Each	  of	  these	  categories	  will	  be	  considered	  critically	  and,	  where	  necessary,	  comments	  
will	  be	  provided.	  The	  categories	  are	  not	  mutually	  exclusive;	  there	  is	  some	  overlap	  
between	  them,	  and	  they	  are	  used	  only	  to	  provide	  a	  helpful	  framework	  for	  discussion.	  
This	  literature	  review	  generally	  considers	  all	  the	  existing	  viewpoints	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  
adoption	  of	  the	  CISG,	  as	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  them	  are	  highly	  relevant	  to	  developing	  
countries	  such	  as	  Iran.	  Consequently,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  each	  main	  section,	  the	  Iranian	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situation	  will	  be	  considered.	  This	  analysis	  is	  important,	  as	  it	  will	  provide	  a	  
comprehensive	  perspective	  which	  can	  lead	  to	  a	  balanced	  conclusion	  on	  whether	  Iran	  
or	  any	  other	  developing	  countries	  should	  adopt	  the	  CISG.	  	  
4.2	  Simpler	  than	  Private	  International	  Law	  
4.2.1	  Certainty	  as	  to	  Applicable	  Law	  in	  International	  Trade	  
When	  engaging	  in	  international	  law,	  fear	  of	  dispute	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  main	  concern.	  
Within	  the	  domain	  of	  international	  trade,	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  foreign	  laws	  causes	  a	  
problem	  with	  which	  law	  to	  apply	  when	  a	  legal	  dispute	  arises.	  In	  determining	  the	  
appropriate	  law	  for	  international	  sales	  contract,	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  common	  law	  
applied	  by	  the	  English	  courts	  relies	  on	  the	  lex	  loci	  contractus	  (the	  place	  where	  the	  
contract	  was	  made)	  and	  the	  lex	  loci	  solutionis	  (the	  place	  of	  performance	  of	  the	  
contract).346	  Also,	  Lord	  Wright	  stated	  that	  ‘the	  law	  with	  which	  the	  contract	  has	  the	  
closest	  and	  most	  real	  connection’	  is	  the	  proper	  law	  of	  contract.347	  The	  law	  with	  the	  
most	  real	  and	  closest	  connection	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  place	  of	  contracting,	  the	  place	  
of	  performance,	  the	  place	  of	  residence	  or	  business	  of	  the	  parties	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  
subject	  matter	  of	  the	  contract.	  
	  
As	  a	  result,	  courts	  have	  taken	  different	  approaches	  to	  determine	  the	  proper	  law,	  for	  
example	  the	  test	  that	  the	  East	  African	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  applied	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Karachi	  
Gas	  Co	  Ltd	  v	  H	  Issaq348	  was	  ‘the	  law	  with	  which	  the	  transaction	  has	  the	  closest	  and	  
most	  real	  connection.’	  In	  contrast,	  in	  the	  Kenyan	  case	  of	  Radia	  v	  Transocean	  (Uganda)	  
Ltd,349	  the	  proper	  law	  of	  contract	  was	  determined	  by	  the	  lex	  loci	  contractus.	  The	  lack	  of	  
uniformity	  in	  the	  application	  of	  the	  rules	  of	  private	  international	  law	  is	  thus	  evident.	  
Not	  surprisingly,	  in	  determining	  the	  applicable	  law,	  the	  rules	  of	  private	  international	  
law	  lead	  to	  uncertainty	  and	  complexity.	  It	  is	  thus	  up	  to	  the	  courts	  to	  decide	  which	  law	  
is	  applicable	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  dispute.	  This	  may	  also	  go	  further,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Libyan	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
346	  C	  M	  V	  Clarkson	  and	  J	  Hill,	  Jaffey	  on	  Conflict	  of	  Laws	  (Butterworths	  London	  1997);	  (Contracts	  made	  
after	  17	  December	  2009	  are	  governed	  by	  Regulation	  (EC)	  No	  593/2008;	  contracts	  before	  then	  but	  after	  
1	  April	  1991	  are	  governed	  by	  Contracts	  (Applicable	  Law)	  Act	  1990).	  
347	  Mount	  Albert	  Borough	  Council	  v	  Australasian	  Temperance	  and	  General	  Assurance	  Society	  [1938]	  AC	  
240;	  See	  Bonython	  v	  Commonwealth	  of	  Australia	  [1951]	  AC	  219.	  
348	  [1965]	  EA	  42.	  
349	  [1985]	  KLR	  300.	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Arab	  Foreign	  Bank	  v	  Manufacturers	  Hanover	  Trust	  Co,350	  in	  which	  the	  court	  decided	  
that	  two	  different	  laws	  should	  be	  applied	  to	  two	  legs	  of	  the	  contract.351	  
	  
The	  solution	  that	  the	  CISG	  provides	  is	  that,	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  dispute,	  parties	  are	  not	  
confronted	  with	  unfamiliar	  foreign	  laws.352	  The	  CISG	  is	  becoming	  better	  known	  and	  
more	  widely	  used	  in	  many	  states.	  On	  top	  of	  that,	  legal	  commentaries	  on	  the	  articles	  of	  
the	  CISG	  and	  case	  law	  are	  beginning	  to	  be	  published.	  Therefore,	  if	  developing	  
countries	  such	  as	  Iran	  adopt	  the	  CISG,	  the	  foreign	  precedent	  decided	  by	  the	  courts	  of	  
other	  state	  parties	  to	  the	  CISG	  would	  be	  opened	  to	  their	  courts.	  This	  would	  obviously	  
be	  of	  help	  to	  them,	  and	  through	  its	  adoption	  developing	  countries	  would	  benefit	  from	  
a	  greater	  degree	  of	  legal	  certainty	  in	  matters	  of	  international	  trade.353	  
	  
CISG	  provisions	  such	  as	  ‘a	  reasonable	  time	  after	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  contract’354	  and	  
‘unless	  the	  circumstances	  indicate	  otherwise’355	  have	  attracted	  a	  lot	  of	  criticism	  for	  
their	  vagueness.356	  However,	  these	  articles	  have	  been	  drafted	  in	  such	  terms	  in	  order	  to	  
promote	  flexibility.	  Given	  the	  circumstances	  of	  the	  dispute,	  it	  is	  the	  court’s	  duty	  to	  
apply	  the	  provisions	  appropriately.	  Fairness	  and	  flexibility	  entail	  uncertainties,	  yet	  the	  
CISG	  has	  reached	  a	  balance	  between	  certainty	  and	  flexibility,	  and	  legal	  certainty	  is	  not	  
endangered	  by	  the	  wording	  of	  its	  provisions.357	  Commentaries	  on	  the	  CISG	  are	  
available	  to	  lawyers	  in	  different	  languages.	  Moreover,	  the	  CISG	  case	  law	  is	  available	  in	  
English	  from	  UNCITRAL	  and	  UNILEX.	  The	  internet	  page	  published	  by	  Pace	  University	  
Law	  School	  is	  another	  source	  of	  information	  on	  the	  CISG	  available	  to	  lawyers	  
throughout	  the	  world.358	  Another	  great	  source	  of	  information	  is	  the	  CISG	  Advisory	  
Council,359	  which	  is	  a	  ‘private	  initiative’	  that	  considers	  and	  renders	  opinions	  on	  
controversial	  and	  unsettled	  issues	  relating	  to	  the	  interpretation	  and	  application	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
350	  [1989]	  1	  Lloyd’s	  Rep	  608.	  
351	  Eunice	  Gichangi,	  ‘The	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  Of	  Goods:	  A	  
Case	  for	  Ratification	  by	  Kenya’	  (2007)	  1	  Kenya	  Law	  Review	  305.	  
352	  Rosett,	  ‘Critical	  Reflections	  on	  the	  United	  Nations	  Convention’	  (n	  14)	  270.	  
353	  Eiselen,	  ‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  (n	  43).	  
354	  Article	  33(C)	  of	  the	  CISG.	  
355	  Article	  18	  (2)	  of	  the	  CISG.	  
356	  On	  Specific	  Drafting	  Issues,	  see	  ch	  3,	  Part	  Two.	  
357	  R	  M	  Lavers,	  ‘To	  Use,	  or	  Not	  to	  Use’	  (1993)	  International	  Business	  Lawyer	  10,	  10–11.	  
358	  See	  ‘CISG	  Database.’	  <http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/>	  accessed	  3	  August	  2013.	  
359	  It	  is	  established	  in	  2001	  by	  Institute	  of	  International	  Commercial	  Law	  at	  Pace	  University	  and	  the	  
Centre	  for	  Commercial	  Law	  Studies	  at	  the	  Queen	  Mary	  University.	  It	  is	  composed	  of	  most	  eminent	  
scholars	  in	  international	  sales	  law.	  
See	  ‘CISG	  Advisory	  Council’	  <	  http://www.cisgac.com/index.php>	  accessed	  2	  July	  2013.	  
102	  
CISG.360	  Such	  enormous	  amounts	  of	  contemporary	  information	  on	  the	  interpretation	  
and	  application	  of	  the	  CISG	  therefore	  cannot	  fail	  to	  promote	  legal	  certainty.361	  
4.2.2	  The	  Provisions	  of	  CISG	  May	  Already	  Apply	  to	  Non-­‐Parties	  to	  CISG	  
The	  fact	  that	  the	  Convention	  may	  already	  apply	  to	  international	  trade	  contracts	  
involving	  a	  party	  from	  any	  non-­‐contracting	  state,	  such	  as	  Iran,	  is	  a	  highly	  motivational	  
factor	  towards	  signing	  it.	  In	  accordance	  with	  CISG	  Article	  1(1)(b),	  the	  Convention	  will	  
be	  applicable	  to	  the	  contract,	  where	  the	  rules	  of	  private	  international	  law	  lead	  to	  the	  
application	  of	  the	  law	  of	  a	  state	  which	  is	  a	  signatory	  to	  the	  CISG.	  This	  applies	  even	  in	  
the	  case	  that	  the	  other	  party	  is	  a	  non-­‐signatory,	  unless	  stated	  otherwise	  (under	  Article	  
6	  of	  the	  CISG,	  parties	  may	  exclude	  the	  application	  of	  the	  Convention).	  Therefore,	  non-­‐
parties	  to	  the	  CISG	  have	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  Convention	  while	  
they	  negotiate.	  A	  cause	  for	  concern	  is	  that	  many	  traders	  in	  Iran	  and	  other	  non-­‐
contracting	  parties	  may	  not	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  CISG	  or	  even	  of	  its	  impact	  on	  their	  
contract,	  and	  that	  is	  because	  the	  CISG	  is	  not	  part	  of	  their	  domestic	  law.	  Needless	  to	  
say,	  this	  puts	  them	  in	  a	  somewhat	  awkward	  situation.	  Given	  the	  high	  rate	  of	  accession	  
to	  the	  CISG,	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  it	  is	  ever	  more	  likely	  that	  the	  CISG	  be	  applied	  to	  
transactions	  involving	  non-­‐contracting	  states.	  CISG	  adoption	  is	  therefore	  beneficial	  to	  
traders	  in	  terms	  of	  educating	  themselves	  on	  its	  provisions	  and	  their	  impact	  on	  a	  
contract	  and	  thus	  being	  better	  prepared	  when	  entering	  into	  a	  contract.362	  
4.2.3	  Legal	  Efficiency	  
The	  legal	  environment	  surrounding	  international	  trade	  contracts	  is	  complicated.	  As	  a	  
result,	  parties	  to	  contracts	  of	  sale	  need	  to	  familiarise	  themselves	  with	  the	  (foreign)	  
legal	  system	  of	  their	  contracting	  party.	  This	  is	  both	  expensive	  and	  time-­‐consuming,363	  
yet	  nevertheless	  large	  entities	  accomplish	  it	  effortlessly;	  it	  is	  more	  of	  a	  hurdle	  for	  
smaller	  entities	  and	  first-­‐time	  traders	  that	  do	  not	  have	  the	  same	  experience	  and	  
resources.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
360	  Loukas	  Mistelis,	  ‘CISG-­‐AC	  Publishes	  First	  Opinions’	  (2003)	  15	  Pace	  International	  Law	  Review	  453.	  	  
361	  Eiselen,	  ‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  (n	  43)	  345.	  
362	  ibid.	  See	  Gichangi,	  ‘The	  United	  Nations	  Convention’	  (n	  351).	  
363	  Michael	  Kabik,	  ‘Through	  the	  Looking-­‐Glass:	  International	  Trade	  in	  the	  “Wonderland”	  of	  the	  United	  
Nations	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods’	  (1992)	  9	  International	  Tax	  and	  
Business	  Lawyer	  408,	  409.	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The	  legal	  uncertainty	  arising	  from	  a	  foreign	  legal	  environment	  could	  lead	  a	  trader	  to	  
take	  unnecessary	  business	  or	  legal	  risks.364	  Adoption	  of	  the	  CISG	  reduces	  the	  time	  and	  
money	  spent	  on	  analysis	  of	  the	  ramifications	  of	  a	  foreign	  legal	  system.365	  It	  is	  a	  fact	  
that	  the	  CISG	  is	  already	  applicable	  to	  traders	  in	  non-­‐contracting	  states	  when	  they	  trade	  
with	  entities	  domiciled	  in	  a	  signatory	  state	  whose	  law	  applies	  to	  the	  contract	  of	  sale.	  
This	  therefore	  necessitates	  partial	  familiarity	  with	  the	  scope	  and	  application	  of	  the	  
CISG.	  However,	  it	  is	  through	  adoption	  of	  the	  CISG	  and	  easier	  access	  to	  that	  law	  that	  
legal	  efficiency	  is	  encouraged.	  Rights,	  duties	  and	  remedies	  are	  already	  established	  
when	  a	  contract	  is	  governed	  by	  the	  CISG.	  The	  CISG	  is	  indeed	  an	  ‘easily	  accessible	  single	  
body	  of	  law	  which	  is	  written	  in	  the	  language	  of	  traders.’366	  In	  order	  to	  enable	  the	  
drafters	  to	  reach	  a	  compromise	  where	  necessary	  or	  preferable,	  the	  CISG	  did	  not	  make	  
firm	  provisions	  for	  all	  aspects	  of	  international	  trade.	  Matters	  such	  as	  disputes	  over	  
mistakes,	  capacity,	  duress,	  undue	  influence,	  liability	  for	  pre-­‐contractual	  misstatement,	  
the	  validity	  of	  standard	  terms	  and	  conditions	  and	  specific	  performance	  are	  
intentionally	  left	  to	  applicable	  domestic	  law.367	  	  
	  
Therefore	  the	  CISG	  does	  not	  completely	  eliminate	  the	  problem	  and	  complexity	  with	  
regard	  to	  choice-­‐of-­‐law	  rules.	  However,	  a	  study	  of	  case	  law	  shows	  that	  the	  great	  
number	  of	  disputes	  arise	  from	  breach	  of	  contract,	  the	  remedies	  available	  and	  the	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  contract	  itself.368	  The	  issues	  that	  are	  sufficiently	  covered	  by	  the	  
CISG	  and	  its	  failure	  to	  cover	  all	  aspects	  of	  a	  law	  of	  contract	  do	  not	  justify	  non-­‐
ratification.369	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
364	  Eiselen,	  ‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  (n	  43)	  349.	  
365	  Sara	  G	  Zwart,	  ‘The	  New	  International	  Law	  of	  Sales:	  A	  Marriage	  Between	  Socialist,	  Third	  World,	  
Common	  Law	  and	  Civil	  Law	  Principles’	  (1988)	  13	  North	  Carolina	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  and	  
Commercial	  Regulation	  109,	  114.	  
366	  ibid	  115.	  
367	  Eiselen,	  ‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  (n	  43)	  350.	  
368	  Robert	  Goff,	  ‘Force	  Majeure	  and	  Frustration’	  in	  Anonymous	  La	  Vendita	  Internationale	  (Milan	  1981)	  
314	  on	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  legal	  systems.	  
369	  Eiselen,	  ‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  (n	  43)	  350.	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4.2.4	  Convenience	  in	  Agreeing	  on	  Governing	  Law	  and	  Language	  
Accessibility	  
When	  it	  comes	  to	  determining	  the	  governing	  law	  of	  contract	  for	  negotiations,	  the	  
language	  barrier	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  major	  reason	  to	  oppose	  a	  specific	  law.	  This	  is	  simply	  
because	  the	  foreign	  parties	  have	  difficulties	  in	  understanding	  it.	  Although	  authentic	  
English	  translation	  of	  statutes	  and	  regulations	  can	  provide	  a	  resolution	  of	  this	  issue,	  
the	  CISG	  is	  already	  available	  in	  six	  official	  languages.370	  It	  has	  also	  been	  translated	  into	  
Persian.371	  This	  facilitates	  negotiations	  in	  international	  trade.	  The	  translation	  of	  the	  
CISG	  into	  these	  six	  languages	  is	  comprehensive	  and	  covers	  all	  articles	  of	  the	  
Convention.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  translation,	  the	  phrases	  that	  had	  close	  parallels	  with	  any	  
domestic	  legal	  system	  were	  excluded.	  The	  six	  official	  texts	  were	  translated	  carefully	  to	  
avoid	  any	  discrepancy	  in	  interpretation.372	  
	  
The	  CISG	  automatically	  applies	  to	  a	  contract	  of	  international	  sale	  when	  parties	  have	  
places	  of	  business	  in	  member	  countries.373	  After	  accession,	  parties	  no	  longer	  need	  to	  
provide	  for	  the	  specific	  governing	  law,	  as	  they	  will	  be	  contracting	  states	  to	  the	  CISG.	  If	  
a	  party	  persists	  in	  the	  application	  of	  its	  own	  domestic	  law,	  the	  other	  party	  can	  easily	  
demand	  application	  of	  the	  CISG,	  as	  it	  will	  be	  part	  of	  both	  parties’	  domestic	  law.	  
Besides,	  the	  CISG	  is	  fairly	  and	  specifically	  drafted	  for	  international	  commerce.	  	  
	  
On	  top	  of	  that,	  the	  CISG	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  international	  standard	  may	  still	  be	  applied	  on	  
request	  when	  negotiation	  is	  taking	  place	  between	  parties	  who	  have	  not	  yet	  ratified	  it.	  
The	  unpredictability	  of	  developing	  countries’	  legal	  systems	  impedes	  the	  flow	  of	  
business.	  On	  some	  occasions,	  a	  government	  or	  a	  company	  in	  negotiation	  with	  a	  
stronger	  bargaining	  power	  may	  refuse	  to	  accept	  the	  law	  of	  the	  Western	  country	  as	  the	  
governing	  law,	  and	  internationally	  accepted	  legal	  principles	  are	  sometimes	  the	  only	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
370	  Arabic,	  English,	  French,	  Spanish,	  Chinese,	  and	  Russian.	  The	  CISG	  is	  however	  available	  in	  numerous	  
unofficial	  languages	  such	  as	  Persian.	  
371	  See	  ‘Texts	  of	  CISG’	  <	  http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/text.html>	  accessed	  16	  August	  2013.	  
372	  Eiselen,	  ‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  (n	  43)	  351.	  
373	  Article	  1(1)(b)	  of	  the	  CISG.	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alternative.	  In	  such	  circumstances	  the	  CISG	  is	  perhaps	  a	  better	  option,	  since	  79374	  
countries	  are	  supposed	  to	  understand	  it.375	  
4.2.5	  Unnecessary	  in	  the	  Light	  of	  Effective	  Trade	  Practices	  and	  Standard	  
Contracts	  
From	  a	  commercial	  perspective,	  the	  need	  for	  unification	  models	  such	  as	  the	  CISG	  is	  
questionable.376	  Lord	  Goff	  is	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  standardised	  trade	  terms	  are	  used	  in	  
most	  areas	  of	  international	  trade,	  and	  cover	  most	  if	  not	  all	  aspects	  of	  international	  
trade	  practice.	  Besides,	  these	  standard	  trade	  terms	  are	  more	  suitable	  for	  the	  law	  of	  
international	  trade.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  very	  unlikely	  that	  traders	  in	  these	  areas	  of	  
international	  trade	  will	  move	  away	  from	  such	  broadly	  used	  and	  well-­‐known	  trade	  
terms	  and	  instead	  use	  a	  new,	  untried	  and	  unfamiliar	  law	  model.	  Although	  this	  criticism	  
is	  valid,	  it	  does	  not	  oppose	  the	  CISG	  in	  cases	  where	  standard	  terms	  or	  forms	  are	  not	  in	  
use	  or	  are	  inadequate.	  It	  seems	  that	  the	  sceptics	  have	  not	  taken	  into	  account	  the	  value	  
of	  the	  CISG	  on	  these	  occasions.	  The	  apprehension	  that	  the	  CISG	  would	  be	  regarded	  as	  
unnecessary	  and	  inappropriate,	  owing	  to	  effective	  standard	  terms	  and	  practices	  being	  
already	  in	  place,	  has	  been	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  correct,	  as	  the	  CISG	  has	  been	  excluded	  by	  
many	  traders	  from	  their	  standard	  contracts.377	  However,	  the	  CISG	  covers	  a	  much	  wider	  
area	  than	  standard	  terms	  and	  trade	  practices	  do.	  A	  large	  number	  of	  transactions	  are	  
indeed	  covered	  by	  none	  at	  all.	  When	  the	  CISG	  is	  excluded	  and	  the	  standard	  terms	  and	  
trade	  practices	  fail	  to	  cover	  individual	  circumstances,	  the	  matter	  is	  left	  to	  national	  law.	  
Neither	  the	  CISG	  nor	  standard-­‐term	  contracts	  need	  to	  be	  excluded.	  Therefore,	  
standard	  contract	  terms	  and	  trade	  practices	  should	  operate	  along	  with	  the	  CISG	  to	  
cover	  every	  legal	  aspect	  of	  international	  trade	  contracts.378	  	  
	  
It	  is	  also	  noteworthy	  that	  when	  parties	  merely	  apply	  the	  standard	  contract	  terms,	  
economically	  stronger	  parties	  will	  deploy	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  bargaining	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374	  As	  of	  5	  March	  2013,	  UNCITRAL	  reported	  that	  79	  states	  have	  adopted	  the	  CISG.	  
‘CISG:	  Table	  of	  Contracting	  States’	  (n	  1).	  	  
375	  Noboru	  Kashiwagi,	  ‘Accession	  by	  Japan	  to	  the	  Vienna	  Sales	  Convention	  (CISG)’	  (Spring	  2007)	  4	  The	  
University	  of	  Tokyo	  Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Politics	  92.	  
376	  Goff,	  ‘Force	  Majeure	  and	  Frustration’	  (n	  368)	  312–313.	  
377	  ibid	  (n	  368)	  324–325;	  Jacob	  S	  Ziegel,	  ‘The	  International	  Sales	  Convention:	  Some	  Considerations’	  in	  
Louis	  Perret	  and	  Nicole	  Lacasse	  (eds),	  Actes	  du	  Colloque	  sur	  la	  Vente	  Internationale	  (Montreal	  1989)	  59–
60;	  Lavers,	  ‘To	  Use,	  or	  Not	  to	  Use’	  (n	  357)	  10–11.	  
378	  Eiselen,	  ‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  (n	  43)	  363.	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their	  interests.	  The	  development	  of	  international	  trade	  requires	  a	  basis	  of	  competitive	  
bargaining,	  and	  this	  happens	  only	  when	  boundaries	  are	  defined	  and	  parties	  have	  equal	  
positions.	  The	  application	  of	  the	  CISG	  can	  safeguard	  this	  to	  a	  large	  extent.	  
	  
Some	  sceptics	  also	  regard	  legal	  unification	  as	  unnecessary,	  as	  they	  believe	  that	  where	  
necessary	  international	  traders	  themselves	  will	  make	  the	  reforms	  required,	  as	  was	  the	  
case	  with	  Incoterms	  and	  UCP.379	  However,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  a	  wider	  overall	  unification	  
of	  international	  sales	  law	  will	  happen,	  as	  the	  efforts	  of	  relevant	  organisations	  are	  
restricted	  to	  certain	  parts	  of	  international	  trade	  and	  they	  also	  lack	  the	  required	  
legislative	  power	  to	  make	  such	  reforms.	  Moreover,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  CISG	  has	  received	  
support	  from	  important	  trade	  organisations	  discredits	  this	  argument.380	  
4.2.6	  Summary:	  The	  Iranian	  Situation	  
As	  discussed	  above,	  the	  arguments	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  CISG’s	  simpler	  approach	  when	  
compared	  to	  private	  international	  law	  win	  over	  the	  arguments	  against	  it.	  These	  former	  
arguments,	  which	  seem	  to	  be	  universally	  relevant,	  are	  particularly	  pertinent	  to	  a	  
country	  such	  as	  Iran.	  With	  regard	  to	  which	  law	  to	  apply	  in	  international	  trade,	  Iran	  will	  
benefit	  from	  the	  legal	  certainty	  that	  the	  CISG	  provides,	  if	  it	  decides	  to	  adopt	  it.	  
Besides,	  by	  adopting	  the	  CISG	  Iranian	  traders	  will	  become	  aware	  of	  its	  provisions	  and	  
will	  no	  longer	  have	  to	  confront	  an	  awkward	  situation	  in	  which	  the	  rules	  of	  private	  
international	  law	  lead	  to	  the	  application	  of	  the	  law	  of	  a	  state	  that	  is	  a	  signatory	  to	  the	  
CISG.	  Adoption	  of	  the	  CISG	  also	  promotes	  legal	  efficiency,	  as	  Iranian	  traders	  no	  longer	  
need	  to	  familiarise	  themselves	  with	  the	  foreign	  legal	  systems	  of	  each	  of	  their	  
contracting	  parties.	  Given	  the	  number	  of	  countries	  that	  have	  acceded	  to	  the	  CISG,	  and	  
that	  the	  Convention	  is	  available	  in	  six	  official	  languages	  plus	  its	  unofficial	  translation	  
into	  Persian,	  it	  offers	  convenience	  to	  Iranian	  businessmen	  during	  negotiations,	  as	  the	  
governing	  law	  would	  be	  the	  same.	  The	  writer	  is	  also	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  the	  
effectiveness	  of	  trade	  practices	  and	  standard-­‐term	  contracts	  does	  not	  make	  the	  CISG	  
unnecessary	  or	  less	  effective.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  CISG	  complements	  standard	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
379	  Jeffrey	  Wool,	  ‘Rethinking	  the	  Notion	  of	  Uniformity	  in	  the	  Drafting	  of	  International	  Commercial	  Law:	  A	  
Preliminary	  Proposal	  for	  the	  Development	  of	  a	  Policy-­‐based	  Unification	  Model’	  (1997)	  1	  Uniform	  Law	  
Review	  47;	  Arthur	  Rosett,	  ‘Unification,	  Harmonization,	  Restatement,	  Codification,	  and	  Reform	  in	  
International	  Commercial	  Law’	  (1992)	  40	  American	  Journal	  of	  Comparative	  Law	  683,	  685.	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  Eiselen,	  ‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  (n	  43)	  363.	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contract	  terms	  and	  trade	  practices.	  Therefore,	  certainty,	  efficiency	  and	  convenience	  
alone	  are	  sufficient	  reasons	  to	  justify	  adoption	  of	  the	  CISG	  by	  Iran.	  
4.3	  Harmony	  with	  Trading	  Partners	  
4.3.1	  Increase	  in	  Trade	  
The	  rapid	  growth	  of	  trade	  between	  major	  trading	  partners	  can	  justify	  adoption	  of	  the	  
CISG.	  To	  demonstrate	  this,	  the	  author	  takes	  Japan	  as	  an	  example,	  as	  it	  has	  recently	  
ratified	  the	  CISG.381	  In	  1990,	  less	  than	  4%	  of	  Japan’s	  export	  and	  import	  trade	  was	  with	  
China.	  This	  has	  increased	  to	  20%	  in	  recent	  years	  and	  is	  close	  to	  Japan’s	  trade	  with	  the	  
United	  States,	  which	  used	  to	  be	  its	  largest	  trading	  partner.	  Almost	  40%	  of	  Japan’s	  
international	  trade	  thus	  comprises	  trade	  with	  China	  and	  the	  US.	  But	  it	  does	  not	  stop	  
here.	  More	  than	  20%	  of	  Japan’s	  international	  trade	  includes	  trade	  with	  other	  East	  
Asian	  countries	  excluding	  China.	  Given	  the	  legal	  diversity	  among	  these	  countries,	  and	  
given	  that	  many	  of	  them	  are	  either	  transition	  economies	  or	  economies	  in	  the	  process	  
of	  developing	  their	  legal	  infrastructure,	  the	  benefits	  of	  adhering	  to	  one	  common	  law	  of	  
contract	  is	  more	  and	  more	  evident.	  At	  present,	  although	  the	  only	  East	  Asian	  states	  that	  
are	  parties	  to	  the	  CISG	  are	  China,	  Singapore,	  South	  Korea	  and	  Japan,	  adoption	  of	  the	  
Convention	  would	  be	  a	  great	  step	  forward	  for	  the	  countries	  of	  the	  region	  in	  dealing	  
with	  Asian	  diversity,382	  and	  on	  a	  larger	  scale	  in	  dealing	  with	  the	  diversity	  that	  exists	  
internationally.	  	  
4.3.2	  Summary:	  The	  Iranian	  Situation	  
These	  arguments	  become	  particularly	  relevant	  when	  applied	  to	  the	  current	  situation	  in	  
Iran.	  Iran	  is	  currently	  subject	  to	  international	  trade	  sanctions	  owing	  to	  its	  nuclear	  
activities,	  but,	  because	  of	  the	  importance	  and	  vitality	  of	  international	  trade	  for	  Iran,	  
this	  situation	  is	  unlikely	  to	  remain	  the	  same.	  The	  major	  trading	  partners	  of	  Iran	  had	  
already	  adopted	  the	  CISG	  before	  the	  placing	  of	  tougher	  economic	  sanctions	  on	  the	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  ‘CISG:	  Table	  of	  Contracting	  States’	  (n	  1).	  
382	  Hiroo	  Sono,	  ‘Japan’s	  Accession	  to	  the	  CISG:	  The	  Asia	  Factor’	  (2008)	  20	  Pace	  International	  Law	  Review	  
105.	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country.383	  Iran’s	  main	  and	  largest	  trading	  partner	  (despite	  international	  boycotts)	  is	  
China,	  whose	  trade	  with	  Iran	  in	  2009	  amounted	  to	  US$26,635,000,000.384	  China	  is	  also	  
a	  contractual	  party	  to	  the	  CISG.	  Although	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  CISG	  
has	  been	  applied	  to	  the	  contracts	  between	  Iranian	  traders	  and	  their	  trading	  partners,	  
adoption	  of	  the	  CISG	  by	  Iran	  would	  bring	  it	  into	  greater	  harmony	  with	  its	  trading	  
partners.	  It	  is	  also	  worth	  mentioning	  that	  accepting	  an	  international	  convention	  like	  
the	  CISG	  might	  help	  to	  combat	  the	  negative	  implications	  of	  the	  trade	  sanctions	  on	  
Iran’s	  reputation.	  
4.4	  Simplicity	  and	  Clarity	  of	  the	  CISG	  as	  a	  Law	  for	  International	  Trade	  
4.4.1	  The	  Nature	  of	  the	  Rules	  and	  Their	  Consequences	  
The	  drafters	  of	  law	  at	  a	  domestic	  level	  have	  a	  difficult	  responsibility:	  to	  create	  a	  law	  
that	  is	  simple	  to	  understand	  but	  simultaneously	  complex	  enough	  to	  be	  applied	  to	  a	  
wide	  range	  of	  circumstances,	  and	  to	  ensure	  that	  its	  application	  has	  fair	  consequences.	  
This	  is	  also	  true	  at	  an	  international	  level,	  which,	  apart	  from	  the	  greater	  need	  for	  
simplicity,	  requires	  fairness	  and	  wider	  application.	  
	  
A	  law	  that	  is	  couched	  in	  terms	  simple	  enough	  to	  be	  understood,	  is	  fair	  and	  equitable	  to	  
all	  parties,	  the	  application	  of	  which	  creates	  certainty,	  and	  which	  is	  applied	  consistently	  
in	  subsequent	  cases	  has	  a	  tendency	  to	  be	  successful.	  However,	  these	  principles	  often	  
give	  rise	  to	  uncertain	  results,	  as	  they	  are	  not	  always	  reconcilable.	  Therefore,	  balancing	  
these	  principles	  is	  the	  only	  way	  to	  succeed.	  The	  complexity	  of	  the	  legal	  environment	  in	  
the	  field	  of	  international	  trade	  intensifies	  the	  need	  for	  such	  a	  balance.	  In	  international	  
trade,	  it	  is	  the	  demands	  of	  private	  international	  law	  or	  the	  vigour	  of	  the	  parties	  
involved	  that	  determine	  which	  law	  applies	  to	  a	  contract.	  As	  the	  domestic	  law	  of	  the	  
stronger	  party	  can	  be	  applied	  more	  forcefully	  to	  a	  contract,	  the	  advantage	  of	  the	  
uniform	  application	  of	  a	  single	  body	  of	  law	  is	  that	  it	  would	  decrease	  the	  complexity	  of	  
a	  situation	  like	  this.	  The	  CISG	  as	  a	  single	  body	  of	  law	  removes	  such	  a	  problem.385	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
383	  See	  ch	  6,	  6.2.3,	  Table	  Two.	  In	  2007,	  China,	  Japan,	  Italy,	  South	  Korea,	  and	  Germany	  were	  Iran’s	  largest	  
trading	  partners.	  Japan	  adhered	  to	  CISG	  in	  2008.	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  IMF,	  Direction	  of	  Trade	  Statistics,	  Major	  Export	  Markets	  and	  Sources	  of	  Imports	  for	  Iran,	  2009.	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  Eiselen,	  ‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  (n	  43).	  
109	  
Moreover,	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  CISG	  specific	  consideration	  was	  given	  to	  trade	  
usage	  and	  commercial	  practice,386	  which	  makes	  it	  capable	  of	  providing	  a	  solution	  to	  
many	  of	  the	  complexities	  inherent	  in	  international	  trade	  contracts.387	  
Given	  the	  high	  level	  of	  participation	  in	  its	  drafting,	  the	  CISG	  went	  beyond	  reaching	  a	  
balanced	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  political	  input;	  it	  also	  provided	  a	  balanced	  outlook	  with	  
regard	  to	  the	  structuring	  of	  the	  rights	  and	  obligations	  of	  the	  buyer	  and	  the	  seller.388	  In	  
this	  respect	  the	  CISG	  has	  been	  an	  improvement	  on	  its	  precursors,	  ULIS	  and	  ULF,	  which	  
were	  vague	  and	  complex.389	  It	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  negotiations	  come	  at	  a	  price,	  and	  
this	  price	  is	  to	  make	  concessions.	  Therefore,	  legal	  certainty	  was	  sacrificed	  in	  order	  to	  
generate	  simple	  articles.390	  
4.4.2	  The	  Increase	  in	  Predictability	  
During	  the	  1980s,	  giving	  top	  priority	  to	  the	  ratification	  of	  the	  CISG	  seemed	  rather	  
difficult,	  since	  there	  were	  few	  cases	  available	  in	  English.	  Today,	  however,	  there	  are	  a	  
number	  of	  useful	  databases,	  such	  as	  CLOUT,	  UNILEX	  and	  Pace	  University.	  CLOUT	  
includes	  a	  large	  number	  of	  abstracts	  in	  English	  of	  cases	  from	  contracting	  states	  to	  the	  
CISG	  throughout	  the	  world.391	  CLOUT	  digests,	  which	  are	  prepared	  by	  UNCITRAL,	  
provide	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  cases	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  CISG.392	  UNILEX393	  also	  gives	  
information	  on	  CISG	  cases	  in	  English.	  The	  full	  text	  of	  judgements	  in	  the	  original	  
language	  or	  in	  English	  is	  also	  given	  in	  UNILEX.	  Pace	  University,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  lists	  
some	  2,900394	  cases	  on	  CISG.	  It	  also	  provides	  an	  enormous	  amount	  of	  scholarly	  writing.	  
As	  noted	  above,	  the	  CISG	  Advisory	  Council,	  which	  aims	  at	  promoting	  a	  uniform	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  Convention,	  provides	  opinions	  for	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  
issues	  related	  to	  the	  CISG.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
386	  Kenneth	  C	  Sutton,	  ‘The	  Draft	  Convention	  on	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  (Part	  II)’	  (1977)	  24	  Business	  
Law	  Review	  119.	  
387	  Kazuaki	  Sono,	  ‘UNCITRAL	  and	  the	  Vienna	  Sales	  Convention’	  (1984)	  18	  International	  Lawyer	  7,	  13.	  
388	  Eiselen,	  ‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  (n	  43).	  
389	  Errol	  P	  Mendes,	  ‘The	  UN	  Sales	  Convention	  &	  Canada	  Transactions:	  Enticing	  the	  World's	  Largest	  
Trading	  Block	  to	  Do	  Business	  Under	  a	  Global	  Sales	  Law’	  (1988)	  8	  Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Commerce	  109,	  121;	  
Peter	  Winship,	  ‘The	  New	  Legal	  Regime	  for	  International	  Sales	  Contracts’	  (1988)	  2	  Review	  of	  
International	  Business	  Law	  108.	  
390	  Eiselen,	  ‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  (n	  43).	  
391	  See	  ‘CLOUT	  Abstracts.’	  <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/case_law/abstracts.html>	  accessed	  3	  
August	  2013.	  
392	  See	  ‘UNCITRAL	  Digest	  of	  Case	  Law.’	  
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/case_law/digests/cisg.html>	  accessed	  3	  August	  2013.	  
393	  See	  <http://www.unilex.info/>	  accessed	  3	  August	  2013.	  
394	  See	  ‘CISG	  Database’	  (n	  358).	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This	  suggests	  that	  the	  application	  of	  the	  CISG	  is	  no	  longer	  unpredictable.	  The	  ever-­‐
growing	  number	  of	  cases	  concerning	  CISG	  and	  scholarly	  texts	  on	  it	  is	  another	  example	  
of	  the	  great	  interest	  of	  member	  countries	  in	  its	  application;	  consequently,	  when	  it	  
comes	  to	  the	  international	  sale	  of	  goods,	  the	  CISG	  predictably	  supersedes	  national	  
codes.	  For	  example,	  most	  of	  the	  cases	  decided	  by	  the	  Japanese	  courts	  with	  regard	  to	  
the	  international	  sale	  of	  goods	  deal	  with	  industrial	  goods,	  whereas	  cases	  covered	  by	  
the	  CISG	  range	  from	  shoes,	  socks	  and	  jewellery	  to	  shellfish,	  new	  and	  old	  machinery	  
and	  chemical	  products	  .	  .	  .	  and	  the	  list	  goes	  on.	  Therefore,	  when	  for	  example	  a	  
Japanese	  company	  tries	  to	  find	  out	  about	  cases	  with	  like	  products	  and	  like	  
circumstances,	  they	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  find	  it	  among	  cases	  under	  the	  CISG.395	  
4.4.3	  Aid	  in	  Negotiations	  	   	  
The	  CISG	  is	  designed	  to	  be	  read	  and	  understood	  easily.	  Contracting	  parties	  benefit	  
from	  this	  balanced	  and	  neutral	  code,	  which	  assists	  them	  at	  the	  time	  of	  negotiation.396	  
To	  a	  large	  extent,	  it	  is	  free	  from	  legal	  technicalities	  in	  order	  to	  be	  utilised	  easily	  by	  
ordinary	  traders.	  Since	  the	  CISG	  is	  drafted	  appropriately	  for	  international	  trade	  
transactions,397	  unless	  stated	  otherwise,	  it	  applies	  to	  every	  contract	  of	  international	  
sale.	  With	  its	  application,	  parties’	  focus	  in	  negotiations	  can	  be	  on	  the	  commercial	  
aspects	  of	  the	  transaction	  such	  as	  price,	  date	  and	  mode	  of	  delivery,	  size	  of	  product	  and	  
quantity	  specifications.	  The	  CISG	  provides	  a	  comprehensive	  checklist	  which	  enables	  
inexperienced	  traders	  to	  make	  sure	  all	  aspects	  of	  the	  contract	  are	  covered	  during	  
negotiation.398	  
	  
In	  addition,	  disputes	  over	  choice	  of	  law	  are	  avoided	  and	  the	  battle	  of	  forms	  is	  less	  
prominent.	  Relying	  on	  the	  CISG	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  legal	  details	  of	  a	  contract	  prevents	  any	  
disagreement,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  a	  more	  productive	  trading	  contract	  can	  be	  conducted.399	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
395	  Kashiwagi,	  ‘Accession	  by	  Japan	  to	  the	  Vienna	  Sales	  Convention	  (CISG)’	  (n	  375).	  
396	  Mendes,	  ‘The	  UN	  Sales	  Convention	  &	  Canada	  Transactions’	  (n	  389)	  126;	  John	  O	  Honnold,	  Uniform	  
Law	  for	  International	  Sales	  under	  the	  1980	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  (1982)	  69;	  Winship,	  ‘The	  New	  
Legal	  Regime	  for	  International	  Sales	  Contracts’	  (n	  389).	  
397	  Michael	  Joachim	  Bonell,	  ‘The	  UNIDROIT	  Principles	  in	  Practice:	  The	  Experience	  of	  the	  First	  Two	  Years’	  
(1997)	  Uniform	  Law	  Review	  34,	  38.	  
398	  Eiselen,	  ‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  (n	  43)	  351.	  
399	  ibid	  (n	  43)	  353.	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Next,	  points	  that	  challenge	  the	  arguments	  for	  simplicity	  and	  clarity	  will	  be	  discussed,	  
as	  it	  is	  important	  to	  deal	  with	  them	  at	  this	  stage.	  
4.4.4	  The	  CISG	  –	  A	  Compromised	  Legal	  Failure	  
The	  drafters	  of	  the	  CISG	  were	  involved	  in	  series	  of	  discussions	  with	  participatory	  
countries,	  and	  such	  a	  widespread	  participation	  resulted	  in	  a	  conflict	  of	  interests.	  To	  
harmonise	  these,	  the	  drafters	  decided	  on	  compromise.	  Some	  scholars	  are	  of	  the	  
opinion	  that	  such	  compromise	  solutions	  create	  a	  false	  illusion	  of	  unification.400	  The	  
compromise	  reached	  in	  this	  case	  means	  the	  CISG	  superficially	  covers	  legal	  conflicts,	  
while	  they	  still	  stand	  in	  practice.	  Some	  articles	  in	  the	  CISG	  have	  been	  heavily	  criticised,	  
such	  as	  Article	  28	  on	  specific	  performance,	  Article	  4	  on	  the	  validity	  of	  a	  contract,	  
Article	  5	  on	  exclusion	  of	  the	  liability	  of	  seller	  for	  any	  death	  or	  injury	  caused	  by	  goods,	  
Article	  7	  with	  regard	  to	  good	  faith,	  and	  Article	  9	  on	  custom	  and	  trade	  usages.401	  	  
Depending	  on	  the	  country,	  the	  interpretation	  of	  these	  articles	  may	  be	  diverse.402	  	  
	  
Disputes	  over	  interpretation	  may	  also	  arise	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  CISG	  has	  failed	  to	  
define	  procedural	  issues	  such	  as	  burden	  of	  proof.403	  Having	  said	  that,	  the	  CISG	  is	  
viewed	  as	  bringing	  considerable	  harmony	  with	  regard	  to	  significant	  aspects	  of	  trade	  
such	  as	  breach	  of	  contract	  and	  remedies.404	  Since	  disputes	  overwhelmingly	  concern	  
issues	  of	  breach	  of	  contract,	  remedies	  and	  interpretation	  of	  the	  contract,	  the	  CISG	  is	  
less	  likely	  to	  result	  in	  conflict.	  Specific	  performance	  is	  a	  remedy	  that	  is	  trusted	  in	  
international	  commercial	  disputes.	  Therefore,	  since	  this	  remedy	  is	  not	  much	  used	  in	  
practice,	  it	  is	  less	  likely	  to	  lead	  to	  conflict.	  In	  the	  end,	  making	  compromises	  was	  
inevitable	  with	  regard	  to	  specific	  issues;	  it	  is	  not,	  however,	  a	  hindrance	  to	  the	  success	  
of	  the	  CISG	  in	  practice.405	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
400	  Rosett,	  ‘Critical	  Reflections	  on	  the	  United	  Nations	  Convention’	  (n	  14)	  270;	  Lisa	  M	  Ryan,	  ‘The	  
Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods:	  Divergent	  Interpretations’	  (1995)	  4	  Tulane	  
Journal	  of	  International	  and	  Comparative	  Law	  99,	  101–8;	  Hobhouse,	  ‘International	  Conventions	  and	  
Commercial	  Law’	  (n	  27)	  533;	  Malcolm	  D	  Evans,	  ‘Uniform	  Law:	  A	  Bridge	  too	  Far?’	  (1995)	  3	  Tulane	  Journal	  
of	  International	  and	  Comparative	  Law	  145,	  147.	  
401	  Eiselen,	  ‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  (n	  43)	  357.	  
402	  Rosett,	  ‘Critical	  Reflections	  on	  the	  United	  Nations	  Convention’	  (n	  14)	  280–281.	  
403	  ibid	  (n	  14)	  281.	  
404	  ibid	  (n	  14)	  270–271;	  Zwart,	  ‘The	  New	  International	  Law	  of	  Sales’	  (n	  365)	  125–126.	  
405	  Eiselen,	  ‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  (n	  43)	  357.	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4.4.5	  Multiplicity	  of	  Languages	  and	  Interpretation	  of	  Styles	  
It	  has	  been	  stated	  that	  the	  success	  of	  the	  CISG	  depends	  on	  its	  uniform	  interpretation	  
and	  application.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  CISG	  has	  been	  translated	  into	  six	  official	  languages	  
and	  contains	  novel	  terms	  that	  lack	  clear	  legal	  definitions	  in	  specific	  cases	  makes	  its	  
uniform	  interpretation	  and	  application	  a	  challenge	  for	  courts	  with	  different	  legal	  
systems	  and	  styles	  and	  cultures	  of	  interpretation.406	  This	  endangers	  the	  unity	  and	  
uniformity	  that	  the	  CISG	  attempts	  to	  establish.	  It	  gets	  even	  worse	  when	  the	  courts	  are	  
required	  to	  develop	  the	  CISG.	  If	  uniform	  initial	  interpretations	  and	  applications	  of	  the	  
CISG	  are	  difficult	  to	  attain,	  its	  further	  development	  seems	  somewhat	  impossible.	  	  
This	  is	  partly	  owing	  to	  the	  more	  liberal	  style	  of	  civil	  law	  courts,	  which	  use	  travaux	  
preparatoires	  freely,	  and	  the	  more	  traditional	  style	  of	  English	  courts,	  which	  take	  no	  
notice	  of	  travaux	  preparatoires	  and	  interpret	  statutory	  text	  strictly	  based	  on	  the	  
language	  used.407	  Since	  the	  civil	  law	  approach	  is	  accepted	  by	  Anglo-­‐American	  courts	  in	  
dealing	  with	  conventions,	  there	  may	  be	  a	  solution	  for	  this	  problem.408	  Lord	  Denning	  
MR	  in	  James	  Buchanan	  &	  Co	  Ltd	  v	  Babco	  Forwarding	  and	  Shipping	  (UK)	  Ltd409	  
demonstrated	  this	  best:	  
	  
This	  art.	  23,	  para.	  4,	  is	  an	  agreed	  clause	  in	  all	  international	  conventions.	  As	  such	  
it	  should	  be	  given	  the	  same	  interpretation	  in	  all	  the	  countries	  who	  were	  parties	  
to	  the	  convention.	  It	  would	  be	  absurd	  that	  the	  courts	  of	  England	  should	  interpret	  
it	  differently	  from	  the	  courts	  of	  France,	  or	  Holland,	  or	  Germany.	  Compensation	  
for	  loss	  should	  be	  assessed	  on	  the	  same	  basis,	  no	  matter	  in	  which	  country	  the	  
claim	  is	  brought.	  We	  must,	  therefore,	  put	  on	  one	  side	  our	  traditional	  rules	  of	  
interpretation	  .	  .	  .	  We	  ought,	  in	  interpreting	  this	  convention,	  to	  adopt	  the	  
European	  method	  .	  .	  .	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
406	  John	  O	  Honnold,	  ‘The	  Sales	  Convention	  in	  Action	  –	  Uniform	  International	  Words:	  Uniform	  
Application?’	  (1988)	  8	  Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Commerce	  207,	  207;	  Rosett,	  ‘Critical	  Reflections	  on	  the	  United	  
Nations	  Convention’	  (n	  14)	  272;	  Evans,	  ‘Uniform	  Law:	  A	  Bridge	  too	  Far?’	  (n	  400)	  150;	  Elizabeth	  Hayes	  
Patterson,	  ‘United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods:	  Unification	  and	  
the	  Tension	  between	  Compromise	  and	  Domination’	  (1986)	  22	  Stanford	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  263,	  
278–279.	  
407	  Scott	  C	  Styles,	  ‘The	  Rule	  of	  Parliament:	  Statutory	  Interpretation	  After	  Pepper	  v	  Hart’	  (1994)	  14	  Oxford	  
Journal	  of	  Legal	  Studies	  151.	  See	  Pepper	  v	  Hart	  [1993]	  AL	  593	  (HL),	  [1993]	  1	  All	  ER	  42	  (HL)	  
408	  Arthur	  Rosett,	  ‘CISG	  Laid	  Bare:	  A	  Lucid	  Guide	  to	  a	  Muddy	  Code’	  (1988)	  21	  Cornell	  International	  Law	  
Journal	  575,	  586.	  
409	  [1977]	  1	  All	  ER	  518	  (CA)	  522,	  524,	  [1977]	  2	  WLR	  107	  (CA)	  112–114.	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This	  suggests	  that	  Anglo-­‐American	  courts	  have	  well	  identified	  the	  need	  and	  
responsibility	  for	  a	  uniform	  interpretation	  of	  the	  CISG	  through	  the	  application	  of	  
similar	  interpretation	  styles.410	  The	  difference	  in	  methods	  of	  interpretation	  is	  not	  the	  
main	  concern,	  but	  rather	  whether	  courts	  continue	  to	  interpret	  the	  novel	  matters	  on	  
the	  basis	  of	  familiar	  approaches	  and	  doctrines	  in	  their	  national	  laws.411	  
4.4.6	  Unification	  is	  Undesirable	  and	  Unachievable	  
One	  of	  the	  objections	  being	  put	  forward	  to	  the	  CISG	  arises	  from	  an	  important	  
opposition	  to	  legal	  unification.412	  Rosett	  argues	  that	  unifying	  substantive	  rules	  of	  law	  
without	  contribution	  and	  co-­‐ordination	  from	  judicial	  and	  social	  contexts,	  in	  which	  the	  
rules	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  applied,	  is	  an	  illusion.413	  He	  holds	  that	  in	  the	  event	  that	  the	  
social	  and	  judicial	  contexts	  are	  not	  integrated,	  the	  outcome	  will	  be	  different	  and	  the	  
substantive	  rules	  will	  be	  applied	  differently.	  Therefore,	  the	  main	  and	  first	  focus	  should	  
be	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  co-­‐ordination.414	  This	  however	  seems	  very	  theoretical,	  failing	  as	  it	  
does	  to	  take	  into	  consideration	  successful	  unifying	  usages	  and	  conventions	  such	  as	  
Incoterms,	  UCP,	  the	  Hague–Visby	  Rules,	  and	  the	  Warsaw	  Convention.415	  The	  success	  of	  
the	  CISG	  along	  with	  these	  examples	  validates	  that,	  within	  different	  legal	  and	  social	  
contexts,	  legal	  unification	  is	  feasible	  and	  desirable.	  
	  
Kotz	  puts	  forward	  a	  similar	  criticism	  of	  the	  efficiency	  of	  legal	  unifying	  efforts.	  He	  
argues	  that	  this	  selective	  and	  partially	  unifying	  outcome	  dominates	  the	  time,	  resources	  
and	  effort	  that	  were	  taken	  to	  create	  them.416	  He	  further	  continues	  that	  the	  
simplification	  is	  endangered:417	  
	  
If	  one	  takes	  a	  closer	  view,	  it	  appears	  justified	  to	  ask	  whether	  legal	  unification,	  
inasmuch	  as	  it	  has	  legal	  simplification	  as	  a	  goal,	  does	  not	  find	  itself	  in	  the	  same	  
position	  as	  Heracles,	  who	  cuts	  off	  the	  one	  snakehead	  of	  the	  Hydra,	  only	  to	  be	  
confronted	  by	  three	  others	  in	  its	  place.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
410	  Eiselen,	  ‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  (n	  43)	  362.	  
411	  Honnold,	  ‘The	  Sales	  Convention	  in	  Action’	  (n	  406)	  208	  and	  211.	  
412	  Rosett,	  ‘CISG	  Laid	  Bare’	  (n	  408)	  576.	  
413	  Rosett,	  ‘Unification,	  Harmonization,	  Restatement,	  Codification,	  and	  Reform’	  (n	  379)	  687–688.	  
414	  Rosett,	  ‘CISG	  Laid	  Bare’	  (n	  408)	  575.	  
415	  Eiselen,	  ‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  (n	  43)	  365.	  




The	  counter	  argument,	  over	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  wisdom	  and	  economic	  sensibility	  of	  these	  
unifying	  efforts,	  is	  that	  this	  argument	  deals	  with	  the	  future	  and	  not	  with	  what	  has	  
already	  been	  achieved.	  The	  CISG	  is	  now	  in	  place	  and	  the	  lengthy	  and	  expensive	  process	  
of	  its	  production	  does	  not	  change	  this	  fact.	  It	  is	  thus	  wise	  to	  use	  the	  Convention	  to	  get	  
the	  most	  value	  out	  of	  the	  time	  and	  cost	  taken	  to	  develop	  it.	  
	  
Magnus	  has	  correctly	  stated	  that,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  legal	  unification,	  the	  
outcome	  will	  be	  fragmentary	  and	  selective.	  This	  however	  does	  not	  imply	  any	  adverse	  
quality.418	  Where	  diversity	  and	  uncertainty	  are	  present,	  the	  best	  way	  of	  attaining	  unity	  
successfully	  and	  usefully	  within	  a	  specific	  field	  is	  to	  take	  a	  realistic	  approach.	  Owing	  to	  
the	  diversification	  of	  the	  field,	  a	  fragmentary	  outcome	  is	  to	  be	  expected.	  The	  unifying	  
efforts	  would	  not	  be	  required	  if	  there	  were	  no	  diversification.	  The	  greater	  the	  
differences,	  the	  slimmer	  the	  chance	  for	  unification.419	  
	  
The	  second	  issue	  is	  whether	  simplification	  and	  unification	  are	  produced	  by	  the	  CISG	  or	  
whether	  it	  further	  complicates	  this	  area	  of	  international	  sales	  law.	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  
it	  has	  not	  covered	  some	  important	  aspects	  that	  may	  arise	  in	  the	  field	  of	  international	  
sales	  law,420	  adequate	  important	  aspects	  have	  been	  unified	  and	  simplified.421	  	  
	  
Therefore,	  the	  CISG	  has	  been	  a	  success	  in	  terms	  of	  reaching	  a	  balanced	  agreement	  
over	  a	  large	  number	  of	  diverse	  issues.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  is	  also	  correct	  that	  the	  CISG	  
did	  not	  reach	  a	  compromise	  over	  some	  other	  issues,	  but	  this	  did	  not	  harm	  the	  
Convention	  in	  general.422	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
418	  Magnus	  in	  Eiselen,	  ‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  (n	  43)	  365.	  
419	  ibid.	  
420	  Zwart,	  ‘The	  New	  International	  Law	  of	  Sales’	  (n	  365)	  115.	  
421	  Eiselen,	  ‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  (n	  43)	  366.	  
422	  Arthur	  Rosett,	  ‘The	  International	  Sales	  Convention:	  A	  Dissenting	  View’	  (1984)	  18	  International	  Lawyer	  
445,	  446–447.	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4.4.7	  Absence	  of	  Legal	  Principles	  
The	  CISG	  has	  been	  criticised	  for	  not	  having	  underlying	  principles	  as	  a	  result	  of	  its	  
compromised	  character.423	  It	  is	  said	  that	  it	  is	  ‘largely	  a	  cut-­‐and-­‐paste	  job’	  and	  that	  its	  
principles	  and	  values	  are	  by	  and	  large	  deceptive.424	  In	  support	  of	  this	  criticism,	  Wool	  
argues	  that	  the	  rigidity	  between	  commercial	  objectives	  and	  a	  diplomatic	  effort	  is	  
unpleasant,	  as	  achieving	  their	  aims	  requires	  a	  comparative	  methodology	  between	  the	  
two.	  As	  a	  result,	  ‘the	  unification	  process	  is	  driven	  without	  clear-­‐cut	  principles	  
underlying	  the	  eventual	  outcome.’425	  The	  best	  example	  is	  the	  role	  of	  good	  faith,	  which	  
was	  a	  dilemma	  within	  the	  CISG.	  Despite	  most	  legal	  systems	  identifying	  such	  a	  principle,	  
it	  was	  not	  included	  as	  an	  independent	  necessity	  because	  there	  was	  a	  fear	  on	  the	  
Anglo-­‐American	  side	  that	  by	  doing	  so	  an	  introduction	  would	  be	  given	  to	  culpa	  in	  
contrahendo	  rules	  in	  international	  trade.	  It	  was	  however	  introduced	  differently,	  and,	  
through	  an	  interpretative	  role	  which	  was	  given	  to	  it,	  it	  became	  a	  source	  of	  
controversy.	  Commentators	  from	  civil	  law	  countries	  demanded	  a	  more	  substantial	  role	  
for	  the	  usage	  of	  this	  principle	  within	  the	  CISG	  than	  commentators	  from	  common	  law	  
countries,	  who	  were	  fearful	  about	  it.426	  	  
	  
This	  has	  now	  been	  invalidated	  by	  a	  careful	  analysis	  of	  the	  CISG	  by	  scholars.	  The	  
compromises,	  which	  were	  achieved	  between	  developing	  and	  developed	  countries,	  
capitalist	  and	  socialist	  nations,	  and	  civil	  and	  common	  law	  jurisdictions,	  never	  
minimised	  or	  lessened	  the	  unity	  and	  balance	  achieved	  between	  the	  buyer’s	  and	  the	  
seller’s	  interests.	  The	  argument	  that	  the	  CISG	  does	  not	  possess	  underlying	  principles	  
has	  been	  sufficiently	  invalidated	  by	  a	  thorough	  analysis	  of	  the	  principles	  in	  the	  CISG	  by	  
some	  prominent	  commentators.427	  Specific	  principles	  such	  as	  party	  autonomy,	  pacta	  
sunt	  servanda,	  freedom	  from	  formalities,	  favor	  contractus,	  and	  protection	  of	  reliance	  
have	  been	  recognised	  all	  through	  the	  CISG.428	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
423	  Rosett,	  ‘Critical	  Reflections	  on	  the	  United	  Nations	  Convention’	  (n	  14)	  299;	  Eorsi,	  ‘A	  propos	  the	  1980	  
Vienna	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods’	  (n	  149)	  348–349.	  
424	  Rosett,	  ‘CISG	  Laid	  Bare’	  (n	  408)	  589.	  
425	  Wool,	  ‘Rethinking	  the	  Notion	  of	  Uniformity	  in	  the	  Drafting	  of	  International	  Commercial	  Law’	  (n	  379)	  
48.	  
426	  Rosett,	  ‘Critical	  Reflections	  on	  the	  United	  Nations	  Convention’	  (n	  14)	  289–290;	  E	  Allan	  Farnsworth,	  
‘Duties	  of	  Good	  Faith	  and	  Fair	  Dealing	  Under	  the	  UNIDROIT	  Principles,	  Relevant	  International	  
Conventions,	  and	  National	  Laws’	  (1995)	  Tulane	  Journal	  of	  International	  and	  Comparative	  Law	  47.	  
427	  Farnsworth,	  ibid;	  Franco	  Ferrari,	  ‘Uniform	  Interpretation	  of	  the	  1990	  Uniform	  Sales	  Law’	  (1994–95)	  
24	  Georgia	  Journal	  of	  International	  and	  Comparative	  Law	  183,	  219.	  
428	  Eiselen,	  ‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  (n	  43)	  358.	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4.4.8	  Novel	  Language	  in	  the	  CISG	  
Another	  criticism	  that	  is	  made	  of	  the	  CISG	  regards	  the	  usage	  of	  unfamiliar	  terminology	  
in	  the	  realm	  of	  contract	  law.	  The	  concern	  is	  over	  the	  legal	  uncertainty	  that	  may	  
emerge	  from	  these	  novel	  terms,	  as	  they	  are	  broad	  and	  inexact	  in	  meaning.429	  The	  
sense	  that	  Farnsworth	  describes	  when	  one	  first	  faces	  such	  novel	  language	  in	  the	  CISG	  
is	  a	  feeling	  of	  concern	  and	  apprehension.430	  For	  example,	  ‘avoidance’	  of	  contract	  is	  a	  
new	  term	  employed	  in	  the	  CISG.	  This	  does	  not,	  however,	  seem	  necessarily	  convincing,	  
since	  these	  terminologies	  are	  being	  explained	  in	  the	  growing	  body	  of	  CISG	  precedents.	  	  
Moreover,	  the	  novel	  terminology	  used	  in	  the	  CISG	  was	  indeed	  intended	  to	  avoid	  terms	  
that	  existed	  in	  current	  legal	  systems	  and	  would	  imply	  political	  and	  theoretical	  
influence.	  That	  the	  likely	  outcome	  of	  this	  new	  language	  would	  be	  legal	  uncertainty	  was	  
evident	  to	  the	  drafters431;	  however,	  they	  were	  ready	  to	  risk	  this	  if	  the	  result	  would	  be	  
the	  creation	  of	  a	  code	  free	  from	  the	  influence	  of	  foreign	  legal	  systems.	  What	  is	  
noteworthy	  is	  that	  no	  insurmountable	  hurdle	  has	  emerged	  from	  such	  novel	  wording	  in	  
the	  CISG;	  quite	  the	  contrary:	  its	  usage	  was	  meant	  to	  connect	  interpretations	  and	  legal	  
ideas	  from	  different	  legal	  systems.432	  This	  suggests	  that	  no	  likely	  dangerous	  
consequences	  are	  attached	  to	  the	  novel	  terminology	  in	  the	  CISG.	  	  
4.4.9	  Legal	  Uncertainty	  
The	  fact	  that	  the	  CISG	  includes	  broad	  terms	  and	  novel	  terminology	  and	  has	  failed	  to	  
define	  these	  terms	  comprehensively	  leads	  to	  legal	  uncertainty,	  and	  obviously	  
contradicts	  the	  claims	  of	  simplification	  and	  the	  need	  for	  clarity.433	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  
the	  Convention’s	  flexibility	  of	  formulation	  and	  adaptability	  to	  different	  circumstances	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
429	  Rosett,	  ‘Critical	  Reflections	  on	  the	  United	  Nations	  Convention’	  (n	  14)	  274–276;	  Evans,	  ‘Uniform	  Law:	  
A	  Bridge	  too	  Far?’	  (n	  400)	  147;	  Ryan,	  ‘The	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods’	  
(n	  400)	  101.	  
430	  E	  Allan	  Farnsworth,	  ‘The	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  from	  the	  
Perspective	  of	  the	  Common	  Law	  Countries’	  in	  Anonymous	  La	  Vendita	  Internazionale	  (Milan	  1981)	  8.	  
431	  Jan	  Hellner,	  ‘The	  UN	  Convention	  on	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  –	  An	  Outsider’s	  View’	  in	  E	  Jayme,	  G	  
Kegel	  and	  M	  Luther	  (eds),	  Jus	  Inter	  Nationes:	  Festschrift	  fur	  Riesenfeld	  (1983)	  79;	  Bernard	  Audit,	  ‘The	  
Vienna	  Sales	  Convention	  and	  the	  Lex	  Mercatoria’	  in	  T	  E	  Carbonneau	  (eds),	  Lex	  Mercatoria	  and	  
Arbitration	  –	  A	  Discussion	  of	  the	  New	  Law	  Merchant	  (1998)	  179–180.	  
432	  Eiselen,	  ‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  (n	  43)	  359.	  
433	  Wool,	  ‘Rethinking	  the	  Notion	  of	  Uniformity	  in	  the	  Drafting	  of	  International	  Commercial	  Law’	  (n	  379)	  
46–47;	  Hobhouse,	  ‘International	  Conventions	  and	  Commercial	  Law’	  (n	  27);	  Robert	  G	  Lee,	  ‘The	  UN	  
Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods:	  OK	  for	  the	  UK?’	  (1993)	  Journal	  of	  Business	  
Law	  131,	  137;	  Bianca	  and	  Bonell,	  Commentary	  on	  the	  International	  Sales	  Law	  (n	  315)	  10–11;	  Evans,	  
‘Uniform	  Law:	  A	  Bridge	  too	  Far?’	  (n	  400)	  147.	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gives	  the	  courts	  more	  freedom	  to	  make	  just	  decisions	  and	  to	  interpret	  it	  uniformly,	  it	  
results	  in	  uncertainty	  over	  predicting	  the	  result	  of	  any	  dispute.434	  	  
That	  the	  CISG	  was	  drafted	  in	  an	  atmosphere	  that	  inclined	  by	  nature	  to	  civil	  law	  is	  said	  
to	  result	  in	  some	  degree	  of	  legal	  uncertainty.435	  This	  however	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  an	  
issue;	  the	  real	  problem	  is	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  this	  legal	  uncertainty	  contradicts	  such	  
constructive	  goals	  of	  flexibility.	  The	  question	  raised	  is	  whether	  the	  domain	  of	  this	  legal	  
uncertainty	  is	  acceptable	  enough	  to	  perform	  effectively.	  The	  failure	  of	  the	  ULIS	  and	  
ULF	  saved	  the	  CISG	  with	  regard	  to	  legal	  uncertainty.	  Many	  principles	  employed	  in	  the	  
CISG	  had	  been	  in	  place	  in	  countries	  that	  ratified	  the	  ULIS	  and	  ULF.	  Feedback	  and	  
commentaries	  were	  published	  on	  the	  CISG’s	  precursors.	  Many	  lessons	  learned	  from	  
these	  reports	  were	  taken	  into	  account	  at	  the	  time	  of	  drafting	  the	  CISG.436	  Therefore,	  
the	  question	  of	  the	  CISG’s	  lack	  of	  legal	  clarity	  was	  rendered	  less	  serious	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  
it	  was	  preceded	  by	  ULIS	  and	  ULF.437	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  extent	  of	  legal	  uncertainty	  in	  
the	  CISG	  is	  acceptable	  and	  is	  not	  an	  impediment	  to	  its	  ratification.	  
4.4.10	  Summary:	  The	  Iranian	  Situation	  
The	  arguments	  made	  against	  the	  simplicity	  and	  clarity	  of	  the	  CISG	  as	  a	  statute	  for	  
international	  law	  outweigh	  the	  arguments	  in	  its	  favour.	  However,	  the	  CISG	  will	  be	  
applied	  by	  parties	  as	  opposed	  to	  states.	  Therefore,	  Iranian	  traders	  will	  benefit	  from	  a	  
CISG	  which	  is	  simple	  enough	  to	  understand	  and	  is	  fair	  and	  equitable	  to	  all	  parties.	  This	  
is	  of	  great	  importance	  for	  Iranian	  traders,	  as	  they	  may	  not	  be	  in	  a	  strong	  bargaining	  
position.	  With	  the	  number	  of	  databases	  now	  available	  on	  the	  CISG,	  its	  predictability	  is	  
no	  longer	  an	  issue.	  Iran	  can	  take	  advantage	  of	  these	  databases	  to	  increase	  awareness	  
in	  the	  Iranian	  legal	  and	  business	  community	  (the	  author’s	  fieldwork	  research	  shows	  
that	  lack	  of	  awareness	  is	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  that	  Iran	  has	  not	  acceded	  to	  the	  CISG).438	  
It	  would	  be	  an	  added	  benefit	  for	  Iran	  to	  accede	  to	  the	  CISG,	  as	  Iranian	  scholars	  would	  
be	  exposed	  to	  a	  wider	  horizon	  and	  would	  keep	  up	  with	  their	  international	  
counterparts.	  Iranian	  traders	  would	  be	  able	  to	  use	  the	  CISG	  as	  an	  aid	  during	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
434	  Farnsworth,	  ‘The	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods’	  (n	  430)	  8.	  
435	  Farnsworth,	  ibid	  11–12;	  Lee,	  ‘The	  UN	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods’	  (n	  
433)	  137.	  
436	  Lee,	  ibid.	  
437	  Eiselen,	  ‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  (n	  43)	  362.	  
438	  See	  ch	  8,	  8.2.1,	  sect	  I.	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negotiations,	  since	  it	  provides	  a	  comprehensive	  checklist	  which	  covers	  all	  aspects	  of	  
contracts.	  
The	  arguments	  that	  are	  made	  against	  adoption	  of	  the	  CISG	  seem	  to	  be	  universally	  
relevant.	  However,	  as	  far	  as	  a	  country	  like	  Iran	  is	  concerned,	  the	  arguments	  against	  
adoption	  can	  be	  refuted	  by	  the	  sheer	  fact	  that	  the	  Iranian	  legal	  system	  is	  by	  no	  means	  
at	  the	  forefront	  of	  well-­‐established	  legal	  systems	  and	  thus	  is	  in	  no	  position	  to	  assert	  
that	  the	  CISG	  has	  failed	  in	  making	  a	  legal	  compromise	  or	  leads	  to	  legal	  uncertainty.	  As	  
it	  will	  be	  shown	  in	  chapter	  seven,	  the	  CISG	  often	  offers	  better	  solutions	  to	  parties	  in	  
international	  trade,	  and	  creates	  certainty	  and	  confidence	  for	  traders	  where	  the	  Iranian	  
Civil	  Code	  fails	  to	  do	  so.	  	  
	  
Given	  the	  position	  of	  Iran	  in	  the	  world	  economy	  and	  given	  that	  the	  Iranian	  legal	  system	  
is	  not	  well	  known,	  Iranian	  traders	  may	  find	  themselves	  in	  circumstances	  in	  which	  the	  
law	  applicable	  to	  their	  contract	  contains	  unfamiliar	  language.	  However,	  the	  novel	  
language	  in	  the	  CISG	  will	  no	  longer	  be	  novel	  once	  the	  CISG	  is	  adopted	  and	  adequately	  
studied.	  It	  is	  indeed	  a	  learning	  cost	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  paid	  once	  and	  for	  all,	  and	  then	  the	  
CISG	  will	  be	  applicable	  in	  international	  trade.	  This	  will	  be	  discussed	  later	  in	  this	  
chapter.	  	  
4.5	  Consistency	  with	  General	  Principles	  of	  International	  Commercial	  Law	  
and	  Trade	  Practices	  	  
Professor	  Schmitthoff,	  the	  author	  of	  the	  report439	  to	  the	  General	  Assembly	  in	  support	  
of	  the	  creation	  of	  UNCITRAL,	  stated	  that	  the	  law	  of	  international	  trade	  was	  based	  on	  
the	  same	  three	  fundamental	  principles	  throughout	  the	  world:	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  
parties;	  the	  faithful	  fulfilment	  of	  contractual	  obligations	  (pacta	  sunt	  servanda);	  and	  the	  
wide	  recognition	  of	  arbitral	  awards.440	  Party	  autonomy	  and	  pacta	  sunt	  servanda	  in	  
support	  of	  adoption	  of	  the	  CISG	  will	  be	  discussed	  next,	  as	  these	  two	  general	  principles	  
are	  recognised	  in	  the	  CISG.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
439	  Text	  to	  n	  114	  in	  ch	  2.	  
440	  A/6396	  -­‐	  Report	  to	  the	  Secretary	  General	  ("The	  Schmitthoff	  Study")	  (document	  ultimately	  was	  
support	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  UNCITRAL)	  (n	  35)	  5.	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4.5.1	  Assimilation	  of	  International	  Trade	  Usage	  
During	  the	  drafting	  of	  the	  CISG,	  careful	  attention	  was	  given	  to	  established	  
international	  trade	  practices	  and	  usages.	  This	  was	  to	  safeguard	  the	  valuable	  practices	  
developed	  through	  experience.	  The	  legal	  principles	  placed	  in	  Incoterms	  and	  the	  
Uniform	  Customs	  and	  Practices	  of	  the	  International	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce	  (ICC),	  along	  
with	  general	  trade	  usages	  and	  practices,	  are	  accommodated	  within	  the	  CISG.441	  This	  
had	  a	  great	  impact	  on	  its	  acceptability	  by	  important	  trading	  states.	  It	  also	  explains	  why	  
many	  large	  trade	  organisations	  approve	  of	  the	  CISG.442	  As	  explained	  in	  chapter	  
three,443	  this	  has	  not	  been	  free	  from	  controversy	  between	  developed	  and	  developing	  
countries,	  though.444	  The	  trade	  usages	  were	  unfamiliar	  to	  developing	  countries.	  
Therefore	  they	  opposed	  their	  inclusion,	  as	  this	  would	  disadvantage	  them	  because	  of	  
their	  lack	  of	  knowledge.	  The	  developed	  nations	  viewed	  it	  differently,	  as	  omission	  of	  
these	  long-­‐established	  practices	  would	  harm	  international	  trade	  by	  creating	  
uncertainty	  and	  confusion.	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  CISG	  formulated	  the	  role	  of	  trade	  usages	  
and	  practices	  in	  its	  current	  form.445	  
4.5.2	  Acknowledgement	  of	  Pacta	  Sunt	  Servanda	  
Pacta	  sunt	  servanda	  is	  a	  principal	  feature	  of	  the	  law	  of	  contract.	  That	  is	  why	  for	  
example	  the	  CISG	  adopted	  specific	  performance	  as	  a	  primary	  remedy.	  This	  primacy	  
shows	  that	  the	  CISG	  drafters	  truly	  implemented	  the	  norm	  of	  pacta	  sunt	  servanda.446	  	  
Although	  the	  CISG	  does	  not	  expressly	  mention	  pacta	  sunt	  servanda,	  it	  is	  implied	  in	  
numerous	  provisions	  of	  the	  Convention	  such	  as	  Articles	  30	  and	  53,	  which	  define	  the	  
duty	  to	  deliver	  and	  the	  duty	  to	  make	  payment.	  The	  binding	  effect	  of	  the	  contract	  is	  
particularly	  shown	  in	  Articles	  71–73	  and	  79	  of	  the	  CISG,	  which	  determine	  that	  the	  
contract	  cannot	  be	  avoided	  in	  cases	  such	  as	  a	  simple	  change	  of	  circumstances	  or	  
frustration	  of	  contract.447	  Therefore,	  if	  no	  obstacles	  exist,	  parties	  should	  be	  faithful	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
441	  Eiselen,	  ‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  (n	  43)	  352.	  
442	  Patterson,	  ‘United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods’	  (n	  406)	  274.	  
443	  See	  ch	  3,	  3.3.4.	  
444	  Zwart,	  ‘The	  New	  International	  Law	  of	  Sales’	  (n	  365)	  118.	  
445	  S	  K	  Date-­‐Bah,	  ‘The	  Convention	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  from	  the	  Perspective	  of	  the	  
Developing	  Countries’	  in	  Anonymous	  La	  Vendita	  Internazionale	  (Milan	  1981)	  26–27.	  
446	  Chengwei	  Liu,	  ‘Changed	  Contract	  Circumstances’	  (April	  2005).	  	  
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/liu5.html>	  accessed	  3	  August	  2013.	  
447	  Rabels	  Zeitschrift,	  Max-­‐Planck-­‐Institute	  for	  foreign	  and	  international	  Private	  Law.	  Ulrich	  Magnus	  and	  
Lisa	  Haberfellner,	  ‘General	  Principles	  of	  UN	  Sales	  Law.’	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the	  fulfilment	  of	  their	  contractual	  obligations.	  As	  Professor	  Schmitthoff	  has	  stated,	  all	  
national	  legal	  systems	  indeed	  recognise	  this	  paramount	  principle.	  
4.5.3	  Acknowledgement	  of	  Party	  Autonomy	  and	  Balance	  of	  Interests	  
Between	  Exporters	  and	  Importers	  
The	  highest	  capacity	  of	  party	  autonomy	  has	  been	  written	  into	  the	  CISG.	  Therefore,	  
parties	  to	  a	  contract	  of	  sales	  governed	  by	  the	  CISG	  may	  wish	  to	  modify	  or	  exclude	  most	  
or	  certain	  articles	  of	  the	  CISG.448	  The	  CISG,	  however,	  places	  some	  restrictions.	  For	  
example,	  particular	  formalities	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  contract	  are	  being	  enforced.449	  	  
Deviation	  from	  these	  required	  formalities	  results	  in	  the	  CISG	  overriding	  the	  contract.	  If	  
the	  contract	  does	  not	  cover	  a	  certain	  necessary	  point,	  the	  CISG	  will	  fill	  the	  gap.450	  
Moreover,	  this	  balanced	  approach	  towards	  the	  seller	  and	  the	  buyer	  is	  of	  great	  value	  
particularly	  to	  smaller	  traders.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  CISG	  does	  not	  favour	  any	  party	  
strengthens	  the	  position	  of	  the	  weaker	  party	  by	  analogy	  with	  its	  normal	  position	  under	  
domestic	  law.451	  This	  is	  particularly	  valuable	  for	  developing	  countries.	  	  
	  
The	  application	  of	  the	  CISG	  leads	  to	  the	  reduction	  of	  bargaining	  power	  to	  a	  certain	  
extent.	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  entirely	  to	  improve	  the	  bargaining	  power	  of	  the	  
weaker	  party	  against	  the	  stronger	  party.	  The	  CISG	  tries	  to	  equalise	  the	  legal	  playing	  
field	  by	  a	  balanced	  distribution	  of	  rights	  and	  obligations.452	  The	  basis	  of	  competition	  
between	  parties	  is	  the	  same	  legal	  code	  that	  restricts	  imposition	  of	  any	  unfair	  terms	  on	  
the	  weaker	  party.453	  This	  as	  a	  result	  strengthens	  competition.	  Therefore,	  this	  levelling	  
of	  the	  playing	  field	  by	  application	  of	  the	  CISG	  creates	  a	  domino	  effect.	  	  
	  
Parties	  may	  also	  remedy	  any	  inadequacy	  inherent	  in	  the	  CISG	  by	  contracting	  around	  
those	  issues	  in	  their	  own	  private	  contract.454	  While	  it	  is	  true	  that	  this	  given	  freedom	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/magnus.html>	  accessed	  3	  August	  2013.	  
448	  Article	  6	  of	  the	  CISG.	  
449	  Part	  II	  of	  the	  CISG.	  
450	  Peter	  Winship,	  ‘International	  Sales	  Contracts	  under	  the	  1980	  Vienna	  Convention’	  (1984)	  17	  Uniform	  
Commercial	  Code	  LJ	  58.	  
451	  Bianca	  and	  Bonell,	  Commentary	  on	  the	  International	  Sales	  Law	  (n	  315)	  15.	  
452	  Mendes,	  ‘The	  UN	  Sales	  Convention	  &	  Canada	  Transactions’	  (n	  389)	  126;	  Winship,	  ‘The	  New	  Legal	  
Regime	  for	  International	  Sales	  Contracts’	  (n	  389).	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  Eiselen,	  ‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  (n	  43)	  353.	  
454	  ibid	  351.	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could	  be	  exploited	  by	  stronger	  parties	  to	  exclude	  its	  entire	  application,455	  this	  principle	  
of	  party	  autonomy	  is	  more	  beneficial	  than	  detrimental.456	  
4.5.4	  Summary:	  The	  Iranian	  Situation	  
The	  arguments	  made	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  CISG’s	  consistency	  with	  general	  principles	  of	  
international	  commercial	  law	  and	  trade	  practices	  all	  come	  out	  in	  favour	  of	  its	  
adoption.	  As	  far	  as	  Iran	  is	  concerned,	  Iranian	  traders	  are	  relatively	  familiar	  with	  
Incoterms	  and	  apply	  them	  to	  their	  contracts	  with	  their	  international	  counterparts.	  	  
Therefore,	  the	  incorporation	  of	  Incoterms,	  UCP	  and	  general	  trade	  usages	  and	  practices	  
into	  the	  CISG	  should	  not	  be	  a	  problem	  for	  Iran.	  The	  purpose	  of	  these	  international	  
trade	  usages	  and	  practices,	  which	  are	  widely	  and	  frequently	  used,	  is	  to	  facilitate	  trade	  
with	  more	  ease	  and	  certainty.	  Hence,	  with	  or	  without	  adoption	  of	  the	  CISG,	  Iranian	  
traders	  may	  find	  themselves	  in	  circumstances	  in	  which	  these	  international	  trade	  
usages	  occur.	  The	  complicated	  and	  sophisticated	  world	  of	  commerce	  requires	  
sophisticated	  traders.	  Therefore,	  the	  sooner	  Iranian	  traders	  familiarise	  themselves	  
with	  these	  sets	  of	  international	  rules,	  the	  better	  it	  will	  be	  for	  them	  from	  a	  commercial	  
standpoint.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  CISG	  acknowledges	  these	  international	  trade	  usages	  is	  an	  
added	  bonus	  for	  Iran,	  since	  they	  are	  all	  gathered	  into	  one	  body	  of	  law.	  	  
	  
The	  principles	  of	  pacta	  sunt	  servanda	  and	  party	  autonomy,	  which	  are	  recognised	  by	  
the	  CISG,	  are	  of	  particularly	  great	  value	  to	  a	  country	  like	  Iran.	  This	  is	  because,	  
depending	  on	  the	  compatibility	  of	  articles	  of	  the	  CISG	  with	  the	  Iranian	  legal	  system,	  
Iran	  can	  modify	  or	  exclude	  certain	  articles	  of	  the	  CISG	  to	  make	  it	  more	  adaptable	  to	  its	  
own	  needs.	  Iranian	  traders	  can	  also	  make	  sure	  that	  faithful	  fulfilment	  of	  contractual	  
obligations	  is	  recognised	  under	  the	  CISG,	  and	  the	  contract	  cannot	  easily	  be	  avoided	  in	  
cases	  such	  as	  a	  simple	  change	  of	  circumstances	  or	  frustration	  of	  contract.	  Besides,	  the	  
balanced	  and	  neutral	  approach	  of	  the	  CISG	  towards	  the	  rights	  and	  obligations	  of	  all	  
parties	  provides	  a	  level	  playing	  field	  which	  strengthens	  the	  position	  of	  Iranian	  traders	  
in	  international	  commercial	  dealings	  with	  stronger	  parties.	  All	  in	  all,	  the	  CISG’s	  detailed	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  Lee,	  ‘The	  UN	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods’	  (n	  433)	  132.	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  Eiselen,	  ‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  (n	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  351;	  See	  ‘CISG-­‐Brazil	  interview	  with	  UNCITRAL	  
Legal	  Officer	  Luca	  Castellani’	  (n	  26).	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approach	  towards	  the	  legal	  aspects	  of	  contract	  assists	  Iranian	  traders	  during	  
negotiations.	  
4.6	  Adaptability	  to	  Future	  Changes	  	  
4.6.1	  Stability	  of	  the	  CISG	  
Another	  argument	  that	  is	  put	  forward	  in	  favour	  of	  accession	  is	  stability.	  This	  is	  
specifically	  true	  for	  countries	  whose	  legislative	  framework	  for	  doing	  business	  is	  still	  
volatile	  and	  liable	  to	  frequent	  and	  peculiar	  changes.	  Therefore,	  business	  is	  more	  
reassured	  if	  it	  relies	  on	  a	  convention	  that	  is	  fair	  and	  equitable	  as	  well	  as	  solid	  and	  long-­‐
lasting.	  Small	  and	  medium-­‐sized	  enterprises	  benefit	  even	  more,	  as	  they	  can	  afford	  
neither	  to	  spend	  much	  on	  legal	  fees	  nor	  to	  have	  their	  contracts	  drafted	  in	  much	  
detail.457	  	  
4.6.2	  Inability	  to	  Grow	  and	  Adapt	   	  
All	  forms	  of	  legal	  code,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  they	  are	  national	  or	  international,	  have	  a	  
tendency	  to	  come	  to	  a	  standstill	  and	  restrict	  the	  development	  of	  law.458	  No	  provisions	  
in	  the	  CISG	  are	  designed	  for	  modification	  or	  alteration.	  The	  CISG	  embodies	  the	  most	  
significant	  aspects	  of	  international	  trade	  contracts,	  which	  are	  greatly	  beneficial	  to	  all	  
parties	  and	  countries	  involved.	  Like	  all	  other	  laws,	  the	  CISG	  was	  written	  against	  a	  
background	  of	  specific	  socio-­‐economic	  conditions	  at	  a	  specific	  time.	  Meeting	  the	  needs	  
of	  the	  international	  trading	  community	  was	  the	  intention	  of	  its	  drafters,	  but	  such	  
needs	  will	  change	  over	  time.	  This	  means	  that	  specific	  articles	  may	  become	  
inappropriate	  and	  inessential,	  and	  may	  act	  as	  a	  hindrance	  to	  the	  development	  of	  sales	  
law	  in	  a	  country.	  National	  laws	  are	  designed	  with	  the	  capacity	  to	  be	  altered	  if	  such	  
legislation	  proves	  to	  be	  unsuitable	  for	  what	  it	  was	  drafted	  for.	  Given	  the	  number	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
457	  Rolf	  Knieper,	  ‘Celebrating	  Success	  by	  Accession	  to	  CISG’	  (2005–06)	  25	  Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Commerce	  
477.	  
458	  Rosett,	  ‘Critical	  Reflections	  on	  the	  United	  Nations	  Convention’	  (n	  14)	  272;	  Zwart,	  ‘The	  New	  
International	  Law	  of	  Sales’	  (n	  365)	  126–127;	  Lee,	  ‘The	  UN	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  
Sale	  of	  Goods’	  (n	  433)	  137;	  Evans,	  ‘Uniform	  Law:	  A	  Bridge	  too	  Far?’	  (n	  400)	  151–152;	  Robert	  M	  Jarvis	  
and	  Michael	  S	  Straubel,	  ‘Litigation	  with	  a	  Foreign	  Flavour:	  A	  Comparison	  of	  the	  Warsaw	  Convention	  and	  
the	  Hamburg	  Rules’	  (1994)	  59	  Journal	  of	  Air	  Law	  and	  Commerce	  907.	  
123	  
countries	  that	  have	  ratified	  the	  CISG,	  altering	  its	  contents	  presents	  a	  problem.459	  This	  is	  
because	  all	  contracting	  states	  have	  to	  agree	  on	  the	  proposed	  changes	  before	  any	  
modification	  can	  take	  place.	  Non-­‐unanimous	  agreement	  on	  the	  changes	  results	  in	  the	  
code	  being	  static	  or	  different	  versions	  of	  the	  code	  being	  in	  place	  at	  the	  same	  time.460	  	  
This	  would	  harm	  the	  goal	  of	  uniformity	  within	  international	  trade.	  However,	  the	  
general	  and	  flexible	  terminology	  that	  was	  so	  strongly	  criticised	  guarantees	  ongoing	  
development.	  Although	  such	  formulations	  result	  in	  a	  degree	  of	  uncertainty,	  they	  are	  
vital	  as	  they	  allow	  for	  the	  vibrancy	  and	  adaptability	  of	  the	  code.461	  It	  is	  indeed	  the	  
interpretation	  given	  to	  the	  CISG	  by	  courts	  and	  tribunals	  that	  provides	  for	  adaptability	  
to	  the	  changing	  circumstances	  and	  not	  ‘some	  supranational	  legislative	  agency.’462	  	  
What	  individual	  courts	  decide	  does	  not	  have	  a	  legally	  binding	  effect	  on	  other	  courts	  in	  
the	  world.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  formulation	  of	  the	  CISG,	  its	  drafters	  were	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  
courts	  and	  tribunals	  would	  in	  good	  faith	  go	  beyond	  national	  law	  and	  apply	  the	  CISG	  in	  
the	  spirit	  in	  which	  it	  was	  drafted.	  They	  would	  also	  comply	  with	  the	  decisions	  of	  other	  
tribunals	  and	  courts,	  although	  they	  are	  not	  obliged	  to	  do	  so.	  This	  is	  not	  naivety,	  but	  
stems	  from	  the	  experience	  that	  a	  comparative	  approach	  is	  taken	  by	  modern	  courts	  to	  
how	  other	  courts	  elsewhere	  have	  dealt	  with	  novel	  circumstances.463	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  
is	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  CISG,	  though	  it	  is	  not	  dictated,	  that	  courts	  are	  aware	  of	  and	  
consider	  other	  courts’	  decisions	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  uniformity	  in	  their	  decisions.	  
There	  is	  often	  a	  misconception	  in	  common	  law	  jurisdictions	  that	  where	  a	  principle	  of	  
stare	  decisis	  does	  not	  exist,	  the	  civil	  law	  jurisdictions	  do	  not	  take	  into	  account	  other	  
courts’	  judgements.464	  This	  is	  disproved,	  however,	  by	  established	  civil	  law	  systems	  
such	  as	  those	  of	  Germany	  and	  the	  Netherlands,	  as	  it	  shows	  uniformity	  in	  court	  
judgements	  and	  legal	  developments.	  To	  make	  sure	  that	  the	  CISG	  does	  not	  become	  
frozen,	  it	  is	  up	  to	  the	  courts	  throughout	  the	  world	  to	  develop	  it	  consistently	  and	  
uniformly.	  It	  is	  not	  yet	  clear	  from	  a	  study	  of	  the	  cases	  whether	  this	  has	  been	  achieved	  
and	  whether	  the	  CISG	  has	  become	  a	  living	  code.465	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  Rosett,	  ‘Critical	  Reflections	  on	  the	  United	  Nations	  Convention’	  (n	  14)	  272;	  Audit,	  ‘The	  Vienna	  Sales	  
Convention	  and	  the	  Lex	  Mercatoria’	  (n	  431)	  187.	  
460	  Eiselen,	  ‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  (n	  43)	  360.	  
461	  Audit,	  ‘The	  Vienna	  Sales	  Convention	  and	  the	  Lex	  Mercatoria’	  (n	  431)	  187.	  
462	  Zwart,	  ‘The	  New	  International	  Law	  of	  Sales’	  (n	  365)	  127;	  Audit,	  ibid;	  Evans,	  ‘Uniform	  Law:	  A	  Bridge	  
too	  Far?’	  (n	  400)	  152.	  
463	  Honnold,	  ‘The	  Sales	  Convention	  in	  Action’	  (n	  406)	  208–209.	  
464	  Rosett,	  ‘Critical	  Reflections	  on	  the	  United	  Nations	  Convention’	  (n	  14)	  298.	  
465	  Eiselen,	  ‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  (n	  43)	  360–361.	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4.6.3	  Summary:	  The	  Iranian	  Situation	  
The	  main	  argument	  made	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  CISG’s	  adaptability	  to	  future	  change	  is	  not	  
in	  favour	  of	  its	  adoption.	  However,	  there	  is	  an	  argument	  that	  stability	  is	  valuable.	  The	  
stability	  that	  the	  CISG	  offers	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  to	  Iranian	  traders,	  as	  they	  can	  rely	  
on	  its	  fair	  and	  detailed	  provisions	  which	  liberate	  them	  from	  hefty	  legal	  expenses.	  With	  
regard	  to	  the	  CISG’s	  inability	  to	  develop	  and	  adapt	  to	  future	  changes,	  the	  writer	  is	  of	  
the	  opinion	  that	  this	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  concern	  for	  Iran.	  That	  is	  because	  the	  current	  
position	  of	  Iran	  in	  the	  world	  economy	  is	  not	  very	  strong,	  and	  the	  priority	  for	  Iran	  at	  this	  
specific	  time	  is	  to	  rely	  on	  a	  body	  of	  law	  that	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  cover	  most	  aspects	  of	  
international	  trade	  and	  to	  be	  more	  beneficial	  to	  Iranian	  traders.	  This	  is	  clearly	  what	  the	  
CISG	  is	  capable	  of,	  and	  what	  the	  Iranian	  legal	  system	  is	  incapable	  of.	  What	  the	  future	  
may	  hold	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  CISG’s	  adaptability	  to	  international	  changes	  is	  an	  issue	  to	  
be	  confronted	  by	  all	  contracting	  states	  and	  not	  just	  Iran	  (in	  the	  event	  that	  Iran	  adopts	  
the	  CISG).	  On	  top	  of	  that,	  as	  discussed	  above,	  the	  CISG	  is	  couched	  in	  general	  and	  
flexible	  terms	  that	  safeguard	  its	  continuous	  development.	  
4.7	  Ease	  of	  Assimilation	  into	  Domestic	  Law	  and	  Practice	  
4.7.1	  Compatibility	  of	  the	  CISG	  
One	  of	  the	  arguments	  put	  forward	  to	  justify	  ratification	  of	  the	  CISG	  is	  its	  compatibility	  
with	  national	  law.	  Taking	  the	  national	  civil	  legislation	  in	  post-­‐Soviet	  countries	  as	  an	  
example,	  the	  CISG	  and	  their	  national	  civil	  codes	  are	  indeed	  very	  compatible.	  In	  this	  
regard,	  the	  text	  of	  the	  CISG	  was	  conferred	  when	  the	  civil	  codes	  of	  the	  Commonwealth	  
of	  Independent	  States	  (CIS)	  were	  drafted.	  This	  obviously	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  there	  are	  
no	  differences	  between	  the	  CISG	  and	  the	  civil	  codes	  of	  CIS	  countries.	  For	  example,	  the	  
reliance	  of	  the	  code	  on	  forms	  contradicts	  CISG	  Article	  11.466	  As	  soon	  as	  the	  offers	  reach	  
the	  other	  party,	  the	  revocation	  of	  offers	  is	  not	  permitted.	  This	  means	  it	  deviates	  from	  
CISG	  Articles	  15467	  and	  16.468	  Specific	  performance	  is	  always	  required,	  but	  restitution	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
466	  Article	  11	  of	  the	  CISG	  states:	  	  
‘A	  contract	  of	  sale	  need	  not	  be	  concluded	  in	  or	  evidenced	  by	  writing	  and	  is	  not	  subject	  to	  any	  other	  
requirement	  as	  to	  form.	  It	  may	  be	  proved	  by	  any	  means,	  including	  witnesses.’	  
467	  Article	  15	  of	  the	  CISG	  states:	  	  
‘(1)	  An	  offer	  becomes	  effective	  when	  it	  reaches	  the	  offeree.	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takes	  place	  before	  monetary	  compensation,	  meaning	  it	  is	  less	  stringent	  than	  CISG	  
Article	  28.469	  The	  examination	  of	  the	  goods	  and	  the	  giving	  of	  notification	  by	  the	  buyer	  
to	  the	  seller	  before	  exercising	  their	  rights	  is	  not	  a	  must.	  This	  also	  makes	  it	  less	  
stringent	  than	  CISG	  Articles	  38470	  and	  39.471	  
	  
However,	  it	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  these	  differences	  between	  the	  CISG	  and	  national	  codes	  
are	  not	  contradictory.	  They	  do	  not	  even	  count	  as	  insurmountable	  impediments,	  since	  
contracting	  states	  can	  make	  a	  reservation	  of	  their	  applicability.	  Parties	  are	  also	  free	  to	  
deviate	  from	  their	  national	  codes	  or	  the	  CISG.	  In	  practice,	  Georgia	  made	  its	  arguments	  
for	  ratification	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  similarity	  between	  its	  national	  code	  and	  the	  CISG.	  This	  
was	  not	  the	  case	  in	  Uzbekistan,	  however,	  as	  legislators	  held	  that,	  owing	  to	  transitional	  
problems,	  more	  weight	  should	  be	  given	  to	  the	  civil	  code	  than	  to	  one	  Soviet	  system.	  
Ratification	  was	  therefore	  justified	  as	  a	  practical	  option	  to	  eliminate	  such	  systems.	  The	  
free-­‐trade	  concept	  of	  the	  CISG	  was	  also	  an	  incentive	  behind	  the	  modernisation	  of	  the	  
national	  Civil	  Code	  of	  Uzbekistan.472	  This	  example	  suggests	  that	  the	  CISG	  may	  be	  
compatible	  with	  many	  other	  national	  laws,	  and,	  where	  differences	  exist	  between	  the	  
two,	  states	  are	  free	  to	  make	  reservations.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(2)	  An	  offer,	  even	  if	  it	  is	  irrevocable,	  may	  be	  withdrawn	  if	  the	  withdrawal	  reaches	  the	  offeree	  before	  or	  
at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  the	  offer.’	  
468	  Article	  16	  of	  the	  CISG	  states:	  
(1)	  Until	  a	  contract	  is	  concluded	  an	  offer	  may	  be	  revoked	  if	  the	  revocation	  reaches	  the	  offeree	  
before	  he	  has	  dispatched	  an	  acceptance.	  
(2)	  However,	  an	  offer	  cannot	  be	  revoked:	  
(a)	  if	  it	  indicates,	  whether	  by	  stating	  a	  fixed	  time	  for	  acceptance	  or	  otherwise,	  that	  it	  is	  
irrevocable;	  or	  
(b)	  if	  it	  was	  reasonable	  for	  the	  offeree	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  offer	  as	  being	  irrevocable	  and	  the	  offeree	  
has	  acted	  in	  reliance	  on	  the	  offer.	  
469	  Article	  28	  of	  the	  CISG	  states:	  	  
If,	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  provisions	  of	  this	  Convention,	  one	  party	  is	  entitled	  to	  require	  
performance	  of	  any	  obligation	  by	  the	  other	  party,	  a	  court	  is	  not	  bound	  to	  enter	  a	  judgement	  for	  
specific	  performance	  unless	  the	  court	  would	  do	  so	  under	  its	  own	  law	  in	  respect	  of	  similar	  
contracts	  of	  sale	  not	  governed	  by	  this	  Convention.	  
470	  Article	  38(1)	  of	  the	  CISG	  (n	  216).	  
471	  Article	  39(1)	  of	  the	  CISG	  states:	  	  
‘The	  buyer	  loses	  the	  right	  to	  rely	  on	  a	  lack	  of	  conformity	  of	  the	  goods	  if	  he	  does	  not	  give	  notice	  to	  the	  
seller	  specifying	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  conformity	  within	  a	  reasonable	  time	  after	  he	  has	  discovered	  it	  
or	  ought	  to	  have	  discovered	  it.’	  
472	  Knieper,	  ‘Celebrating	  Success	  by	  Accession	  to	  CISG’	  (n	  457).	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4.7.2	  Domesticity	  of	  the	  CISG	  
One	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  accession	  to	  the	  CISG	  is	  that	  it	  becomes	  domestic	  law	  in	  
signatory	  states.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  when	  disputes	  arise	  between	  parties	  to	  an	  
international	  sales	  contract,	  they	  do	  not	  need	  to	  compete	  with	  a	  foreign	  law	  with	  
which	  they	  are	  not	  familiar.	  This	  speeds	  up	  their	  dispute	  resolution,	  as	  they	  need	  not	  
struggle	  with	  confusing	  foreign	  law.	  Besides,	  no	  matter	  where	  the	  case	  is	  heard,	  
jurisdiction	  debates	  are	  prevented,	  as	  the	  same	  law	  will	  apply.473	  Unfortunately,	  in	  
dealing	  with	  international	  sales	  contracts,	  there	  are	  still	  countries	  like	  Iran	  that	  need	  to	  
understand	  and	  apply	  foreign	  law.	  If	  these	  countries	  accede	  to	  the	  CISG,	  the	  choice	  of	  
law	  will	  be	  excluded	  from	  sales	  transactions	  involving	  signatory	  states.	  The	  courts	  will	  
not	  waste	  time	  considering	  which	  law	  to	  apply	  to	  the	  dispute.	  Proving	  foreign	  law	  in	  
court	  is	  no	  longer	  needed,	  and	  as	  argument	  proceeds	  the	  relevant	  information	  on	  the	  
law	  will	  be	  introduced.474	  
4.7.3	  Artificial	  Division	  Between	  National	  and	  International	  Transactions	  
Rosett	  argues	  that	  making	  a	  distinction	  between	  domestic	  and	  international	  
transactions	  is	  not	  feasible,	  since	  parties	  choose	  to	  ignore	  international	  boundaries	  
under	  new	  economic	  conditions.475	  In	  accordance	  with	  Article	  1	  of	  the	  CISG,	  the	  
parties’	  place	  of	  business	  determines	  the	  sphere	  of	  application	  of	  the	  CSIG.	  	  
Although	  it	  is	  artificial,	  this	  does	  not	  cause	  a	  problem	  in	  most	  transactions,	  as,	  when	  
two	  legal	  systems	  come	  into	  play,	  the	  CISG	  clearly	  takes	  precedence.	  However,	  in	  
some	  instances,	  the	  CISG	  may	  apply	  but	  the	  conflict	  rules	  would	  not,476	  so	  parties	  
could	  choose	  to	  apply	  their	  own	  national	  law	  or	  prove	  that	  their	  intention	  was	  to	  apply	  
national	  law.	  Although	  this	  formulation	  seems	  peculiar,	  application	  of	  the	  CISG	  in	  such	  
manner	  results	  in	  certainty,	  which	  is	  respectful.477	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  Kabik,	  ‘Through	  the	  Looking-­‐Glass’	  (n	  363)	  409.	  
474	  Eiselen,	  ‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  (n	  43).	  
475	  Rosett,	  ‘Critical	  Reflections	  on	  the	  United	  Nations	  Convention’	  (n	  14)	  268;	  Bianca	  and	  Bonell,	  
Commentary	  on	  the	  International	  Sales	  Law	  (n	  315)	  8.	  
476	  Rosett,	  ‘Critical	  Reflections	  on	  the	  United	  Nations	  Convention’	  (n	  14)	  277–279.	  
477	  Eiselen,	  ‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  (n	  43)	  359.	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4.7.4	  The	  Costs	  of	  Familiarisation	  
Another	  reason	  put	  forward	  against	  adoption	  of	  the	  CISG	  in	  certain	  jurisdictions	  is	  the	  
cost,	  time	  and	  effort	  required	  to	  become	  familiar	  with	  the	  Convention.	  Such	  costs,	  
however,	  as	  Professor	  Flechtner	  argues,	  are	  ‘start-­‐up’	  costs,	  and	  are	  required	  as	  an	  
initial	  investment.478	  As	  soon	  as	  such	  an	  investment	  is	  made	  in	  CISG	  knowledge,	  the	  
CISG	  can	  be	  in	  use	  for	  a	  long	  time.479	  	  
4.7.5	  Lack	  of	  Manpower	  to	  Adopt	  the	  CISG	  
Another	  reason	  given	  by	  some	  countries	  for	  not	  ratifying	  the	  CISG	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  
manpower.480	  For	  example,	  Japan	  (though	  it	  is	  now	  a	  contracting	  party)	  was	  struggling	  
with	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  bursting	  of	  the	  bubble	  economy	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.	  Therefore,	  
in	  an	  attempt	  to	  achieve	  economic	  recovery,	  its	  entire	  legislative	  agenda	  focused	  on	  
insolvency	  laws,	  corporation	  laws,	  and	  laws	  on	  secured	  transactions.	  At	  the	  time,	  it	  
was	  not	  possible	  for	  Japan	  to	  focus	  on	  adoption	  of	  the	  CISG.481	  	  
4.7.6	  Slow	  Process	  Towards	  the	  CISG	  
The	  fact	  that	  many	  countries	  have	  not	  yet	  ratified	  the	  CISG	  does	  not	  always	  mean	  they	  
are	  opposing	  it.	  Many	  countries	  have	  already	  taken	  steps	  towards	  its	  ratification	  but	  
are	  at	  different	  stages.	  For	  example,	  in	  Azerbaijan	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Economic	  
Development	  is	  still	  considering	  ratification,	  but	  they	  are	  certain	  that	  it	  will	  be	  
adopted.	  In	  other	  words,	  ‘procedures	  are	  slow	  but	  steady.’	  In	  Armenia	  (now	  a	  
contracting	  state	  to	  the	  CISG),	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  the	  CISG	  was	  first	  approved	  by	  
the	  Constitutional	  Court,	  and	  then,	  after	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  approved	  it,	  
the	  government	  sent	  the	  text	  to	  be	  adopted	  by	  parliament.	  In	  Kazakhstan	  too,	  the	  
Ministry	  of	  Industry	  and	  Trade	  and	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice	  have	  approved	  it.	  It	  is	  then	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  Harry	  M	  Flechtner,	  ‘Changing	  the	  Opt-­‐Out	  Tradition	  in	  the	  United	  States’	  (2010)	  University	  of	  
Pittsburgh	  Legal	  Studies	  Research	  Paper	  Series	  Working	  Paper	  No	  2010–10.	  
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1571281>	  accessed	  3	  August	  2013.	  
479	  Lisa	  Spagnolo,	  ‘A	  Glimpse	  through	  the	  Kaleidoscope:	  Choices	  of	  Law	  and	  the	  CISG	  (Kaleidoscope	  Part	  
I)’	  (2009)	  Vindobona	  Journal	  of	  International	  Commercial	  Law	  and	  Arbitration	  135,	  140.	  
480	  Yoshihisa	  Nomi,	  ‘The	  CISG	  from	  the	  Asian	  Perspective’	  in	  ‘Celebrating	  Success:	  25	  Years	  United	  
Nations	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods’	  (2005)	  Singapore	  International	  
Arbitration	  Centre	  169.	  
481	  Sono,	  ‘Japan’s	  Accession	  to	  the	  CISG’	  (n	  382).	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up	  to	  the	  president,	  the	  Constitutional	  Council	  and	  ultimately	  the	  vote	  of	  parliament	  to	  
conclude	  its	  adoption.482	  
4.7.7	  The	  CISG	  –	  More	  Neglected	  Than	  Resisted	  
It	  is	  believed	  that	  ‘non-­‐adherence	  to	  the	  CISG	  is	  not	  based	  on	  systemic	  or	  ideological	  
resistance.’	  This	  is	  a	  totally	  different	  reaction	  from	  what	  it	  is	  seen	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  
Model	  Law	  on	  International	  Commercial	  Arbitration,	  which	  met	  with	  total	  resistance	  
from	  judiciary,	  prosecutors	  and	  government	  officials	  in	  countries	  in	  transition.	  In	  some	  
countries,	  commercial	  arbitration	  is	  regarded	  with	  suspicion	  and	  apprehension,	  so	  the	  
CISG	  is	  neglected	  rather	  than	  resisted.	  For	  example,	  post-­‐Soviet	  countries	  do	  not	  
actively	  oppose	  and	  obstruct	  the	  CISG,	  nor	  do	  their	  legal	  systems	  or	  judges	  resist	  
learning	  about	  or	  applying	  the	  CISG	  (bearing	  in	  mind	  that	  their	  national	  law	  has	  been	  
recently	  and	  frequently	  changed).	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  may	  reflect	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  civil	  
society,	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  independent	  chamber	  of	  commerce	  or	  other	  commerce-­‐
related	  organisations,	  and,	  more	  importantly,	  the	  scarcity	  of	  influential	  individuals	  or	  
groups	  capable	  of	  showing	  willingness	  and	  lobbying	  for	  the	  CISG	  in	  parliament.	  
Another	  reason	  could	  be	  the	  legacy	  of	  Soviet	  times,	  when	  all	  international	  business	  
transactions	  were	  controlled	  from	  Moscow.	  It	  will	  require	  co-­‐operation	  and	  legal	  
assistance	  to	  surmount	  these	  hurdles	  originating	  from	  the	  old	  system.483	  
4.7.8	  Multiple	  Conventions	  or	  Codes	  Lead	  to	  Confusion	  
Unifying	  efforts	  should	  facilitate	  the	  simplification	  of	  international	  trade	  rather	  than	  
complicating	  this	  already	  complex	  field.	  The	  fact	  is	  that	  when	  there	  are	  diverse	  
conventions	  trying	  to	  bring	  uniformity	  in	  the	  same	  field,	  determining	  which	  set	  of	  rules	  
to	  apply	  will	  result	  in	  more	  confusion.	  This	  is	  very	  much	  true	  in	  the	  case	  of	  laws	  of	  the	  
sea,	  with	  the	  Hague	  Rules,	  Hague–Visby	  Rules	  and	  Hamburg	  Rules	  in	  place.	  This	  does	  
not	  apply,	  however,	  to	  international	  trade	  law,	  since	  the	  CISG’s	  forerunners’	  (ULIS	  and	  
ULF)	  are	  no	  longer	  in	  place.	  	  
	  
Rosett	  criticises	  the	  fact	  that	  American	  businesses	  are	  now	  supposed	  to	  deal	  with	  
more	  than	  one	  set	  of	  sales	  laws,	  while	  before	  acceptance	  they	  had	  only	  the	  Uniform	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  Knieper,	  ‘Celebrating	  Success	  by	  Accession	  to	  CISG’	  (n	  457).	  
483	  ibid.	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Commercial	  Code	  (UCC),	  a	  nationally	  applicable	  law.484	  This	  argument	  is	  not	  entirely	  
convincing,	  since	  before	  the	  CISG	  American	  tradesmen	  were	  either	  in	  a	  stronger	  
position	  to	  impose	  the	  UCC,	  or	  they	  were	  in	  a	  position	  in	  which	  the	  other	  party	  
dictated	  which	  law	  should	  be	  applied.	  As	  a	  result,	  any	  foreign	  legal	  system	  could	  apply,	  
or	  the	  applicable	  legal	  system	  was	  determined	  by	  normal	  conflict	  rules,	  which	  again	  
could	  be	  either	  UCC	  or	  a	  foreign	  law.	  Acceptance	  of	  the	  CISG	  means	  that	  the	  possibility	  
of	  different	  legal	  systems	  being	  applied	  to	  the	  contract	  is	  greatly	  decreased.485	  If	  both	  
parties	  to	  the	  contract	  are	  signatory	  states,	  there	  will	  be	  no	  foreign	  national	  law	  
connected	  if	  and	  when	  conflict	  arises.	  This	  is	  particularly	  beneficial	  for	  countries	  that	  
have	  not	  yet	  ratified	  the	  CISG,	  as	  the	  CISG	  facilitates	  international	  trade.	  
Therefore,	  the	  accusation	  of	  complicating	  international	  trade	  is	  not	  valid,	  as	  in	  many	  
instances	  the	  CISG	  has	  succeeded	  in	  its	  simplification.486	  It	  is	  however	  true	  that	  the	  
CISG	  has	  left	  certain	  aspects	  open,	  and	  this	  could	  result	  in	  complications.487	  	  
4.7.9	  Popularity	  of	  the	  CISG	  and	  the	  Extent	  of	  International	  Acceptance	  
The	  fact	  that	  some	  of	  the	  world’s	  major	  trading	  states	  have	  ratified	  the	  CISG	  shows	  its	  
popularity	  in	  practice.	  Although	  popularity	  is	  not	  always	  translated	  into	  success,	  this	  
widespread	  acceptance	  of	  the	  CISG	  makes	  it	  an	  influential	  convention	  for	  international	  
trade	  transactions.	  Many	  developing	  countries	  enter	  into	  contracts	  of	  international	  
trade	  with	  countries	  that	  have	  ratified	  the	  CISG,	  which	  therefore	  necessitates	  the	  
paying	  of	  more	  attention	  to	  the	  Convention	  by	  non-­‐contracting	  states	  in	  order	  to	  
facilitate	  more	  efficient	  trade	  with	  contracting	  states.	  Ratification	  of	  the	  CISG	  may	  
therefore	  promote	  improved	  relations	  with	  trading	  partners.	  Non-­‐ratification	  may	  also	  
have	  an	  adverse	  effect,	  though	  this	  obviously	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  general	  acceptance	  
by	  the	  world	  justifies	  ratification.488	  
	  
However,	  the	  Convention	  has	  been	  endorsed	  by	  many	  organisations,	  such	  as	  the	  
American	  Association	  of	  Exporters	  and	  Importers,	  the	  National	  Trade	  Council,	  the	  
American	  National	  Association	  of	  Manufacturers,	  and	  also	  the	  Canadian	  Manufacture	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  Nations	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  (n	  14)	  273.	  
485	  Garro,	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  of	  Legal	  Traditions’	  (n	  152)	  450–452.	  
486	  Kabik,	  ‘Through	  the	  Looking-­‐Glass’	  (n	  363)	  409.	  
487	  Rosett,	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  on	  the	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  Nations	  Convention’	  (n	  14)	  281;	  Lavers,	  ‘To	  Use,	  or	  Not	  to	  
Use’	  (n	  357)	  10–11.	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Association.	  Leading	  legal	  bodies	  such	  as	  the	  American	  and	  the	  Canadian	  Bar	  
Associations	  also	  firmly	  support	  the	  CISG.489	  This	  widespread	  and	  diverse	  acceptance	  
should	  be	  a	  sign	  of	  its	  dominance	  over	  the	  law	  of	  international	  trade.	  The	  hesitation	  
that	  existed	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  over	  how	  the	  CISG	  would	  be	  applied	  no	  longer	  exists	  
today.490	  The	  ever-­‐growing	  body	  of	  case	  law	  reveals	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  CISG	  is	  
being	  used	  on	  a	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  basis	  in	  trade.	  Further	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Convention	  in	  
the	  light	  of	  this	  increasing	  body	  of	  case	  law	  will	  be	  provided.491	  
	  
It	  is	  also	  believed	  that	  the	  CISG	  as	  a	  recognised	  part	  of	  international	  trade	  has	  the	  
capability	  to	  become	  the	  ultimate	  power	  governing	  international	  commerce.492	  The	  
deliberate	  exclusion	  of	  the	  CISG	  from	  contracts	  of	  international	  trade	  could	  be	  a	  result	  
of	  ignorance,	  prejudice	  and	  habit.493	  This	  is	  because	  the	  CISG	  is	  used	  more	  and	  more	  
every	  day,	  and	  there	  is	  a	  growing	  knowledge	  about	  it,	  so	  trading	  practice	  is	  also	  
influenced.	  The	  new	  generation	  of	  traders	  are	  more	  in	  favour	  of	  its	  application,	  which	  
suggests	  that	  the	  CISG	  will	  become	  the	  norm	  in	  international	  trade	  and	  that	  its	  
exclusion	  will	  be	  unusual.494	  This	  shift	  indeed	  justifies	  its	  ratification	  and	  incorporation	  
into	  domestic	  law.	  
4.7.10	  CISG	  –	  The	  Great	  Rate	  of	  Opt-­‐Outs	  
As	  the	  CISG	  allows	  for	  the	  exclusion	  of	  its	  application,	  in	  its	  entirety	  or	  in	  part,	  it	  has	  
been	  said	  that	  the	  CISG	  has	  been	  frequently	  ‘opted	  out	  of.’495	  The	  CISG’s	  goals	  of	  
reduction	  of	  the	  cost	  of	  transactions	  and	  the	  facilitation	  of	  trade	  will	  not	  be	  achieved	  if	  
it	  is	  not	  widely	  used	  by	  parties	  in	  international	  trade.	  The	  more	  parties	  opt	  out	  of	  the	  
CISG,	  the	  more	  likely	  it	  will	  be	  for	  the	  CISG	  not	  to	  reach	  its	  objectives.	  The	  statistics	  
taken	  from	  some	  jurisdictions	  show	  how	  frequently	  this	  exclusion	  takes	  place.	  For	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  Economies’	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  50	  American	  Journal	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  Law	  97,	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131	  
example,	  in	  the	  US,	  the	  rate	  of	  opt-­‐out	  is	  somewhere	  in	  the	  region	  of	  55%–71%.496	  In	  
Germany,	  45%	  of	  lawyers	  ‘generally/predominantly’	  opt	  out.497	  In	  Switzerland	  and	  
Austria,	  the	  rates	  are	  around	  41%498	  and	  55%499	  respectively.	  Also	  in	  China	  the	  figure	  
for	  lawyers	  who	  typically	  opt	  out	  of	  the	  CISG	  is	  around	  37%.500	  Although	  the	  reason	  for	  
exclusion	  might	  differ	  from	  jurisdiction	  to	  jurisdiction,	  the	  impact	  is	  pretty	  much	  the	  
same,	  which	  is	  that	  the	  CISG	  is	  not	  able	  to	  achieve	  its	  objectives.	  On	  top	  of	  that,	  it	  
could	  also	  have	  a	  knock-­‐on-­‐effect	  on	  the	  rate	  of	  adherence	  to	  the	  CISG	  by	  other	  
countries.	  	  
	  
The	  high	  rate	  of	  opt-­‐outs	  could	  perhaps	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  somewhat	  indifferent	  
attitude	  of	  large	  corporations	  and	  international	  business	  lawyers.	  It	  has	  been	  reported	  
that	  they	  may	  be	  unwilling:	  
	  
i. Because	  of	  their	  unfamiliarity	  with	  the	  CISG’s	  contents.	  There	  has	  been	  no	  need	  so	  
far	  to	  familiarise	  themselves	  with	  it	  and	  they	  basically	  do	  not	  like	  what	  they	  are	  
not	  acquainted	  with.501	  
ii. Because	  they	  are	  under	  American	  lawyers’	  influence,	  concerning	  the	  superiority	  of	  
the	  Uniform	  Commercial	  Code	  over	  the	  CISG.502	  They	  may	  thus	  be	  of	  the	  opinion	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  Law	  Publishers	  2005)	  500.	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that	  the	  CISG	  is	  ill	  drafted	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  compromise	  made	  between	  the	  civil	  
and	  the	  common	  law	  jurisdictions.	  
iii. Simply	  as	  a	  result	  of	  speculation.	  In	  some	  countries,	  large	  corporations	  and	  
international	  law	  firms	  may	  not	  be	  involved	  in	  many	  international	  disputes	  arising	  
from	  contracts	  of	  sale	  of	  goods.	  Although	  there	  may	  not	  be	  an	  empirical	  study	  on	  
this,	  the	  statistics	  show	  that	  legal	  work	  in	  law	  firms	  and	  corporations	  involved	  in	  
international	  transactions	  is	  mainly	  concerned	  with	  M&A,	  investment,	  joint	  
ventures,	  large-­‐scale	  finance,	  construction	  projects,	  legal	  issues	  under	  anti-­‐trust,	  
anti-­‐dumping,	  issues	  of	  non-­‐compliance	  or	  different	  legal	  disputes.	  There	  are	  
rarely	  or	  hardly	  ever	  conflicts	  over	  the	  international	  sale	  of	  goods.503	  	  
iv. Because	  many	  large	  corporations	  are	  in	  possession	  of	  branch	  offices	  or	  
subsidiaries	  or	  joint	  venture	  companies	  in	  other	  countries	  where	  their	  raw	  
materials	  and	  parts	  are	  being	  bought	  or	  in	  countries	  where	  they	  export	  their	  
goods.	  Thus,	  if	  a	  dispute	  arises	  over	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  goods	  or	  time	  of	  delivery,	  
the	  issues	  will	  be	  between	  original	  sellers	  or	  final	  buyers	  in	  that	  particular	  country	  
and	  the	  branch	  offices	  or	  subsidiaries	  of	  those	  corporations	  in	  the	  same	  foreign	  
country.	  In	  such	  circumstances,	  disputes	  over	  the	  international	  sale	  of	  goods	  are	  
no	  longer	  international	  and	  will	  be	  treated	  domestically	  in	  that	  country.	  This	  may	  
not,	  however,	  be	  the	  case	  for	  small	  companies	  that	  cannot	  afford	  to	  have	  
subsidiaries	  or	  branches	  in	  other	  countries.	  Their	  disputes	  over	  international	  sales	  
transactions	  are	  thus	  treated	  internationally.	  Having	  said	  that,	  in	  some	  countries,	  
such	  as	  Japan,	  there	  are	  several	  large	  companies	  involved	  in	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  
trading	  activities.	  Therefore,	  most	  small	  businesses	  rely	  on	  the	  expertise	  of	  these	  
trading	  companies	  and	  their	  services.	  These	  trading	  companies	  are	  also	  in	  
possession	  of	  subsidiaries	  and	  branch	  offices	  throughout	  the	  world.	  So,	  again,	  
when	  a	  dispute	  arises	  regarding	  export	  and	  import	  business,	  it	  will	  become	  a	  
domestic	  dispute	  in	  that	  particular	  country.	  This	  has	  thus	  been	  the	  main	  reason	  for	  
their	  negativity	  towards	  the	  CISG.504	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
502	  Ralph	  H	  Folsom,	  Michael	  W	  Gordon	  and	  John	  A	  Spanogle,	  International	  Business	  Transactions	  (6th	  
edn,	  West	  Nutshell	  Series	  2000)	  51.	  
503	  Kashiwagi,	  ‘Accession	  by	  Japan	  to	  the	  Vienna	  Sales	  Convention	  (CISG)’	  (n	  375).	  
504	  ibid.	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4.7.11	  Summary:	  The	  Iranian	  Situation	  
The	  arguments	  against	  the	  CISG’s	  ease	  of	  assimilation	  into	  domestic	  law	  and	  practice	  
outweigh	  the	  arguments	  in	  its	  favour.	  This	  should	  not,	  however,	  pose	  a	  threat	  for	  Iran.	  	  
In	  chapter	  seven,	  it	  will	  be	  shown	  that	  the	  CISG	  and	  the	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code	  are	  
compatible	  in	  many	  respects.	  Where	  differences	  exist	  between	  the	  two	  legal	  systems,	  
it	  is	  possible	  to	  overcome	  them.	  In	  the	  event	  that	  Iran	  ratifies	  the	  CISG,	  it	  will	  become	  
its	  domestic	  law	  as	  a	  signatory	  state.	  Hence	  the	  CISG	  will	  be	  the	  applicable	  law	  in	  
international	  trade,	  which	  accelerates	  dispute	  resolution	  between	  parties.	  Although	  
Iran	  will	  have	  to	  spend	  time	  on	  and	  pay	  the	  costs	  of	  becoming	  familiar	  with	  the	  CISG,	  
this	  process,	  time-­‐consuming	  and	  expensive	  as	  it	  is,	  is	  far	  more	  justifiable	  than	  the	  
constant	  costs	  of	  becoming	  familiar	  with	  foreign	  laws.	  These	  foreign	  laws	  are	  likely	  to	  
vary	  with	  different	  international	  transactions,	  and	  the	  cost	  of	  complying	  has	  to	  be	  
borne	  by	  each	  individual	  Iranian	  trader.	  	  
	  
The	  writer’s	  fieldwork505	  in	  Iran	  shows	  that	  the	  CISG	  is	  more	  neglected	  than	  resisted	  
there.	  The	  CISG	  has	  never	  met	  with	  resistance	  from	  Government	  officials	  in	  Iran,	  and	  
no	  statement	  has	  ever	  been	  issued	  by	  them	  to	  disprove	  this	  point	  or	  reveal	  their	  
position.	  The	  writer	  does	  not	  even	  believe	  that	  lack	  of	  manpower	  has	  been	  the	  reason	  
behind	  the	  non-­‐ratification	  of	  the	  CISG	  by	  Iran,	  as	  Iran	  has	  already	  ratified	  a	  number	  of	  
other	  international	  conventions.506	  	  
	  
Besides,	  if	  Iran	  adopts	  the	  CISG,	  the	  possibility	  of	  different	  legal	  systems	  being	  applied	  
to	  contracts	  between	  Iranian	  traders	  and	  their	  international	  counterparts	  will	  
considerably	  decrease,	  which	  will	  of	  course	  simplify	  international	  trade	  for	  Iran.	  Owing	  
to	  the	  popularity	  of	  the	  CISG,	  it	  is	  important	  that	  Iran	  should	  consider	  adoption	  sooner	  
rather	  than	  later,	  since	  Iran	  could	  conduct	  more	  efficient	  trade	  with	  the	  CISG’s	  
contracting	  states.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
505	  See	  generally	  ch	  8,	  8.2.	  
506	  See	  ch	  6,	  6.3.3.	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4.8	  Benefits	  to	  Domestic	  Law	  
4.8.1	  Suitability	  of	  the	  CISG	  for	  Modern	  Sales	  Transactions	  –	  The	  CISG	  
Might	  Even	  Lead	  to	  Domestic	  Reform	  
In	  order	  to	  meet	  the	  demands	  of	  domestic	  sales,	  countries	  have	  to	  improve	  their	  law	  
of	  sales,	  but	  such	  a	  development	  may	  not	  fully	  and	  properly	  fit	  with	  international	  sales	  
law.	  For	  example,	  South	  African	  sales	  law	  has	  been	  improved,	  but	  still	  has	  many	  
obsolete	  rules	  that	  are	  not	  appropriate	  for	  modern	  international	  commerce.507	  This	  
was	  also	  true	  for	  the	  Japanese	  Civil	  Code,	  which	  came	  into	  effect	  in	  1898:	  despite	  
several	  amendments,	  its	  basic	  provisions	  for	  the	  sale	  of	  goods	  remained	  unchanged.508	  	  
	  
In	  the	  formulation	  of	  the	  CISG	  specific	  attention	  was	  given	  to	  contemporary	  
international	  trade.	  This	  involved	  taking	  into	  account	  both	  domestic	  developments	  and	  
different	  aspects	  of	  the	  law	  of	  sale	  from	  all	  over	  the	  world,	  and	  the	  result	  was	  the	  
creation	  of	  a	  law	  of	  sale	  suitable	  for	  international	  commerce	  and	  sensitive	  to	  
international	  economic	  usage	  and	  practice.509	  A	  further	  advantage	  of	  adoption	  of	  the	  
CISG	  would	  be	  updating	  one’s	  own	  domestic	  sales	  law,510	  since	  this	  might	  inspire	  
national	  legislators	  to	  adopt	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  CISG	  when	  reforming	  their	  own	  
contract	  law.511	  
4.8.2	  Summary:	  The	  Iranian	  Situation	  
The	  benefits-­‐to-­‐domestic-­‐law	  argument	  for	  adopting	  the	  CISG	  seems	  particularly	  
relevant	  to	  Iran.	  The	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code,	  the	  main	  source	  of	  the	  law	  of	  contract,	  was	  
first	  prepared	  in	  1928	  and	  then	  completed	  in	  1935–36.512	  This	  code	  has	  remained	  
untouched	  for	  nearly	  80	  years.	  During	  that	  time	  the	  volume,	  complexity	  and	  
international	  character	  of	  commercial	  transactions	  have	  changed	  and	  the	  Iranian	  Civil	  
Code	  is	  no	  longer	  suitable	  for	  modern	  international	  trade.	  The	  CISG,	  which	  is	  a	  more	  
modern	  document	  developed	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  international	  character	  and	  complexity	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
507	  Eiselen,	  ‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  (n	  43)	  343.	  
508	  Kashiwagi,	  ‘Accession	  by	  Japan	  to	  the	  Vienna	  Sales	  Convention	  (CISG)’	  (n	  375).	  
509	  Mendes,	  ‘The	  UN	  Sales	  Convention	  &	  Canada	  Transactions’	  (n	  389)	  118.	  
510	  Eiselen,	  ‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  (n	  43).	  
511	  Gary	  F	  Bell,	  ‘Harmonisation	  of	  Contract	  Law	  in	  Asia	  –	  Harmonising	  Regionally	  or	  Adopting	  Global	  
Harmonisations	  –	  The	  Example	  of	  the	  CISG’	  (2005)	  Singapore	  Journal	  of	  Legal	  Studies	  362.	  
512	  Text	  to	  n	  610	  in	  ch	  6.	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of	  current	  trade	  practices,	  responds	  better	  to	  international	  commerce.	  Besides,	  
chapter	  seven	  will	  show	  that	  the	  CISG	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code	  in	  many	  
ways;	  therefore,	  it	  could	  be	  used	  by	  Iran	  to	  embark	  on	  updating	  its	  own	  domestic	  law	  
of	  sale.	  	  
4.9	  Protection	  of	  National	  Sovereignty	  	  
4.9.1	  Flexibility	  of	  the	  CISG	  
The	  flexibility	  of	  the	  CISG	  as	  reflected	  in	  Articles	  92–96	  offers	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  
possibilities	  for	  contracting	  out	  of	  the	  Convention	  and	  restricting	  the	  application	  of	  
parts	  of	  it,	  which	  might	  lead	  to	  higher	  rates	  of	  adherence.	  One	  might	  also	  argue,	  
however,	  that	  this	  same	  flexibility	  harms	  uniformity	  and	  clarity	  and	  could	  result	  in	  
higher	  transaction	  costs.	  The	  Soviet	  Union,	  for	  example,	  decided	  against	  the	  written	  
and	  other	  forms	  of	  contract	  that	  are	  found	  in	  the	  CISG.	  Articles	  11	  and	  29	  were	  
therefore	  declared	  not	  applicable	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  this	  regime	  of	  formalities	  that	  
was	  typical	  of	  Soviet	  law.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  advantage	  of	  a	  swift	  and	  smooth	  conclusion	  
of	  contract	  was	  lost.	  The	  Russian	  Federation	  has	  maintained	  this	  reservation.	  Georgia	  
and	  Uzbekistan,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  have	  not	  followed	  this	  approach.	  This	  flexibility	  or	  
the	  right	  to	  contract	  totally	  or	  partly	  out	  of	  the	  CISG	  is	  probably	  a	  realistic	  option	  for	  
parties	  that	  are	  able	  to	  afford	  detailed	  drafting	  and	  prefer	  more	  suitable	  clauses.	  
Governments	  may	  prefer	  to	  adhere	  to	  the	  CISG	  when	  they	  are	  aware	  that	  it	  is	  not	  jus	  
cognes	  for	  their	  enterprises.513	  
4.9.2	  The	  Inclusive	  and	  Participative	  Process	  of	  the	  Creation	  of	  the	  CISG	  
As	  discussed	  earlier,	  considerable	  amounts	  of	  criticism	  were	  levelled	  at	  the	  CISG’s	  
precursors	  (ULIS	  and	  ULF).	  This	  criticism	  centred	  on	  their	  creation	  mainly	  by	  the	  
developed,	  Western	  European	  and	  civil	  law	  states,	  and	  the	  exclusion	  of	  the	  
developing,	  non-­‐Western	  European,	  common	  law	  states.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  social,	  
political	  and	  economic	  position	  of	  non-­‐capitalist	  developing	  states	  was	  not	  
reflected.514	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
513	  Knieper,	  ‘Celebrating	  Success	  by	  Accession	  to	  CISG’	  (n	  457).	  
514	  Mendes,	  ‘The	  UN	  Sales	  Convention	  &	  Canada	  Transactions’	  (n	  389)	  121;	  Zwart,	  ‘The	  New	  
International	  Law	  of	  Sales’	  (n	  365)	  114–116.	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This	  was	  no	  longer	  the	  case	  during	  the	  drafting	  of	  the	  CISG.	  Representatives	  from	  all	  
over	  the	  world	  participated,	  including	  developing	  and	  common	  law	  states,	  and	  they	  
aired	  their	  concerns	  during	  the	  drafting	  process.	  This	  was	  a	  truly	  participatory	  and	  
representative	  process,	  and	  thus	  provides	  no	  hindrance	  to	  ratifying	  the	  CISG.515	  
4.9.3	  Regional	  Integration	  
4.9.3.1	  Leadership	  Role	  in	  the	  Region	  
Some	  countries	  in	  the	  world	  are	  considered	  major	  absentees	  from	  the	  CISG,	  such	  as	  
the	  United	  Kingdom,	  India	  and	  South	  Africa.	  The	  role	  that	  these	  countries	  play	  within	  a	  
specific	  region	  or	  in	  the	  world	  may	  have	  a	  great	  impact	  on	  other	  states.	  For	  example,	  
South	  Africa	  is	  the	  leading	  economic	  power	  in	  Southern	  Africa,	  which	  obliges	  it	  to	  run	  
its	  domestic	  business	  and	  to	  interact	  with	  its	  neighbours	  in	  ways	  that	  improve	  national	  
economies	  in	  the	  region.	  Many	  of	  these	  Southern	  African	  countries	  have	  weak	  and	  
fragile	  economies,	  exacerbated	  by	  their	  inexperience	  and	  undercapitalisation	  in	  the	  
international	  commercial	  arena.	  This	  opens	  the	  way	  for	  them	  to	  be	  exploited	  by	  
stronger	  traders.	  A	  great	  number	  of	  developing	  countries	  enter	  into	  trading	  
relationships	  with	  experienced	  developed	  countries,516	  which	  gives	  the	  stronger	  party	  
the	  opportunity	  to	  determine	  which	  laws	  apply	  to	  contracts,	  and	  there	  is	  an	  excellent	  
chance	  that	  this	  will	  be	  the	  law	  of	  a	  foreign	  state.	  This	  entails	  legal	  costs	  and	  requires	  a	  
great	  deal	  of	  time	  for	  familiarisation	  with	  this	  foreign	  law.517	  	  
	  
If	  the	  CISG	  were	  in	  place,	  the	  African	  states	  would	  be	  better	  served.	  The	  CISG	  applies	  
to	  a	  contract	  if	  the	  other	  party	  is	  a	  signatory	  country	  and	  rules	  of	  private	  international	  
law	  require	  it.	  This	  results	  in	  legal	  certainty	  and	  a	  reduction	  in	  money	  and	  time	  spent.	  
The	  developing	  countries	  would	  be	  better	  served	  under	  a	  unified	  law	  applicable	  to	  
international	  sales	  contracts,	  as	  this	  would	  remove	  the	  hurdles	  presented	  by	  foreign	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
515	  Gichangi,	  ‘The	  United	  Nations	  Convention’	  (n	  351);	  See	  Eiselen,	  ‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  
(n	  43)	  353–354.	  
516	  Eiselen,	  ibid	  355.	  
517	  Muna	  Ndulo,	  ‘The	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  (1980)	  
and	  the	  Eastern	  and	  Southern	  African	  Preferential	  Trade	  Area’	  (1987)	  3(2)	  Lesotho	  Law	  Journal	  127,	  
129–130.	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law.	  If	  South	  Africa	  ratifies	  the	  CISG,	  it	  is	  believed	  that	  the	  flow	  of	  trade	  will	  takes	  place	  
more	  smoothly.	  African	  states’	  national	  economies	  will	  thus	  develop.	  The	  drafters	  
made	  great	  efforts	  to	  reflect	  and	  protect	  the	  interests	  of	  developing	  countries	  but,	  
despite	  their	  best	  efforts,	  the	  CISG	  has	  achieved	  a	  low	  rate	  of	  ratification	  in	  the	  
developing	  world.	  There	  is	  a	  belief	  that	  it	  is	  internal	  efforts	  that	  result	  in	  economic	  
growth	  in	  African	  states,	  and	  therefore	  all	  measures	  must	  be	  taken	  to	  reach	  this	  goal	  
of	  sustainable	  economic	  growth.	  Ratification	  of	  the	  CISG	  is	  regarded	  as	  the	  right	  
starting	  point.	  The	  economically	  stronger	  parties	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  take	  advantage	  
of	  the	  weaker	  position	  of	  developing	  parties.	  Therefore,	  its	  acceptance	  by	  South	  Africa	  
might	  well	  encourage	  neighbouring	  countries	  to	  take	  steps	  towards	  the	  ratification	  of	  
the	  CISG.518	  This	  would	  safeguard	  even	  more	  trade	  practices	  for	  South	  Africa	  and	  
Southern	  African	  countries,	  and	  suggests	  that	  the	  influential	  position	  and	  leadership	  
role	  that	  a	  country	  has	  in	  a	  region	  gives	  rise	  to	  the	  acceptability	  of	  the	  CISG	  in	  the	  eyes	  
of	  other	  countries	  in	  that	  region.	  
4.9.3.2	  CISG	  for	  the	  East	  African	  Community	  and	  a	  Common	  Market	  for	  
East	  and	  Southern	  Africa	  
The	  CISG	  can	  also	  serve	  as	  one	  harmonised	  sales	  law	  for	  regional	  integration.	  As	  a	  case	  
in	  point,	  Kenya	  is	  a	  member	  of	  the	  East	  African	  Community	  (EAC)	  and	  the	  Common	  
Market	  for	  East	  and	  Southern	  Africa	  (COMESA).	  Both	  organisations	  aim	  to	  develop	  
trade	  between	  the	  member	  states.	  Given	  that	  each	  member	  state	  has	  its	  own	  national	  
law	  of	  sale,	  one	  harmonised	  law	  of	  sale	  is	  required	  in	  these	  two	  organisations.	  The	  
CISG	  is	  fit	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  EAC	  and	  COMESA	  as	  a	  unified	  law	  of	  sale	  providing	  the	  
necessary	  legal	  framework	  for	  regional	  trade.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  only	  two	  of	  the	  
EAC	  states	  (Burundi	  and	  Uganda)	  have	  ratified	  the	  CISG,	  and	  of	  the	  COMESA	  states	  
only	  four	  (Burundi,	  Egypt,	  Uganda	  and	  Zambia)	  have	  ratified	  it.519	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  Eiselen,	  ‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  (n	  43)	  356.	  
519	  Gichangi,	  ‘The	  United	  Nations	  Convention’	  (n	  351).	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4.9.4	  Imposing	  a	  Foreign	  Solution	  
Rosett	  believes	  that	  a	  foreign	  solution	  to	  well-­‐known	  problems,	  such	  as	  that	  
introduced	  by	  the	  CISG,	  had	  already	  been	  provided	  by	  the	  UCC.520	  Since	  these	  
problems	  were	  well	  recognised,	  the	  trading	  parties	  were	  in	  a	  better	  position	  to	  deal	  
with	  their	  own	  specific	  situations	  and	  come	  up	  with	  solutions.521	  Thus	  the	  CISG	  is	  
unnecessary	  and	  complicates	  matters	  by	  introducing	  a	  new	  set	  of	  rules.	  
That	  the	  parties	  can	  establish	  their	  own	  solutions	  is	  correct:	  this	  has	  been	  recognised	  
by	  the	  CISG	  in	  the	  principle	  of	  party	  autonomy,	  which	  ensures	  that	  parties	  are	  free	  to	  
negotiate	  the	  terms	  of	  their	  contract.	  However,	  it	  is	  also	  true	  that	  parties	  often	  do	  not	  
succeed	  in	  covering	  some	  or	  all	  of	  the	  aspects	  that	  are	  well	  covered	  by	  the	  CISG.	  
Besides,	  standard	  terms	  or	  Incoterms	  are	  not	  always	  used	  by	  all	  companies	  in	  
international	  trade,522	  and,	  even	  if	  they	  are	  used,	  they	  may	  have	  deficiencies.	  This	  
precipitates	  the	  need	  for	  a	  set	  of	  rules	  to	  apply	  if	  an	  issue	  is	  not	  adequately	  addressed	  
by	  the	  contract.	  This	  is	  also	  true	  for	  American	  businesses	  to	  which	  the	  UCC	  is	  not	  
applicable:	  the	  businesses	  do	  not	  need	  to	  deal	  with	  a	  large	  number	  of	  foreign	  legal	  
systems.523	  
4.9.5	  CISG	  for	  Pan-­‐Asian	  Law	  and	  Practice	  and	  Its	  Role	  in	  the	  
Development	  of	  a	  Trade	  Law	  
It	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  courts,	  lawyers	  and	  law	  faculties	  in	  Asia	  focus	  almost	  
exclusively	  on	  national	  law	  as	  expressed	  in	  local	  languages.	  This	  leaves	  few	  Asian	  
lawyers	  capable	  of	  the	  regional	  and	  international	  exercise	  of	  law.	  Moreover,	  jurists	  in	  
Asian	  law	  schools	  are	  not	  trained	  to	  practise	  law	  transnationally	  in	  foreign	  languages.	  
Europe	  experienced	  the	  same	  problem	  until	  a	  few	  decades	  ago,	  but	  today,	  with	  the	  
spread	  of	  the	  Europeanisation	  of	  law,	  this	  is	  no	  longer	  is	  the	  case.	  A	  considerable	  
amount	  of	  time	  is	  spent	  in	  European	  law	  schools	  on	  teaching	  non-­‐national	  law	  that	  
applies	  beyond	  national	  borders.	  Civil	  and	  common	  law	  are	  often	  connected	  by	  
European	  law;	  this	  thus	  provides	  the	  basis	  for	  a	  comparative	  approach	  to	  teaching	  law	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
520	  Rosett,	  ‘The	  International	  Sales	  Convention’	  (n	  422)	  447;	  Rosett,	  ‘Critical	  Reflections	  on	  the	  United	  
Nations	  Convention’	  (n	  14)	  286	  and	  303–305.	  
521	  Patterson,	  ‘United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods’	  (n	  406)	  276;	  
Farnsworth,	  ‘The	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods’	  (n	  430)	  18.	  
522	  Franca	  Ciambella,	  ‘Business	  Sector’s	  Attitudes	  Towards	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  in	  Louis	  Perret	  and	  
Nicole	  Lacasse	  (eds),	  Actes	  du	  Colloque	  sur	  la	  Vente	  Internationale	  (Montreal	  1989)	  292.	  
523	  Eiselen,	  ‘Adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’	  (n	  43)	  365.	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in	  law	  schools.	  It	  is	  sometimes	  accompanied	  by	  spending	  a	  year	  studying	  law	  in	  
another	  European	  country,	  which	  enables	  lawyers	  to	  improve	  their	  abilities	  and	  
aptitudes	  in	  comparative	  law	  as	  well	  as	  their	  language	  skills.	  As	  a	  result	  they	  are	  better	  
prepared	  to	  practise	  law	  internationally.	  A	  similar	  approach	  is	  taken	  by	  top	  American	  
law	  schools.	  International	  law	  is	  being	  progressively	  taught,	  and	  comparative	  law	  is	  an	  
essential	  part	  of	  this.524	  	  
	  
The	  number	  of	  American	  and	  European	  lawyers	  establishing	  a	  practice	  in	  Asia	  is	  
increasing.	  Despite	  the	  limitations	  that	  Asian	  laws	  impose,	  the	  practice	  of	  international	  
commercial	  law	  will	  not	  stop	  growing.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  believed	  that	  foreign	  law	  firms	  
ought	  to	  be	  less	  restricted	  and	  regulated	  by	  local	  practices,	  and	  instead	  that	  local	  
practices	  should	  align	  themselves	  with	  the	  practice	  of	  law	  both	  internationally	  and	  
transnationally.	  This	  would	  be	  more	  easily	  achieved	  by	  adoption	  of	  the	  CISG	  as	  a	  
common	  sales	  law	  that	  is	  specifically	  designed	  for	  international	  sales	  and	  forms	  the	  
basis	  for	  a	  pan-­‐Asian	  practice	  of	  law.525	  
4.9.6	  Building	  a	  Comparative	  Law	  Expertise	  
The	  comparative	  study	  of	  law	  now	  has	  an	  important	  role	  to	  play.	  Expertise	  in	  both	  
common	  and	  civil	  law	  is	  no	  longer	  regarded	  as	  an	  exceptional	  phenomenon	  in	  Europe,	  
owing	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  law	  is	  transnational.	  This	  is	  not	  the	  case	  in	  Asia,	  however,	  and	  
that	  is	  because	  most	  law	  schools	  approach	  law	  as	  a	  national	  discipline.	  Adoption	  of	  the	  
CISG	  would	  revolutionise	  this	  approach	  and	  foster	  a	  more	  comparative	  study	  of	  law,	  in	  
particular	  contract	  and	  sales	  law.	  It	  is	  through	  a	  comparative	  study	  of	  common	  and	  
civil	  law	  that	  one	  realises	  the	  compromises	  that	  have	  been	  made	  in	  the	  CISG.	  This	  was	  
the	  case	  in	  Europe	  decades	  ago,	  when	  expertise	  in	  comparative	  law	  emerged	  from	  the	  
harmonisation	  of	  law	  in	  Europe.	  This	  can	  happen	  today	  in	  Asia:	  if	  more	  Asian	  countries	  
sign	  up	  to	  the	  CISG,	  the	  knowledge	  of	  comparative	  law	  will	  increase	  in	  the	  region,	  
which	  will	  in	  turn	  enable	  lawyers	  to	  recommend	  the	  most	  suitable	  law	  of	  contract	  to	  
their	  clients.	  International	  law	  firms	  require	  and	  demand	  this	  kind	  of	  ‘internationally	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
524	  Bell,	  ‘Harmonisation	  of	  Contract	  Law	  in	  Asia’	  (n	  511).	  
525	  ibid.	  
140	  
savvy	  lawyer.’	  Therefore,	  Asia	  should	  strive	  to	  build	  such	  a	  body	  of	  comparative	  law	  
expertise	  through	  adoption	  of	  the	  CISG.526	  
4.9.7	  Influencing	  the	  Interpretation	  of	  the	  CISG	  
The	  review	  of	  case	  law	  concerning	  the	  CISG	  shows	  that	  China	  is	  contributing	  
significantly	  to	  its	  interpretation.	  This	  is	  being	  achieved	  through	  decisions	  made	  by	  
courts	  and	  arbitral	  tribunals.	  Compared	  with	  the	  European	  contribution,	  China’s	  share	  
seems	  very	  small.	  Even	  small	  countries	  in	  Europe	  such	  as	  Belgium,	  the	  Netherlands	  and	  
Switzerland	  have	  a	  higher	  number	  of	  cases	  reported	  than	  China.	  This	  number	  
obviously	  goes	  up	  a	  lot	  if	  larger	  European	  countries	  such	  as	  Germany,	  France	  and	  
Russia	  are	  added	  to	  the	  analogy.	  There	  are	  some	  2,900	  cases	  reported	  on	  the	  CISG,	  of	  
which	  fewer	  than	  500	  come	  from	  Asia.527	  
	  
Therefore,	  it	  is	  certainly	  true	  to	  say	  that	  most	  of	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  CISG	  is	  being	  
made	  in	  Europe	  and	  primarily	  by	  civil	  law	  countries	  (the	  UK	  of	  course	  being	  a	  major	  
absentee	  from	  the	  CISG).	  Common	  law	  jurisdictions	  (the	  USA,	  Australia,	  Canada	  and	  
New	  Zealand),	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  have	  reported	  only	  a	  few	  cases.	  Asian	  common	  law	  
jurisdictions,	  including	  Singapore,	  which	  is	  a	  signatory	  state,	  have	  made	  little	  
contribution.528	  India,	  the	  most	  important	  common	  law	  jurisdiction	  in	  Asia,	  has	  not	  yet	  
ratified	  the	  CISG,	  as	  is	  indeed	  true	  for	  other	  common	  law	  jurisdictions	  in	  Asia	  (apart	  
from	  Singapore).	  
	  
The	  reality	  is	  that	  the	  area	  of	  the	  international	  sale	  of	  goods	  governed	  by	  the	  CISG	  is	  
being	  formed	  by	  European	  courts	  and	  tribunals.	  Therefore,	  if	  Asia	  wishes	  to	  contribute	  
to	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  CISG	  and	  hence	  to	  the	  shaping	  of	  that	  law,	  the	  Convention	  
should	  be	  adopted	  and	  applied	  by	  the	  Asian	  countries	  as	  soon	  as	  possible.529	  
4.9.8	  Promoting	  Law,	  Courts	  and	  Tribunals	  
Asian	  courts	  and	  tribunals	  lack	  expertise	  on	  the	  CISG;	  this	  makes	  it	  more	  likely	  that	  
CISG	  cases	  will	  be	  governed	  outside	  Asia	  or	  by	  arbitrators	  outside	  Asia.	  This	  will	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continue	  for	  as	  long	  as	  Asia	  lacks	  expertise	  on	  the	  CISG.	  To	  change	  this	  trend,	  more	  
Asian	  countries	  need	  to	  adopt	  the	  CISG.	  For	  the	  time	  being,	  it	  seems	  that	  China	  is	  the	  
only	  country	  in	  Asia	  that	  has	  developed	  expertise	  on	  the	  CISG.530	  
4.9.9	  Promoting	  Arbitration	  
It	  is	  believed	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  CISG	  is	  international	  by	  nature	  makes	  it	  perfect	  for	  
international	  arbitration.	  That	  is	  because	  the	  CISG	  requires	  no	  expertise	  in	  any	  specific	  
national	  law;	  in	  other	  words,	  it	  is	  supranational,	  and	  lawyers	  from	  different	  
jurisdictions	  are	  able	  to	  use	  it.	  If	  two	  signatory	  countries	  (such	  as	  America	  and	  
Singapore)	  enter	  into	  a	  contract	  and	  the	  CISG	  applies	  to	  their	  contract,	  lawyers	  from	  
these	  two	  contracting	  states	  can	  apply	  the	  CISG	  in	  arbitration	  and	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  
hire	  foreign	  lawyers.	  This	  however	  would	  not	  be	  the	  case	  if	  the	  CISG	  did	  not	  govern	  
their	  contract	  and,	  for	  example,	  the	  law	  of	  New	  York	  without	  the	  CISG	  applied.	  In	  such	  
a	  case,	  the	  country	  (in	  this	  case	  Singapore)	  whose	  law	  has	  not	  been	  applied	  would	  
have	  to	  hire	  American	  lawyers	  or	  face	  being	  disadvantaged.	  Therefore,	  in	  order	  to	  
increase	  the	  CISG	  arbitration	  business	  in	  Asia	  or	  any	  other	  part	  of	  the	  world,	  more	  
countries	  have	  to	  adopt	  the	  CISG.531	  
4.9.10	  CISG	  –	  Reduction	  of	  Transaction	  Costs	  
It	  is	  believed	  that	  contracting	  internationally	  is	  normally	  more	  expensive	  than	  
contracting	  domestically.	  This	  is	  because	  coming	  from	  different	  legal	  backgrounds	  
complicates	  the	  conclusion	  of	  a	  contract	  in	  the	  international	  field.	  Parties	  have	  to	  deal	  
with	  the	  law	  that	  applies	  to	  their	  contract.532	  The	  application	  of	  the	  law	  of	  one	  party	  is	  
generally	  agreed,	  and	  the	  other	  party	  consequently	  has	  to	  familiarise	  itself	  with	  the	  
applicable	  legal	  regime,	  which	  obviously	  implies	  a	  process	  of	  learning.533	  With	  this	  in	  
mind,	  it	  seems	  that	  an	  international	  sales	  law	  saves	  on	  the	  costs	  of	  transactions	  for	  
two	  reasons:	  (i)	  that	  there	  would	  be	  no	  question	  mark	  over	  the	  applicable	  law,	  since	  
the	  same	  law	  would	  apply	  to	  the	  whole	  contract	  and	  thus	  the	  costs	  of	  bargaining	  over	  
the	  applicable	  law	  would	  be	  saved	  by	  the	  parties;	  and	  (ii)	  that	  the	  applicable	  law	  would	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be	  part	  of	  their	  domestic	  law.	  Therefore,	  no	  parties	  would	  be	  unfamiliar	  with	  it	  and	  as	  
a	  result	  there	  would	  be	  no	  need	  to	  learn	  it.534	  	  
	  
However,	  in	  the	  end	  it	  is	  the	  parties’	  degree	  of	  legal	  sophistication	  that	  determines	  
how	  international	  sales	  law	  affects	  the	  costs	  of	  a	  transaction.535	  If	  international	  sellers	  
and	  buyers	  are	  unsophisticated	  parties,	  they	  could	  benefit	  from	  the	  CISG	  ex	  post.	  
These	  parties	  are	  not	  worried	  about	  the	  law	  applicable	  to	  their	  contract	  ex	  ante.	  They	  
do	  not	  even	  investigate	  whether	  their	  contract	  will	  be	  enforceable.	  In	  the	  event	  that	  a	  
problem	  arises,	  they	  may	  question	  which	  law	  governs	  their	  contract	  and	  at	  this	  stage	  
seek	  legal	  advice.	  If	  the	  issue	  is	  better	  and	  more	  easily	  resolved	  by	  the	  CISG,	  it	  could	  
then	  be	  advantageous.	  As	  a	  result,	  their	  rights	  under	  this	  legal	  regime	  could	  be	  
determined	  with	  greater	  ease	  and	  a	  higher	  degree	  of	  certainty,	  which	  would	  have	  a	  
positive	  impact	  on	  their	  negotiation	  and	  litigation.	  The	  CISG,	  by	  way	  of	  explanation,	  
increases	  legal	  certainty	  and	  reduces	  the	  costs	  of	  litigation	  and	  pre-­‐litigation.536	  
	  
If	  international	  sellers	  and	  buyers	  are	  sophisticated	  parties,	  they	  bear	  higher	  
transaction	  costs	  when	  concluding	  a	  contract	  in	  an	  international	  context.	  Therefore,	  
the	  harmonisation	  of	  international	  sales	  law	  would	  in	  effect	  avoid	  the	  need	  to	  
negotiate	  over	  the	  applicable	  legal	  regime	  and	  learn	  the	  content	  of	  the	  foreign	  law	  
governing	  the	  contract,	  and	  would	  thus	  reduce	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  transaction.537	  
In	  sum,	  the	  harmonisation	  of	  the	  applicable	  law	  would	  have	  the	  same	  impact	  on	  both	  
groups,	  namely	  saving	  the	  costs	  of	  determining	  the	  governing	  legal	  regime	  and	  
learning	  it.	  
4.9.11	  Building	  an	  International	  Law	  Expertise	  
It	  is	  believed	  that	  understanding	  the	  CISG	  requires	  lawyers	  to	  have	  a	  good	  grounding	  in	  
public	  international	  law.	  The	  ever-­‐growing	  application	  of	  the	  CISG	  establishes	  a	  need	  
for	  lawyers	  in	  private	  commercial	  practice	  to	  stay	  familiar	  with	  the	  basic	  principles	  of	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  Gilles	  Cuniberti,	  ‘Is	  the	  CISG	  benefiting	  anybody?’	  (2006)	  39	  Vanderbilt	  Journal	  of	  Transnational	  Law	  
1.	  <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1045121>	  accessed	  3	  August	  2013.	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public	  international	  law.	  This	  is	  of	  great	  importance	  to	  them,	  as	  the	  number	  of	  
commercial	  matters	  being	  governed	  by	  international	  treaties	  is	  growing.538	  	  
4.9.12	  Summary:	  The	  Iranian	  Situation	  
The	  arguments	  put	  forward	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  CISG’s	  protection	  of	  national	  sovereignty	  
are	  overwhelmingly	  in	  favour	  of	  its	  adoption.	  This	  issue	  is	  of	  great	  importance	  for	  Iran.	  
The	  flexibility	  that	  the	  CISG	  offers	  enables	  Iran	  to	  contract	  out	  of	  it	  or	  limit	  application	  
of	  parts	  of	  it.	  It	  is	  however	  noteworthy	  that	  no	  provision	  of	  the	  CISG	  allows	  
reservations	  concerning	  Article	  78	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  duty	  to	  pay	  interest.	  This	  will	  be	  
discussed	  in	  more	  depth	  in	  chapter	  seven,	  but	  suffice	  it	  to	  say	  that	  Article	  78	  of	  the	  
CISG	  does	  not	  contradict	  the	  principles	  and	  fundamental	  values	  of	  Iranian	  law	  and	  
Islam.539	  	  
	  
As	  discussed	  in	  chapters	  two	  and	  three,	  the	  CISG	  was	  finally	  adopted	  following	  a	  series	  
of	  participative	  processes,	  and	  representatives	  from	  developed	  and	  developing	  nations	  
had	  their	  say	  during	  the	  drafting	  process.	  Although	  Iran	  did	  not	  participate	  during	  the	  
drafting	  of	  the	  CISG,	  some	  developing	  and	  Muslim	  countries	  did	  reflect	  their	  views	  and	  
concerns,	  and	  therefore	  Iran	  was	  able	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  its	  concerns	  were	  taken	  on	  
board.	  Besides,	  the	  CISG	  has	  now	  achieved	  a	  high	  rate	  of	  acceptance	  throughout	  the	  
world.	  This	  may	  foster	  friendlier	  relations	  between	  Iranian	  traders	  and	  their	  trading	  
partners.	  In	  the	  event	  that	  Iran	  adopts	  the	  CISG,	  owing	  to	  its	  religious	  ties	  with	  Muslim	  
states	  other	  countries	  in	  the	  region	  may	  be	  encouraged	  to	  adopt	  the	  CISG	  because	  
they	  will	  realise	  that	  the	  CISG	  does	  not	  pose	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  principles	  and	  fundamental	  
values	  of	  Islam.	  If	  this	  happens,	  Iran,	  along	  with	  other	  countries	  in	  the	  region,	  can	  
contribute	  to	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  CISG,	  which	  for	  the	  time	  being	  is	  non-­‐existent.	  	  
Besides,	  if	  the	  CISG	  were	  adopted,	  more	  comparative	  study	  of	  contract	  and	  sales	  law	  
would	  take	  place	  in	  Iran’s	  law	  schools	  and	  law	  firms,	  which	  would	  ultimately	  lead	  to	  
promotion	  of	  the	  CISG	  within	  the	  courts	  and	  tribunals	  of	  Iran.	  Iran	  can	  gain	  the	  
expertise	  needed	  on	  the	  CISG,	  which	  may	  be	  useful	  for	  the	  promotion	  of	  arbitration	  in	  
the	  region	  or	  in	  Iran	  itself.	  Eventually,	  if	  Iran	  decides	  to	  reform	  its	  domestic	  law	  in	  this	  
field,	  this	  will	  take	  place	  more	  maturely	  and	  effectively.	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  Bell,	  ‘Harmonisation	  of	  Contract	  Law	  in	  Asia’	  (n	  511).	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  Text	  to	  n(s)	  651	  and	  652	  in	  ch	  7.	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4.10	  Conclusion	  
This	  chapter	  has	  aimed	  to	  analyse	  the	  reasons	  for	  and	  against	  adoption	  of	  the	  CISG	  
primarily	  by	  developing	  countries,	  with	  particular	  attention	  to	  the	  situation	  in	  Iran.	  The	  
study	  shows	  that	  the	  case	  for	  ratification	  dominates	  the	  case	  against	  ratification.	  As	  a	  
commentator	  once	  stated:540	  
	  
in	  this	  age	  of	  global	  commerce	  seemingly	  routine	  transactions	  are	  subject	  to	  the	  
CISG.	  The	  general	  practitioner	  must	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  CISG	  and	  the	  significant	  
changes	  it	  brings	  to	  sales	  law.	  
	  
Ignoring	  the	  CISG	  is	  no	  longer	  an	  option	  for	  Iran	  and	  other	  developing	  countries.	  Iran	  
should	  pay	  careful	  attention	  to	  the	  positive	  global	  movement	  towards	  the	  CISG.	  The	  
fear	  that	  the	  CISG	  may	  result	  in	  uncertainty	  is	  outweighed	  by	  the	  greater	  uncertainty	  
that	  arises	  from	  the	  application	  of	  foreign	  law.	  The	  fact	  that	  certain	  terms	  are	  not	  yet	  
well	  defined	  does	  not	  justify	  non-­‐ratification.	  Definitions	  are	  being	  developed,	  and	  this	  
process	  requires	  all-­‐embracing	  contribution.	  	  
	  
The	  CISG	  has	  met	  with	  widespread	  acceptance	  from	  both	  developed	  and	  developing	  
countries.	  This	  includes	  commercial	  communities	  that	  apply	  its	  provisions	  in	  their	  
trading	  contracts.	  As	  well	  as	  international	  unification,	  ratification	  of	  the	  CISG	  would	  in	  
certain	  instances	  bring	  regional	  harmonisation.	  This	  would	  be	  of	  great	  value	  to	  Iran,	  
since	  it	  might	  encourage	  other	  countries	  in	  the	  region	  to	  ratify	  the	  CISG	  and	  would	  
thus	  establish	  a	  unified	  body	  of	  law	  that	  would	  form	  the	  basis	  for	  smoother	  trade	  
among	  the	  member	  states	  of	  the	  region	  as	  well	  as	  around	  the	  globe.	  While	  the	  
Incoterms	  are	  recognised	  in	  Iran,	  it	  is	  important	  that	  Iran	  adopts	  the	  CISG	  to	  complete	  
the	  unifying	  effort.	  The	  benefits	  of	  ratifying	  the	  CISG	  far	  outweigh	  the	  drawbacks.	  
Therefore,	  it	  is	  true	  to	  say	  that	  the	  case	  for	  adopting	  the	  CISG	  in	  Iran	  remains	  strong.	  
Owing	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  UK	  is	  the	  major	  trading	  state,	  which	  has	  resisted	  ratification,	  it	  
will	  thus	  be	  useful	  to	  investigate	  the	  reasons	  put	  forward	  by	  the	  UK	  in	  order	  to	  
determine	  whether	  or	  not	  Iran	  should	  hold	  back	  on	  account	  of	  those	  reasons.	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  Harry	  M	  Flechtner,	  ‘Another	  CISG	  Case	  in	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  Journal	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  127,	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Chapter	  Five	  
Comparative	  Study:	  The	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  the	  CISG:	  Should	  
Iran	  Hold	  Back	  on	  Account	  of	  Reasons	  Put	  Forward	  by	  the	  UK?	  
5.1	  Introduction	  	  
For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  paper	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  consider	  the	  position	  of	  the	  UK	  with	  
regard	  to	  the	  CISG.	  The	  debate	  in	  the	  UK	  is	  worth	  following	  because	  it	  has	  considered	  
the	  CISG	  carefully,	  and	  yet	  has	  failed	  to	  ratify	  it.	  By	  contrast,	  other	  non-­‐ratifying	  states	  
have	  not	  examined	  the	  CISG	  as	  closely.	  This	  study	  also	  matters	  because	  legal	  
developments	  in	  the	  UK	  might	  be	  followed	  by	  other	  specific	  jurisdictions,	  in	  such	  a	  way	  
that	  the	  UK’s	  position	  regarding	  the	  CISG	  may	  prevent	  these	  countries	  from	  adopting	  
the	  Convention	  (see	  appendix	  A).541	  It	  is	  therefore	  worth	  asking	  if	  any	  of	  the	  
arguments	  made	  regarding	  the	  ratification	  of	  the	  CISG	  by	  the	  UK	  would	  apply	  to	  Iran.	  It	  
will	  be	  argued	  that	  even	  if	  the	  UK’s	  failure	  to	  ratify	  the	  CISG	  can	  be	  justified,	  the	  same	  
justification	  would	  not	  apply	  to	  Iran.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  from	  the	  outset	  that	  although	  
there	  are	  economic	  justifications	  for	  the	  UK’s	  non-­‐ratification,	  Iran	  is	  not	  in	  a	  
comparable	  position.	  There	  are	  no	  economic	  advantages	  for	  Iran	  in	  maintaining	  its	  
domestic	  law	  for	  international	  matters.	  It	  should	  also	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  that	  the	  
UK	  intends	  to	  ratify	  the	  CISG	  when	  legislative	  priority	  allows.542	  Although	  a	  decision	  
has	  been	  made	  to	  ratify	  it,	  there	  is	  still	  considerable	  confusion	  in	  the	  UK,	  as	  it	  seems	  
that	  the	  reasons	  given	  for	  non-­‐ratification	  are	  strongly	  supported	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  
government’s	  decision	  to	  go	  ahead.	  	  
	  
In	  this	  chapter,	  the	  author	  will	  first	  examine	  the	  debate	  on	  the	  UK’s	  position	  on	  and	  
approach	  towards	  the	  CISG,	  and	  then	  demonstrate	  how	  the	  arguments	  made	  by	  the	  
UK	  against	  the	  CISG	  would	  not	  apply	  to	  Iran.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
541	  In	  July	  2011,	  the	  writer	  sought	  Professor	  Castellani’s	  (UNCITRAL	  Legal	  Officer)	  opinion	  on	  the	  
question	  of	  why	  developing	  nations	  have	  been	  much	  more	  reluctant	  to	  ratify	  the	  CISG	  than	  the	  
developed	  nations.	  His	  response	  to	  this	  inquiry	  reveals	  that	  it	  is	  partly	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  ‘	  .	  .	  .	  certain	  
jurisdictions	  might	  closely	  follow	  legal	  developments	  in	  England	  and	  therefore	  be	  prevented	  from	  
adopting	  the	  CISG	  by	  the	  position	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  with	  respect	  to	  that	  text.’	  
Email	  from	  Luca	  Castellani	  to	  author	  (5	  July	  2011).	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5.2	  The	  United	  Kingdom’s	  Approach	  to	  and	  Decision	  on	  Non-­‐Ratification	  
of	  the	  CISG	  	  
Non-­‐ratification	  of	  the	  CISG	  by	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  seems	  to	  be	  just	  ‘another	  case	  of	  
splendid	  isolation.’543	  However,	  ratification	  of	  the	  CISG	  in	  its	  entirety	  has	  been	  finally	  
decided.544	  The	  author	  will	  therefore	  consider	  the	  reasons	  for	  and	  against	  its	  adoption	  
in	  more	  depth.	  	  
5.2.1	  The	  Reasons	  Against	  Adoption	  	  
There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  arguments	  being	  put	  forward	  against	  ratification	  of	  the	  CISG	  
and	  its	  incorporation	  into	  English	  law.	  First	  of	  all,	  it	  is	  held	  that	  the	  UK	  is	  unfamiliar	  
with	  many	  rights	  and	  legal	  principles	  being	  introduced	  in	  the	  CISG.	  This	  includes	  the	  
right	  to	  cure	  after	  the	  fixed	  timed	  for	  performance,	  the	  right	  to	  reduce	  the	  price	  when	  
the	  goods	  delivered	  are	  not	  in	  conformity,	  and	  also	  the	  notion	  of	  fundamental	  breach.	  
Secondly,	  the	  popularity	  of	  the	  English	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  Act	  1979	  is	  said	  to	  be	  another	  
reason.	  Many	  contracts	  choose	  English	  law	  as	  the	  applicable	  law	  even	  when	  the	  
contracting	  parties	  are	  not	  from	  the	  UK.545	  English	  commercial	  law	  has	  achieved	  world	  
renown.	  The	  statistics	  show	  that,	  in	  at	  least	  50%	  of	  cases	  brought	  before	  the	  English	  
Commercial	  Court,	  one	  party	  is	  non-­‐British,	  and	  in	  30%	  of	  cases	  neither	  party	  is	  
British.546	  Therefore,	  by	  adopting	  the	  CISG,	  the	  UK	  may	  witness	  a	  ‘reduction	  in	  the	  
number	  of	  international	  arbitrations	  coming	  into	  the	  UK’547	  because	  of	  the	  likelihood	  
of	  the	  diminishing	  or	  weakening	  of	  the	  role	  of	  English	  law548	  in	  settling	  disputes	  in	  
international	  commerce.	  Thirdly,	  it	  was	  held	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  CISG	  may	  be	  interpreted	  
and	  applied	  differently	  by	  different	  courts	  would	  result	  in	  non-­‐uniformity	  of	  
application.	  Fourthly,	  it	  was	  stated	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  CISG	  allows	  commercial	  
traders	  to	  opt	  out	  of	  its	  application	  could	  have	  an	  adverse	  effect	  on	  its	  efficiency.	  
Fifthly,	  since	  issues	  such	  as	  contractual	  validity	  and	  the	  passing	  of	  property	  fall	  outside	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
543	  Nicholas,	  ‘The	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  the	  Vienna	  Sales	  Convention’	  (n	  35).	  	  
544	  Department	  of	  Trade	  and	  Industry,	  ‘Report	  to	  the	  House	  of	  Commons’	  (House	  of	  Commons	  Library,	  
Great	  Britain).	  The	  CISG	  is	  yet	  to	  be	  ratified.	  
545	  Nicholas,	  ‘The	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  the	  Vienna	  Sales	  Convention’	  (n	  35).	  	  
546	  Williams,	  ‘Forecasting	  the	  Potential	  Impact	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Sales	  Convention’	  (n	  2).	  
547	  Forte,	  ‘Reason	  or	  Unreason	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom’	  (n	  37)	  57.	  
548	  Ahmad	  Azzouni,	  ‘The	  Adoption	  of	  the	  1980	  Convention	  on	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  by	  the	  
United	  Kingdom’	  (2002)	  PACE	  Law	  School	  Institute	  of	  International	  Commercial	  Law.	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the	  scope	  of	  the	  CISG,	  the	  Convention	  is	  thus	  a	  non-­‐comprehensive	  code.549	  Sixthly,	  
international	  conventions	  such	  as	  the	  CISG	  are	  ‘multi-­‐cultural	  compromises	  between	  
different	  schemes	  of	  law,	  which	  .	  .	  .	  introduce	  uncertainty	  where	  no	  uncertainty	  
existed	  before’	  and	  also	  ‘lack	  coherence	  and	  consistency.’550	  	  
	  
Such	  was	  the	  reasoning	  put	  forward	  to	  oppose	  adoption	  of	  the	  CISG.	  However,	  the	  UK	  
has	  been	  criticised	  for	  its	  reluctance	  to	  ratify	  the	  CISG.	  In	  addition	  to	  these	  arguments,	  
two	  central	  principles	  of	  the	  CISG	  are	  put	  forward	  against	  ratification:	  (i)	  in	  the	  event	  
of	  breach	  of	  contract,	  the	  CISG	  tries	  to	  continue	  with	  the	  contract	  if	  possible;	  (ii)	  when	  
there	  are	  gaps	  in	  law,	  the	  CISG	  tries	  to	  fill	  in	  such	  gaps	  in	  order	  to	  assist	  the	  progress	  of	  
trade.	  These	  two	  principles	  should	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  when	  other	  differences	  
between	  English	  law	  and	  the	  CISG	  are	  considered.	  Moreover,	  The	  CISG	  was	  drafted	  on	  
a	  different	  basis,551	  and	  fails	  to	  meet	  ‘English	  standards	  of	  precision	  and	  drafting.’	  The	  
general	  rules	  that	  the	  CISG	  offers	  are	  required	  to	  meet	  the	  needs	  of	  all	  parties	  
participating,	  whereas	  English	  law	  approaches	  it	  differently	  and	  provides	  ‘concrete	  
solutions	  to	  specific	  problems.’	  Such	  a	  drafting	  style,	  aiming	  at	  general	  principles,	  
allows	  for	  a	  more	  subjective	  approach	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  interpretation	  of	  
contracts.	  But	  the	  English	  courts	  have	  a	  different	  view,	  as	  they	  tend	  to	  be	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  
more	  objective	  interpretation.	  A	  subjective	  interpretation	  is	  provided	  through	  Article	  
8(3)	  of	  the	  CISG,	  but	  this	  is	  allowed	  only	  when	  Article	  8(1)	  does	  not	  succeed	  in	  
providing	  a	  solution.552	  Therefore,	  in	  any	  interpretation	  of	  the	  intention	  of	  parties,	  the	  
written	  agreement	  will	  be	  very	  influential.	  	  
	  
Documentary	  sales	  are	  also	  another	  source	  of	  difference.	  Article	  9	  of	  the	  CISG	  takes	  
into	  account	  two	  conditions:	  
	  
(1)	  The	  parties	  are	  bound	  by	  any	  usage	  to	  which	  they	  have	  agreed	  and	  by	  any	  
practices	  which	  they	  have	  established	  between	  themselves.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
549	  Nicholas,	  ‘The	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  the	  Vienna	  Sales	  Convention’	  (n	  35);	  Williams,	  ‘Forecasting	  the	  
Potential	  Impact	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Sales	  Convention’	  (n	  2).	  
550	  Hobhouse,	  ‘International	  Conventions	  and	  Commercial	  Law’	  (n	  27)	  533;	  See	  John	  Linarelli,	  ‘The	  
Economics	  of	  Uniform	  Laws	  and	  Uniform	  Lawmaking’	  (2003)	  48	  WAYNE	  Law	  Review	  1387.	  
551	  Williams,	  ‘Forecasting	  the	  Potential	  Impact	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Sales	  Convention’	  (n	  2).	  
552	  Article	  8(1)	  of	  the	  CISG	  states	  (n	  17).	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(2)	  The	  parties	  are	  considered,	  unless	  otherwise	  agreed,	  to	  have	  impliedly	  made	  
applicable	  to	  their	  contract	  or	  its	  formation	  a	  usage	  of	  which	  the	  parties	  knew	  or	  
ought	  to	  have	  known	  and	  which	  in	  international	  trade	  is	  widely	  known	  to,	  and	  
regularly	  observed	  by,	  parties	  to	  contracts	  of	  the	  type	  involved	  in	  the	  particular	  
trade	  concerned.	  
	  
It	  is	  argued	  that	  the	  CISG	  is	  not	  well	  designed	  for	  documentary	  sales,	  since	  there	  is	  no	  
allusion	  to	  them	  and	  the	  significance	  given	  to	  non-­‐conforming	  documents	  is	  not	  as	  
important	  as	  the	  common	  law.553	  It	  is	  also	  said	  that	  standard	  forms	  of	  documentary	  
sales	  are	  not	  sufficiently	  protected	  by	  the	  CISG	  and	  standard	  business	  terms	  are	  not	  
protected	  either	  in	  Article	  9.	  One	  could	  however	  argue	  that	  the	  CISG	  is	  not	  designed	  to	  
deal	  with	  all	  types	  of	  contract	  or	  goods,	  and	  that	  its	  focus	  is	  to	  detect	  the	  intention	  of	  
the	  parties	  in	  their	  agreement	  by	  including	  common	  terms	  of	  trading.	  
	  
It	  was	  also	  claimed	  that	  the	  CISG	  is	  not	  as	  suitable	  as	  the	  English	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  Act	  
when	  it	  comes	  to	  commodity	  sales.	  That	  is	  because,	  under	  the	  CISG,	  avoidance	  is	  not	  
easily	  permitted	  in	  the	  case	  of	  non-­‐conforming	  goods	  and	  documents.554	  Under	  the	  
CISG,	  it	  is	  a	  fundamental	  breach,	  which	  gives	  way	  to	  avoidance	  of	  contract,	  whereas	  
under	  the	  English	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  Act	  non-­‐conformity	  gives	  way	  to	  termination	  of	  the	  
contract,	  as	  it	  is	  considered	  a	  breach	  of	  condition.555	  	  
	  
Another	  source	  of	  difference	  was	  how	  to	  interpret	  the	  CISG.556	  In	  accordance	  with	  
Article	  7(1),	  in	  interpretation	  of	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  CISG,	  regard	  has	  to	  be	  given	  to	  its	  
international	  character	  and	  to	  the	  promotion	  of	  uniformity	  in	  its	  application.	  It	  also	  
requires	  observance	  of	  good	  faith	  in	  the	  interpretation	  of	  international	  trade.557	  This	  
does	  not,	  however,	  apply	  to	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  contract.558	  It	  is	  also	  expected	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
553	  Williams,	  ‘Forecasting	  the	  Potential	  Impact	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Sales	  Convention’	  (n	  2).	  
554	  Michael	  Bridge,	  ‘A	  Law	  for	  International	  Sales’	  (2007)	  37	  Hong	  Kong	  Law	  Journal	  17,	  35;	  Alastair	  
Mullis,	  ‘Twenty-­‐Five	  Years	  On	  –	  The	  United	  Kingdom,	  Damages	  and	  the	  Vienna	  Sales	  Convention’	  (2007)	  
71	  Rabels	  Zeitschrift	  für	  ausländisches	  und	  internationales	  Privatrecht	  35;	  Hofmann,	  ‘Interpretation	  
Rules	  and	  Good	  Faith	  as	  Obstacles	  to	  the	  UK’s	  Ratification	  of	  the	  CISG’	  (n	  35).	  
555	  Hofmann,	  ibid.	  
556	  ibid.	  
557	  Article	  7	  of	  the	  CISG.	  
558	  There	  have	  been	  number	  of	  cases	  that	  have	  applied	  the	  principle	  of	  good	  faith	  to	  the	  performance	  of	  
the	  contract.	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courts	  have	  an	  understanding	  of	  and	  take	  into	  account	  the	  decisions	  submitted	  by	  
other	  foreign	  courts.559	  English	  courts	  might	  be	  able	  to	  accustom	  themselves	  to	  such	  
methods	  of	  interpretation.	  In	  Fothergill	  v	  Monarch	  Airlines	  Ltd,	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  held	  
that	  the	  traditional	  ‘plain	  meaning’	  approach	  in	  interpretation	  must	  accept	  the	  more	  
flexible	  approach	  adopted	  by	  other	  parties	  to	  the	  Convention.560	  	  
	  
In	  October	  1997,	  a	  consultation	  document	  was	  published	  by	  the	  Department	  of	  Trade	  
and	  Industry	  (DTI)	  in	  favour	  of	  adoption	  of	  the	  CISG.	  The	  document	  identified	  that	  the	  
CISG	  was	  now	  more	  widely	  accepted.	  It	  stated	  that:561	  
	  
	  .	  .	  .	  the	  UK	  is	  becoming	  increasingly	  isolated	  within	  the	  international	  trading	  
community	  in	  not	  having	  ratified	  the	  convention.	  We	  judge	  the	  time	  is	  right	  
therefore	  to	  consider	  again	  whether	  our	  international	  traders	  are	  at	  a	  
disadvantage	  because	  the	  UK	  is	  not	  party	  to	  the	  convention	  and	  therefore	  does	  
not	  have	  access	  to	  a	  law	  which	  was	  drafted	  specifically	  for	  international	  sales	  in	  
the	  modern	  world.	  Ratification	  would	  also	  enable	  our	  courts	  to	  contribute	  
towards	  the	  interpretation	  and	  development	  of	  the	  convention,	  which	  is	  taking	  
place	  at	  the	  moment	  without	  our	  participation.	  
	  
The	  document	  asked	  for	  views	  on	  whether	  the	  CISG	  should	  be	  adopted;	  however,	  the	  
responses	  received	  were	  underwhelming.562	  They	  revealed	  a	  considerable	  lack	  of	  
interest.	  The	  Law	  Reform	  Committee	  of	  the	  Law	  Society	  of	  England	  and	  Wales	  
expressed	  a	  negative	  vision	  and	  suggested	  non-­‐ratification.563	  The	  Committee	  decided	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
France	  22	  February	  1995	  Appellate	  Court	  Grenoble.	  
<	  http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cases/950222f1.html>	  accessed	  5	  August	  2013;	  
Mushrooms	  case	  
Hungary	  17	  November	  1995	  Budapest	  Arbitration	  proceeding	  Vb	  94124.	  	  
<	  http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cases/951117h1.html>	  accessed	  5	  August	  2013;	  	  
Rolled	  metal	  sheets	  case	  	  
Austria	  15	  June	  1994	  Vienna	  Arbitration	  proceeding	  SCH-­‐4318.	  
<http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cases/940615a4.html>	  accessed	  5	  August	  2013;	  
Renard	  Constructions	  v	  Minister	  for	  Public	  Works	  
Australia	  12	  March	  1992,	  Appellate	  Court	  New	  South	  Wales.	  	  
<http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cases/920312a2.html>	  accessed	  5	  August	  2013.	  
559	  Flechtner,	  ‘Another	  CISG	  Case	  in	  the	  US	  Courts’	  (n	  540).	  
560	  [1980]	  3	  WLR	  209	  (HL).	  
561	  Department	  of	  Trade	  and	  Industry,	  ‘United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  
Sale	  of	  Goods	  (the	  Vienna	  Convention):	  A	  Consultation	  Document’	  (1997).	  <http://www.dti.gov.uk>	  
562	  Moss,	  ‘Why	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  Has	  Not	  Ratified	  the	  CISG’	  (n	  22).	  
563	  The	  Law	  Reform	  Committee	  firstly	  held	  that:	  
150	  
that,	  in	  the	  event	  of	  the	  UK	  deciding	  to	  ratify	  the	  CISG,	  it	  should	  make	  reservations	  
under	  Articles	  94	  and	  95.564	  Under	  Article	  94,	  the	  CISG	  would	  not	  be	  applicable	  to	  
contracts	  being	  made	  between	  a	  party	  whose	  place	  of	  business	  is	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  a	  party	  
whose	  place	  of	  business	  is	  either	  in	  another	  contracting	  state	  or	  in	  a	  non-­‐contracting	  
state,	  considering	  both	  states	  have	  the	  same	  or	  similar	  rules	  to	  those	  found	  in	  the	  
Convention.	  Under	  Article	  95	  of	  the	  CISG,	  the	  application	  of	  the	  CISG	  under	  its	  Article	  
1(1)(b)	  is	  not	  permitted.	  The	  responses	  and	  recommendations	  were	  poor	  and	  mainly	  
negative;	  therefore,	  it	  is	  expected	  that	  the	  UK	  will	  ratify	  the	  CISG	  only	  if	  ‘parliamentary	  
time	  allows.’565	  The	  UK’s	  failure	  to	  ratify	  the	  CISG	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  harm	  its	  national	  
economy,	  so	  ratification	  is	  not	  seen	  as	  a	  high	  priority.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  UK	  apparently	  
intends	  to	  ratify	  the	  CISG,	  depending	  on	  legislative	  priority.566	  	  
	  
Adoption	  of	  the	  CISG	  in	  the	  UK	  is	  still	  pending,	  awaiting	  the	  availability	  of	  
parliamentary	  time.	  Other	  trading	  states,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  are	  applying	  the	  CISG	  and	  
contributing	  to	  its	  interpretation.	  It	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  most	  of	  the	  European	  states	  
along	  with	  major	  world	  trading	  nations	  such	  as	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America,	  China	  
and	  Japan	  are	  now	  contracting	  states	  to	  the	  CISG.	  It	  does	  not	  however	  stop	  here,	  as	  
the	  CISG	  may	  be	  applied	  and	  interpreted	  by	  English	  courts	  if	  parties	  to	  a	  contract	  have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
On	  the	  merits	  of	  the	  revised	  uniform	  law	  adopted	  in	  the	  1980	  Convention,	  we	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  
exaggerate	  the	  differences	  from	  the	  provisions	  of	  UK	  law	  (the	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  Act).	  There	  are,	  
however,	  certain	  differences	  which	  are	  not	  altogether	  insignificant	  and	  we	  think	  they	  are	  not	  
such	  as	  to	  make	  the	  uniform	  law	  more	  attractive	  to	  traders	  than	  the	  existing	  UK	  law.	  Moreover	  
they	  have	  the	  inherent	  disadvantage	  that	  even	  slight	  changes	  of	  wording	  from	  that	  in	  the	  Sale	  of	  
Goods	  Act	  result	  in	  losing	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  certainty	  conferred	  by	  long	  established	  case	  law	  on	  
the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Act.	  	  
Law	  Reform	  Committee	  Report,	  para	  4.	  
The	  Law	  Reform	  Committee	  secondly	  stated	  that:	  	  
If	  the	  Convention	  were	  ratified	  by	  the	  UK	  and	  .	  .	  .	  came	  to	  be	  widely	  applied	  to	  international	  
sales,	  with	  or	  without	  a	  connection	  with	  this	  country,	  the	  role	  of	  English	  law	  in	  the	  settlement	  of	  
international	  trading	  matters	  would	  obviously	  be	  diminished.	  A	  consequential	  effect	  might	  well	  
be	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  number	  of	  international	  arbitrations	  coming	  to	  this	  country.	  
Law	  Reform	  Committee	  Report,	  para	  8.	  
564	  Law	  Reform	  Committee	  Report,	  para	  10.	  
565	  Moss,	  ‘Why	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  Has	  Not	  Ratified	  the	  CISG’	  (n	  22).	  	  
566	  Department	  of	  Trade	  and	  Industry,	  ‘United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  
Sale	  of	  Goods’	  (n	  561).	  	  
The	  UK	  has	  decided	  to	  ratify	  the	  CISG	  in	  its	  entirety	  without	  making	  a	  declaration	  like	  the	  USA	  to	  
limit	  the	  application	  of	  the	  CISG	  to	  other	  contracting	  States.	  Fifteen	  out	  of	  the	  thirty-­‐five	  replies	  
to	  the	  DTI	  Consultation	  Paper	  in	  1997	  suggested	  that	  the	  UK	  model	  the	  USA.	  However,	  such	  an	  
approach	  would	  indicate	  that	  that	  the	  UK	  is	  not	  committed	  to	  objectives	  of	  the	  CISG.	  Legal	  
organisations	  such	  as	  the	  Law	  Society	  and	  the	  Commercial	  Bar	  Association	  opposed	  ratification.	  
They	  agreed	  however	  that	  if	  the	  UK	  did	  ratify	  the	  Convention	  that	  no	  declaration	  should	  be	  made	  
to	  limit	  the	  application	  of	  the	  CISG	  to	  contracts	  with	  other	  States,	  because	  the	  act	  of	  ratification	  
would	  make	  the	  CISG	  a	  part	  of	  English	  law	  anyway.	  	  
151	  
decided	  to	  apply	  it,	  or	  if	  it	  is	  applied	  because	  the	  rule	  of	  private	  international	  law	  
demands	  application	  of	  the	  law	  of	  a	  party	  from	  a	  contracting	  state.	  	  
5.2.2	  The	  Reasons	  in	  Favour	  of	  Adoption	  
The	  UK	  has	  modified	  its	  position	  with	  regard	  to	  ratification	  of	  the	  CISG.	  The	  CISG	  is	  no	  
longer	  seen	  as	  an	  ill-­‐drafted	  code	  with	  minor	  benefits;	  rather,	  it	  is	  seen	  as	  an	  
instrument	  designed	  to	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  law	  of	  international	  trade.567	  It	  is	  
believed	  that	  the	  CISG	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  make	  English	  law	  and	  English	  courts	  more	  
profitable	  and	  popular.	  The	  English	  Commercial	  Court	  is	  reputed	  throughout	  the	  world	  
for	  its	  realistic	  and	  efficient	  approach	  to	  and	  understanding	  of	  business	  issues.	  English	  
judges	  are	  highly	  experienced	  and	  competent.568	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  only	  upon	  ratification	  
that	  the	  knowledge	  and	  reputation	  of	  English	  lawyers	  and	  the	  English	  Commercial	  
Court	  can	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  the	  interpretation	  and	  application	  of	  the	  CISG.569	  	  
	  
The	  main	  argument	  put	  forward	  for	  ratification	  is	  that	  ratification	  will	  have	  a	  positive	  
influence	  on	  the	  number	  of	  parties	  that	  choose	  London	  for	  the	  resolution	  of	  their	  
dispute.570	  It	  is	  further	  suggested	  that,	  owing	  to	  ever-­‐growing	  competition	  in	  the	  
arbitration	  sector,	  it	  is	  necessary	  for	  London	  to	  present	  the	  full	  range	  of	  legal	  services	  
offered	  in	  other	  places.	  	  
	  
The	  second	  argument	  in	  favour	  states	  that	  English	  law	  and	  the	  CISG	  are	  similar	  in	  many	  
ways.571	  There	  are	  difficulties,	  but	  they	  are	  surmountable.	  When	  the	  UK	  ratifies	  the	  
CISG,	  parties	  should	  be	  able	  to	  apply	  the	  CISG	  with	  the	  choice	  of	  English	  law	  and	  
English	  courts	  as	  the	  centre	  for	  resolving	  their	  dispute,	  as	  long	  as	  they	  are	  not	  
prevented	  by	  legal	  costs.	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  if	  English	  law	  works	  in	  conjunction	  
with	  the	  CISG	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  it	  fills	  in	  the	  aspects	  that	  the	  CISG	  does	  not	  cover	  and	  
English	  courts	  are	  elected	  as	  the	  centre	  for	  reaching	  resolution,	  the	  principle	  of	  
certainty	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  maintained	  by	  English	  courts.572	  Under	  such	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  Williams,	  ‘Forecasting	  the	  Potential	  Impact	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Sales	  Convention’	  (n	  2).	  
568	  Derek	  Wheatley,	  ‘Why	  I	  Oppose	  the	  Wind	  of	  Change’	  (1990)	  The	  Times	  (UK)	  31.	  
569	  Nicholas,	  ‘The	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  the	  Vienna	  Sales	  Convention’	  (n	  35).	  
570	  The	  Law	  Society,	  ‘1980	  Convention	  of	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods,	  Comments	  by	  
the	  Council's	  Law	  Reform	  Committee’	  (April	  1981).	  
571	  Williams,	  ‘Forecasting	  the	  Potential	  Impact	  of	  the	  Vienna	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circumstances,	  Commercial	  Court	  judges	  can	  make	  sure	  that	  established	  trade	  terms	  
such	  as	  ‘fob’	  and	  ‘cif’	  are	  operative	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  conflicting	  provisions	  of	  the	  CISG.	  	  
Another	  point	  in	  favour	  of	  ratification	  is	  that,	  after	  ratification	  of	  the	  CISG,	  the	  English	  
courts	  would	  be	  able	  to	  contribute	  to	  its	  development	  and	  to	  provide	  authority	  that	  
other	  states	  can	  rely	  on.573	  On	  top	  of	  that,	  ratification	  of	  the	  CISG	  would	  be	  beneficial	  
to	  traders	  and	  in	  particular	  to	  small	  traders,	  who	  suffer	  from	  insufficient	  bargaining	  
power	  to	  apply	  their	  own	  choice	  of	  law,	  in	  this	  case	  English	  law.	  The	  problems	  and	  high	  
costs	  that	  exist	  under	  a	  foreign	  legal	  system	  would	  be	  avoided	  by	  application	  of	  the	  
CISG.	  The	  CISG	  as	  a	  neutral	  set	  of	  codes	  would	  open	  up	  more	  potential	  markets	  to	  UK	  
traders,	  which	  might	  be	  of	  especial	  significance	  for	  small	  traders,	  who	  cannot	  afford	  to	  
have	  subsidiaries	  in	  foreign	  countries	  and	  need	  more	  global	  opportunities.	  In	  addition,	  
as	  Professor	  Castellani	  has	  stated,	  ‘	  .	  .	  .	  small	  and	  medium-­‐sized	  enterprises	  .	  .	  .	  have	  
limited	  access	  to	  expert	  legal	  advice	  when	  drafting	  their	  contracts	  and	  little	  influence	  
on	  the	  choice	  of	  the	  law	  applicable	  to	  the	  contract,	  [so]	  they	  would	  take	  advantage	  
correspondingly	  from	  the	  application	  of	  the	  CISG.’574	  
	  
A	  consultative	  document575	  that	  was	  issued	  by	  the	  Department	  of	  Trade	  and	  Industry	  
in	  1989	  enumerated	  the	  likely	  benefits	  that	  adherence	  to	  the	  CISG	  might	  bring:	  (i)	  it	  
might	  achieve	  uniformity	  in	  international	  trade	  law,	  and	  the	  neutral	  rules	  of	  the	  CISG	  
would	  be	  the	  bedrock	  for	  creating	  contracts576;	  (ii)	  the	  need	  to	  determine	  the	  proper	  
law	  of	  a	  contract,	  which	  is	  often	  expensive	  and	  time-­‐consuming,	  might	  be	  reduced	  by	  
the	  application	  of	  this	  uniform	  law;577	  and	  (iii)	  resolving	  disputes	  that	  have	  arisen	  
under	  the	  CISG	  may	  be	  beneficial	  to	  the	  UK’s	  court	  arbitrators	  and	  the	  CISG’s	  
jurisprudence	  could	  be	  developed	  by	  their	  participation.578	  Some	  of	  these	  points	  have	  
been	  stated	  earlier.	  Ratification	  of	  the	  CISG	  was,	  interestingly,	  supported	  by	  both	  Law	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Societies	  along	  with	  the	  Commercial	  Law	  Sub-­‐Committee	  of	  the	  City	  of	  London	  Law	  
Society.579	  
	  
It	  seems	  that	  economic	  and	  political	  reasons	  are	  the	  driving	  forces	  encouraging	  the	  
ratification	  of	  the	  CISG,	  but,	  having	  said	  that,	  the	  remedial	  differences	  that	  exist	  
between	  the	  CISG	  and	  English	  law	  require	  more	  scrutiny.	  
5.3	  Should	  Iran	  Hold	  Back	  on	  Account	  of	  Reasons	  Put	  Forward	  by	  the	  
UK?	  
Iran	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  are	  similar	  in	  that	  both	  countries	  are	  bound	  to	  be	  
concerned	  by	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  transformation	  in	  law.	  That,	  however,	  is	  where	  the	  
similarity	  ends.	  It	  appears	  that	  the	  changes	  and	  transitions	  in	  Iran	  would	  not	  be	  so	  
significant	  that	  they	  would	  hinder	  adoption	  of	  the	  CISG.	  The	  practical	  objections	  are	  
very	  different	  in	  Iran.	  By	  adopting	  the	  CISG,	  Iran	  would	  gain	  business	  rather	  than	  losing	  
business.	  The	  argument	  that	  economic	  factors	  justify	  the	  UK’s	  non-­‐ratification	  by	  no	  
means	  applies	  to	  Iran.	  Iran	  is	  not	  a	  highly-­‐sought-­‐after	  dispute	  resolution	  forum.	  
Besides,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  popularity	  of	  the	  English	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  Act	  1979	  may	  result	  in	  
its	  use	  as	  the	  applicable	  law	  when	  the	  contracting	  parties	  are	  not	  from	  the	  UK	  has	  
never	  been	  the	  case	  in	  Iran.	  Indeed,	  Iranian	  law	  is	  hardly	  known	  in	  the	  world.	  
The	  CISG	  has	  been	  thoroughly	  studied	  by	  the	  UK	  to	  decide	  what	  advantages	  and	  
disadvantages	  it	  can	  offer.	  The	  UK	  has	  held	  two	  formal	  consultations	  on	  whether	  it	  
should	  ratify	  the	  Convention.	  This	  has	  never	  been	  the	  case	  in	  Iran.	  The	  Iranian	  
Government	  has	  never	  published	  any	  statement	  to	  show	  its	  official	  position,	  nor	  have	  
the	  provisions	  of	  the	  CISG	  been	  thoroughly	  examined	  in	  Iran.	  There	  are	  only	  a	  few	  PhD	  
theses	  that	  have	  done	  a	  comparative	  study	  of	  aspects	  of	  the	  CISG	  and	  Iranian	  law.580	  	  
	  
There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  reasons	  for	  Iran	  to	  be	  apprehensive	  about	  adopting	  the	  CISG,	  
such	  as	  the	  duty	  to	  pay	  interest,581	  as	  recognised	  by	  the	  CISG,	  but	  none	  seem	  to	  be	  
related	  to	  the	  arguments	  made	  by	  the	  UK	  against	  its	  adoption.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
579	  A	  body	  representing	  the	  constituency	  most	  likely	  to	  be	  affected	  by	  accession.	  
580	  Text	  to	  n(s)	  621,	  622	  and	  623	  in	  ch	  7.	  
581	  See	  generally	  ch	  7,	  7.2.2.	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As	  detailed	  in	  chapter	  four,	  Iran	  would	  obtain	  many	  benefits	  if	  it	  adopted	  the	  CISG.	  
Therefore,	  Iran	  should	  not	  hold	  back	  on	  the	  grounds	  cited	  by	  the	  UK,	  as	  the	  two	  
countries	  are	  not	  in	  an	  equal	  economic	  position.	  
5.4	  Conclusion	  	  
Despite	  the	  efforts	  made	  and	  scholarly	  writings	  published	  by	  its	  supporters,	  it	  seems	  
that	  the	  CISG	  is	  still	  very	  unpopular	  in	  all	  sectors	  in	  the	  UK.	  Although	  other	  European	  
countries	  are	  benefiting	  from	  the	  application	  of	  the	  CISG	  in	  trade,	  it	  appears	  that	  this	  is	  
not	  necessarily	  convincing	  the	  English	  communities.	  This	  position	  might	  have	  an	  
impact	  on	  certain	  jurisdictions	  that	  follow	  legal	  developments	  in	  this	  country.	  Although	  
the	  UK	  has	  not	  yet	  ratified	  the	  CISG,	  it	  has	  promised	  to	  adopt	  it.	  A	  comparative	  study	  
of	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  CISG	  and	  those	  of	  English	  law	  shows	  that	  there	  are	  no	  major	  
legal	  barriers	  in	  the	  way	  of	  its	  adoption.	  The	  fear	  that	  the	  CISG	  would	  have	  a	  negative	  
impact	  on	  domestic	  law	  is	  baseless,	  as	  English	  law	  would	  apply	  to	  domestic	  matters	  
and	  the	  CISG	  only	  to	  international	  sales.	  The	  main	  reason	  for	  non-­‐ratification	  seems	  to	  
be	  lack	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  CISG.	  The	  economic	  reasons	  might	  also	  justify	  non-­‐
ratification,	  since	  the	  UK,	  as	  a	  primary	  forum	  for	  dispute	  resolution	  in	  international	  
trade,	  is	  not	  willing	  to	  lose	  its	  edge.	  The	  UK	  seems	  to	  believe	  that	  ratification	  would	  
jeopardise	  its	  exceptional	  position,	  but	  this	  is	  not	  necessarily	  convincing,	  seeing	  that,	  
after	  ratification,	  parties	  would	  seek	  the	  English	  courts’	  expertise.	  This	  means,	  
therefore,	  that	  English	  judges	  would	  contribute	  to	  the	  further	  interpretation	  of	  the	  
Convention.	  But	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case	  in	  developing	  countries	  such	  as	  Iran.	  In	  reality,	  
developing	  countries	  are	  not	  known	  as	  the	  world’s	  foremost	  dispute	  resolution	  
forums.	  While	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  may	  arguably	  be	  privileged	  enough	  to	  maintain	  its	  
domestic	  law	  in	  international	  trade,	  this	  cannot	  be	  a	  source	  of	  pride	  for	  developing	  
countries.	  
	  
Iran	  need	  not	  hold	  back	  on	  account	  of	  the	  reasons	  put	  forward	  by	  the	  UK.	  This	  is	  
because	  the	  two	  countries	  are	  not	  in	  a	  comparable	  position	  economically,	  and	  Iran	  
lacks	  a	  well-­‐established	  domestic	  sales	  law.	  Instead,	  Iran	  should	  follow	  the	  German	  
model	  and	  further	  consider	  whether	  domestic	  law	  should	  be	  reformed	  to	  reflect	  the	  
CISG.	  While	  chapter	  seven	  will	  provide	  a	  comparative	  study	  of	  the	  Iranian	  law	  of	  sale	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and	  the	  CISG,	  it	  is	  necessary	  that	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  the	  economy	  and	  the	  legal	  


























The	  Commercial	  Law	  of	  Iran	  
6.1	  Introduction	  	  
A	  further	  aspect	  of	  the	  debate	  on	  ratification	  in	  Iran	  concentrates	  on	  the	  legal	  situation	  
in	  Iran	  itself.	  This	  builds	  on	  one	  of	  the	  points	  made	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  as	  the	  
burden	  of	  making	  the	  transition	  to	  the	  CISG	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  factor	  that	  discourages	  
ratification	  in	  the	  UK.	  If,	  in	  Iran,	  the	  legal	  profession	  and	  traders	  come	  to	  the	  view	  that	  
the	  cost	  of	  transition	  is	  very	  high,	  this	  may	  be	  a	  strong	  argument	  against	  ratification;	  in	  
effect,	  it	  would	  not	  be	  the	  case	  that	  the	  content	  of	  the	  CISG	  is	  regarded	  as	  undesirable,	  
but	  simply	  that	  the	  differences	  from	  the	  current	  law	  are	  too	  great	  to	  allow	  a	  smooth	  
transition.	  This	  chapter	  and	  the	  next	  therefore	  examine	  this	  question	  in	  some	  depth.	  
	  
The	  purpose	  of	  this	  study	  is	  to	  provide	  a	  brief	  review	  of	  the	  economy	  and	  the	  legal	  
environment	  of	  Iran,	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  creating	  a	  basis	  for	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  
relationship	  between	  Iranian	  law	  and	  the	  CISG.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  there	  are	  some	  
differences	  between	  Iranian	  law	  and	  the	  CISG,	  but	  none	  that	  would	  make	  transition	  to	  
the	  CISG	  so	  difficult	  that	  it	  should	  be	  rejected.	  
	  
This	  chapter	  will	  take	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  Iran’s	  economy,	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  providing	  general	  
information	  on	  Iran’s	  position	  in	  the	  world	  economy,	  its	  volume	  of	  international	  trade,	  
and	  its	  trading	  partners.	  It	  then	  considers	  the	  legal	  environment	  in	  Iran	  in	  order	  to	  
ascertain	  the	  sources	  of	  law	  in	  Iran,	  in	  particular	  the	  law	  on	  the	  sale	  of	  goods,	  and	  will	  
finally	  look	  at	  the	  status	  of	  international	  conventions	  under	  the	  Iranian	  legal	  system.	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6.2	  Iran’s	  Economy	  
6.2.1	  General	  Information	  
As	  of	  July	  2013,	  Iran	  is	  an	  upper-­‐middle-­‐income	  country.582	  According	  to	  the	  World	  
Bank’s	  income	  classification	  of	  2012,	  countries	  with	  GNI	  per	  capita	  of	  between	  
US$4,086	  and	  US$12,615	  are	  classified	  as	  upper-­‐middle-­‐income	  countries.583	  The	  
Budget	  Act	  1390	  (2011–2012)	  provides	  for	  state	  revenues	  of	  US$	  131.2	  billion	  in	  the	  
Persian	  calendar	  year	  lasting	  from	  March	  2011	  to	  March	  2012.584	  Iran’s	  economy	  is	  
mainly	  reliant	  on	  the	  oil	  sector,	  which	  provides	  most	  of	  the	  Government’s	  revenues.	  
Iran	  is	  classified	  as	  the	  second	  largest	  oil	  producer	  in	  the	  Organization	  of	  the	  
Petroleum	  Exporting	  Countries	  (OPEC),	  and	  its	  oil	  and	  gas	  reserves	  are	  among	  the	  
largest	  in	  the	  world.585	  
	  
In	  the	  early	  1970s	  Iran’s	  economy	  was	  relatively	  balanced	  and	  had	  commenced	  full-­‐
scale	  industrialisation.	  Iran’s	  economic	  growth	  rates	  during	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s	  were	  
around	  10%,	  which	  was	  one	  of	  the	  highest	  in	  the	  world.586	  This	  dynamic	  move	  to	  
modernise	  the	  economy	  and	  social	  structure	  of	  the	  country	  started	  during	  the	  reign	  of	  
Muhammad	  Reza	  Pahlavi.	  It	  was	  seen	  as	  feasible	  because	  of	  the	  availability	  of	  
manpower	  (ten	  million	  at	  the	  time)	  and	  because	  Iran’s	  oil	  wealth	  could	  accommodate	  
such	  industrial	  growth.	  However,	  this	  rapid	  modernisation	  was	  never	  fully	  completed	  
because	  of	  the	  revolution	  in	  1979,	  which	  changed	  its	  modern	  economic	  history.	  
The	  industrial	  and	  commercial	  units	  that	  existed	  in	  Iran	  up	  to	  the	  1979	  revolution	  were	  
classified	  in	  two	  categories:	  
	  
(a) The	  public	  sector	  units	  under	  the	  complete	  control	  of	  Government	  and	  
Government	  agencies.	  This	  included	  airlines,	  shipping	  lines,	  radio,	  television,	  
telecommunication	  and	  like	  industries.	  Other	  state	  industries	  were	  either	  in	  close	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
582	  ‘The	  World	  Bank,	  Country	  and	  Lending	  Groups.’	  <http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-­‐
classifications/country-­‐and-­‐lending-­‐groups#Upper_middle_income>	  accessed	  4	  July	  2013.	  
583	  ‘The	  World	  Bank,	  How	  we	  Classify	  Countries.’	  <http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-­‐
classifications>	  accessed	  4	  July	  2013.	  
584	  ‘Central	  Intelligence	  Agency,	  The	  World	  Factbook,	  Iran.’	  
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-­‐world-­‐factbook/geos/ir.html>	  accessed	  4	  July	  2013.	  
585	  Shayerah	  Ilias,	  ‘Iran’s	  Economy’	  (22	  August	  2008)	  CRS	  Report	  for	  Congress.	  
<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/110402.pdf>	  accessed	  4	  July	  2013.	  
586	  ibid.	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correlation	  with	  the	  national	  interests	  of	  Iran	  (such	  as	  the	  defence	  trade	  and	  arms	  
production)	  or	  had	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  the	  national	  economy	  (such	  as	  the	  oil,	  
oil-­‐related,	  petrochemical,	  copper	  and	  steel	  industries);	  
(b) The	  private	  sector	  units	  which	  existed	  in	  all	  areas	  of	  business	  and	  functioned	  on	  
the	  principles	  of	  a	  ‘free	  market.’587	  
	  
The	  1979	  revolution,	  which	  transformed	  Iran	  into	  an	  Islamic	  state	  with	  a	  public-­‐sector-­‐
dominated	  economy,588	  adversely	  affected	  the	  Iranian	  economy	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  
industrial	  sector.	  This	  was	  followed	  by	  the	  Iran–Iraq	  war,	  lasting	  from	  September	  1980	  
to	  August	  1988.	  According	  to	  the	  Central	  Bank	  of	  Iran’s	  official	  figures,	  Iran’s	  GNP	  fell	  
by	  6%,	  3.5%	  and	  over	  10%	  in	  1978–79,	  1979–1980	  and	  1980–1981	  respectively.589	  
During	  the	  1990s,	  Iran’s	  economy	  needed	  to	  recover	  from	  the	  war	  and	  growing	  
international	  isolation,	  but	  a	  severe	  economic	  downturn	  occurred	  in	  the	  late	  1990s	  
owing	  to	  a	  drop	  in	  international	  oil	  prices.590	  However,	  by	  the	  2000s	  Iran’s	  economy	  
had	  recovered	  and	  was	  experiencing	  growth,	  albeit	  below	  the	  average	  level	  of	  
economic	  growth	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  Central	  Asia	  and	  oil-­‐exporting	  countries	  in	  
general.591	  It	  is	  worth	  examining	  the	  different	  sectors	  of	  the	  economy,	  to	  understand	  
the	  role	  of	  international	  trade	  in	  the	  Iranian	  economy,	  and	  in	  particular	  how	  measures	  
to	  ease	  the	  barriers	  to	  trade	  (such	  as	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  CISG)	  might	  affect	  the	  
economy.	  The	  following	  sections	  carry	  out	  this	  examination.	  
6.2.2 International	  Trade	  
The	  vast	  natural	  resources	  of	  Iran	  and	  its	  population	  of	  some	  78	  million	  make	  it	  an	  
important	  partner	  for	  trading	  nations.	  The	  total	  imports	  for	  2011,	  as	  reported	  by	  the	  
Central	  Intelligence	  Agency,592	  were	  estimated	  at	  US$76.1	  billion,	  compared	  with	  
US$70.0	  billion	  for	  2010.593	  Iran’s	  economy	  has	  benefited	  significantly	  from	  
international	  trade	  and	  has	  witnessed	  a	  dramatic	  increase	  over	  the	  past	  few	  years.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
587	  Sayed	  Hassan	  Amin,	  Commercial	  Law	  of	  Iran	  (Vahid	  Publications	  1988)	  9–10.	  
588	  Ilias,	  ‘Iran’s	  Economy’	  (n	  585).	  
589	  As	  stated	  in	  Amin,	  Commercial	  Law	  of	  Iran	  (n	  587)	  10.	  
590	  Abdelali	  Jbili,	  Vitali	  Kramarenko	  and	  José	  Bailén,	  ‘Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Iran:	  Managing	  the	  Transition	  to	  
a	  Market	  Economy’	  (2007)	  IMF	  1–5.	  
591	  IMF,	  ‘Regional	  Economic	  Outlook:	  Middle	  East	  and	  Central	  Asia’	  (May	  2008)	  World	  Economic	  and	  
Financial	  Surveys	  44.	  
592	  The	  writer	  relies	  on	  CIA	  figures,	  as	  there	  are	  no	  reliable	  figures	  from	  Iran.	  
593	  ‘Central	  Intelligence	  Agency,	  The	  World	  Factbook,	  Iran’	  (n	  584).	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During	  the	  period	  from	  2004	  to	  2007,	  the	  total	  trade	  in	  goods	  (exports	  plus	  imports)	  in	  
Iran	  almost	  doubled	  and	  reached	  around	  $147	  billion	  in	  2007.	  Iran	  has	  enjoyed	  a	  
growing	  and	  positive	  trade	  balance	  in	  goods,	  benefiting	  from	  high	  international	  oil	  
prices.	  In	  2007,	  exports	  levelled	  at	  about	  $97	  billion,	  while	  imports	  were	  about	  $56	  
billion.	  However,	  in	  2008	  and	  2009	  Iran	  witnessed	  a	  drop	  in	  its	  trade	  surplus	  from	  $32	  
billion	  to	  $17	  billion,	  which	  was	  due	  to	  the	  decrease	  in	  global	  oil	  prices.594	  (Please	  see	  
Table	  One	  below.)	  
	  
Table	  One:	  Iran’s	  Merchandise	  Trade,	  2006–2008	  
(Millions	  of	  US	  dollars)	  
Merchandise	   	   	   2006	   	   2007	   	   2008a	   	   2009b	  
Exports	  	   	   	   76,055	  	   97,401	  	   100,572	   77,408	  
	   Oil	  and	  Gas	  	   	   62,011	  	   81,764	  	   81,855	  	   59,240	  
	   Non-­‐oil	  and	  Gas	   14,044	  	   15,637	  	   18,717	  	   18,168	  
Imports	   	   	   50,020	  	   56,582	  	   68,533	  	   60,327	  
Trade	  Balance	  	   	   26,035	  	   40,819	  	   32,039	  	   17,081	  
Total	  Trade	   	   	   126,075	   153,983	   169,105	   137,735	  
Sources:	  IMF,	  ‘Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Iran:	  2008	  Article	  IV	  Consultation’	  (August	  2008)	  IMF	  Country	  Report	  
No	  08/284;	  IMF,	  ‘Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Iran:	  2006	  Article	  IV	  Consultation’	  (March	  2007)	  IMF	  Country	  
Report	  No	  07/100	  
Notes:	  a.	  Data	  for	  2008	  are	  estimated	  	  
b.	  Data	  for	  2009	  are	  projected	  
	  
Iran’s	  other	  major	  export	  commodities	  include	  petrochemicals,	  carpets	  and	  fresh	  and	  
dried	  fruits.	  Iran’s	  non-­‐oil	  exports,	  such	  as	  liquid	  natural	  gas,	  are	  exported	  to	  the	  
United	  Arab	  Emirates	  (UAE),	  Iraq,	  China,	  Japan	  and	  India.	  Iran’s	  major	  imports	  are	  
gasoline	  and	  other	  refined	  petroleum	  products,	  industrial	  raw	  materials	  and	  
intermediate	  goods	  used	  as	  manufacturing	  inputs,	  capital	  goods,	  food	  products,	  and	  
other	  consumer	  goods.595	  Many	  of	  the	  contracts	  that	  govern	  these	  transactions	  are	  
standard	  contracts	  used	  in	  international	  trade.	  Hence	  it	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  the	  case	  that	  
many	  transactions	  are	  already	  governed	  by	  foreign	  law,	  and	  the	  transition	  to	  the	  CISG	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
594	  Shayerah	  Ilias,	  ‘Iran’s	  Economic	  Conditions:	  U.S.	  Policy	  Issues’	  (22	  April	  2010)	  CRS	  Report	  for	  
Congress.	  
<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34525.pdf>	  accessed	  4	  July	  2013.	  
595	  Ilias,	  ‘Iran’s	  Economic	  Conditions:	  U.S.	  Policy	  Issues’	  (n	  594).	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could	  provide	  a	  means	  for	  ensuring	  that	  the	  law	  applicable	  to	  contracts	  would	  be	  
better	  understood	  in	  Iran.	  
6.2.3	  Major	  Trading	  Partners	  
In	  2007,	  China	  was	  the	  top	  trading	  partner	  for	  Iran.	  Its	  next	  largest	  trading	  partners	  
were	  Japan,	  Italy,	  South	  Korea	  and	  Germany	  respectively.	  Iran’s	  most	  important	  export	  
markets	  are	  China,	  Japan,	  Turkey	  and	  Italy.	  Germany,	  China,	  the	  UAE	  and	  South	  Korea	  
are	  Iran’s	  major	  merchandise	  suppliers.	  (Please	  see	  Table	  Two	  below.)	  
	  
Table	  Two:	  Major	  Export	  Markets	  and	  Sources	  of	  Imports	  for	  Iran,	  FY	  2007	  












China	   20,135	   12,188	   8,017	   4,101	   Yes	  
1	  Jan	  
1988	  





8,421	   5,139	   3,282	   1,857	   Yes	  
1	  Mar	  
2005	  
Italy	   8,039	   5,215	   2,824	   2,391	   Yes	  
1	  Jan	  
1988	  
Turkey	   7,539	   6,013	   1,526	   4,487	   Yes	  
1	  Aug	  
2011	  
Germany	   6,066	   621	   5,445	   -­‐4,824	   Yes	  
1	  Jan	  
1991	  
UAE	   5,915	   747	   5,168	   -­‐4,421	   No	  
-­‐	  
	  
France	   5,334	   3,069	   2,265	   804	   Yes	  
1	  Jan	  
1988	  
Russia	   3,272	   282	   2,990	   -­‐2,708	   Yes	  
1	  Sept	  
1991	  
Sources:	  IMF,	  Direction	  of	  Trade	  Statistics;	  and	  CISG:	  Table	  of	  Contracting	  States	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International	  concern	  about	  Iran’s	  nuclear	  programme	  has	  affected	  its	  trading	  
relations.	  The	  trade	  ties	  between	  Iran	  and	  Germany	  have	  historically	  been	  very	  strong,	  
but	  Germany	  and	  other	  European	  countries	  have	  reduced	  their	  trade	  with	  Iran	  over	  
recent	  years.	  As	  a	  result	  Iran’s	  trade	  has	  witnessed	  a	  shift	  from	  the	  developed	  to	  the	  
developing	  world.	  Asian	  countries,	  in	  particular	  China	  and	  Japan,	  Russia	  and	  other	  
Central	  Asian	  countries	  and	  the	  Middle	  East	  have	  become	  Iran’s	  increasingly	  important	  
trading	  partners.596	  	  
	  
As	  shown	  above,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  UAE,	  Iran’s	  other	  trading	  partners	  in	  the	  table	  
are	  all	  CISG	  signatories.	  The	  question,	  however,	  is	  whether	  these	  contracting	  states	  
apply	  the	  CISG	  when	  the	  other	  party’s	  country	  is	  not	  a	  signatory.	  As	  indicated	  in	  the	  
introduction	  to	  the	  thesis,	  in	  accordance	  with	  Article	  1(1)	  of	  the	  CISG,	  the	  CISG	  applies	  
to	  a	  contract	  of	  sale	  of	  goods	  between	  parties	  (i)	  who	  are	  located	  in	  different	  
Convention	  states,	  or	  (ii)	  where	  the	  rules	  of	  private	  international	  law	  governing	  the	  
contract	  lead	  to	  the	  application	  of	  the	  law	  of	  a	  Convention	  state.	  Iran	  is	  not	  a	  
contracting	  state,	  and	  therefore	  prerequisite	  (i)	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  a	  contract	  of	  sale	  of	  
goods	  between	  Iran	  and	  a	  contracting	  state.	  However,	  there	  are	  circumstances	  in	  
which	  the	  rules	  of	  private	  international	  law	  result	  in	  the	  application	  of	  the	  law	  of	  a	  
contracting	  state	  which	  has	  ratified	  the	  CISG	  (prerequisite	  (ii)),	  and	  thus	  the	  CISG	  
applies.	  Therefore,	  CISG	  Article	  1(1)(b)	  expands	  the	  scope	  of	  application	  of	  the	  CISG	  
where	  the	  parties	  are	  not	  located	  in	  different	  CISG	  states	  or	  one	  of	  them	  is	  not	  located	  
in	  a	  CISG	  state.597	  One	  could	  argue	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  Article	  95598	  of	  the	  CISG	  is	  to	  
limit	  the	  scope	  of	  application.	  However,	  a	  study	  of	  the	  Convention’s	  contracting	  states	  
shows	  that	  only	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  countries	  have	  made	  reservations	  under	  Article	  
95.599	  Nevertheless,	  in	  a	  hypothetical	  example,	  where	  a	  contracting	  state	  (eg	  China)	  
has	  made	  an	  Article	  95	  declaration,	  and	  parties	  to	  the	  contract	  (Iran	  and	  China)	  have	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
596	  Ilias,	  ‘Iran’s	  Economy’	  (n	  585).	  
597	  Jacob	  Ziegel,	  ‘The	  Scope	  of	  the	  Convention:	  Reaching	  Out	  to	  Article	  One	  and	  Beyond’	  (2005–06)	  25	  
Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Commerce	  59.	  
598	  Article	  95	  of	  the	  CISG	  states:	  
‘Any	  State	  may	  declare	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  deposit	  of	  its	  instrument	  of	  ratification,	  acceptance,	  approval	  
or	  accession	  that	  it	  will	  not	  be	  bound	  by	  subparagraph	  (1)(b)	  of	  article	  1	  of	  this	  Convention.’	  
599	  China	  (PRC),	  Singapore,	  St	  Vincent	  &	  Grenadines,	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  Czech	  Republic	  and	  Slovakia	  
declared	  that	  they	  would	  not	  be	  bound	  by	  Article	  1(1)(b).	  
‘CISG:	  Table	  of	  Contracting	  States’	  (n	  1).	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accepted	  a	  choice-­‐of-­‐law	  clause	  indicating	  China’s	  law	  as	  the	  law	  of	  the	  contract,	  
should	  it	  be	  interpreted	  to	  say	  that	  they	  intended	  that	  the	  CISG	  should	  govern	  their	  
relationship	  in	  spite	  of	  China’s	  reservation	  under	  Article	  95	  to	  exclude	  the	  CISG?	  The	  
answer	  could	  be	  that,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Asante	  Technologies,600	  the	  federal	  court	  in	  
California	  decided	  that	  the	  dispute	  between	  parties	  was	  determined	  by	  the	  application	  
of	  the	  CISG.	  The	  court	  held	  that	  the	  CISG	  was	  part	  of	  the	  law	  of	  the	  State	  of	  California	  
and	  the	  buyer	  adopted	  Californian	  law	  as	  the	  choice-­‐of-­‐law	  clause.	  Therefore,	  the	  CISG	  
applied.	  By	  way	  of	  analogy,	  it	  could	  be	  concluded	  that	  the	  CISG	  may	  govern	  the	  
relationship	  between	  Iran	  and	  China	  in	  this	  hypothetical	  example.	  	  
	  
It	  should	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  Iran’s	  own	  trading	  partners	  would	  apply	  the	  CISG,	  since	  
they	  have	  acceded	  to	  it.	  This	  signifies	  the	  importance	  of	  accession	  to	  the	  CISG	  by	  Iran.	  
If	  Iran	  decides	  to	  adopt	  the	  CISG,	  it	  will	  benefit	  from	  the	  many	  advantages	  of	  
adherence	  to	  the	  Convention	  that	  were	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  four,	  such	  as	  accepting	  a	  
legal	  regime	  that	  already	  is	  applied	  by	  the	  majority	  of	  Iran's	  trading	  partners.	  This	  
could	  be	  far	  more	  beneficial	  to	  Iran	  than	  regional	  trade,	  since	  regional	  trade	  is	  likely	  to	  
be	  with	  countries	  that	  have	  not	  adopted	  the	  CISG,	  but	  adoption	  of	  the	  CISG	  facilitates	  
more	  trade	  with	  OECD	  countries	  that	  are	  already	  signatories.	  
6.2.4	  Summary	  
Iran	  is	  the	  eighteenth	  largest	  economy	  in	  the	  world.601	  It	  is	  an	  important	  partner	  for	  
trading	  nations	  owing	  to	  its	  vast	  natural	  resources	  and	  considerable	  population.	  Oil	  
and	  gas	  are	  easily	  the	  most	  important	  exports,	  and	  finished	  and	  refined	  goods	  are	  the	  
most	  important	  imports	  for	  Iran.	  Even	  where	  there	  is	  a	  domestic	  manufacturing	  
industry,	  it	  is	  not	  strong	  enough	  to	  meet	  domestic	  demand	  and	  Iran	  is	  an	  importer.	  In	  
effect,	  the	  types	  of	  goods	  that	  dominate	  its	  patterns	  of	  international	  trade	  have	  not	  
changed	  significantly	  since	  the	  1970s:	  like	  most	  developing	  countries	  of	  that	  period,	  it	  
is	  an	  exporter	  of	  commodities	  and	  an	  importer	  of	  manufactured	  goods.	  Thus	  some	  of	  
the	  concerns	  of	  developing	  countries	  that	  were	  valid	  during	  the	  drafting	  of	  the	  CISG	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
600	  Asante	  Technologies	  v	  PMC-­‐Sierra	  
United	  States	  27	  July	  2001	  Federal	  District	  Court	  [California].	  
<	  http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cases/010727u1.html>	  accessed	  5	  August	  2013.	  
601	  ‘Central	  Intelligence	  Agency,	  The	  World	  Factbook,	  Country	  Comparison:	  GDP	  (2012).’	  
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-­‐world-­‐factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html>	  accessed	  4	  
July	  2013.	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the	  1970s	  still	  apply	  to	  Iran.602	  This	  has	  already	  been	  established	  that	  the	  CISG	  reflects	  
the	  concerns	  of	  the	  developing	  nations	  and	  is	  therefore	  suitable	  for	  developing	  
countries.	  
6.3	  The	  Legal	  Environment	  in	  Iran	  
This	  section	  will	  provide	  a	  general	  description	  of	  the	  Iranian	  legal	  environment,	  which	  
will	  be	  useful	  in	  determining	  the	  level	  of	  compatibility	  of	  Iranian	  law	  and	  the	  CISG.	  To	  
that	  end,	  it	  begins	  with	  a	  brief	  introduction	  to	  the	  Iranian	  legal	  system	  and	  the	  source	  
of	  law	  in	  Iran.	  It	  then	  takes	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code	  as	  the	  main	  source	  of	  
Iranian	  law	  on	  the	  sale	  of	  goods.	  Lastly,	  it	  will	  consider	  the	  status	  of	  international	  
conventions	  under	  the	  Iranian	  legal	  system.	  
6.3.1 The	  Iranian	  Legal	  System	  
Until	  1906,	  for	  some	  2,500	  years	  Iran	  was	  ruled	  by	  an	  absolute	  monarchy.	  In	  that	  year,	  
the	  Constitutional	  Revolution	  (Monarchy)	  came	  into	  effect.	  This	  was	  replaced	  by	  the	  
1979	  Republican	  Constitution	  following	  the	  revolution	  which	  resulted	  in	  the	  Islamic	  
Republic	  of	  Iran.	  
Source	  of	  Law	  
Under	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Iran,	  the	  major	  sources	  of	  law	  are	  as	  follows:	  
6.3.1.1 Islamic	  Law	  
Under	  the	  Iranian	  Constitution	  of	  1979,	  Islamic	  law	  is	  the	  major	  source	  of	  law	  in	  Iran.	  
The	  Constitution	  in	  its	  Article	  4	  states	  that:	  
	  
All	  civil,	  penal,	  financial,	  economic,	  administrative,	  cultural,	  military,	  political	  and	  
other	  laws	  and	  regulations	  must	  be	  based	  on	  Islamic	  criteria.	  This	  principle	  
applies	  absolutely	  and	  generally	  to	  all	  articles	  of	  the	  Constitution	  as	  well	  as	  to	  all	  
other	  laws	  and	  regulations,	  and	  the	  fuqaha	  of	  the	  Guardian	  Council	  are	  judges	  in	  
this	  matter.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




This	  provision	  emphasises	  the	  supremacy	  of	  Islamic	  law	  in	  all	  matters	  relating	  to	  
constitutional	  and	  municipal	  laws	  and	  customary	  and	  conventional	  international	  law.	  
To	  clarify	  the	  matter	  further,	  reference	  can	  be	  made	  to	  statements	  made	  by	  the	  leader	  
of	  the	  Iranian	  delegation	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  Human	  Rights	  Committee	  (Geneva)	  in	  
July	  1982.	  In	  those	  years,	  reports	  of	  mass	  murder	  and	  torture	  in	  Iran	  were	  under	  
investigation.	  In	  response	  to	  the	  questions	  being	  posed	  by	  the	  members	  of	  the	  
Committee,	  the	  Iranian	  chief	  delegate	  stated	  that	  what	  is	  accepted	  in	  Iran	  is	  the	  
‘supremacy	  of	  Islamic	  laws,	  which	  are	  universal.’603	  This	  signifies	  that	  in	  the	  event	  that	  
the	  provisions	  of	  the	  1966	  Covenant	  on	  Human	  Rights	  should	  come	  into	  conflict	  with	  
Islamic	  law,	  the	  latter	  would	  prevail	  in	  Iran.	  
	  
This	  principle	  formed	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  invalidation	  of	  many	  secular	  laws	  and	  legal	  
precedents	  dating	  from	  pre-­‐revolutionary	  days.	  Therefore,	  in	  accordance	  with	  Articles	  
4	  and	  170604	  of	  the	  1979	  Constitution,	  secular	  legislation	  could	  not	  be	  accepted	  as	  the	  
‘law	  of	  the	  land.’	  	  
	  
It	  is	  said	  that	  Article	  4	  of	  the	  1979	  Constitution	  is	  ‘an	  unequivocal	  statement	  of	  the	  
absolute	  supremacy	  or	  predominance	  of	  Islamic	  law	  over	  all	  other	  systems	  of	  law.	  It	  
also	  precludes	  the	  existence	  of	  arbitrariness,	  prerogative,	  even	  discretionary	  authority	  
on	  the	  part	  of	  any	  branch	  of	  the	  State	  whether	  it	  be	  the	  executive	  or	  legislature.’605	  
The	  supremacy	  of	  Islamic	  law	  therefore	  requires	  society	  to	  adapt	  to	  its	  provisions	  and	  
prerequisites,	  and	  establishes	  that	  Islamic	  law	  is	  not	  to	  be	  changed	  to	  suit	  the	  socio-­‐
economic	  climate.606	  As	  a	  case	  in	  point,	  there	  is	  a	  mandatory	  rule	  in	  Islamic	  law	  that	  
prohibits	  payment	  of	  interest,	  which	  the	  author	  will	  be	  returning	  to	  later	  in	  chapter	  
seven607	  and	  chapter	  eight.608	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
603	  As	  stated	  in	  Amin,	  Commercial	  Law	  of	  Iran	  (n	  587)	  31.	  	  
604	  Article	  170	  of	  the	  1979	  Constitution	  states:	  
Judges	  of	  courts	  are	  obliged	  to	  refrain	  from	  executing	  statutes	  and	  regulations	  of	  the	  
government	  that	  are	  in	  conflict	  with	  the	  laws	  or	  the	  norms	  of	  Islam,	  or	  lie	  outside	  the	  
competence	  of	  the	  executive	  power.	  Everyone	  has	  the	  right	  to	  demand	  the	  annulment	  of	  any	  
such	  regulation	  from	  the	  Court	  of	  Administrative	  Justice.	  	  
605	  Amin,	  Commercial	  Law	  of	  Iran	  (n	  587)	  32.	  	  
606	  Y	  Noori,	  Islamic	  Government	  and	  Revolution	  in	  Iran	  (Glasgow:	  Royston	  Ltd	  1985)	  11–74.	  
607	  See	  generally	  ch	  7,	  7.2.2.	  
608	  See	  generally	  ch	  8,	  8.2.2,	  sect	  II.	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6.3.1.2 The	  Constitutional	  Law	  
The	  second	  primary	  source	  of	  law	  in	  Iran	  after	  Islamic	  law	  is	  the	  country’s	  constitution.	  
The	  first	  Iranian	  constitution	  dates	  from	  1906,	  and	  was	  followed	  by	  a	  supplement	  in	  
1907.	  The	  very	  nature	  of	  these	  constitutional	  instruments	  was	  liberal,	  as	  they	  followed	  
the	  pattern	  of	  the	  French	  and	  Belgian	  constitutions,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  embodied	  
provisions	  appropriate	  to	  Iran	  such	  as	  the	  state	  religion	  (Shia	  Islam).	  Following	  the	  
Constitution	  of	  1906–07,	  the	  European	  continental	  theory	  of	  law	  was	  added	  to	  the	  
Islamic	  norms	  and	  as	  a	  result	  the	  secular	  Iranian	  legal	  system	  emerged.	  	  
After	  the	  revolution	  in	  1979,	  however,	  the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Iran	  
replaced	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1906–07.	  The	  1979	  Constitution	  has	  its	  basis	  in	  religious	  
sovereignty	  in	  line	  with	  the	  doctrine	  of	  ‘the	  governance	  of	  Islamic	  jurists.’	  Therefore,	  
‘the	  post-­‐revolution	  constitutional	  law	  is	  limited	  in	  its	  effect	  by	  its	  subjection	  to	  the	  
religious	  law	  and	  Islamic	  principles.’609	  
6.3.1.3 Legislation	  
Legislation	  is	  the	  third	  primary	  source	  of	  law	  in	  Iran.	  This	  includes	  a	  law	  which	  is	  
declared	  by	  Parliament	  (the	  Majlis).	  Iranian	  law	  conforms	  to	  a	  number	  of	  important	  
codes	  as	  well	  as	  to	  thousands	  of	  acts	  of	  parliament	  proposed	  by	  the	  Majlis.	  In	  
interpreting	  and	  analysing	  cases,	  the	  judges	  refer	  to	  the	  laws	  established	  by	  the	  
legislature	  such	  as	  the	  Civil	  Code,	  Commercial	  Code,	  Criminal	  Code,	  Civil	  Procedure	  
Code	  and	  etc.	  Article	  166	  of	  the	  Constitution	  sets	  out	  that:	  
	  
The	  verdicts	  of	  courts	  must	  be	  well	  reasoned	  out	  and	  documented	  with	  
reference	  to	  the	  articles	  and	  principles	  of	  the	  law	  in	  accordance	  with	  which	  they	  
are	  delivered.	  
	  
In	  accordance	  with	  Articles	  71	  and	  72	  of	  the	  Iranian	  Constitution,	  ‘The	  Islamic	  
Consultative	  Assembly	  [Majlis]	  can	  establish	  laws	  on	  all	  matters,	  within	  the	  limits	  of	  its	  
competence	  as	  laid	  down	  in	  the	  Constitution,’	  and	  ‘	  .	  .	  .	  cannot	  enact	  laws	  contrary	  to	  
the	  official	  religion	  of	  the	  country	  or	  to	  the	  Constitution	  .	  .	  .	  ’	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
609	  Amin,	  Commercial	  Law	  of	  Iran	  (n	  587)	  33.	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6.3.2	  Iranian	  Law	  on	  the	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  
The	  main	  source	  of	  Iranian	  law	  on	  the	  sale	  of	  goods	  is	  the	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code.	  There	  are	  
other	  codes	  that	  contain	  a	  few	  articles	  on	  the	  sale	  of	  goods.	  These	  will	  be	  discussed	  
further	  below.	  	  
6.3.2.1 The	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code	  
Under	  the	  Iranian	  legal	  system,	  the	  main	  source	  of	  the	  law	  of	  contract	  is	  the	  Iranian	  
Civil	  Code.	  The	  Code	  contains	  1,335	  articles,	  and	  consists	  of	  three	  volumes:	  Volume	  I	  
concerning	  ‘Property’	  was	  first	  prepared	  in	  1928;	  Volume	  II	  concerning	  ‘Nationality’	  
and	  Volume	  III	  on	  ‘Evidence	  in	  Substantiation	  of	  Claims’	  were	  drafted	  in	  1935–36.610	  
The	  committee	  in	  charge	  of	  drafting	  the	  Civil	  Code	  consisted	  of	  both	  Muslim	  jurists	  and	  
secular	  jurists	  educated	  in	  Europe.	  They	  considered	  Islamic	  law	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Code	  
Napoleon.	  Other	  European	  civil	  codes	  such	  as	  those	  of	  France,	  Switzerland	  and	  
Belgium	  were	  taken	  into	  account.	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code	  was	  a	  codification	  
of	  Islamic	  law	  for	  the	  most	  part	  (including	  the	  law	  of	  contract,	  property	  and	  family)	  but	  
in	  the	  format	  and	  structure	  of	  European	  civil	  codes.611	  
6.3.2.2 Other	  Statutory	  Sources	  on	  Sale	  
The	  Iranian	  Commercial	  Code	  1932	  differentiates	  between	  commercial	  sales	  and	  civil	  
sales.	  It	  specifies	  that	  a	  sale	  is	  regarded	  as	  commercial	  if	  it	  is	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  resale	  
or	  hire	  (Article	  2(1))	  or	  is	  made	  by	  a	  person	  engaged	  in	  commercial	  activities	  (Article	  3).	  
Nonetheless,	  the	  same	  law	  is	  applicable	  to	  these	  two	  types	  of	  sale.	  The	  Commercial	  
Code	  contains	  no	  provisions	  with	  regard	  to	  commercial	  sales;	  therefore,	  the	  Iranian	  
Civil	  Code	  governs	  both	  commercial	  sales	  and	  non-­‐commercial	  sales.	  There	  are	  
provisions	  concerning	  ‘contract	  of	  carriage’612	  in	  the	  Iranian	  Commercial	  Code,	  and	  
provisions	  concerning	  ‘carriage	  of	  goods	  by	  sea’613	  in	  the	  Iranian	  Maritime	  Code	  1964.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
610	  Hamid	  Bahrami-­‐Ahmadi,	  ‘A	  Historical	  Overview	  on	  the	  Development	  of	  Civil	  Code.’	  
(Available	  in	  Persian.)	  
<http://www.isu.ac.ir/publication/research-­‐quarterly/research-­‐quarterly_24/Research-­‐
Quarterly_2402.htm>	  accessed	  4	  July	  2013.	  
611	  Amin,	  Commercial	  Law	  of	  Iran	  (n	  587)	  36.	  	  
612	  Chapter	  Eight	  on	  ‘Contract	  of	  Carriage,’	  Articles	  377	  to	  394	  of	  Iranian	  Commercial	  Code.	  (Available	  in	  
Persian.)	  
613	  Chapter	  Four	  on	  ‘Carriage	  of	  Goods	  by	  Sea,’	  Article	  52	  to	  68	  of	  Iranian	  Maritime	  Code.	  (Available	  in	  
Persian.)	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These	  provisions	  however	  mainly	  deal	  with	  the	  relationships	  between	  the	  sellers	  and	  
the	  carriers	  rather	  than	  those	  of	  the	  sellers	  and	  buyers.	  It	  is	  thus	  fair	  to	  say	  that	  the	  
only	  source	  of	  Iranian	  law	  on	  the	  sale	  of	  goods	  is	  the	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code.	  
6.3.3 The	  Status	  of	  International	  Conventions	  Under	  the	  Iranian	  Legal	  
System	  
Under	  Article	  9	  of	  the	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code,	  ‘treaty	  stipulations	  which	  have	  been,	  in	  
accordance	  with	  the	  Constitutional	  Law,	  concluded	  between	  the	  Iranian	  Government	  
and	  other	  government[s],	  shall	  have	  the	  force	  of	  law.’	  The	  Iranian	  Constitution	  lays	  
down	  that	  international	  treaties	  must	  be	  approved	  by	  the	  legislature614	  and	  the	  
Council	  of	  Guardians	  must	  determine	  its	  compatibility	  with	  Islamic	  law,615	  and	  finally	  
the	  president	  signs	  the	  treaty.616	  This	  suggests	  that	  when	  the	  provisions	  of	  an	  
international	  convention	  are	  incompatible	  with	  the	  principles	  of	  either	  Islam	  or	  the	  
Constitution,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  the	  Council	  of	  Guardians	  would	  approve	  the	  convention.	  
In	  such	  a	  case,	  a	  possible	  solution	  is	  the	  exercise	  of	  the	  right	  to	  reservation	  to	  those	  
particular	  articles,	  as	  long	  as	  the	  convention	  allows	  for	  the	  making	  of	  reservations	  to	  
those	  articles.617	  The	  significance	  of	  this	  point,	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  CISG,	  is	  discussed	  
below.	  
	  
There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  international	  conventions	  that	  the	  Iranian	  Government	  has	  
acceded	  to	  without	  making	  any	  reservations.	  These	  include	  the	  International	  
Convention	  on	  Maritime	  Search	  and	  Rescue	  1979	  (ratified	  in	  June	  1994),	  the	  
International	  Convention	  for	  Safety	  of	  Life	  at	  Sea	  1984	  (ratified	  in	  July	  1994),	  and	  the	  
International	  Convention	  on	  Salvage	  1989	  (ratified	  in	  May	  1994).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
614	  Article	  77	  of	  the	  Iranian	  Constitution	  states:	  
‘International	  treaties,	  protocols,	  contracts,	  and	  agreements	  must	  be	  approved	  by	  the	  Islamic	  
Consultative	  Assembly.’	  
615	  Article	  96	  of	  the	  Iranian	  Constitution	  states:	  
The	  determination	  of	  compatibility	  of	  the	  legislation	  passed	  by	  the	  Islamic	  Consultative	  Assembly	  
with	  the	  laws	  of	  Islam	  rests	  with	  the	  majority	  vote	  of	  the	  religious	  men	  on	  the	  Guardian	  Council;	  
and	  the	  determination	  of	  its	  compatibility	  with	  the	  Constitution	  rests	  with	  the	  majority	  of	  all	  the	  
members	  of	  the	  Guardian	  Council.	  
616	  Article	  125	  of	  the	  Iranian	  Constitution	  states:	  
The	  President	  or	  his	  legal	  representative	  has	  the	  authority	  to	  sign	  treaties,	  protocols,	  contracts,	  
and	  agreements	  concluded	  by	  the	  Iranian	  government	  with	  other	  governments,	  as	  well	  as	  
agreements	  pertaining	  to	  international	  organizations,	  after	  obtaining	  the	  approval	  of	  the	  Islamic	  
Consultative	  Assembly.	  
617	  Text	  to	  n	  646	  in	  ch	  7.	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However,	  in	  September	  1994	  Iran	  ratified	  the	  International	  Convention	  on	  a	  Unified	  
System	  of	  Description	  and	  Codification	  of	  Goods,	  and	  has	  made	  reservations	  to	  its	  
Article	  4.	  This	  article	  is	  in	  conflict	  with	  Article	  139	  of	  the	  Iranian	  Constitution,	  which	  
requires	  the	  approval	  of	  the	  Majlis	  in	  cases	  where	  one	  party	  to	  the	  dispute	  is	  a	  
foreigner.	  
	  
In	  2001,	  Iran	  also	  signed	  up	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  the	  Recognition	  and	  
Enforcement	  of	  Foreign	  Arbitral	  Awards	  1958	  (the	  New	  York	  Convention).	  
6.4	  Conclusion	  
Iran’s	  vast	  natural	  resources	  and	  considerable	  population	  make	  it	  an	  important	  partner	  
for	  other	  trading	  countries.	  Its	  pattern	  of	  international	  commerce	  as	  an	  exporter	  of	  oil,	  
gas	  and	  commodities	  and	  an	  importer	  of	  manufactured	  goods	  reflects	  developing	  
countries’	  concerns	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  during	  the	  drafting	  process	  of	  the	  CISG.	  Bearing	  
in	  mind	  that	  the	  CISG	  addresses	  the	  concerns	  of	  developing	  nations	  and	  that	  many,	  if	  
not	  all,	  trading	  partners	  of	  Iran	  are	  signatory	  states	  to	  it,	  there	  is	  no	  justification	  for	  
Iran	  not	  to	  adopt	  the	  CISG.	  
	  
The	  status	  of	  international	  conventions	  under	  the	  Iranian	  legal	  system	  means	  that	  Iran	  
has	  already	  acceded	  to	  a	  number	  of	  them.	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  the	  
reason	  why	  Iran	  has	  not	  adopted	  the	  CISG,	  one	  can	  use	  the	  New	  York	  Convention	  as	  a	  
‘litmus	  test.’618	  Professor	  Castellani	  suggests,	  ‘	  .	  .	  .	  Those	  factors	  preventing	  .	  .	  .	  
adoption	  of	  the	  CISG	  in	  developing	  countries	  impede	  the	  adoption	  of	  other	  trade	  law	  
texts	  as	  well.’619	  (See	  appendix	  A.)	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  Iran	  has	  adopted	  the	  New	  York	  
Convention,	  which	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  no	  legal	  reason	  for	  it	  not	  to	  ratify	  the	  CISG.	  	  
	  
In	  chapter	  seven,	  Iranian	  law	  will	  be	  compared	  with	  the	  articles	  of	  the	  CISG	  to	  
determine	  the	  degree	  of	  harmony	  between	  the	  two	  legal	  systems.	  As	  explained	  in	  the	  
introduction	  to	  this	  chapter,	  the	  degree	  of	  harmony	  can	  have	  a	  significant	  influence	  on	  
the	  level	  of	  support	  for	  ratification.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
618	  Email	  from	  Luca	  Castellani	  to	  author	  (n	  541).	  
619	  ibid.	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Chapter	  Seven	  
An	  Investigation	  into	  the	  Compatibility	  of	  the	  CISG	  with	  Iranian	  
Law	  
7.1	  Introduction	  	  
The	  first	  step	  in	  determining	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  ratify	  the	  Convention	  is	  to	  examine	  
whether	  the	  CISG	  is	  compatible	  with	  Iranian	  law.	  The	  rights,	  duties	  and	  remedies	  
accommodated	  in	  the	  CISG	  will	  be	  compared	  with	  those	  provided	  for	  in	  the	  Iranian	  
Civil	  Code.	  Where	  the	  CISG	  is	  different	  from	  the	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code,	  the	  author	  will	  
make	  a	  critical	  examination	  to	  decide	  whether	  such	  a	  discrepancy	  can	  be	  overcome	  
and,	  if	  so,	  how.	  This	  should	  help	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  CISG	  would	  
represent	  a	  radical	  break	  with	  Iranian	  law	  and	  hence	  whether	  the	  cost	  of	  adapting	  to	  a	  
new	  law	  would	  make	  the	  change	  undesirable.	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  provisions	  of	  a	  
uniform	  law	  require	  changes	  in	  legal	  and	  commercial	  practice	  can	  be	  a	  factor	  in	  
determining	  support	  for	  ratification.	  Hence,	  for	  Iran,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  review	  the	  
similarities	  to	  and	  differences	  from	  existing	  law.	  	  
	  
It	  is	  again	  worth	  mentioning	  the	  flexible	  nature	  of	  the	  CISG,	  and	  in	  particular	  Article	  6,	  
which	  allows	  the	  parties	  to	  exclude	  the	  application	  of	  the	  Convention	  from	  their	  
contract	  or,	  subject	  to	  Article	  12,	  to	  derogate	  from	  or	  vary	  the	  effect	  of	  any	  of	  its	  
provisions.620	  Therefore,	  parties	  may	  alter	  or	  exclude	  any	  or	  all	  duties,	  rights	  and	  
remedies.	  Hence	  an	  Iranian	  party	  to	  the	  contract	  could	  seek	  to	  derogate	  from	  or	  
modify	  the	  applicability	  of	  CISG	  provisions	  that	  are	  inconsistent	  with	  Iranian	  law.	  In	  
effect,	  the	  differences	  from	  Iranian	  law,	  and	  the	  cost	  and	  effort	  of	  adapting	  to	  the	  
CISG,	  are	  partly	  under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  parties.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
620	  Article	  12	  of	  the	  CISG	  states:	  	  
Any	  provision	  of	  article	  11,	  article	  29	  or	  Part	  II	  of	  this	  Convention	  that	  allows	  a	  contract	  of	  sale	  or	  
its	  modification	  or	  termination	  by	  agreement	  or	  any	  offer,	  acceptance	  or	  other	  indication	  of	  
intention	  to	  be	  made	  in	  any	  form	  other	  than	  in	  writing	  does	  not	  apply	  where	  any	  party	  has	  his	  
place	  of	  business	  in	  a	  Contracting	  State	  which	  has	  made	  a	  declaration	  under	  article	  96	  of	  this	  
Convention.	  The	  parties	  may	  not	  derogate	  from	  or	  vary	  the	  effect	  or	  this	  article.	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There	  are	  as	  yet	  very	  few	  analyses	  of	  the	  compatibility	  of	  the	  CISG	  with	  Iranian	  law.	  
The	  main	  ones	  are	  the	  doctoral	  theses	  undertaken	  by	  Mirghasem	  Jafarzadeh,621	  Hamid	  
Reza	  Oloumi-­‐Yazdi622	  and	  Ali	  Moghaddam	  Abrishami.623	  Therefore,	  there	  is	  a	  dearth	  of	  
writing	  on	  this	  subject.	  This	  chapter	  will	  emphasise	  the	  important	  points	  made	  by	  
Iranian	  authors,	  and	  additional	  analysis	  will	  be	  made	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  writer’s	  own	  
fieldwork	  in	  Iran.624	  To	  illustrate	  the	  key	  points	  of	  difference	  and	  similarity	  between	  
the	  CISG	  and	  Iranian	  law,	  in	  this	  chapter	  the	  author	  will	  consider	  both	  general	  
principles	  and	  specific	  provisions	  on	  some	  selective	  points	  as	  a	  case	  study.	  Part	  A	  will	  
examine	  the	  general	  principles,	  including	  taking	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  duties	  to	  pay	  
damages	  and	  interest.	  This	  area	  in	  particular	  is	  of	  great	  importance,	  as	  there	  is	  a	  good	  
deal	  of	  controversy	  over	  the	  compatibility	  of	  the	  two	  legal	  systems.	  In	  Part	  B,	  the	  
chapter	  will	  turn	  to	  a	  case-­‐study	  analysis	  of	  the	  rights	  and	  remedies	  available	  to	  
parties.	  This	  is	  important,	  since,	  where	  certain	  rights	  and	  remedies	  provided	  for	  in	  the	  
CISG	  do	  not	  have	  a	  counterpart	  under	  Iranian	  law,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  ensure	  that	  they	  
do	  not	  pose	  a	  threat	  to	  legal	  stability	  in	  Iran.	  The	  CISG	  will	  be	  examined	  first	  and	  then	  
the	  position	  under	  Iranian	  law	  will	  be	  considered	  in	  order	  to	  reach	  a	  conclusion	  on	  the	  
compatibility	  of	  the	  two	  systems.	  
Part	  A	  	  
7.2	  General	  Principles	  
The	  drafters	  of	  the	  Convention	  studied	  different	  legal	  systems	  and	  took	  into	  account	  
their	  rules	  and	  solutions.	  As	  a	  result,	  they	  proposed	  and	  drafted	  provisions	  and	  
principles	  that	  are	  compatible	  with	  many	  of	  the	  rules	  applicable	  in	  different	  countries	  
and	  legal	  systems.	  Below	  the	  author	  will	  concentrate	  on	  some	  of	  the	  more	  important	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
621	  Mirghasem	  Jafarzadeh,	  ‘Buyer’s	  Right	  to	  Withhold	  Performance	  and	  Termination	  of	  Contract:	  A	  
Comparative	  Study	  Under	  English	  Law,	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  
Goods	  1980,	  Iranian	  and	  Shi’ah	  Law’	  (2001).	  
This	  publication	  has	  its	  origin	  in	  Jafarzadeh’s	  1998	  PhD	  thesis	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Sheffield.	  
622	  Hamid	  Reza	  Oloumi-­‐Yazdi,	  ‘Delivery	  in	  International	  Sales	  of	  Goods	  –	  An	  Analytical	  Study	  of	  Iranian	  
Law	  and	  the	  Vienna	  Sale	  Convention’	  (PhD	  thesis,	  University	  of	  Exeter	  1998).	  
623	  Ali	  Moghaddam	  Abrishami,	  ‘How	  to	  Modernise	  Formation	  of	  Contract	  Rules	  in	  Iranian	  Law?	  Proposals	  
for	  Reform	  of	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code	  from	  Comparative	  Perspective	  of	  English	  and	  Uniform	  Law’	  (PhD	  thesis,	  
Queen	  Mary,	  University	  of	  London	  2007).	  
624	  See	  generally	  ch	  8,	  8.2.	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concepts	  and	  principles	  contained	  in	  both	  Iranian	  law	  and	  the	  Convention	  as	  
illustrations	  of	  the	  extent	  of	  this	  compatibility.	  
7.2.1 Duty	  to	  Pay	  Damages	  
All	  legal	  systems	  recognise	  the	  duty	  to	  pay	  damages	  to	  an	  aggrieved	  party;	  however,	  
what	  can	  be	  obtained	  from	  claiming	  damages	  under	  one	  legal	  system	  may	  not	  be	  the	  
same	  under	  another	  system	  of	  law.	  For	  example,	  whether	  indirect	  as	  well	  as	  direct	  loss	  
is	  included	  in	  damages	  and	  whether	  consequential	  damages	  can	  be	  recovered	  or	  not	  
will	  affect	  the	  concept	  of	  damages	  under	  different	  legal	  systems.625	  
	  
The	  Convention	  is	  based	  on	  a	  general	  principle	  that	  the	  party	  in	  breach	  of	  contract	  has	  
to	  pay	  damages	  to	  the	  aggrieved	  party	  unless	  he	  is	  exempt	  from	  liability	  in	  accordance	  
with	  Article	  79626	  of	  the	  Convention.	  This	  principle	  is	  set	  out	  in	  Article	  45(1)(b),627	  
Article	  61(1)(b)628	  and	  Article	  74629	  of	  the	  Convention.	  Under	  the	  CISG,	  damage	  is	  ‘a	  
sum	  equal	  to	  the	  loss,	  including	  loss	  of	  profit,	  suffered	  by	  the	  other	  party	  as	  a	  
consequence	  of	  breach’	  (Article	  74).	  The	  liability	  of	  the	  breaching	  party	  is	  limited	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
625	  Oloumi-­‐Yazdi,	  ‘Delivery	  in	  International	  Sales	  of	  Goods’	  (n	  622).	  
626	  Article	  79	  (2)(a)	  of	  the	  CISG	  states:	  
‘	  .	  .	  .	  (2)	  If	  the	  party's	  failure	  is	  due	  to	  the	  failure	  by	  a	  third	  person	  whom	  he	  has	  engaged	  to	  perform	  the	  
whole	  or	  a	  part	  of	  the	  contract,	  that	  party	  is	  exempt	  from	  liability	  only	  if:	  
(a)	  he	  is	  exempt	  under	  the	  preceding	  paragraph	  .	  .	  .	  ’	  
627	  Article	  45	  of	  CISG	  states:	  
(1)	  If	  the	  seller	  fails	  to	  perform	  any	  of	  his	  obligations	  under	  the	  contract	  or	  this	  Convention,	  the	  
buyer	  may:	  
(a)	  exercise	  the	  rights	  provided	  in	  articles	  46	  to	  52;	  
(b)	  claim	  damages	  as	  provided	  in	  articles	  74	  to	  77.	  
(2)	  The	  buyer	  is	  not	  deprived	  of	  any	  right	  he	  may	  have	  to	  claim	  damages	  by	  exercising	  his	  right	  to	  
other	  remedies.	  
(3)	  No	  period	  of	  grace	  may	  be	  granted	  to	  the	  seller	  by	  a	  court	  or	  arbitral	  tribunal	  when	  the	  buyer	  
resorts	  to	  a	  remedy	  for	  breach	  of	  contract.	  
628	  Article	  61	  of	  the	  CISG	  states:	  
(1)	  If	  the	  buyer	  fails	  to	  perform	  any	  of	  his	  obligations	  under	  the	  contract	  or	  this	  Convention,	  the	  
seller	  may:	  
(a)	  exercise	  the	  rights	  provided	  in	  articles	  62	  to	  65;	  
(b)	  claim	  damages	  as	  provided	  in	  articles	  74	  to	  77.	  
(2)	  The	  seller	  is	  not	  deprived	  of	  any	  right	  he	  may	  have	  to	  claim	  damages	  by	  exercising	  his	  right	  to	  
other	  remedies.	  
(3)	  No	  period	  of	  grace	  may	  be	  granted	  to	  the	  buyer	  by	  a	  court	  or	  arbitral	  tribunal	  when	  the	  seller	  
resorts	  to	  a	  remedy	  for	  breach	  of	  contract.	  
629	  Article	  74	  of	  the	  CISG	  states:	  
Damages	  for	  breach	  of	  contract	  by	  one	  party	  consist	  of	  a	  sum	  equal	  to	  the	  loss,	  including	  loss	  of	  
profit,	  suffered	  by	  the	  other	  party	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  breach.	  Such	  damages	  may	  not	  
exceed	  the	  loss	  which	  the	  party	  in	  breach	  foresaw	  or	  ought	  to	  have	  foreseen	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  
conclusion	  of	  the	  contract,	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  facts	  and	  matters	  of	  which	  he	  then	  knew	  or	  ought	  
to	  have	  known,	  as	  a	  possible	  consequence	  of	  the	  breach	  of	  contract.	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the	  foreseeable	  loss	  suffered	  by	  the	  aggrieved	  party	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  breach.	  The	  
Convention	  also	  states	  that	  ‘the	  loss	  which	  the	  party	  in	  breach	  foresaw	  or	  ought	  to	  
have	  foreseen	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  contract’	  is	  the	  foreseeability	  test	  
for	  recovery	  of	  damages.630	  Therefore,	  where	  such	  damages	  were	  foreseeable	  to	  the	  
seller,	  the	  seller	  is	  liable	  and	  damages	  can	  be	  awarded	  under	  the	  Convention.631	  
It	  is	  said	  that	  Article	  74	  of	  the	  Convention	  is	  important	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  indirect	  
consequences	  of	  breach.632	  As	  regards	  whether	  the	  liability	  extends	  to	  losses	  by	  
indirect	  causality,	  there	  is	  no	  explicit	  answer	  in	  the	  Convention.	  To	  answer	  this	  
question,	  the	  criterion	  of	  foreseeability	  should	  apply.	  Therefore,	  the	  liability	  of	  the	  
breaching	  party	  extends	  to	  the	  loss	  indirectly	  caused	  to	  the	  other	  party	  provided	  that	  
the	  party	  in	  breach	  could	  foresee	  this	  loss	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  
contract.633	  Under	  the	  Convention,	  the	  only	  method	  of	  recovery	  from	  losses	  is	  
monetary	  compensation,	  as	  stated	  in	  Article	  74,	  and	  it	  does	  not	  permit	  restitution.	  This	  
may	  cause	  problems,	  as	  ‘the	  injured	  party	  will	  sometimes	  not	  be	  placed	  in	  his	  original	  
economic	  position.’634	  
	  
Under	  Iranian	  law,	  the	  aggrieved	  party	  is	  also	  entitled	  to	  claim	  damages	  when	  the	  
other	  party	  has	  breached	  the	  contract	  and	  this	  has	  caused	  loss	  or	  loss	  of	  profit.	  The	  
breach	  of	  contractual	  obligation,	  however,	  does	  not	  have	  any	  legal	  impact	  when	  it	  
does	  not	  cause	  any	  damage	  to	  the	  aggrieved	  party.	  When	  it	  is	  ascertained	  that	  the	  
aggrieved	  party	  would	  have	  obtained	  profit	  had	  the	  defaulting	  party	  fulfilled	  his	  
obligations,	  loss	  of	  profit	  can	  be	  compensated	  for.	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  such	  a	  level	  of	  
assurance	  of	  obtaining	  profit	  may	  be	  ascertained	  by	  a	  relevant	  custom	  and	  usage.635	  
When	  non-­‐performance	  of	  contractual	  obligations	  causes	  loss	  of	  profit,	  it	  is	  easier	  to	  
ascertain	  such	  a	  degree	  of	  certainty	  so	  as	  to	  entitle	  the	  innocent	  party	  to	  damages	  for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
630	  Jacob	  S	  Ziegel,	  ‘The	  Remedial	  Provisions	  in	  the	  Vienna	  Sales	  Convention:	  Some	  Common	  Law	  
Perspectives’	  in	  Galston	  and	  Smit	  (eds),	  International	  Sales:	  The	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  
for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  (Matthew	  Bender	  1984)	  ch	  9,	  9–1;	  Joseph	  Lookofsky,	  ‘The	  1980	  
United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods’	  in	  J	  Herbots	  (eds)/	  R	  
Blanpain	  general	  (eds),	  International	  Encyclopaedia	  of	  Laws	  –	  Contracts	  (29th	  Supp,	  2000).	  
631	  Schlechtriem,	  Uniform	  Sales	  Law	  (n	  169).	  
632	  Lookofsky,	  ‘The	  1980	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods’	  (n	  
630).	  
633	  Victor	  Knapp,	  ‘Article	  74’	  in	  Bianca	  and	  Bonell	  (eds),	  Commentary	  on	  the	  International	  Sales	  Law	  
(Giuffré:	  Milan,	  1987)	  538.	  
634	  ibid.	  
635	  N	  Katouzian,	  Huquq-­‐i	  Madani	  (Civil	  Law,	  General	  Principles	  of	  Contracts)	  vol	  4,	  231–232.	  
(Available	  in	  Persian.)	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the	  lost	  profit.	  However,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  Iranian	  law	  would	  compensate	  for	  the	  loss	  of	  
profit	  when	  it	  involves	  a	  possible	  profit	  of	  resale	  or	  any	  future	  transaction	  with	  regard	  
to	  the	  object	  of	  sale.636	  	  
	  
Unlike	  the	  Convention,	  the	  Iranian	  Civil	  Procedure	  Code	  specifies	  that	  the	  aggrieved	  
party	  cannot	  be	  compensated	  for	  any	  loss	  that	  is	  not	  directly	  caused	  by	  the	  failure	  of	  
the	  party	  in	  breach.	  Therefore,	  determination	  of	  direct	  loss	  and	  indirect	  loss	  does	  not	  
seem	  to	  be	  an	  easy	  task.	  According	  to	  Dr	  Katouzian,	  a	  contemporary	  Iranian	  jurist,	  
direct	  loss	  is	  a	  loss	  that	  is	  directly	  and	  inevitably	  caused	  by	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  breaching	  
party.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  breach	  of	  contract	  is	  the	  cause	  of	  direct	  loss,	  and	  other	  
factors,	  if	  any,	  should	  not	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  loss	  to	  a	  degree	  that	  can	  break	  the	  
logical	  relationship	  between	  cause	  and	  effect.637	  
	  
For	  the	  breach	  of	  obligations	  caused	  by	  the	  defaulting	  party,	  the	  extent	  of	  his	  
responsibility	  is	  for	  a	  foreseeable	  loss	  (the	  Convention	  and	  Iranian	  law	  are	  similar	  in	  
this	  regard).	  Article	  221	  of	  the	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code	  contains	  this	  principle,	  and	  provides	  
that:	  
	  
If	  any	  party	  undertakes	  to	  perform	  or	  to	  abstain	  from	  any	  act,	  he	  is	  responsible	  
to	  pay	  compensation	  to	  the	  other	  party	  in	  the	  event	  of	  his	  not	  carrying	  out	  his	  
undertaking	  provided	  the	  compensation	  for	  such	  losses	  is	  specified	  in	  the	  
contract	  or	  is	  understood	  in	  the	  contract	  according	  to	  customary	  law	  or	  provided	  
such	  compensation	  is	  by	  law	  regarded	  as	  guaranteed.	  	  
	  
Therefore,	  the	  limit	  of	  responsibility	  of	  a	  party	  in	  breach	  is	  those	  situations	  that	  are	  
determined	  in	  the	  contract.	  In	  the	  event	  that	  recoverable	  damages	  are	  not	  foreseen	  in	  
the	  contract,	  the	  gap	  may	  be	  filled	  with	  custom	  and	  usage,	  and	  the	  party	  in	  breach	  will	  
be	  accountable	  for	  direct	  and	  ordinary	  loss	  caused	  by	  his	  breach	  of	  contract.	  However,	  
parties	  may	  agree	  on	  extending	  the	  liability	  of	  the	  party	  in	  breach	  to	  the	  instances	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
636	  Oloumi-­‐Yazdi,	  ‘Delivery	  in	  International	  Sales	  of	  Goods’	  (n	  622).	  
This	  is	  in	  line	  with	  the	  decision	  of	  court	  of	  appeal	  in	  Victoria	  Laundry	  (Windsor)	  Ltd	  v	  Newman	  Industries	  
Ltd.	  which	  held	  that	  claimant	  only	  had	  to	  be	  compensated	  for	  ordinary	  and	  not	  extraordinary	  loss	  of	  
profit.	  See	  Victoria	  Laundry	  (Windsor)	  Ltd	  v	  Newman	  Industries	  Ltd	  [1949]	  2	  KB	  528.	  
637	  Katouzian,	  Huquq-­‐i	  Madani	  (n	  635)	  248.	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cover	  indirect	  and	  unusual	  loss	  arising	  from	  the	  breach.638	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that,	  
according	  to	  a	  general	  principle	  of	  Islamic	  law	  with	  regard	  to	  liability	  for	  damages,	  
there	  is	  no	  liability	  for	  unforeseeable	  and	  uncommon	  loss.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  type	  
of	  breach	  that	  has	  to	  be	  foreseen;	  it	  is	  rather	  the	  consequences	  of	  that	  breach	  with	  
regard	  to	  the	  interests	  and	  status	  of	  other	  party	  that	  have	  to	  be	  foreseen.639	  	  
With	  regard	  to	  methods	  of	  compensation,	  Iranian	  law	  is	  silent.	  Thus	  damages	  can	  be	  
recovered	  by	  either	  monetary	  compensation	  or	  compensation	  by	  restitution.	  However,	  
where	  the	  damage	  can	  be	  compensated	  for	  by	  restitution,	  the	  aggrieved	  party	  cannot	  
be	  compensated	  by	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  money.640	  
	  
One	  can	  therefore	  see	  that	  damages,	  under	  both	  Iranian	  law	  and	  the	  Convention,	  
cover	  loss	  including	  the	  loss	  of	  profit.	  The	  loss	  that	  is	  the	  consequence	  of	  a	  breach	  of	  
contract	  has	  to	  be	  foreseeable	  by	  the	  party	  in	  breach.	  Iranian	  law	  requires	  that	  the	  loss	  
or	  loss	  of	  profit	  be	  caused	  directly	  by	  the	  party	  in	  breach,	  while	  the	  Convention	  has	  no	  
such	  requirement.	  Therefore,	  under	  the	  CISG,	  the	  indirect	  consequences	  of	  breach	  
may	  be	  recoverable	  provided	  that	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  Convention	  are	  met.	  An	  
examination	  of	  the	  duty	  to	  pay	  damages	  under	  the	  two	  legal	  systems	  thus	  shows	  that	  
there	  are	  no	  fundamental	  differences	  between	  them.	  Therefore,	  there	  should	  be	  no	  
significant	  adjustments,	  at	  least	  in	  relation	  to	  these	  points,	  for	  Iranian	  lawyers	  and	  
traders	  if	  the	  CISG	  were	  adopted.	  	  
7.2.2 Duty	  to	  Pay	  Interest	  
As	  for	  the	  payment	  of	  interest	  as	  a	  general	  principle,	  there	  is	  a	  point	  of	  divergence	  
between	  the	  CISG	  and	  Iranian	  law.	  The	  Convention	  specifies	  provisions	  with	  regard	  to	  
interest	  that	  seem	  to	  be	  incompatible	  with	  Islamic	  law	  and	  Iranian	  law.	  The	  proposal	  at	  
the	  conference,641	  at	  the	  time	  of	  drafting	  the	  CISG,	  reflected	  different	  views,	  divergent	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
638	  Oloumi-­‐Yazdi,	  ‘Delivery	  in	  International	  Sales	  of	  Goods’	  (n	  622).	  
639	  Katouzian,	  Huquq-­‐i	  Madani	  (n	  635)	  250–261.	  
640	  Oloumi-­‐Yazdi,	  ‘Delivery	  in	  International	  Sales	  of	  Goods’	  (n	  622).	  
641	  ‘LEGISLATIVE	  HISTORY	  1980	  Vienna	  Diplomatic	  Conference,	  Report	  of	  the	  First	  Committee.’	  
<http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cisg/1stcommittee/summaries78,84.html>	  accessed	  25	  July	  2013.	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theoretical	  approaches	  and	  conflicting	  practical	  requirements	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  duty	  
to	  pay	  interest.	  It	  was	  also	  opposed	  for	  religious	  reasons.642	  
Article	  74	  of	  the	  Convention	  sets	  out	  a	  general	  rule	  that	  damages	  caused	  as	  a	  
consequence	  of	  breach	  of	  contract	  should	  be	  recovered.	  It	  then	  provides	  in	  Article	  78	  
that	  ‘if	  a	  party	  fails	  to	  pay	  the	  price	  or	  any	  other	  sum	  that	  is	  in	  arrears,	  the	  other	  party	  
is	  entitled	  to	  interest	  on	  it,	  without	  prejudice	  to	  any	  claim	  for	  damages	  recoverable	  
under	  Article	  74.’	  It	  is	  understood	  that,	  under	  the	  obligation	  to	  pay	  interest,	  the	  debtor	  
is	  responsible	  for	  paying	  interest	  even	  if	  his	  failure	  was	  the	  consequence	  of	  an	  
impediment	  beyond	  his	  control,	  and	  thus,	  according	  to	  Article	  79,	  he	  is	  not	  liable	  for	  
damages.643	  It	  is	  also	  laid	  down	  in	  Article	  84	  (1)	  of	  the	  Convention	  that,	  in	  the	  event	  
that	  the	  seller	  is	  bound	  to	  refund	  the	  price,	  he	  must	  pay	  interest	  on	  it	  from	  the	  date	  
the	  price	  was	  paid.	  	  
It	  is	  argued	  that:	  
	  
	  .	  .	  .	  a	  general	  obligation	  for	  the	  breaching	  party	  to	  pay	  interest	  may	  well	  
preclude	  the	  argument	  that	  an	  award	  of	  interest	  under	  Article	  78	  might	  be	  
declared	  invalid	  under	  the	  applicable	  domestic	  law,	  [and]	  such	  an	  award	  would	  
surely	  be	  unenforceable	  in	  those	  fora	  where	  the	  applicable	  domestic	  law	  
prohibits	  interest	  payments.644	  	  
	  
However,	  whether	  or	  not	  such	  a	  conflict	  over	  the	  payment	  of	  interest	  would	  act	  as	  
much	  of	  a	  deterrent	  against	  adoption	  of	  the	  Convention	  by	  Iran	  requires	  more	  in-­‐
depth	  examination.	  
	  
With	  regard	  to	  Iranian	  law,	  there	  is	  a	  mandatory	  rule	  in	  Islamic	  law	  that	  prohibits	  riba.	  
Riba	  or	  interest	  includes	  any	  unwarranted	  increase	  in	  capital	  which	  is	  free	  from	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
642	  Egyptian	  Delegate	  proposed	  ‘it	  would	  be	  advisable	  to	  provide	  for	  reservations	  which	  would	  permit	  
any	  country,	  particularly	  those	  where	  the	  concept	  of	  interest	  was	  incompatible	  with	  their	  religion,	  to	  
apply	  the	  relevant	  clauses	  in	  a	  different	  manner.’	  	  
‘LEGISLATIVE	  HISTORY	  1980	  Vienna	  Diplomatic	  Conference,	  Summary	  Records	  of	  Meetings	  of	  the	  First	  
Committee,	  34th	  meeting.’	  	  
<http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cisg/firstcommittee/Meeting34.html>	  accessed	  25	  July	  2013.	  
643	  Schlechtriem,	  Uniform	  Sales	  Law	  (n	  169).	  
644	  Lookofsky,	  ‘The	  1980	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods’	  (n	  
630).	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compensation.645	  Therefore,	  acceptance	  of	  the	  payment	  of	  interest	  on	  an	  unpaid	  price	  
or	  any	  amount	  when	  the	  time	  of	  its	  payment	  has	  elapsed	  contradicts	  the	  principle	  of	  
prohibition	  of	  riba	  under	  Islamic	  law.	  	  
	  
One	  might	  argue	  that	  this	  conflict	  could	  easily	  be	  avoided	  by	  making	  a	  reservation	  to	  
Article	  78	  of	  the	  Convention.	  But	  this	  could	  easily	  be	  refuted	  by	  closer	  analysis	  of	  the	  
Final	  Provisions	  of	  the	  Convention,	  embodied	  in	  Articles	  89–101.	  There	  is	  no	  provision	  
of	  the	  Convention	  that	  allows	  reservation	  to	  Article	  78.646	  Article	  98	  provides	  that	  ‘no	  
reservations	  are	  permitted	  except	  those	  expressly	  authorized	  in	  this	  Convention.’	  
Having	  said	  that,	  by	  virtue	  of	  Article	  6,	  parties	  may	  derogate	  from	  or	  vary	  any	  or	  all	  
provisions	  of	  the	  Convention.647	  Therefore,	  if	  a	  contracting	  party	  does	  not	  accept	  
paying	  interest,	  he	  can	  choose	  to	  deviate	  from	  Article	  78.	  Article	  78	  of	  the	  Convention,	  
like	  its	  other	  provisions,	  is	  applied	  when	  parties	  have	  not	  stipulated	  otherwise,	  and	  by	  
their	  silence	  have	  expressed	  their	  consent	  that	  the	  Convention	  be	  applied.648	  This	  
interpretation	  therefore	  clarifies	  that	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Convention	  do	  not	  
contradict	  the	  principles	  of	  Islamic	  law.	  
	  
Besides	  that,	  it	  is	  stated	  that	  most	  schools	  of	  Islamic	  law	  are	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  when	  
the	  debtor	  voluntarily	  returns	  more	  than	  what	  he	  owes,	  then	  it	  is	  lawful.649	  The	  Council	  
of	  Guardians,	  which	  according	  to	  the	  Iranian	  Constitution	  has	  the	  duty	  to	  examine	  the	  
compatibility	  of	  rules	  and	  legislation	  with	  Islamic	  law,	  has	  authorised	  a	  clause	  to	  be	  
stipulated	  in	  the	  contract	  which	  necessitates	  the	  debtor	  to	  pay	  12%	  of	  the	  unpaid	  
amount	  of	  a	  loan	  to	  the	  bank	  when	  he	  delays	  making	  the	  repayment	  of	  this	  loan.650	  It	  
should	  be	  noted	  that	  Iranian	  law	  recognises	  late	  payment	  compensation	  as	  contained	  
in	  Articles	  515(2)	  and	  522	  of	  the	  Iranian	  Civil	  Procedure	  Code	  1379	  (2000).	  Late	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
645	  Nabil	  A	  Saleh,	  Unlawful	  Gain	  and	  Legitimate	  Profits	  in	  Islamic	  Law	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press	  1986)	  
13–15.	  
646	  T	  S	  Twibell,	  ‘Implementation	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  
Sale	  of	  Goods	  (CISG)	  under	  Shari’a	  Law:	  will	  Article	  78	  of	  the	  CISG	  Be	  Enforced	  When	  the	  Forum	  Is	  an	  
Islamic	  State?’	  (1997)	  9	  International	  Legal	  Perspective	  25;	  Oloumi-­‐Yazdi,	  ‘Delivery	  in	  International	  Sales	  
of	  Goods’	  (n	  622).	  
647	  Article	  6	  of	  the	  Convention	  states:	  
‘The	  parties	  may	  exclude	  the	  application	  of	  this	  Convention	  or,	  subject	  to	  article	  12,	  derogate	  from	  or	  
vary	  the	  effect	  of	  any	  of	  its	  provisions.’	  
648	  Oloumi-­‐Yazdi,	  ‘Delivery	  in	  International	  Sales	  of	  Goods’	  (n	  622).	  
649	  Saleh,	  Unlawful	  Gain	  and	  Legitimate	  Profits	  in	  Islamic	  Law	  (n	  645)	  36.	  
650	  The	  letter	  No	  7742	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Guardians,	  in	  The	  Iranian	  Official	  Gazette,	  No	  11301	  on	  11	  
Esfand	  1361	  (2nd	  March	  1983).	  (Available	  in	  Persian.)	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payment	  compensation	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  interest.651	  Therefore,	  it	  could	  
be	  concluded	  that	  under	  Iranian	  law	  it	  is	  lawful	  to	  pay	  interest	  on	  compensation	  of	  
damages	  caused	  by	  late	  payment.	  
	  
On	  top	  of	  that,	  on	  4	  October	  1987	  the	  Council	  of	  Guardians	  in	  Iran	  held	  that	  it	  is	  
permissible	  to	  receive	  interest	  from	  those	  foreign	  trading	  partners	  that	  do	  not	  regard	  
interest	  as	  illegal.652	  Therefore,	  one	  can	  argue	  that	  the	  interest	  referred	  to	  in	  Articles	  
84	  and	  78	  of	  the	  Convention	  is	  not	  the	  type	  that	  is	  illegal	  under	  the	  Islamic	  law	  of	  Iran,	  
and	  as	  a	  result	  adoption	  of	  these	  provisions	  of	  the	  Convention	  is	  justifiable	  and	  
compatible	  with	  Iranian	  law.	  
	  
One	  can	  conclude	  that	  the	  Convention	  in	  no	  way	  contradicts	  the	  principles	  and	  
fundamental	  values	  of	  Iranian	  law	  and	  Islam.	  Iran	  can	  therefore	  adopt	  the	  CISG	  
without	  departing	  from	  the	  principles	  and	  values	  that	  have	  been	  so	  important	  to	  it.	  
Iran’s	  accession	  to	  the	  Convention	  would	  appear	  to	  have	  benefits	  for	  Iran	  at	  an	  
international	  level,	  as	  it	  would	  most	  likely	  promote	  Iran’s	  international	  trade	  and	  be	  
beneficial	  for	  its	  economic	  growth	  and	  development.	  Iran’s	  trading	  partners	  would	  be	  
able	  to	  predict	  the	  governing	  law	  of	  the	  contract.	  This	  governing	  law,	  which	  is	  familiar	  
to	  them	  and	  derived	  from	  international	  customs	  and	  trade	  usages,	  would	  enable	  them	  
to	  enter	  into	  contracts	  with	  Iran	  with	  a	  higher	  degree	  of	  certainty,	  which	  would	  
promote	  stronger	  trade	  relations.	  
	  
It	  is	  also	  worth	  mentioning	  that	  accession	  to	  the	  CISG	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  our	  own	  
national	  law	  will	  be	  neglected	  or	  abandoned.	  Since	  the	  Convention	  governs	  only	  
international	  sales	  contracts	  between	  parties	  whose	  places	  of	  business	  are	  in	  two	  
different	  countries,	  the	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code	  would	  still	  govern	  contracts	  of	  sales	  made	  
within	  Iran.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
651	  H	  Safai,	  M	  Adel,	  M	  Kazemi,	  and	  A	  Mirzanejad,	  The	  Law	  of	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  –	  A	  
Comparative	  Study	  (2nd	  edn,	  University	  of	  Tehran	  Press	  2008)	  446.	  
(Available	  in	  Persian.)	  
652	  ibid.	  Sayed	  Hassan	  Amin,	  ‘Banking	  and	  Finance	  Based	  On	  Islamic	  Principles	  –	  Law	  and	  Practice	  in	  
Modern	  Iran’	  (1989)	  9	  Islamic	  and	  Comparative	  Law	  Quarterly	  1.	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Part	  B	  	  
7.3	  Case	  Study	  
7.3.1	  Place	  of	  Delivery	  
In	  accordance	  with	  Article	  31	  of	  the	  Convention,	  when	  the	  contract	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  a	  
particular	  location	  for	  handing	  over	  the	  goods,	  the	  place	  of	  delivery	  is	  determined	  by	  
whether	  the	  sale	  involves	  carriage	  of	  goods	  or	  not.	  The	  Convention	  sets	  out	  that	  when	  
the	  contract	  of	  sale	  involves	  carriage	  of	  goods,	  the	  seller	  hands	  over	  the	  goods	  to	  the	  
first	  carrier	  for	  transmission	  to	  the	  buyer.	  When	  the	  contract	  is	  related	  to	  specific	  
goods	  or	  goods	  to	  be	  manufactured	  or	  produced	  or	  goods	  to	  be	  drawn	  from	  stock	  at	  a	  
particular	  place,	  the	  goods	  will	  be	  placed	  at	  the	  buyer’s	  disposal	  at	  that	  place;	  in	  other	  
cases,	  it	  will	  be	  placed	  at	  the	  seller’s	  place	  of	  business.653	  If	  it	  is	  contractually	  agreed,	  
the	  seller	  is	  bound	  to	  deliver	  ‘at	  any	  other	  particular	  place.’	  
	  
Under	  Iranian	  law,	  the	  statutory	  regulation	  regarding	  place	  of	  delivery	  is	  different	  from	  
the	  Convention.	  Under	  Iranian	  civil	  law,	  the	  seller	  has	  to	  place	  the	  goods	  at	  the	  buyer’s	  
disposal	  at	  the	  place	  of	  conclusion	  of	  the	  contract,	  unless	  stated	  otherwise.654	  As	  an	  
Iranian	  scholar655	  has	  argued,	  this	  could	  result	  in	  confusion	  and	  ambiguity	  on	  the	  
following	  grounds:	  (i)	  there	  is	  no	  express	  provision	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  place	  of	  
conclusion	  of	  a	  contract	  in	  the	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  delivery	  
should	  not	  be	  linked	  to	  the	  place	  of	  conclusion	  of	  the	  contract,	  since	  it	  is	  the	  place	  of	  
performance	  of	  the	  contract	  which	  is	  more	  important	  and	  practical;	  (ii)	  it	  is	  impossible	  
to	  establish	  the	  place	  and	  time	  of	  conclusion	  of	  the	  contract	  when	  the	  contract	  
involves	  international	  sales;	  and	  (iii)	  when	  the	  contracting	  parties	  fail	  to	  take	  into	  
account	  an	  issue	  such	  as	  place	  of	  delivery,	  it	  is	  the	  conductive	  rules	  of	  law	  of	  contracts	  
that	  is	  meant	  to	  fill	  the	  gaps.	  Therefore,	  it	  should	  be	  either	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  parties	  
or	  common	  usages	  which	  fill	  the	  gap.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  place	  of	  delivery	  should	  be	  what	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
653	  Article	  31	  of	  the	  CISG.	  
654	  Article	  375	  of	  the	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code	  states:	  
‘Delivery	  should	  be	  made	  at	  the	  place	  where	  the	  contract	  was	  concluded,	  unless	  another	  place	  is	  
required	  by	  common	  usage	  or	  unless	  by	  a	  provision	  in	  the	  contract	  of	  sale	  a	  special	  place	  has	  been	  fixed	  
for	  the	  delivery.’	  
655	  Oloumi-­‐Yazdi,	  ‘Delivery	  in	  International	  Sales	  of	  Goods’	  (n	  622).	  
179	  
the	  parties	  would	  have	  agreed	  on,	  had	  it	  been	  decided	  by	  them.	  The	  place	  of	  
conclusion	  of	  the	  contract	  is	  not	  fit	  for	  this	  purpose,	  as	  parties	  often	  do	  not	  know	  
where	  the	  contract	  is	  concluded.656	  
	  
It	  has	  also	  been	  argued	  that	  Article	  375	  of	  the	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code	  is	  based	  only	  on	  old	  
customs	  and	  usage	  and	  has	  no	  strong	  origin	  in	  religion.	  In	  addition,	  Article	  375	  is	  not	  a	  
compulsory	  rule,	  and	  the	  will	  of	  parties	  or	  customs	  and	  trade	  usages	  will	  supersede	  
this	  article.657	  Therefore,	  adoption	  of	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Convention,	  which	  is	  based	  
on	  modern	  trade	  usages	  and	  customs,	  does	  not	  contradict	  Iranian	  law,	  and	  Iran	  can	  
easily	  adopt	  the	  Convention.	  
7.3.2 Passing	  of	  Risk	  
According	  to	  Articles	  67	  and	  69	  of	  the	  Convention,	  the	  passing	  of	  risk	  takes	  place	  upon	  
physical	  acts	  of	  transfer	  of	  possession.	  Article	  67	  must	  be	  read	  in	  conjunction	  with	  
Article	  69,	  since	  the	  circumstances	  not	  covered	  by	  Article	  67	  fall	  automatically	  into	  
Article	  69.658	  Apart	  from	  special	  circumstances	  that	  come	  under	  Article	  68,	  the	  two	  
Articles	  (67	  and	  69)	  together	  accommodate	  comprehensive	  rules	  for	  the	  passing	  of	  risk	  
in	  all	  cases.659	  
	  
When	  the	  carriage	  of	  goods	  is	  involved	  in	  the	  contract,	  the	  passing	  of	  risk	  is	  subject	  to	  
the	  handing	  over	  of	  the	  goods	  to	  the	  first	  carrier	  (Article	  67(1)).	  Article	  67(1)	  embodies	  
the	  traditional	  solution	  for	  the	  passing	  of	  risk,	  and	  the	  provision	  does	  not	  differentiate	  
between	  carriage	  by	  sea,	  road	  or	  air	  or	  by	  multimodal	  transport.660	  In	  cases	  of	  
combined	  modes	  of	  transport,	  it	  does	  not	  divide	  the	  risk.661	  The	  passing	  of	  risk	  is	  
marked	  by	  the	  transfer	  of	  goods	  to	  the	  carrier	  (Article	  67(1)).	  In	  most	  cases	  of	  carriage,	  
therefore,	  the	  passing	  of	  risk	  to	  the	  buyer	  takes	  place	  at	  this	  point,	  and	  practical	  
considerations	  correspond	  with	  this	  general	  CISG	  rule	  that	  the	  buyer	  will	  be	  in	  a	  better	  
position	  to	  inspect	  goods	  damaged	  by	  transit-­‐related	  risks	  and	  to	  make	  claims	  against	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
656	  ibid.	  
657	  Safai,	  Adel,	  Kazemi,	  and	  Mirzanejad,	  The	  Law	  of	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  (n	  651)	  446.	  
658	  Honnold,	  Uniform	  Law	  for	  International	  Sales	  (n	  241);	  Barry	  Nicholas,	  ‘Article	  67’	  in	  Bianca	  and	  Bonell	  
(eds),	  Commentary	  on	  the	  International	  Sales	  Law	  (Giuffré:	  Milan	  1987)	  487.	  
659	  Nicholas,	  ibid.	  
660	  Schlechtriem,	  Uniform	  Sales	  Law	  (n	  169).	  
661	  ibid.	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the	  carrier	  or	  insurer	  concerned.662	  The	  passage	  of	  risk	  is	  not	  influenced	  by	  the	  fact	  
that	  the	  seller	  holds	  the	  documents	  of	  transport	  (Article	  67(1)).	  Therefore,	  maintaining	  
the	  documents	  to	  secure	  payment	  and	  the	  reciprocal	  right	  to	  control	  the	  disposition	  of	  
the	  goods	  does	  not	  prevent	  the	  passing	  of	  the	  risk	  to	  the	  buyer.	  This	  provision	  implies	  
that	  the	  passing	  of	  risk	  is	  not	  dependent	  upon	  the	  transfer	  of	  title.663	  	  
	  
When	  no	  carriage	  of	  goods	  is	  involved,	  the	  transfer	  of	  risk	  takes	  place	  when	  the	  buyer	  
takes	  over	  the	  goods	  or	  the	  goods	  are	  placed	  at	  his	  disposal	  (Article	  69(1)).	  If	  the	  buyer	  
is	  bound	  to	  take	  over	  the	  goods	  at	  a	  place	  other	  than	  the	  seller’s	  place	  of	  business,	  the	  
risk	  passes	  under	  Article	  69(2)	  when	  the	  goods	  are	  delivered	  and	  the	  buyer	  knows	  that	  
the	  goods	  are	  placed	  at	  his	  disposal	  at	  that	  place.	  Passing	  of	  risk,	  therefore,	  has	  taken	  
place	  when	  the	  buyer	  is	  in	  control	  of	  the	  goods	  or	  his	  control	  over	  the	  goods	  is	  better	  
than	  the	  seller’s.	  If	  the	  buyer	  fails	  to	  take	  over	  the	  goods	  on	  time	  at	  the	  seller’s	  place	  
of	  business,	  the	  risk	  passes	  to	  him	  at	  the	  point	  at	  which	  he	  breaches	  this	  
commitment.664	  However,	  when	  the	  provision	  of	  the	  contract	  specifies	  that	  the	  buyer	  
can	  collect	  the	  goods	  within	  a	  given	  period,	  the	  passing	  of	  risk	  does	  not	  takes	  place	  
until	  the	  given	  period	  has	  elapsed,	  regardless	  of	  the	  goods	  being	  held	  available	  during	  
the	  given	  period.665	  But	  when	  the	  contract	  permits	  the	  buyer	  to	  collect	  the	  goods	  
within	  a	  given	  period	  at	  a	  place	  other	  that	  the	  seller’s	  place	  of	  business,	  and	  the	  goods	  
are	  available,	  the	  risk	  will	  pass	  before	  the	  period	  has	  expired;	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  seller	  is	  
in	  no	  better	  position	  to	  protect	  against	  the	  loss.666	  In	  spite	  of	  all	  this	  discussed	  above,	  
the	  scope	  of	  application	  of	  Article	  69	  is	  limited	  in	  practice,	  as	  most	  international	  
contracts	  of	  sale	  involve	  the	  carriage	  of	  goods.667	  
	  
When	  goods	  are	  in	  transit,	  the	  first	  sentence	  of	  Article	  68	  lays	  down	  the	  primary	  rule	  
that	  the	  buyer	  bears	  the	  risk	  from	  the	  moment	  the	  contract	  is	  made.	  In	  order	  to	  
protect	  buyers	  in	  developing	  countries,	  the	  opponents	  included	  this	  rule	  (Article	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  Lookofsky,	  ‘The	  1980	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods’	  (n	  
630).	  
663	  Schlechtriem,	  Uniform	  Sales	  Law	  (n	  169).	  






68(1)),	  whereby	  the	  risk	  passes	  at	  the	  time	  of	  contracting.668	  The	  second	  sentence	  of	  
Article	  68,	  whereby	  the	  risk	  passes	  retroactively	  at	  the	  time	  the	  goods	  were	  handed	  
over	  to	  the	  carrier,	  was	  more	  acceptable	  to	  Western	  experts,	  as	  they	  believed	  it	  is	  
difficult	  in	  most	  cases	  to	  determine	  when	  damage	  during	  transport	  has	  taken	  place.669	  
One	  can	  argue	  that,	  when	  the	  contract	  is	  concluded,	  the	  buyer	  does	  not	  physically	  
possess	  the	  goods.	  However,	  he	  may	  acquire	  constructive	  possession	  of	  the	  goods	  
through	  shipping	  documents	  or	  he	  may	  examine	  the	  goods	  and	  claim	  damages	  when	  
he	  receives	  them,	  as	  he	  is	  in	  a	  better	  position	  than	  the	  seller.	  Furthermore,	  when	  there	  
is	  doubt	  over	  the	  possession	  of	  the	  goods,	  the	  effects	  of	  law	  would	  be	  to	  give	  the	  
possession	  to	  the	  person	  with	  the	  legal	  title	  to	  the	  goods.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  buyer	  is	  
seen	  as	  the	  person	  who	  has	  the	  possession	  of	  the	  goods.	  Having	  said	  that,	  according	  to	  
Article	  6	  of	  the	  Convention,	  parties	  can	  agree	  on	  the	  time	  of	  passing	  of	  risk.	  Parties	  are	  
at	  absolute	  liberty	  to	  agree	  on	  the	  time	  of	  passing	  of	  risk,	  which	  can	  even	  be	  prior	  to	  
the	  transfer	  of	  property.	  
	  
Under	  Iranian	  law,	  the	  risk	  passes	  on	  delivery.	  This	  principle	  has	  its	  origin	  in	  Islamic	  
law.	  It	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  justify	  passing	  of	  risk	  under	  Iranian	  law	  when	  there	  are	  
other	  legal	  systems	  in	  which	  risk	  passes	  at	  the	  time	  of	  conclusion	  of	  the	  contract.	  
Those	  legal	  systems	  believe	  that,	  once	  ownership	  is	  transferred,	  the	  risk,	  accidental	  
damages	  and	  loss	  should	  also	  be	  borne	  by	  the	  owner.670	  
	  
Passing	  of	  risk	  on	  delivery	  puts	  the	  party	  in	  control	  of	  the	  goods	  at	  risk	  of	  loss	  or	  
damage.	  It	  is	  argued	  that,	  since	  transfer	  of	  risk	  by	  delivery	  derives	  from	  the	  intention	  
of	  the	  parties,	  they	  may	  agree	  on	  the	  passing	  of	  risk	  to	  the	  buyer	  at	  a	  time	  prior	  to	  the	  
transfer	  of	  property	  or	  at	  the	  time	  of	  contract.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  buyer	  
acknowledges	  accepting	  defective	  goods	  and	  waives	  any	  rights	  he	  may	  have	  had	  when	  
the	  goods	  delivered	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  defective	  or	  non-­‐conforming.	  If	  it	  later	  becomes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
668	  Argentina,	  Egypt,	  Pakistan,	  Republic	  of	  Korea,	  Turkey;	  Document	  A/CONF.97/L.15	  
‘LEGISLATIVE	  HISTORY	  1980	  Vienna	  Diplomatic	  Conference,	  M	  Proposals	  and	  Amendments	  Submitted	  to	  
the	  Plenary	  Conference.’	  
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/mproposal.html>	  accessed	  3	  August	  2013.	  	  
See	  Text	  to	  n	  286	  in	  ch	  3.	  	  
669	  Drafting	  Committee;	  Document	  A/CONF.97/L.23	  	  
‘Legislative	  History	  1980	  Vienna	  Diplomatic	  Conference’	  (n	  668).	  
See	  Text	  to	  n	  290	  in	  ch	  3.	  
670	  Oloumi-­‐Yazdi,	  ‘Delivery	  in	  International	  Sales	  of	  Goods’	  (n	  622).	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evident	  that	  the	  goods	  were	  defective	  before	  the	  contract	  was	  made,	  the	  buyer	  is	  not	  
under	  obligation	  to	  make	  the	  payment	  in	  spite	  of	  having	  agreed	  on	  transfer	  of	  risk	  
prior	  to	  the	  contract,	  as	  the	  contract	  is	  invalid.671	  	  
	  
The	  Convention	  and	  Iranian	  law	  have	  taken	  different	  approaches	  to	  the	  matter	  of	  the	  
passing	  of	  risk.	  But	  they	  are	  similar	  in	  that	  they	  both	  link	  the	  passing	  of	  risk	  to	  the	  
control	  of	  the	  goods.	  In	  both	  legal	  systems,	  parties	  are	  at	  liberty	  to	  agree	  on	  the	  time	  
in	  which	  the	  risk	  passes.	  Therefore,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  passing	  of	  risk,	  there	  is	  no	  
impediment	  in	  the	  way	  of	  Iran	  ratifying	  the	  Convention.	  
7.3.3	  The	  Right	  to	  Withhold	  
The	  Convention	  in	  its	  Article	  71(1)	  provides	  that	  the	  aggrieved	  party	  (seller	  or	  buyer)	  
has	  a	  right	  to	  suspend	  the	  performance	  of	  his	  obligations	  when	  ‘it	  becomes	  apparent	  
that	  the	  other	  party	  will	  not	  perform	  a	  substantial	  part	  of	  his	  obligation.’	  Therefore,	  
any	  failure	  to	  carry	  out	  a	  substantial	  part	  of	  the	  obligation	  may	  entitle	  the	  aggrieved	  
party	  to	  suspend	  the	  contract.	  Although	  there	  is	  no	  precise	  measurement	  for	  these	  
terms,	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  provisions	  contained	  in	  Article	  72672	  reveals	  that	  under	  the	  
Convention	  it	  is	  easier	  to	  suspend	  than	  to	  avoid.673	  The	  wording	  of	  the	  two	  articles	  
shows	  that	  failure	  to	  perform	  a	  ‘substantial	  part’	  of	  obligations	  implies	  something	  less	  
than	  a	  ‘fundamental	  breach,’	  and	  an	  ‘apparent’	  non-­‐performance	  is	  intended	  to	  show	  
a	  lesser	  degree	  of	  certainty	  than	  that	  which	  is	  ‘clear.’674	  	  
	  
Therefore,	  as	  long	  as	  the	  seller	  is	  in	  possession	  of	  the	  goods,	  suspension	  of	  the	  
contract	  frees	  him	  from	  both	  delivery	  and	  taking	  any	  further	  step	  such	  as	  
manufacturing	  the	  goods	  as	  provided	  in	  the	  contract.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  first	  sentence	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
671	  ibid.	  
672	  Article	  72	  of	  the	  CISG	  states:	  
(1)	  If	  prior	  to	  the	  date	  for	  performance	  of	  the	  contract	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  one	  of	  the	  parties	  will	  
commit	  a	  fundamental	  breach	  of	  contract,	  the	  other	  party	  may	  declare	  the	  contract	  avoided.	  
(2)	  If	  time	  allows,	  the	  party	  intending	  to	  declare	  the	  contract	  avoided	  must	  give	  reasonable	  
notice	  to	  the	  other	  party	  in	  order	  to	  permit	  him	  to	  provide	  adequate	  assurance	  of	  his	  
performance.	  
(3)	  The	  requirements	  of	  the	  preceding	  paragraph	  do	  not	  apply	  if	  the	  other	  party	  has	  declared	  
that	  he	  will	  not	  perform	  his	  obligations.	  
673	  Lookofsky,	  ‘The	  1980	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods’	  (n	  
630);	  See	  Text	  to	  n	  277	  in	  ch	  3.	  
674	  Lookofsky,	  ibid;	  see	  generally	  ch	  3,	  3.3.2.	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of	  Article	  71	  grants	  the	  seller	  or	  buyer	  the	  right	  to	  suspend	  the	  contract,	  when	  it	  
becomes	  apparent	  that	  the	  other	  party	  is	  unable	  to	  fulfil	  a	  substantial	  part	  of	  that	  
contract,	  means	  that	  there	  is	  no	  need	  for	  actual	  occurrence	  of	  breach.	  To	  prevent	  
abuse	  of	  the	  exercise	  of	  this	  right,	  the	  grounds	  on	  which	  the	  Convention	  gives	  
permission	  to	  suspend	  the	  contract	  are	  set	  out	  in	  Article	  71(1):	  
	  
(a) a	  serious	  deficiency	  in	  his	  ability	  to	  perform	  or	  in	  his	  creditworthiness;	  or	  
(b)	  his	  conduct	  in	  preparing	  to	  perform	  or	  in	  performing	  the	  contract.	  
	  
Although	  the	  provisions	  of	  Article	  71	  are	  not	  limited	  to	  cases	  of	  insolvency,675	  if	  the	  
buyer	  becomes	  insolvent	  it	  is	  considered	  to	  show	  a	  serious	  deficiency	  in	  his	  
creditworthiness,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  the	  seller	  is	  given	  the	  right	  to	  suspend	  the	  contract.	  
Article	  71	  of	  the	  Convention	  in	  its	  third	  paragraph	  continues	  that	  it	  is	  required	  that	  the	  
party	  that	  intends	  to	  suspend	  the	  contract	  give	  notice	  to	  the	  other	  party.676	  This	  is	  
because	  the	  other	  party	  must	  have	  a	  chance	  to	  provide	  adequate	  assurance	  of	  his	  
performance.	  If	  and	  when	  adequate	  assurance	  is	  given,	  the	  suspending	  party	  must	  
continue	  to	  fulfil	  his	  obligations.	  
	  
Iranian	  law	  recognises	  the	  right	  of	  lien	  for	  the	  aggrieved	  party	  when	  the	  defaulting	  
party	  does	  not	  fulfil	  his	  obligations.	  The	  reciprocity	  between	  payment	  and	  delivery	  
gives	  the	  seller	  the	  right	  not	  to	  deliver	  when	  the	  buyer	  does	  not	  pay	  the	  price,	  and	  the	  
same	  right	  is	  given	  to	  the	  buyer	  when	  the	  seller	  does	  not	  deliver	  the	  goods.677	  
Therefore,	  in	  accordance	  with	  Article	  377678	  of	  the	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code,	  both	  parties	  may	  
refuse	  to	  fulfil	  their	  obligations	  until	  the	  other	  party	  delivers	  or	  pays.	  The	  aggrieved	  
party	  may	  waive	  this	  right	  when	  a	  partial	  delivery	  takes	  place.	  Insolvency	  of	  the	  buyer	  
before	  delivery	  gives	  rise	  to	  non-­‐delivery	  by	  the	  seller.	  As	  long	  as	  the	  seller	  is	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
675	  Bennett,	  ‘Article	  71’	  (n	  253)	  513.	  
676	  Article	  71	  (3)	  of	  the	  CISG	  states:	  
‘(3)	  A	  party	  suspending	  performance,	  whether	  before	  or	  after	  dispatch	  of	  the	  goods,	  must	  immediately	  
give	  notice	  of	  the	  suspension	  to	  the	  other	  party	  and	  must	  continue	  with	  performance	  if	  the	  other	  party	  
provides	  adequate	  assurance	  of	  his	  performance.’	  
677	  Oloumi-­‐Yazdi,	  ‘Delivery	  in	  International	  Sales	  of	  Goods’	  (n	  622).	  
678	  Article	  377	  of	  the	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code	  states:	  
Either	  the	  seller	  of	  the	  buyer	  can	  retain	  the	  goods	  sold	  or	  their	  consideration	  until	  the	  other	  party	  
is	  prepared	  to	  deliver	  his	  part,	  unless	  either	  the	  object	  of	  sale	  or	  the	  consideration	  thereof	  is	  
agreed	  to	  be	  delivered	  at	  a	  subsequent	  date	  in	  which	  case	  either	  the	  object	  of	  sale	  or	  
consideration	  which	  has	  become	  mature	  should	  be	  surrendered.	  
184	  
possession	  of	  the	  goods,	  he	  can	  exercise	  this	  right.679	  Article	  378680	  of	  the	  Iranian	  Civil	  
Code	  provides	  that	  the	  seller	  will	  be	  deprived	  of	  his	  right	  to	  withhold	  only	  when	  he	  
intentionally	  delivers	  the	  goods	  before	  receiving	  the	  price.	  	  
	  
The	  right	  to	  suspend	  the	  contract	  prior	  to	  delivery	  as	  set	  out	  in	  the	  Convention	  may	  
seem	  identical	  to	  the	  right	  to	  lien	  in	  Iranian	  law;	  however,	  the	  right	  to	  suspend	  has	  a	  
wider	  scope	  and	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  non-­‐delivery	  or	  non-­‐payment.	  Having	  said	  that,	  the	  
provisions	  of	  the	  Convention	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  right	  to	  suspend	  the	  contract	  are	  
compatible	  with	  Iranian	  law.	  Under	  both	  legal	  systems,	  both	  the	  buyer	  and	  the	  seller	  
may	  exercise	  their	  right	  to	  withhold	  delivery	  or	  payment	  when	  the	  other	  party	  does	  
not	  fulfil	  or	  is	  not	  able	  to	  fulfil	  his	  obligations.	  Buyer	  insolvency	  under	  Iranian	  law,	  
which	  is	  partly	  equal	  to	  a	  serious	  deficiency	  in	  his	  creditworthiness	  under	  the	  
Convention,	  gives	  rise	  to	  termination	  of	  the	  contract	  by	  the	  seller.	  Under	  the	  
Convention,	  however,	  a	  serious	  deficiency	  in	  one	  of	  the	  parties’	  ability	  to	  perform	  
entitles	  the	  other	  party	  to	  suspend	  the	  contract.	  Iranian	  law,	  which	  has	  taken	  a	  more	  
rigid	  and	  strict	  approach,	  can	  accept	  the	  remedy	  of	  suspension	  of	  contract,	  which	  
takes	  a	  more	  lenient	  approach.	  Both	  Iranian	  and	  Islamic	  law	  accept	  the	  Convention,	  
which	  was	  developed	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  close	  relationship	  between	  the	  obligations	  of	  
both	  parties.	  Therefore,	  as	  far	  as	  the	  right	  to	  withhold	  performance	  is	  concerned,	  Iran	  
can	  adopt	  the	  Convention.	  
7.3.4	  Delivery	  of	  Non-­‐Conforming	  Goods	  
The	  Convention	  recognises	  the	  remedy	  of	  the	  buyer’s	  right	  to	  withhold	  performance	  
where	  the	  seller	  fails	  to	  deliver	  conforming	  goods.681	  The	  Convention	  identifies	  this	  
remedy	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  interdependence	  of	  the	  delivery	  and	  payment	  
obligations	  (CISG	  Articles	  58682	  and	  71683).	  Iranian	  civil	  law	  recognises	  this	  remedy	  on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
679	  Oloumi-­‐Yazdi,	  ‘Delivery	  in	  International	  Sales	  of	  Goods’	  (n	  622).	  
680	  Article	  378	  of	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code	  states:	  
‘The	  seller	  who	  has	  voluntarily	  delivered	  the	  object	  of	  sale	  before	  receiving	  the	  price	  thereof,	  cannot	  
reclaim	  the	  object	  of	  sale,	  except	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  cancellation	  of	  the	  transaction	  assuming	  that	  he	  has	  
the	  option	  to	  do	  so.’	  
681	  CISG	  Advisory	  Council	  Opinion	  No	  5,	  ‘The	  buyer’s	  right	  to	  avoid	  the	  contract	  in	  case	  of	  non-­‐
conforming	  goods	  or	  documents’	  (2005).	  Rapporteur:	  Professor	  Dr	  Ingeborg	  Schwenzer,	  LLM,	  Professor	  
of	  Private	  Law,	  University	  of	  Basel.	  
682	  Article	  58	  of	  the	  CISG	  states:	  
(1)	  If	  the	  buyer	  is	  not	  bound	  to	  pay	  the	  price	  at	  any	  other	  specific	  time,	  he	  must	  pay	  it	  when	  the	  
seller	  places	  either	  the	  goods	  or	  documents	  controlling	  their	  disposition	  at	  the	  buyer's	  disposal	  in	  
185	  
the	  basis	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  sharte-­‐e-­‐demni	  (implied	  agreement)684	  or	  the	  theory	  of	  
mutuality,685	  which	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  Convention.	  This	  is	  to	  say	  that	  both	  
Iranian	  law	  and	  the	  Convention	  justify	  the	  remedy	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  
dependency.686	  
	  
The	  similarity	  ends,	  however,	  when	  the	  seller	  fulfils	  his	  obligation	  to	  deliver	  the	  goods,	  
but	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  conformity	  with	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  contract.	  The	  Convention	  does	  
not	  refer	  to	  the	  buyer’s	  right	  to	  withhold	  performance	  in	  Articles	  45	  to	  52	  (remedial	  
provisions);	  however,	  closer	  examination	  of	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Convention	  shows	  
that	  this	  right	  to	  withhold	  performance	  of	  the	  obligations	  exists	  for	  the	  buyer.	  
Professor	  Schlechtriem	  argues	  that	  ‘pursuant	  to	  Article	  7(2)	  CISG,	  such	  a	  right	  [right	  of	  
withholding]	  can	  be	  developed	  as	  a	  gap-­‐filler.’687	  A	  justified	  refusal	  to	  take	  delivery	  
signifies	  that	  the	  buyer	  is	  not	  in	  breach	  of	  the	  contract,	  as	  he	  has	  the	  right	  to	  withhold	  
his	  performance.688	  It	  is	  however	  not	  clear	  whether	  lack	  of	  conformity	  will	  permit	  the	  
right	  to	  refuse	  to	  accept	  and	  take	  delivery	  of	  goods	  under	  the	  Convention;	  however,	  it	  
is	  clear	  that	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  show	  that	  non-­‐conformity	  corresponds	  to	  a	  
‘fundamental	  breach’	  as	  stated	  in	  Article	  25.	  The	  breach	  need	  be	  fundamental	  only	  in	  
order	  to	  give	  rise	  to	  termination	  and	  delivery	  of	  substitute	  goods	  (Articles	  46(2),	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
accordance	  with	  the	  contract	  and	  this	  Convention.	  The	  seller	  may	  make	  such	  payment	  a	  
condition	  for	  handing	  over	  the	  goods	  or	  documents.	  
(2)	  If	  the	  contract	  involves	  carriage	  of	  the	  goods,	  the	  seller	  may	  dispatch	  the	  goods	  on	  terms	  
whereby	  the	  goods,	  or	  documents	  controlling	  their	  disposition,	  will	  not	  be	  handed	  over	  to	  the	  
buyer	  except	  against	  payment	  of	  the	  price.	  
(3)	  The	  buyer	  is	  not	  bound	  to	  pay	  the	  price	  until	  he	  has	  had	  an	  opportunity	  to	  examine	  the	  goods,	  
unless	  the	  procedures	  for	  delivery	  or	  payment	  agreed	  upon	  by	  the	  parties	  are	  inconsistent	  with	  
his	  having	  such	  an	  opportunity.	  
683	  Article	  71(2)	  of	  the	  CISG	  states:	  
(2)	  If	  the	  seller	  has	  already	  dispatched	  the	  goods	  before	  the	  grounds	  described	  in	  the	  preceding	  
paragraph	  become	  evident,	  he	  may	  prevent	  the	  handing	  over	  of	  the	  goods	  to	  the	  buyer	  even	  
though	  the	  buyer	  holds	  a	  document	  which	  entitles	  him	  to	  obtain	  them.	  The	  present	  paragraph	  
relates	  only	  to	  the	  rights	  in	  the	  goods	  as	  between	  the	  buyer	  and	  the	  seller.	  
684	  This	  means	  that	  at	  the	  time	  of	  concluding	  the	  contract,	  beside	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  contracting	  parties	  
expressly	  commit	  themselves	  on	  a	  duty	  to	  do	  something	  in	  return	  of	  the	  other	  party’s	  commitment,	  
they	  also	  impliedly	  agree	  to	  perform	  their	  obligations	  simultaneously	  in	  exchange	  of	  the	  other	  party’s	  
performance.	  
685	  There	  is	  also	  this	  school	  of	  thought	  that	  the	  right	  to	  withhold	  performance	  is	  justified	  on	  the	  theory	  
of	  mutuality	  of	  obligations.	  It	  is	  indeed	  the	  nature	  of	  mutual	  contracts	  which	  gives	  rise	  to	  the	  right	  of	  
refusal.	  The	  reciprocal	  character	  of	  transaction	  supports	  the	  simultaneous	  performance	  of	  counter-­‐
obligations.	  
686	  Jafarzadeh,	  ‘Buyer’s	  Right	  to	  Withhold	  Performance	  and	  Termination	  of	  Contract’	  (n	  622).	  
687	  Peter	  Schlechtriem,	  ‘Subsequent	  Performance	  and	  Delivery	  Deadlines	  –	  Avoidance	  of	  CISG	  Sales	  
Contracts	  Due	  to	  Non-­‐conformity	  of	  the	  Goods’	  (2006)	  18	  Pace	  International	  Law	  Review	  83.	  
688	  ibid.	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49(1)(a),	  51,	  72	  and	  73).	  The	  Convention	  does	  not,	  however,	  give	  rise	  to	  the	  right	  to	  
refuse	  to	  accept	  the	  goods	  for	  any	  non-­‐conformity.	  Articles	  46(2)	  and	  (3)	  and	  Article	  
71(1)	  of	  the	  Convention	  emphasise	  that	  the	  buyer	  is	  not	  entitled	  to	  the	  right	  to	  reject	  
the	  goods	  for	  minor	  non-­‐conformity.	  	  
	  
Under	  the	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code,	  the	  buyer’s	  right	  to	  withhold	  performance	  where	  the	  
seller	  delivers	  the	  non-­‐conforming	  goods	  is	  recognised,	  and	  the	  buyer	  is	  given	  this	  right	  
to	  reject.	  However,	  the	  circumstances	  that	  give	  rise	  to	  the	  buyer’s	  right	  to	  reject	  goods	  
in	  non-­‐conformity	  are	  not	  clear:	  is	  he	  entitled	  to	  reject	  any	  non-­‐conforming	  delivery,	  
or	  is	  there	  some	  restriction	  on	  the	  exercise	  of	  this	  right?689	  If	  one	  applies	  the	  theory	  of	  
implied	  agreement	  or	  the	  theory	  of	  mutuality	  to	  the	  case	  of	  non-­‐conforming	  delivery,	  
where	  the	  former	  is	  applied	  one	  may	  argue	  that	  it	  was	  the	  mutual	  intention	  of	  both	  
parties	  to	  the	  contract	  that	  any	  non-­‐conformity	  should	  permit	  the	  right	  to	  reject.	  If	  the	  
basis	  of	  this	  right	  is	  the	  theory	  of	  mutuality,	  it	  is	  not	  easy	  to	  say	  that,	  under	  a	  reciprocal	  
contract,	  any	  party	  should	  have	  the	  right	  to	  refuse	  to	  accept	  the	  performance	  of	  other	  
party	  for	  any	  non-­‐conformity.	  This	  serves	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  restricting	  the	  right	  to	  reject	  to	  
circumstances	  in	  which	  the	  non-­‐conformity	  is	  not	  minor.	  
	  
If	  the	  second	  doctrine	  accords	  with	  Iranian	  civil	  law,	  it	  would	  then	  be	  very	  similar	  to	  
the	  analysis	  made	  by	  the	  Convention.	  In	  any	  event,	  the	  court	  should	  consider	  the	  
impact	  of	  breach	  on	  the	  position	  of	  the	  buyer	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  whether	  the	  buyer	  
was	  entitled	  to	  reject	  the	  seller’s	  delivery.690	  
	  
The	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code	  recognises	  that	  the	  buyer	  has	  this	  right	  to	  withhold	  performance	  
of	  obligation	  if	  the	  seller	  fails	  to	  deliver	  the	  subject	  matter	  of	  the	  contract.	  But	  would	  
adopting	  the	  CISG	  require	  a	  change	  in	  practice?	  It	  appears	  that	  there	  is	  no	  substantial	  
difference	  between	  the	  Convention	  and	  Iranian	  law	  on	  this.	  Under	  Iranian	  law,	  it	  is	  
rather	  confusing	  to	  establish	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  the	  buyer	  would	  be	  entitled	  
to	  exercise	  this	  right,	  and	  the	  doctrine	  which	  justifies	  the	  exercise	  of	  this	  right.	  Having	  
said	  that,	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  CISG	  contradicts	  Iranian	  law.	  
Adoption	  of	  the	  Convention	  would	  put	  Iranian	  commercial	  traders	  in	  a	  better	  position,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
689	  ibid.	  
690	  Jafarzadeh,	  ‘Buyer’s	  Right	  to	  Withhold	  Performance	  and	  Termination	  of	  Contract’	  (n	  621).	  
187	  
as	  its	  provisions	  remove	  any	  confusion	  and	  allow	  for	  a	  higher	  degree	  of	  certainty	  in	  
establishing	  the	  exercise	  of	  this	  right.	  	  
7.3.5 Tender	  of	  Non-­‐Conforming	  Documents	  
Where	  the	  seller	  does	  not	  fulfil	  his	  obligation	  to	  obtain	  and	  deliver	  documents	  that	  
represent	  the	  goods	  according	  to	  the	  requirements	  provided	  by	  the	  documentary	  sale	  
contracts,	  certain	  problems	  may	  occur:	  (i)	  should	  the	  buyer	  have	  the	  right	  to	  reject	  
non-­‐conforming	  documents?;	  and	  (ii)	  if	  the	  right	  to	  reject	  documents	  is	  granted,	  how	  is	  
this	  exercised?691	  This	  is	  of	  great	  importance	  in	  international	  trade,	  as	  many	  
transactions	  (especially	  those	  involving	  payment	  by	  documentary	  credits)	  depend	  on	  
conformity	  of	  documents	  for	  their	  completion.	  	  
	  
The	  Convention	  refers	  to	  the	  seller’s	  duty	  to	  deliver	  both	  goods	  and	  documents	  in	  
accordance	  with	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  contract	  (Articles	  30692	  and	  34693);	  however,	  it	  has	  
failed	  to	  properly	  answer	  the	  questions	  above.	  According	  to	  Articles	  30	  and	  34	  of	  the	  
CISG,	  the	  seller	  must	  deliver	  documents	  that	  conform	  to	  the	  contract.	  The	  second	  and	  
third	  sentences	  of	  Article	  34	  discuss	  the	  cure	  of	  non-­‐conforming	  documents.694	  It	  must	  
be	  noted	  that	  the	  buyer	  still	  has	  the	  right	  to	  damages	  resulting	  from	  the	  seller’s	  
exercise	  of	  the	  right	  to	  cure	  non-­‐conformity	  in	  the	  documents	  (Article	  34	  sentence	  
three).	  Although	  it	  seems	  to	  be	  unquestionable	  that	  the	  seller	  could	  cure	  non-­‐
conformity	  before	  the	  agreed	  date	  for	  handing	  over	  the	  documents,695	  it	  is	  unclear	  
what	  remedy	  is	  available	  to	  the	  buyer	  for	  the	  non-­‐conformity	  of	  documents	  after	  the	  
agreed	  time.	  Article	  48696	  of	  the	  Convention	  deals	  with	  the	  seller’s	  right	  to	  cure	  where	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
691	  Jafarzadeh,	  ibid.	  
692	  Article	  30	  of	  the	  CISG	  states:	  
‘The	  seller	  must	  deliver	  the	  goods,	  hand	  over	  any	  documents	  relating	  to	  them	  and	  transfer	  the	  property	  
in	  the	  goods,	  as	  required	  by	  the	  contract	  and	  this	  Convention.’	  
693	  Article	  34	  of	  the	  CISG	  states:	  
If	  the	  seller	  is	  bound	  to	  hand	  over	  documents	  relating	  to	  the	  goods,	  he	  must	  hand	  them	  over	  at	  
the	  time	  and	  place	  and	  in	  the	  form	  required	  by	  the	  contract.	  If	  the	  seller	  has	  handed	  over	  
documents	  before	  that	  time,	  he	  may,	  up	  to	  that	  time,	  cure	  any	  lack	  of	  conformity	  in	  the	  
documents,	  if	  the	  exercise	  of	  this	  right	  does	  not	  cause	  the	  buyer	  unreasonable	  inconvenience	  or	  
unreasonable	  expense.	  However,	  the	  buyer	  retains	  any	  right	  to	  claim	  damages	  as	  provided	  for	  in	  
this	  Convention.	  
694	  Fritz	  Enderlein,	  ‘Rights	  and	  Obligations	  of	  the	  Seller	  under	  the	  UN	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  
International	  Sale	  of	  Goods’	  in	  Petar	  Sarcevic	  and	  Paul	  Volken	  (eds),	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods:	  
Dubrovnik	  Lectures	  (Oceana	  1996)	  ch	  5,	  133.	  
695	  ibid.	  
696	  Article	  48	  of	  the	  CISG	  states:	  
188	  
he	  has	  failed	  to	  perform	  his	  obligations	  after	  delivery;	  therefore,	  the	  same	  rule	  is	  
applicable	  to	  defective	  and	  non-­‐conforming	  documents.697	  That	  is	  because	  a	  breach	  of	  
obligation	  to	  transfer	  conforming	  documents	  is	  approached	  in	  exactly	  the	  same	  way	  as	  
delivery	  of	  non-­‐conforming	  goods.698	  	  
	  
Article	  48(1)	  refers	  to	  the	  phrase	  ‘subject	  to	  Article	  49.’	  According	  to	  Article	  49,	  the	  
buyer	  may	  avoid	  the	  contract:	  (a)	  when	  a	  failure	  by	  the	  seller	  to	  perform	  ‘any	  of	  his	  
obligations’	  amounts	  to	  a	  ‘fundamental	  breach	  of	  contract’;	  and	  (b)	  ‘in	  case	  of	  non-­‐
delivery,	  if	  the	  seller	  does	  not	  deliver	  the	  goods’	  within	  an	  additional	  period	  of	  time	  
fixed	  by	  a	  Nachfrist	  notice	  under	  Article	  47.	  However,	  it	  seems	  to	  be	  agreed	  that,	  in	  
most	  cases,	  the	  seller	  should	  be	  given	  this	  right	  to	  cure	  even	  serious	  defects	  in	  
accordance	  with	  Article	  48(1).	  This	  includes	  situations	  where	  lack	  of	  conformity	  might	  
seem	  to	  fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  fundamental	  breach	  rule	  in	  Article	  49.699	  
In	  the	  Cobalt	  Sulphate	  Case,700	  the	  Dutch	  plaintiff	  (seller)	  sold	  four	  quantities	  of	  cobalt	  
sulphate	  to	  the	  German	  defendant	  (buyer).	  They	  had	  agreed	  on	  the	  British	  origin	  of	  
the	  goods	  and	  that	  the	  plaintiff	  had	  to	  represent	  the	  certificates	  of	  origin	  and	  quality.	  
Upon	  receipt	  of	  the	  documents,	  the	  buyer	  avoided	  the	  contract,	  as	  the	  cobalt	  sulphate	  
was	  of	  South	  African	  origin	  and	  the	  certificate	  of	  origin	  was	  thus	  wrong.	  The	  German	  
Supreme	  Court	  decided,	  however,	  that	  there	  were	  no	  grounds	  to	  declare	  the	  contract	  
avoided	  and	  the	  plaintiff	  was	  thus	  not	  guilty.	  The	  Court	  held	  that	  the	  plaintiff	  had	  
delivered	  the	  goods,	  and	  non-­‐conformity	  of	  the	  goods	  with	  the	  contract	  because	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(1)	  Subject	  to	  article	  49,	  the	  seller	  may,	  even	  after	  the	  date	  for	  delivery,	  remedy	  at	  his	  own	  
expense	  any	  failure	  to	  perform	  his	  obligations,	  if	  he	  can	  do	  so	  without	  unreasonable	  delay	  and	  
without	  causing	  the	  buyer	  unreasonable	  inconvenience	  or	  uncertainty	  of	  reimbursement	  by	  the	  
seller	  of	  expenses	  advanced	  by	  the	  buyer.	  However,	  the	  buyer	  retains	  any	  right	  to	  claim	  damages	  
as	  provided	  for	  in	  this	  Convention.	  
(2)	  If	  the	  seller	  requests	  the	  buyer	  to	  make	  known	  whether	  he	  will	  accept	  performance	  and	  the	  
buyer	  does	  not	  comply	  with	  the	  request	  within	  a	  reasonable	  time,	  the	  seller	  may	  perform	  within	  
the	  time	  indicated	  in	  his	  request.	  The	  buyer	  may	  not,	  during	  that	  period	  of	  time,	  resort	  to	  any	  
remedy	  which	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  performance	  by	  the	  seller.	  
(3)	  A	  notice	  by	  the	  seller	  that	  he	  will	  perform	  within	  a	  specified	  period	  of	  time	  is	  assumed	  to	  
include	  a	  request,	  under	  the	  preceding	  paragraph,	  that	  the	  buyer	  make	  known	  his	  decision.	  
(4)	  A	  request	  or	  notice	  by	  the	  seller	  under	  paragraph	  (2)	  or	  (3)	  of	  this	  article	  is	  not	  effective	  
unless	  received	  by	  the	  buyer.	  
697	  Ole	  Lando,	  ‘Article	  34’	  in	  Bianca	  and	  Bonell	  (eds),	  Commentary	  on	  the	  International	  Sales	  Law	  
(Giuffré:	  Milan	  1987)	  265;	  Schlechtriem,	  Uniform	  Sales	  Law	  (n	  169);	  Honnold,	  Uniform	  Law	  for	  
International	  Sales	  (n	  241)	  249–250.	  
698	  Schlechtriem,	  ibid.	  
699	  Lookofsky,	  ‘The	  1980	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods’	  (n	  
630).	  
700	  Germany	  3	  April	  1996	  Supreme	  Court.	  
<http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cases/960403g1.html>	  accessed	  5	  August	  2013.	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either	  their	  lesser	  quantity	  or	  their	  different	  origin	  did	  not	  constitute	  non-­‐delivery.	  
Although	  the	  exercise	  of	  the	  buyer’s	  right	  to	  avoid	  the	  contract	  is	  not	  straightforward	  
under	  the	  tender	  of	  non-­‐conforming	  documents,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  such	  a	  remedy	  exists	  
for	  the	  buyer	  when	  the	  circumstances	  warrant.	  
	  
In	  contrast,	  Iranian	  civil	  law	  appears	  very	  inadequate	  in	  this	  regard.	  There	  are	  no	  
proper	  rules	  regulating	  the	  obligations	  of	  the	  seller	  to	  deliver	  conforming	  documents,	  
and	  no	  proper	  remedies	  for	  the	  buyer	  when	  the	  seller	  does	  not	  perform	  his	  duties	  to	  
deliver	  documents	  in	  conformity	  with	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  contract.	  The	  right	  to	  
reject	  non-­‐conforming	  documents	  is	  non-­‐existent	  under	  Iranian	  civil	  law.	  Under	  that	  
law,	  the	  obligation	  of	  the	  seller	  to	  prepare	  and	  deliver	  documents	  for	  the	  purchased	  
goods	  has	  to	  be	  analysed	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  shart-­‐e-­‐fel.701	  702	  Therefore,	  
if	  the	  seller	  does	  not	  deliver	  documents	  in	  conformity	  with	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  contract,	  
the	  right	  to	  refuse	  to	  accept	  should	  be	  granted	  to	  the	  buyer.	  This	  is	  because	  a	  
documentary	  sale	  transaction	  obliges	  the	  seller	  to	  prepare	  certain	  documents	  and	  
deliver	  them	  to	  the	  buyer	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  contract.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  
buyer	  is	  under	  obligation	  to	  accept	  and	  pay	  for	  the	  performance.	  Therefore,	  if	  the	  
seller	  does	  not	  deliver	  such	  a	  performance,	  the	  buyer	  has	  no	  obligation	  to	  accept	  and	  
pay	  for	  them.	  It	  is	  agreed	  that,	  under	  such	  contracts,	  the	  right	  to	  withhold	  
performance	  is	  justified	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  shart-­‐e-­‐demni	  (implied	  stipulation)	  and	  
therefore	  would	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  case.703	  That	  the	  seller	  should	  offer	  and	  show	  
documents	  in	  full	  conformity	  with	  the	  terms	  of	  contract	  is	  a	  well-­‐established	  rule.	  Any	  
lack	  of	  conformity	  gives	  rise	  to	  the	  buyer’s	  (or	  his	  bank’s,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  making	  the	  
payment	  through	  letter	  of	  credit)	  right	  to	  reject	  and	  pay	  for	  them.704	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  
concluded	  that	  it	  is	  impliedly	  agreed	  between	  parties	  to	  a	  documentary	  sale	  contract	  
that	  the	  conforming	  documents	  should	  be	  tendered	  and	  any	  non-­‐conformity	  should	  
give	  rise	  to	  the	  right	  to	  reject	  them.	  It	  is	  argued	  that,	  under	  a	  documentary	  sale	  
contract,	  the	  buyer	  should	  have	  the	  right	  to	  reject	  documents	  for	  defects	  on	  their	  face,	  
whether	  these	  defects	  are	  related	  to	  the	  goods,	  the	  documents,	  or	  even	  both.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
701	  Shart-­‐e-­‐fel	  is	  an	  expression	  which	  describes	  terms	  signifying	  a	  promise	  to	  do	  or	  refrain	  to	  do	  
something.	  
702	  Jafarzadeh,	  ‘Buyer’s	  Right	  to	  Withhold	  Performance	  and	  Termination	  of	  Contract’	  (n	  621).	  
703	  ibid.	  
704	  See	  Uniform	  Customs	  and	  Practices	  for	  Documentary	  Credits	  2007,	  UCP	  600.	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However,	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  clarity	  on	  whether	  the	  right	  should	  be	  granted	  to	  the	  buyer	  
to	  reject	  the	  goods	  on	  arrival	  for	  deficiency	  in	  the	  goods	  if	  the	  buyer	  has	  already	  
accepted	  the	  documents.	  It	  could	  however	  be	  suggested	  that,	  if	  the	  deficiency	  were	  
not	  apparent	  on	  the	  face	  of	  the	  documents,	  the	  right	  should	  be	  given	  to	  the	  buyer	  to	  
reject.	  The	  reasoning	  behind	  this	  is	  that,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  termination	  of	  the	  contract,	  the	  
buyer	  will	  not	  be	  given	  this	  right	  if	  he	  was	  or	  ought	  to	  have	  been	  aware	  of	  non-­‐
conformity	  which	  gives	  rise	  to	  the	  right	  to	  terminate.	  However,	  if	  the	  deficiency	  was	  
evident	  on	  the	  face	  of	  the	  documents	  or	  could	  have	  been	  discovered	  by	  an	  
examination,	  the	  buyer	  has	  accepted	  the	  goods	  in	  non-­‐conformity	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  
doctrine	  of	  isqat	  (waiver)	  or	  the	  doctrine	  of	  iqdam705	  (action	  against	  himself).706	  
	  
This	  suggests	  that,	  although	  this	  issue	  is	  not	  covered	  under	  the	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code,	  	  
there	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	  the	  two	  legal	  systems	  are	  incompatible.	  Iranian	  commercial	  
traders	  would	  be	  even	  better	  off	  with	  the	  CISG,	  and	  that	  is	  because	  the	  Convention	  
makes	  provisions	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  tender	  of	  conforming	  documents	  by	  the	  seller,	  
and	  failure	  to	  do	  so	  gives	  rise	  to	  the	  buyer’s	  right	  to	  avoid	  the	  contract	  when	  
circumstances	  allow.	  This	  per	  se	  increases	  traders’	  confidence,	  as	  they	  would	  be	  aware	  
of	  their	  rights	  and	  obligations	  in	  similar	  circumstances.	  
7.3.6 Partial	  Non-­‐Conforming	  Delivery	  
The	  CISG	  contains	  certain	  provisions	  that	  deal	  with	  circumstances	  in	  which	  the	  seller	  
either	  delivers	  the	  wrong	  quantity	  of	  goods,	  or	  delivers	  the	  right	  quantity	  but	  in	  partial	  
non-­‐conformity	  with	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  contract.	  Article	  51(1)707	  of	  the	  Convention	  
expressly	  entitles	  the	  buyer	  to	  exercise	  his	  remedies	  under	  Articles	  46–50	  with	  regard	  
to	  non-­‐conformity;	  therefore,	  it	  is	  arguable	  that	  the	  same	  logic	  applicable	  to	  full	  non-­‐
conformity	  of	  goods	  could	  apply	  to	  partial	  non-­‐conformity.708	  The	  UNCITRAL	  Digest	  on	  
the	  CISG	  states	  that	  ‘the	  general	  rule	  is	  that	  apart	  from	  damages,	  all	  remedies	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
705	  In	  accordance	  with	  this	  principle,	  a	  right	  given	  to	  a	  person	  will	  be	  lost	  where	  he	  himself,	  knowing	  of	  
the	  right,	  acts	  to	  his	  own	  detriment.	  
706	  Jafarzadeh,	  ‘Buyer’s	  Right	  to	  Withhold	  Performance	  and	  Termination	  of	  Contract’	  (n	  621).	  
707	  Article	  51(1)	  of	  the	  CISG	  states:	  
‘If	  the	  seller	  delivers	  only	  a	  part	  of	  the	  goods	  or	  if	  only	  a	  part	  of	  the	  goods	  delivered	  is	  in	  conformity	  with	  
the	  contract,	  articles	  46	  to	  50	  apply	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  part	  which	  is	  missing	  or	  which	  does	  not	  conform.’	  
708	  ‘UNCITRAL	  Digest	  of	  Case	  Law	  on	  the	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods.’	  
A/CN.9/SER.C/DIGEST/CISG/51	  
<http://daccess-­‐dds-­‐ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V04/553/20/PDF/V0455320.pdf?OpenElement>	  
accessed	  25	  July	  2013.	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buyer	  refer	  only	  to	  that	  part	  of	  the	  contract	  which	  is	  not	  performed.	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  
contract	  remains	  unimpaired.’709	  Paragraph	  1	  of	  Article	  51	  follows	  the	  general	  
approach	  of	  the	  Convention,	  which	  is	  to	  safeguard	  as	  much	  of	  the	  contract	  as	  
possible.710	  That	  is	  why	  the	  remedies	  contained	  in	  the	  contract	  shall	  not	  be	  available	  to	  
the	  buyer	  when	  only	  part	  of	  the	  performance	  is	  in	  non-­‐conformity.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  true	  
to	  say	  that	  Articles	  46–50	  are	  applicable	  only	  to	  the	  non-­‐conforming	  or	  missing	  part.711	  
The	  rest	  of	  the	  contract	  generally	  cannot	  be	  declared	  avoided.712	  	  
	  
It	  is	  understood	  from	  paragraph	  1	  of	  Article	  51	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  divide	  the	  
performance	  of	  the	  seller	  into	  conforming	  and	  non-­‐conforming	  parts.	  Where	  the	  
missing	  or	  non-­‐conforming	  part	  can	  be	  divided,	  Articles	  46	  to	  50	  apply	  to	  that	  part.713	  
The	  UNCITRAL	  Digest	  on	  the	  CISG	  also	  states	  that	  Article	  51	  requires	  that	  the	  goods	  
delivered	  embody	  severable	  parts.714	  
	  
Under	  Iranian	  civil	  law,	  there	  are	  no	  conflicting	  views	  on	  whether	  the	  buyer	  should	  be	  
entitled	  to	  reject	  goods	  for	  partial	  non-­‐conformity.	  However,	  partial	  rejection	  is	  not	  
covered	  under	  the	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code	  as	  a	  remedy.	  It	  does	  however	  state	  that	  the	  
buyer,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  option	  of	  defect,	  has	  the	  right	  to	  terminate	  the	  contract	  partially	  
where	  the	  seller	  of	  the	  specific	  goods	  delivers	  goods	  that	  are	  partially	  in	  non-­‐
conformity	  with	  the	  contract	  quality.	  These	  conflicting	  views	  on	  the	  acceptance	  of	  the	  
right	  to	  partial	  termination	  arise	  because	  there	  is	  no	  clear	  distinction	  between	  
severable	  and	  non-­‐severable	  contracts.	  In	  a	  non-­‐severable	  contract,	  it	  is	  agreed	  that	  
breach	  of	  shart-­‐e-­‐sefat	  or	  shart-­‐e-­‐sehhat	  with	  regard	  to	  some	  part	  of	  the	  goods	  should	  
be	  seen	  as	  a	  breach	  of	  the	  whole	  contract,	  and	  therefore	  this	  allows	  for	  rejection	  of	  
the	  contract.	  In	  a	  severable	  contract,	  however,	  partial	  non-­‐conformity	  entitles	  the	  
buyer	  to	  keep	  the	  conforming	  part	  and	  reject	  the	  rest.715	  Therefore,	  those	  who	  
support	  the	  buyer’s	  right	  to	  partial	  rejection	  seem	  to	  refer	  to	  this	  situation.716	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
709	  ibid.	  
710	  Michael	  Will,	  ‘Article	  51’	  in	  Bianca	  and	  Bonell	  (eds),	  Commentary	  on	  the	  International	  Sales	  Law	  
(Giuffré:	  Milan	  1987)	  377.	  
711	  ibid.	  
712	  CLOUT	  case	  No	  302	  [Arbitration	  International	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce	  No	  7660	  1994].	  
713	  Will,	  ‘Article	  51’	  (n	  710).	  
714	  ‘UNCITRAL	  Digest	  of	  Case	  Law’	  (n	  708).	  	  
715	  Jafarzadeh,	  ‘Buyer’s	  Right	  to	  Withhold	  Performance	  and	  Termination	  of	  Contract’	  (n	  621).	  
716	  ibid.	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Therefore,	  in	  Iranian	  civil	  law	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  Convention,	  the	  right	  to	  partial	  rejection	  
depends	  on	  the	  severability	  or	  non-­‐severability	  of	  the	  contract.	  If	  the	  contract	  is	  
separable,	  each	  severable	  part	  will	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  separate	  subsidiary	  contract	  under	  the	  
main	  contract	  and	  the	  buyer	  has	  the	  same	  right	  with	  regard	  to	  separable	  parts	  as	  with	  
regard	  to	  a	  non-­‐severable	  contract.	  Therefore,	  adoption	  of	  the	  Convention	  does	  not	  
require	  a	  change	  in	  practice,	  as	  they	  are	  compatible	  in	  this	  regard.	  
7.3.7 Delivery	  of	  Wrong	  Quantity	  
In	  accordance	  with	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  contract,	  the	  seller	  is	  under	  an	  obligation	  to	  
deliver	  the	  exact	  quantity	  of	  goods	  stipulated	  in	  the	  contract.	  If	  the	  quantity	  of	  goods	  
delivered	  does	  not	  amount	  to	  what	  was	  agreed	  (in	  either	  shortfall	  or	  excess),	  it	  is	  then	  
considered	  as	  a	  breach	  of	  contract,	  and	  gives	  rise	  to	  certain	  remedies	  for	  the	  buyer.	  
The	  Convention	  and	  Iranian	  law	  both	  contain	  provisions	  for	  this,	  so	  the	  author	  will	  
consider	  them	  in	  turn.	  	  
7.3.7.1 Shortfall	  in	  Delivery	  
Under	  the	  Convention,	  it	  is	  unclear	  whether	  a	  shortfall	  in	  delivery	  entitles	  the	  buyer	  to	  
refuse	  to	  take	  delivery	  of	  the	  goods.	  If	  it	  is	  allowed,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  what	  degree	  of	  
shortcoming	  grants	  the	  buyer	  the	  right	  to	  rejection.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  Article	  37717	  of	  
the	  Convention	  specifies	  that	  a	  shortfall	  on	  delivery	  can	  be	  cured	  by	  the	  seller	  either	  
by	  delivering	  the	  missing	  part	  or	  by	  making	  up	  any	  deficiency	  in	  the	  quantity	  of	  the	  
goods	  delivered,	  provided	  that	  the	  delivery	  is	  made	  before	  the	  date	  specified	  in	  the	  
contract.	  Although	  according	  to	  Article	  37	  the	  buyer	  retains	  any	  right	  to	  claim	  damages	  
provided	  by	  the	  Convention,	  the	  scope	  of	  application	  of	  this	  article	  is	  limited	  to	  
circumstances	  in	  which	  the	  delivery	  takes	  place	  before	  the	  date	  fixed	  by	  the	  contract.	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  in	  accordance	  with	  Article	  51(2)718	  of	  the	  Convention,	  termination	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
717	  Article	  37	  of	  the	  CISG	  states:	  
If	  the	  seller	  has	  delivered	  goods	  before	  the	  date	  for	  delivery,	  he	  may,	  up	  to	  that	  date,	  deliver	  any	  
missing	  part	  or	  make	  up	  any	  deficiency	  in	  the	  quantity	  of	  the	  goods	  delivered,	  or	  deliver	  goods	  in	  
replacement	  of	  any	  non-­‐conforming	  goods	  delivered	  or	  remedy	  any	  lack	  of	  conformity	  in	  the	  
goods	  delivered,	  provided	  that	  the	  exercise	  of	  this	  right	  does	  not	  cause	  the	  buyer	  unreasonable	  
inconvenience	  or	  unreasonable	  expense.	  However,	  the	  buyer	  retains	  any	  right	  to	  claim	  damages	  
as	  provided	  for	  in	  this	  Convention.	  
718	  Article	  51(2)	  of	  the	  CISG	  states:	  
‘The	  buyer	  may	  declare	  the	  contract	  avoided	  in	  its	  entirety	  only	  if	  the	  failure	  to	  make	  delivery	  
completely	  or	  in	  conformity	  with	  the	  contract	  amounts	  to	  a	  fundamental	  breach	  of	  the	  contract.’	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of	  the	  contract	  under	  certain	  circumstances	  is	  granted	  to	  the	  buyer	  in	  full;	  therefore,	  
the	  buyer	  is	  entitled	  to	  refuse	  to	  perform	  until	  the	  seller	  offers	  delivery	  of	  conforming	  
goods	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  contract.719	  It	  is	  however	  unclear	  whether	  the	  buyer	  can	  
refuse	  to	  fulfil	  his	  obligations	  if	  parts	  of	  the	  goods	  are	  missing.	  Article	  51(1)	  sets	  out	  
that,	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  shortfall	  in	  delivery	  or	  non-­‐conforming	  delivery,	  Articles	  46	  to	  50	  
apply	  in	  respect	  of	  missing	  or	  non-­‐conforming	  parts.	  Therefore,	  following	  a	  shortfall	  in	  
delivery,	  the	  buyer:	  (i)	  according	  to	  Article	  46(1)720	  may	  require	  performance	  by	  the	  
seller	  of	  his	  obligation	  (in	  this	  case	  refusing	  the	  delivered	  quantity	  and	  requesting	  a	  
perfect	  delivery),	  or	  (ii)	  in	  accordance	  with	  Article	  46(3)721	  request	  repair	  (in	  this	  case	  
accepting	  the	  quantity	  delivered	  and	  asking	  for	  the	  missing	  part).722	  A	  shortfall	  in	  
delivery	  does	  not	  entitle	  the	  aggrieved	  party	  to	  avoid	  the	  contract,	  as	  it	  does	  not	  have	  
the	  same	  effect	  as	  fundamental	  breach.	  That	  is	  because	  the	  defaulting	  party	  can	  cure	  
any	  deficiency	  in	  the	  quantity	  of	  goods	  delivered.	  	  
	  
The	  question	  that	  might	  provoke	  controversy	  is,	  if	  the	  buyer	  accepts	  the	  quantity	  
delivered	  to	  him	  and	  does	  not	  ask	  for	  delivery	  of	  the	  missing	  part,	  will	  he	  be	  able	  to	  
reduce	  the	  price	  in	  accordance	  with	  Article	  50?723	  Most	  commentators	  have	  so	  far	  
failed	  to	  make	  a	  recommendation	  on	  whether	  price	  reduction	  should	  be	  available	  as	  a	  
remedy	  for	  the	  buyer	  where	  the	  seller	  delivers	  the	  wrong	  quantity.724	  Only	  one	  
commentary	  has	  considered	  insufficient	  quantity	  to	  qualify	  as	  a	  form	  of	  non-­‐
performance,	  and	  consequently	  regarded	  price	  reduction	  as	  an	  available	  remedy	  for	  
the	  buyer	  when	  there	  is	  deficiency	  in	  quantity	  and	  quality	  of	  goods	  delivered.725	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
719	  Jafarzadeh,	  ‘Buyer’s	  Right	  to	  Withhold	  Performance	  and	  Termination	  of	  Contract’	  (n	  621).	  
720	  Article	  46(1)	  of	  the	  CISG	  states:	  
‘The	  buyer	  may	  require	  performance	  by	  the	  seller	  of	  his	  obligations	  unless	  the	  buyer	  has	  resorted	  to	  a	  
remedy	  which	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  this	  requirement.’	  
721	  Article	  46(3)	  of	  the	  CISG	  states:	  
If	  the	  goods	  do	  not	  conform	  with	  the	  contract,	  the	  buyer	  may	  require	  the	  seller	  to	  remedy	  the	  
lack	  of	  conformity	  by	  repair,	  unless	  this	  is	  unreasonable	  having	  regard	  to	  all	  the	  circumstances.	  A	  
request	  for	  repair	  must	  be	  made	  either	  in	  conjunction	  with	  notice	  given	  under	  article	  39	  or	  within	  
a	  reasonable	  time	  thereafter.	  
722	  Oloumi-­‐Yazdi,	  ‘Delivery	  in	  International	  Sales	  of	  Goods’	  (n	  622).	  
723	  Article	  50	  of	  the	  CISG	  (n	  242).	  
724	  See	  Bianca	  and	  Bonell,	  Commentary	  on	  the	  International	  Sales	  Law	  (n	  315);	  John	  O	  Honnold,	  Uniform	  
Law	  for	  International	  Sales	  under	  the	  1980	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  (2nd	  edn,	  1991).	  	  
They	  have	  failed	  to	  discuss	  whether	  or	  not	  price	  reduction	  is	  available	  to	  the	  buyer	  as	  a	  remedy	  where	  
the	  seller	  delivers	  the	  wrong	  quantity.	  
725	  Bergsten	  and	  Miller,	  ‘The	  Remedy	  of	  Reduction	  of	  Price’	  (n	  242).	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Flechtner,	  however,	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  phrase	  in	  Article	  50	  that	  says	  ‘if	  the	  goods	  do	  
not	  conform	  with	  the	  contract’	  covers	  only	  circumstances	  in	  which	  the	  goods	  do	  not	  
meet	  the	  quality	  requirement	  of	  the	  contract.726	  Article	  35(1)727	  does	  not	  explicitly	  
mention	  that	  deficiency	  in	  the	  quantity	  of	  delivered	  goods	  amounts	  to	  non-­‐conformity.	  
Article	  35(2)728	  also	  clearly	  expresses	  that	  goods	  do	  not	  conform	  to	  the	  contract	  unless	  
they	  meet	  quality	  specifications.	  In	  addition,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  provisions	  of	  Article	  37	  
make	  a	  distinction	  between	  a	  deficiency	  in	  quantity	  of	  goods	  and	  non-­‐conformity.729	  
All	  in	  all,	  a	  shortfall	  in	  delivery	  may	  not	  be	  regarded	  as	  non-­‐conformity	  under	  the	  
Convention,	  and	  therefore	  reduction	  of	  price	  will	  not	  be	  available	  under	  its	  provisions.	  
The	  decision	  of	  a	  US	  federal	  court	  in	  S	  V	  Braun	  Inc	  v	  Alitalia-­‐Linee	  Aeree	  Italiane	  S	  p	  
A730	  endorses	  this	  point	  that	  the	  Convention	  may	  authorise	  a	  price	  reduction	  for	  non-­‐
conforming	  goods,	  but	  in	  this	  case	  the	  goods	  delivered	  did	  conform	  although	  the	  
delivery	  was	  short	  on	  quantity.	  
	  
Under	  Iranian	  law,	  a	  shortfall	  in	  delivery	  leaves	  the	  aggrieved	  party	  with	  two	  options:	  
he	  can	  accept	  the	  goods	  and	  pay	  for	  the	  amount	  delivered	  at	  the	  contract	  rate,	  or	  he	  
can	  avoid	  the	  contract	  (Article	  384731	  of	  the	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code).	  When	  the	  item	  being	  
sold	  is	  not	  divisible,	  such	  as	  a	  carpet,	  the	  only	  available	  remedy	  is	  to	  cancel	  the	  
contract	  (Article	  385732	  of	  the	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code).	  These	  articles	  attract	  criticism,	  as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
726	  Harry	  M	  Flechtner,	  ‘More	  US	  Decisions	  on	  the	  UN	  Sales	  Convention:	  Scope,	  Parol	  Evidence,	  “Validity”	  
And	  Reduction	  of	  Price	  Under	  Article	  50’	  (1995)	  14	  Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Commerce	  153.	  
727	  Article	  35(1)	  of	  the	  CISG	  states:	  
‘The	  seller	  must	  deliver	  goods	  which	  are	  of	  the	  quantity,	  quality	  and	  description	  required	  by	  the	  
contract	  and	  which	  are	  contained	  or	  packaged	  in	  the	  manner	  required	  by	  the	  contract.’	  
728	  Article	  35(2)	  of	  the	  CISG	  states:	  
Except	  where	  the	  parties	  have	  agreed	  otherwise,	  the	  goods	  do	  not	  conform	  with	  the	  contract	  
unless	  they:	  
(a)	  are	  fit	  for	  the	  purposes	  for	  which	  goods	  of	  the	  same	  description	  would	  ordinarily	  be	  used;	  
(b)	  are	  fit	  for	  any	  particular	  purpose	  expressly	  or	  impliedly	  made	  known	  to	  the	  seller	  at	  the	  time	  
of	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  contract,	  except	  where	  the	  circumstances	  show	  that	  the	  buyer	  did	  not	  
rely,	  or	  that	  it	  was	  unreasonable	  for	  him	  to	  rely,	  on	  the	  seller's	  skill	  and	  judgment;	  
(c)	  possess	  the	  qualities	  of	  goods	  which	  the	  seller	  has	  held	  out	  to	  the	  buyer	  as	  a	  sample	  or	  model;	  
(d)	  are	  contained	  or	  packaged	  in	  the	  manner	  usual	  for	  such	  goods	  or,	  where	  there	  is	  no	  such	  
manner,	  in	  a	  manner	  adequate	  to	  preserve	  and	  protect	  the	  goods.	  
729	  Flechtner,	  ‘More	  US	  Decisions	  on	  the	  UN	  Sales	  Convention’	  (n	  726).	  
730	  United	  States	  6	  April	  1994	  Federal	  District	  Court	  [New	  York].	  
<http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cases/940406u1.html>	  accessed	  5	  August	  2013.	  	  
731	  Article	  384	  of	  the	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code	  states:	  
If	  under	  a	  contract	  the	  object	  sold	  is	  fixed	  in	  quantity	  and	  if	  on	  delivery	  less	  than	  this	  quantity	  is	  
handed	  over,	  the	  buyer	  will	  have	  the	  choice	  of	  cancelling	  the	  contract	  or	  of	  taking	  the	  quantity	  
available	  on	  payment	  of	  the	  right	  proportion	  of	  the	  price.	  If	  the	  object	  sold	  exceeds	  in	  quantity	  
the	  amount	  fixed	  in	  the	  contract,	  the	  excess	  belongs	  to	  the	  seller.	  
732	  Article	  385	  of	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code	  states:	  
195	  
they	  do	  not	  introduce	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  request	  for	  delivery	  of	  the	  quantity	  
contracted.733	  It	  could	  however	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  main	  concern	  of	  Articles	  384	  and	  
385	  of	  the	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code	  is	  with	  the	  sale	  of	  ascertained	  goods,	  and,	  under	  a	  
contract	  for	  sale	  of	  unascertained	  goods,	  shortfall	  in	  delivery	  is	  bound	  to	  the	  general	  
principles	  of	  Iranian	  law	  regarding	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  obligations.734	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  
such	  a	  case,	  the	  buyer	  may	  request	  delivery	  of	  the	  contractual	  quantity,	  and	  the	  court	  
may	  force	  the	  seller	  to	  deliver	  that	  quantity.	  If	  the	  seller	  refuses	  to	  deliver	  the	  quantity	  
stipulated	  by	  the	  contract,	  the	  buyer	  may	  cancel	  the	  contract.735	  
7.3.7.2 Excess	  in	  Delivery	  
The	  Convention,	  in	  the	  event	  of	  an	  excess	  delivery,	  has	  given	  the	  right	  to	  the	  buyer	  
either	  to	  accept	  the	  excess	  amount	  and	  pay	  at	  the	  rate	  of	  contract,	  or	  to	  accept	  the	  
contractual	  quantity	  and	  reject	  the	  excess	  amount	  (Article	  52(2)).736	  737	  There	  are	  
circumstances	  in	  which	  delivery	  of	  excess	  goods	  can	  comprise	  a	  fundamental	  breach,	  
and	  give	  rise	  to	  the	  buyer’s	  right	  to	  avoid	  the	  contract.	  An	  example	  of	  this	  is	  when	  the	  
seller	  renders	  a	  bill	  of	  lading	  that	  covers	  both	  the	  contractual	  quantity	  and	  the	  excess	  
amount	  and	  states	  that	  delivery	  of	  goods	  is	  subject	  to	  payment	  for	  all	  goods	  (including	  
the	  excess	  goods).738	  
	  
Under	  Iranian	  law,	  Articles	  384	  and	  385	  of	  the	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code	  suggest	  that,	  in	  cases	  
of	  delivery	  of	  excess	  quantities,	  the	  buyer	  has	  no	  rights	  over	  the	  excess	  amount.	  
Where	  the	  objet	  of	  sale	  is	  separable,	  the	  excess	  amount	  belongs	  to	  the	  seller,739	  and	  
where	  the	  object	  of	  sale	  is	  not	  separable,	  the	  seller	  can	  cancel	  the	  contract.740	  As	  
discussed	  earlier,	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  two	  articles	  are	  mainly	  connected	  with	  the	  sale	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
‘If	  an	  object	  sold	  is	  one	  that	  cannot	  be	  divided	  without	  damage,	  such	  as	  a	  house	  or	  a	  carpet,	  and	  if	  it	  is	  
sold	  as	  being	  of	  a	  fixed	  size	  but	  on	  delivery	  it	  is	  smaller	  or	  larger	  in	  size,	  then	  the	  buyer	  in	  the	  former	  
case	  and	  the	  seller	  in	  the	  latter	  can	  cancel	  the	  contract.’	  
733	  Oloumi-­‐Yazdi,	  ‘Delivery	  in	  International	  Sales	  of	  Goods’	  (n	  622).	  
734	  ibid.	  
735	  ibid.	  
736	  Article	  52	  of	  the	  CISG	  states:	  
‘If	  the	  seller	  delivers	  a	  quantity	  of	  goods	  greater	  than	  that	  provided	  for	  in	  the	  contract,	  the	  buyer	  may	  
take	  delivery	  or	  refuse	  to	  take	  delivery	  of	  the	  excess	  quantity.	  If	  the	  buyer	  takes	  delivery	  of	  all	  or	  part	  of	  
the	  excess	  quantity,	  he	  must	  pay	  for	  it	  at	  the	  contract	  rate.’	  
737	  Lookofsky,	  ‘The	  1980	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  Contracts	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  Goods’	  (n	  
630);	  Will,	  ‘Article	  51’	  (n	  710).	  
738	  Honnold,	  Uniform	  Law	  for	  International	  Sales	  (n	  241);	  Schlechtriem,	  Uniform	  Sales	  Law	  (n	  169).	  
739	  Article	  384	  of	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code.	  
740	  Article	  385	  of	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code.	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ascertained	  goods.	  Therefore,	  if	  the	  buyer	  so	  chooses,	  he	  can	  accept	  the	  quantity	  as	  
defined	  under	  the	  contract	  and	  reject	  the	  excess	  amount.741	  
7.3.7.3 Summary	  
Iranian	  law	  does	  not	  adequately	  cover	  the	  problems	  of	  shortfall	  or	  excess	  in	  delivery.	  
The	  CISG	  however	  has	  a	  more	  remedial	  approach	  in	  this	  area.	  The	  remedies	  provided	  
under	  the	  Convention	  appear	  to	  be	  compatible	  with	  Iranian	  law.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  excess	  delivery,	  there	  is	  no	  provision	  in	  Iranian	  law	  that	  contradicts	  the	  buyer’s	  
right	  to	  accept	  the	  delivered	  goods	  and	  pay	  for	  the	  excess	  amount	  at	  the	  contract	  rate.	  
The	  remedy	  of	  specific	  performance	  in	  the	  case	  of	  shortfall	  in	  delivery	  that	  the	  
Convention	  offers	  to	  the	  aggrieved	  party	  is	  also	  available	  as	  an	  alternative	  under	  
Iranian	  law.	  When	  the	  excess	  or	  shortfall	  in	  delivery	  corresponds	  to	  a	  fundamental	  
breach,	  the	  Convention	  may	  entitle	  the	  injured	  party	  to	  avoid	  the	  contract.	  This	  
approach	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  right	  that	  Iranian	  law	  gives	  to	  the	  injured	  party	  to	  cancel	  the	  
contract	  when	  the	  enforced	  performance	  of	  contract	  becomes	  impossible	  and	  
impractical.	  	  
7.4	  Conclusion	  
The	  above	  comparison	  demonstrates	  that	  similarity	  exists	  between	  the	  duties,	  rights	  
and	  remedies	  contained	  within	  the	  CISG	  and	  those	  in	  the	  Iranian	  law	  of	  sale.	  There	  is	  
similarity	  in	  the	  seller’s	  duty	  to	  deliver	  goods	  that	  conform	  in	  nature	  to	  the	  
requirements	  of	  the	  contract,	  and	  the	  buyer’s	  duty	  to	  take	  delivery	  of	  the	  goods.	  The	  
CISG	  largely	  mirrors	  Iranian	  law	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  duties,	  and	  the	  corresponding	  
rights,	  of	  the	  buyer	  and	  the	  seller.	  
	  
A	  number	  of	  remedies	  contained	  in	  the	  CISG	  are	  not	  strictly	  catered	  for	  in	  Iranian	  law.	  
For	  example,	  the	  duty	  to	  pay	  interest	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  compatible	  with	  Iranian	  law	  
as	  it	  is	  forbidden	  under	  Islamic	  law.	  However,	  closer	  examination	  of	  Iranian	  law	  shows	  
that	  late	  payment	  compensation	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  interest	  and	  is	  
permitted	  under	  the	  Iranian	  Civil	  Procedure	  Code.	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  permissible	  to	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  Oloumi-­‐Yazdi,	  ‘Delivery	  in	  International	  Sales	  of	  Goods’	  (n	  622).	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receive	  interest	  from	  those	  foreign	  trading	  partners	  that	  do	  not	  regard	  interest	  as	  
illegal.	  The	  duty	  to	  pay	  interest	  is	  therefore	  not	  unknown	  in	  Iranian	  law.	  
	  
Other	  remedies	  under	  the	  CISG,	  however,	  do	  match	  those	  in	  Iranian	  law.	  The	  remedy	  
of	  the	  right	  to	  withhold,	  enabling	  the	  innocent	  party	  to	  suspend	  the	  contract,	  is	  
accepted	  under	  both	  legal	  systems.	  Both	  systems	  provide	  for	  the	  suspension	  of	  a	  
breached	  contract;	  the	  only	  difference	  being	  that	  suspension	  under	  the	  CISG	  has	  a	  
wider	  scope,	  while	  the	  right	  to	  lien	  under	  Iranian	  law	  is	  limited	  to	  non-­‐delivery	  and	  
non-­‐payment.	  Under	  both	  concepts,	  parties	  can	  exercise	  their	  right	  to	  withhold	  
delivery	  or	  payment	  when	  the	  other	  party	  cannot	  fulfil	  or	  is	  not	  able	  to	  fulfil	  his	  
obligations.	  
	  
The	  duties,	  rights	  and	  remedies	  stipulated	  by	  the	  CISG	  largely	  resemble	  those	  catered	  
for	  under	  Iranian	  law.	  Where	  discrepancies	  do	  exist,	  they	  can	  be	  overcome	  by	  utilising	  
sufficiently	  similar	  principles	  that	  are	  well	  known	  under	  Iranian	  law	  to	  produce	  the	  
equivalent	  results.	  The	  duties,	  rights	  and	  remedies	  contained	  in	  the	  CISG	  do	  not	  
therefore	  pose	  an	  impediment	  to	  ratification.	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Chapter	  Eight	  	  
Concluding	  Remarks	  
8.1	  The	  Road	  Ahead	  
This	  research	  constitutes	  an	  attempt	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  suitability	  of	  the	  CISG	  for	  
advancing	  international	  commerce	  with	  an	  Iranian	  buyer	  or	  seller.	  The	  opening	  
chapter	  set	  out	  the	  issues	  that	  would	  need	  to	  be	  addressed,	  to	  determine	  both	  
whether	  the	  ratification	  of	  the	  CISG	  would	  be	  advantageous	  for	  Iran	  and	  whether	  (and	  
how)	  it	  would	  be	  feasible	  to	  implement	  it.	  As	  the	  chapter	  (and	  subsequent	  ones)	  
explained,	  the	  questions	  of	  desirability	  and	  feasibility	  are	  not	  merely	  technical	  legal	  
questions.	  The	  broader	  historical	  and	  political	  contexts	  are	  important,	  as	  is	  the	  current	  
status	  of	  knowledge	  and	  opinion	  in	  Iran	  regarding	  the	  CISG.	  Hence,	  the	  thesis	  sought	  
to	  determine	  the	  level	  of	  compatibility	  between	  the	  CISG	  and	  Iranian	  sales	  law.	  The	  
historical	  development	  of	  the	  CISG	  shows	  that	  its	  drafters	  intended	  to	  create	  a	  unified	  
code	  that	  would	  harmonise	  international	  trade	  law.	  The	  CISG	  was	  also	  intended	  to	  
contribute	  to	  the	  achievement	  of	  NIEO.	  The	  Preamble	  refers	  to	  the	  NIEO	  and	  the	  
importance	  of	  developing	  trade	  ‘on	  the	  basis	  of	  equality	  and	  mutual	  benefit.’	  These	  
objectives	  reflected	  the	  desire	  to	  create	  a	  structure	  for	  international	  trade	  that	  would	  
be	  fairer	  to	  developing	  nations.	  Many	  states	  have	  recognised	  the	  potential	  of	  the	  CISG	  
to	  achieve	  its	  objectives,	  as	  ratification	  promotes	  a	  harmonised	  sales	  law	  that	  will	  
bring	  great	  future	  benefits	  to	  contracting	  states	  in	  the	  area	  of	  both	  domestic	  and	  
international	  sales.	  	  
	  
It	  must	  be	  noted,	  however,	  that	  the	  desirability	  of	  ratification	  depends	  on	  local	  
conditions.	  The	  United	  Kingdom	  is	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  a	  state	  that	  has	  not	  yet	  ratified	  
the	  CISG,	  though	  it	  has	  promised	  to	  do	  so	  in	  the	  future.	  A	  comparative	  analysis	  of	  the	  
provisions	  of	  the	  CISG	  and	  those	  of	  English	  law	  reveals	  that	  no	  major	  legal	  impediment	  
exists	  to	  ratification.742	  The	  fear	  that	  the	  CISG	  would	  have	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	  
domestic	  law	  is	  unjustified	  because	  English	  law	  would	  remain	  applicable	  to	  domestic	  
matters	  and	  the	  CISG	  would	  apply	  only	  to	  international	  sales.	  The	  writer	  believes	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
742	  See	  generally	  ch	  5,	  5.2.2.	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the	  primary	  reason	  behind	  the	  UK’s	  failure	  to	  ratify	  is	  lack	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  CISG.	  There	  
are	  economic	  justifications	  for	  the	  UK	  not	  ratifying	  the	  CISG:	  the	  UK	  is	  currently	  the	  
leading	  forum	  for	  dispute	  resolution	  in	  matters	  relating	  to	  international	  trade,	  and	  
there	  is	  a	  degree	  of	  apprehension	  that	  ratification	  would	  dissipate	  the	  UK’s	  economic	  
benefits	  and	  harm	  its	  prominent	  position.743	  This	  may	  not	  necessarily	  be	  the	  case,	  
however,	  as	  ratification	  of	  the	  CISG	  might	  benefit	  the	  UK	  given	  that	  parties	  often	  seek	  
the	  experience	  of	  English	  courts.	  The	  experience	  gained	  by	  the	  English	  courts	  in	  
international	  trade	  matters	  will	  not	  be	  sidelined	  by	  the	  CISG;	  in	  fact,	  the	  experience	  of	  
English	  judges	  will	  be	  invaluable	  in	  the	  interpretation	  of	  this	  Convention.744	  	  
	  
Iran	  is	  not	  in	  a	  comparable	  position.	  Although	  there	  are	  similarities	  between	  the	  two	  
countries	  (Iran	  and	  the	  UK),	  for	  example	  in	  that	  they	  are	  both	  bound	  to	  be	  concerned	  
by	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  required	  transformation	  in	  law,	  in	  Iran	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  changes	  
would	  not	  be	  so	  significant	  that	  the	  CISG	  could	  not	  be	  adopted.	  One	  has	  to	  bear	  in	  
mind	  that	  the	  practical	  objections	  are	  different	  in	  Iran.	  Iran	  is	  not	  a	  highly	  sought-­‐after	  
dispute	  resolution	  forum	  and	  Iranian	  law	  is	  not	  well	  known	  in	  the	  world.	  Ratifying	  the	  
CISG	  could	  very	  well	  lead	  to	  more	  legal	  business	  coming	  to	  Iran,	  rather	  than	  to	  its	  
losing	  business.	  Although	  the	  UK	  can	  justifiably	  claim	  that	  it	  might	  obtain	  economic	  
advantage	  from	  maintaining	  English	  domestic	  law	  for	  international	  matters,	  Iran	  
cannot	  claim	  the	  same.	  
	  
In	  the	  event	  that	  Iran	  ratifies	  the	  CISG,	  it	  will	  have	  to	  decide	  whether	  domestic	  law	  
reforms	  should	  be	  made	  to	  bring	  domestic	  law	  into	  line	  with	  the	  Convention.	  Germany	  
is	  a	  major	  example	  of	  a	  ratifying	  state	  which	  has	  embraced	  the	  CISG.	  In	  addition	  to	  
ratifying	  it,	  Germany	  has	  undertaken	  domestic	  law	  reforms	  to	  align	  German	  law	  with	  
the	  Convention.	  From	  our	  investigation	  into	  the	  compatibility	  of	  the	  CISG	  with	  Iranian	  
law	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  two	  legal	  systems	  are	  similar.	  Where	  differences	  exist,	  the	  gaps	  
can	  be	  filled	  by	  finding	  fairly	  similar	  Iranian	  principles.	  Therefore,	  ratifying	  the	  CISG	  
does	  not	  mean	  that	  Iran	  will	  have	  to	  give	  up	  parts	  of	  its	  domestic	  law.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  
that	  Iran	  has	  to	  pursue	  the	  German	  model,	  but	  it	  can	  maintain	  domestic	  law	  for	  
domestic	  sales	  and	  apply	  the	  CISG	  to	  international	  sales.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
743	  See	  generally	  ch	  5.	  
744	  See	  generally	  ch	  5.	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In	  chapter	  four,	  it	  was	  shown	  that	  the	  arguments	  in	  support	  of	  ratification	  seem	  to	  
outweigh	  those	  against.	  The	  focus	  of	  this	  study	  has	  been	  on	  substantive	  legal	  
provisions,	  which	  show	  similarity	  between	  the	  CISG	  and	  Iranian	  law.	  The	  rights	  and	  
duties	  contained	  in	  the	  CISG	  to	  some	  extent	  match	  those	  in	  Iranian	  law.	  Iran	  cannot	  
disregard	  the	  CISG.	  The	  argument	  that	  the	  CISG	  may	  result	  in	  uncertainty	  is	  
outweighed	  by	  the	  greater	  uncertainty	  that	  arises	  already	  from	  the	  application	  of	  
foreign	  law,	  given	  that	  the	  CISG	  has	  some	  degree	  of	  similarity	  to	  Iranian	  law.	  One	  could	  
argue	  that	  a	  simple	  choice-­‐of-­‐law	  clause	  would	  avoid	  such	  uncertainty,	  but	  it	  would	  
not	  fully	  eradicate	  the	  difficulty,	  since	  the	  applicable	  law	  would	  be	  foreign	  law	  for	  at	  
least	  one	  of	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  contract.	  Therefore,	  a	  unified	  body	  of	  law,	  in	  this	  case	  
the	  CISG,	  is	  seen	  as	  necessary	  to	  escape	  from	  such	  predicaments.	  In	  addition,	  the	  CISG	  
is	  constantly	  being	  subjected	  to	  interpretation	  and	  clarification,	  and	  Iran	  could	  
contribute	  to	  this	  process.	  The	  provisions	  of	  the	  CISG	  show	  similarity	  with	  Iranian	  law,	  
and	  therefore	  there	  should	  be	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  impractical	  definitions	  will	  be	  
developed.	  
	  
The	  CISG	  has	  obtained	  worldwide	  acceptance	  because	  it	  appeals	  to	  both	  developed	  
and	  developing	  nations.	  Commercial	  entities	  have	  also	  happily	  accepted	  the	  CISG,	  as	  
its	  provisions	  govern	  their	  trade	  contracts.	  The	  CISG	  has	  been	  a	  success	  in	  Europe.	  The	  
majority	  of	  states	  have	  ratified	  it	  and	  now	  apply	  the	  CISG	  to	  their	  trade	  disputes.	  This	  
is	  to	  a	  great	  extent	  because	  the	  European	  Union	  fosters	  trade	  among	  its	  member	  
states.	  European	  states	  have	  gone	  a	  step	  further	  and	  even	  used	  the	  CISG	  as	  a	  model	  
for	  the	  harmonisation	  of	  other	  areas	  of	  European	  contract	  law.	  This	  is	  in	  contrast	  with	  
the	  developing	  nations.	  Although	  the	  CISG	  has	  been	  better	  received	  by	  the	  developing	  
world	  than	  its	  precursors	  were,	  the	  rate	  of	  accession	  to	  the	  CISG	  has	  not	  been	  as	  high.	  
Therefore,	  it	  is	  fair	  to	  say	  that	  many	  developing	  countries	  have	  not	  ratified	  it	  and	  have	  
made	  no	  substantial	  contribution	  to	  literature	  and	  case	  law	  on	  CISG.	  This	  would	  not	  
have	  been	  expected	  from	  their	  high	  level	  of	  participation	  during	  the	  CISG’s	  drafting	  
process.	  	  
	  
If	  Iran	  decided	  to	  ratify	  the	  CISG,	  it	  would	  be	  positioning	  itself	  within	  the	  international	  
community	  as	  well	  as	  with	  the	  OECD	  states,	  many	  of	  which	  have	  already	  acceded	  to	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the	  Convention.	  It	  might	  also	  lead	  to	  ratification	  of	  the	  CISG	  by	  Iran’s	  neighbouring	  
countries,	  which	  could	  facilitate	  trade	  among	  them	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  unified	  set	  of	  
laws.	  
	  
The	  CISG	  poses	  few	  risks	  to	  traders	  and	  may	  facilitate	  international	  trade	  through	  a	  
unified	  body	  of	  law,	  which	  can	  govern	  their	  contracts	  or	  may	  be	  adjusted	  according	  to	  
the	  wills	  of	  the	  parties.	  Therefore,	  the	  CISG	  maintains	  party	  autonomy,	  and	  signatories	  
are	  at	  liberty	  to	  form	  their	  contracts	  in	  accordance	  with	  their	  particular	  legal	  needs.	  
It	  is	  a	  pity	  that	  few	  Iranian	  academics	  have	  embarked	  on	  a	  thorough	  examination	  of	  
the	  CISG.	  It	  is	  essential	  that	  businesses,	  legal	  professionals,	  academics	  and	  private	  
individuals	  educate	  themselves	  on	  the	  substance	  and	  application	  of	  this	  Convention.	  
The	  CISG	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  avoided	  in	  the	  international	  market,	  and	  Iran	  will	  have	  to	  
face	  it	  more	  and	  more	  in	  international	  trade.	  
	  
The	  CISG	  is	  not	  trying	  to	  replace	  domestic	  law	  or	  govern	  trade	  through	  its	  own	  legal	  
principles	  alone.	  There	  are	  certain	  aspects	  of	  sales	  contracts	  to	  which	  the	  CISG	  needs	  
to	  be	  applied	  in	  domestic	  law,	  and	  it	  approves	  the	  use	  of	  existing	  trade	  usages	  and	  
customs.	  The	  CISG	  supports	  a	  framework	  that	  encourages	  a	  unified	  international	  trade	  
law	  irrespective	  of	  the	  political,	  social	  and	  economic	  conditions	  of	  contracting	  states.	  
Every	  individual	  signatory	  state	  will	  benefit	  from	  this	  international	  Convention,	  
provided	  that	  they	  all	  support	  and	  participate	  in	  the	  project.	  There	  is	  a	  great	  likelihood	  
that	  the	  CISG	  will	  become	  law	  for	  the	  trading	  nations	  which	  was	  made	  by	  them.	  It	  is	  up	  
to	  Iran	  to	  decide	  whether	  to	  join	  this	  global	  project,	  which	  has	  already	  gathered	  such	  
momentum.	  
	  
This	  study	  recommends	  that	  Iran	  become	  a	  signatory	  state	  to	  the	  CISG	  and	  complete	  
the	  ratification	  process.	  
8.2	  Summary	  of	  Fieldwork	  in	  Iran	  	  
In	  2011/2012,	  the	  writer	  conducted	  a	  survey	  in	  Iran	  to	  measure	  the	  level	  of	  familiarity	  
with	  CISG,	  the	  knowledge	  of	  the	  CISG	  and	  the	  attitude	  of	  Iranian	  academics/lawyers,	  
the	  business	  community	  and	  Government	  officials	  to	  the	  CISG.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	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study	  was	  to	  gain	  a	  better	  sense	  of	  the	  practical	  difficulties	  that	  may	  arise	  in	  
implementing	  the	  CISG	  in	  Iran	  (see	  appendix	  B).	  
8.2.1	  Method	  
The	  aim	  of	  the	  fieldwork	  was	  to	  conduct	  unstructured	  interviews	  with	  leading	  figures	  
in	  business,	  law	  and	  Government	  in	  Iran	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  area	  of	  international	  trade.	  
The	  goal	  was	  to	  determine:	  (i)	  whether	  they	  are	  familiar	  with	  the	  CISG;	  (ii)	  whether	  
they	  support/oppose	  its	  introduction,	  with	  reasons	  why;	  and	  (iii)	  whether	  there	  are	  
any	  other	  insights/observations	  on	  the	  potential	  difficulties	  of	  implementation.	  
To	  that	  end,	  contact	  was	  made	  through	  an	  initial	  questionnaire,	  sent	  by	  post	  and	  then	  
followed	  up	  by	  telephone	  or	  written	  contact	  if	  no	  reply	  was	  received.	  
	  
The	  writer	  issued	  60	  documents	  and	  received	  only	  nine	  responses:	  five	  responses	  
came	  in	  the	  form	  of	  questionnaires	  only,	  two	  responses	  included	  both	  questionnaire	  
and	  a	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  interview,	  and	  two	  responses	  were	  obtained	  only	  from	  interviews	  
(one	  was	  a	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  interview	  and	  one	  was	  a	  telephone	  interview).	  The	  small	  
number	  of	  responses	  means	  it	  is	  important	  to	  be	  cautious	  in	  interpreting	  results.	  
However,	  three	  tentative	  conclusions	  can	  be	  drawn:	  
I.	  Lack	  of	  Awareness	  
Although	  it	  is	  arguable	  that	  the	  low	  level	  of	  response	  might	  reflect	  the	  technical	  nature	  
of	  the	  subject,	  the	  lack	  of	  awareness	  of	  and	  familiarity	  with	  the	  CISG	  could	  be	  
considered	  as	  one	  of	  the	  major	  factors	  potentially	  hindering	  accession.	  The	  
implications	  of	  this	  lack	  of	  awareness	  are	  discussed	  below.	  
	  
This	  is	  supported	  by	  interviews/questionnaires.	  One	  example	  is	  the	  ‘Mega	  Motor	  
Company,’	  whose	  managing	  director	  admitted	  his	  unfamiliarity	  with	  the	  CISG.	  It	  is	  
worth	  mentioning	  that,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  three	  that	  came	  from	  academia	  or	  the	  
legal	  community,	  other	  endorsements	  for	  accession	  came	  from	  organisations	  whose	  
level	  of	  familiarity	  with	  the	  CISG	  was	  either	  low	  or	  non-­‐existent.	  In	  other	  words,	  
despite	  unfamiliarity,	  they	  were	  not	  opposing	  accession	  to	  the	  CISG.	  
203	  
II.	  Direct	  Opposition	  
With	  the	  exception	  of	  one	  vote	  against,	  the	  majority	  were	  in	  favour	  of	  adoption.	  
However,	  the	  opposition	  is	  significant	  because,	  although	  it	  did	  not	  focus	  on	  trade	  
issues,	  for	  instance	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  not	  yet	  evident	  whether	  the	  CISG	  would	  
promote	  trade	  or	  reduce	  legal	  business	  (as	  in	  the	  UK),	  it	  focused	  instead	  on	  the	  secular	  
nature	  of	  the	  CISG.	  A	  highly	  influential	  organisation	  that	  was	  against	  ratification	  was	  
the	  Trade	  Promotion	  Organisation	  of	  Iran,	  which	  is	  a	  subset	  of	  the	  Iran	  Chamber	  of	  
Commerce,	  Industries	  and	  Mines.	  Their	  main	  objection	  was	  the	  incompatibility	  of	  the	  
CISG	  with	  Islamic	  jurisprudence.	  	  
	  
From	  this	  point	  of	  view	  it	  is	  not	  incorrect	  to	  oppose	  adoption	  of	  the	  CISG,	  on	  the	  
grounds	  that	  the	  Convention	  specifies	  provisions	  with	  regard	  to	  interest	  that	  seem	  to	  
be	  incompatible	  with	  Islamic	  and	  Iranian	  law.745	  For	  example,	  Article	  84	  of	  the	  CISG	  
states	  that	  in	  the	  event	  that	  the	  seller	  is	  bound	  to	  refund	  the	  price,	  he	  must	  pay	  
interest	  on	  it	  from	  the	  date	  the	  price	  was	  paid.	  Also,	  under	  CISG	  Article	  78,	  it	  is	  clear	  
that	  interest	  must	  be	  paid	  to	  the	  aggrieved	  party.	  
	  
But	  this	  does	  not	  in	  fact	  introduce	  a	  radical	  change,	  since	  Iranian	  law	  recognises	  late	  
payment	  compensation	  (Articles	  515(2)	  and	  522	  of	  the	  Iranian	  Civil	  Procedure	  Code	  
1379	  (2000)),	  which	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  interest.746	  Moreover,	  when	  an	  
action	  is	  brought	  outside	  Iran,	  Iranian	  authorities	  do	  request	  interest	  in	  their	  dealings	  
and	  litigation	  arbitration	  proceedings	  with	  foreign	  corporations.747	  
	  
Hence	  it	  could	  be	  very	  difficult	  politically	  to	  promote	  access	  to	  the	  CISG	  in	  Iran.	  Those	  
who	  prefer	  secular	  law	  may	  feel	  that	  it	  is	  unwise	  to	  promote	  the	  Convention,	  as	  it	  may	  
invite	  closer	  scrutiny	  of	  the	  Civil	  Code.	  It	  is	  only	  speculation,	  but	  it	  may	  explain	  the	  low	  
rate	  of	  return	  of	  the	  questionnaires.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
745	  Text	  to	  n(s)	  641	  and	  642	  in	  ch	  7.	  
746	  Text	  to	  n	  651	  in	  ch	  7.	  
747	  Text	  to	  n	  652	  in	  ch	  7.	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III.	  There	  Is	  Some	  Support	  for	  the	  CISG	  
Several	  respondents	  stated	  their	  willingness	  to	  adhere	  to	  the	  CISG,	  but	  one	  went	  a	  
step	  further	  and	  explained	  that	  Iran’s	  accession	  to	  the	  New	  York	  Convention	  (1958	  
United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  the	  Recognition	  and	  Enforcement	  of	  Foreign	  Arbitral	  
Awards)	  on	  15	  October	  2001748	  implies	  that	  accession	  to	  the	  CISG	  is	  feasible.	  Those	  
respondents	  who	  were	  very	  familiar	  with	  the	  CISG	  and	  in	  favour	  of	  accession	  put	  
forward	  their	  arguments	  as	  follows:	  
	  
1. Iran’s	  accession	  to	  the	  Convention	  would	  appear	  to	  have	  benefits	  for	  Iran	  at	  an	  
international	  level.	  It	  is	  believed	  that	  it	  would	  promote	  Iran’s	  international	  trade	  
and	  be	  beneficial	  for	  its	  economic	  growth	  and	  development.	  Iran’s	  trading	  partners	  
would	  be	  able	  to	  predict	  the	  governing	  law	  of	  the	  contract.	  This	  governing	  law,	  
which	  is	  familiar	  to	  them	  and	  derived	  from	  international	  customs	  and	  trade	  usages,	  
would	  enable	  them	  to	  enter	  into	  contracts	  with	  Iran	  with	  a	  higher	  degree	  of	  
certainty,	  which	  would	  in	  turn	  lead	  to	  the	  building	  of	  stronger	  relations.	  
2. Accession	  to	  the	  Convention	  would	  not	  mean	  that	  our	  own	  national	  law	  would	  be	  
neglected	  or	  abandoned.	  Since	  the	  Convention	  governs	  only	  international	  sales	  
contracts	  between	  parties	  whose	  places	  of	  business	  are	  in	  two	  different	  countries,	  
the	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code	  would	  still	  govern	  contracts	  of	  sales	  made	  nationally.	  
3. A	  comparative	  study	  of	  the	  CISG	  and	  the	  Iranian	  Civil	  Code	  does	  not	  suggest	  any	  
radical	  departure	  from	  our	  Civil	  Code.	  	  
8.2.2	  Future	  Action	  
The	  three	  points	  made	  above	  suggest	  the	  following	  areas	  of	  action:	  
I.	  Awareness	  
There	  is	  clearly	  a	  great	  need	  for	  further	  awareness.	  The	  outcome	  of	  this	  survey	  shows	  
that	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  familiarity	  with	  and	  awareness	  of	  the	  CISG	  within	  the	  business	  
community	  in	  particular.	  The	  problems	  this	  brings	  include	  not	  only	  a	  lack	  of	  support	  for	  
the	  CISG	  but	  also	  the	  likelihood	  that	  the	  transition	  to	  the	  CISG	  would	  be	  more	  difficult.	  
Although	  this	  thesis	  shows	  that	  the	  CISG	  is	  preferable	  in	  many	  ways	  to	  the	  Civil	  Code,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
748	  The	  New	  York	  Convention	  came	  into	  force	  on	  13	  January	  2002.	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and	  that	  there	  are	  not	  that	  many	  incompatibilities	  between	  the	  two	  legal	  systems,	  
many	  of	  the	  benefits	  would	  not	  be	  obtained	  if	  the	  legal	  and	  business	  community	  
lacked	  the	  knowledge	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  CISG.	  Moreover,	  there	  is	  a	  risk	  that	  
their	  lack	  of	  knowledge	  might	  increase	  the	  cost	  of	  doing	  business	  rather	  than	  reduce	  it,	  
as	  the	  CISG	  is	  intended	  to	  do.	  
	  
The	  CISG	  allows	  contracting	  parties	  to	  opt	  out	  of	  its	  provisions	  and	  choose	  the	  
application	  of	  a	  different	  body	  of	  law.	  The	  source	  of	  this	  autonomy	  is	  contained	  in	  
Article	  6	  of	  the	  Convention,	  which	  permits	  signatories	  to	  ‘opt	  out’	  of	  the	  Convention	  in	  
its	  entirety	  or	  to	  derogate	  from	  or	  vary	  the	  effect	  of	  any	  of	  its	  principles.	  The	  reasoning	  
behind	  this	  was	  that	  parties	  could	  always	  opt	  out	  of	  the	  provisions	  they	  wanted	  to	  
avoid,	  and	  this	  is	  very	  useful,	  in	  particular	  for	  persuading	  sceptics	  to	  adopt	  the	  CISG.	  
For	  example,	  in	  Iran	  those	  contracting	  parties	  that	  did	  not	  wish	  to	  apply	  the	  provisions	  
on	  interest	  could	  declare	  that	  such	  provisions	  did	  not	  apply	  to	  their	  contract.	  However,	  
in	  taking	  advantage	  of	  Article	  6,	  the	  legal	  profession	  should	  apply	  the	  CISG	  in	  cases	  
where	  it	  could	  be	  very	  useful.	  But	  the	  question	  is,	  why	  do	  the	  lawyers	  opt	  out	  of	  the	  
CISG?	  But,	  though	  the	  answer	  to	  this	  could	  be	  much	  extended,	  one	  of	  the	  main	  
reasons	  is,	  again,	  lack	  of	  awareness	  and	  knowledge	  of	  the	  CISG.	  	  
	  
So	  how	  does	  one	  compensate	  for	  this	  lack	  of	  awareness?	  It	  seems	  that	  the	  most	  
important	  resources	  through	  which	  one	  can	  raise	  awareness	  are	  law	  schools	  and	  the	  
publication	  of	  scholarly	  writings,	  commentaries	  and	  court	  decisions	  in	  specialised	  and	  
general	  law	  reviews.	  Time,	  cost	  and	  effort	  are	  indeed	  required	  at	  the	  start	  to	  become	  
familiar	  with	  the	  CISG,	  but,	  given	  the	  position	  of	  Iran	  in	  the	  international	  community,	  
such	  expenditure	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  of	  vital	  importance.	  It	  is	  then	  up	  to	  the	  legal	  and	  
business	  communities	  to	  make	  their	  desire	  to	  ratify	  the	  CISG	  clear	  to	  the	  Government.	  
There	  is	  also	  an	  issue	  with	  the	  transition	  from	  the	  Civil	  Code	  to	  the	  CISG,	  but	  this	  
should	  not	  create	  serious	  difficulties,	  as	  education	  would	  focus	  on	  ensuring	  that	  
lawyers	  and	  professionals	  were	  comfortable	  with	  the	  CISG	  and	  could	  see	  its	  
advantages.	  The	  writer	  acknowledges	  that	  there	  are	  some	  valid	  objections	  to	  the	  CISG	  
that	  are	  related	  not	  to	  its	  usefulness	  but	  to	  its	  compatibility	  with	  Islamic	  principles.	  
Therefore,	  this	  issue	  will	  need	  to	  be	  addressed	  separately.	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II.	  Concern	  Over	  Anti-­‐Islamic	  Elements	  
The	  one	  vote	  against	  ratification	  registered	  during	  the	  writer’s	  fieldwork	  came	  from	  
the	  Trade	  Promotion	  Organisation	  of	  Iran.	  This	  Governmental	  organisation	  appears	  to	  
reflect	  the	  Government’s	  view.	  However,	  the	  Government	  of	  Iran	  has	  never	  published	  
any	  statement	  to	  express	  its	  direct	  and/or	  indirect	  opposition	  to	  ratification	  of	  the	  
CISG.	  	  
	  
The	  prohibition	  of	  interest	  by	  the	  Qur'an,	  which	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  impediment	  to	  
accession	  to	  the	  CISG	  for	  Islamic	  countries,	  has	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  been	  avoided	  by	  
interpretation.	  Taking	  Egypt	  as	  an	  example,	  Article	  226	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  Civil	  Code	  
awards	  interest.749	  More	  importantly,	  as	  noted	  above,	  Articles	  515(2)	  and	  522	  of	  the	  
Iranian	  Civil	  Procedure	  Code	  1379	  (2000)	  introduce	  compensation	  for	  late	  payment,	  
which	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  interest.	  
	  
Such	  interpretations	  perhaps	  explain	  why	  those	  Islamic	  countries	  that	  are	  party	  to	  the	  
CISG750	  have	  not	  made	  reservations	  on	  Article	  78,	  which	  deals	  with	  interest.	  One	  could	  
however	  argue	  that	  the	  reason	  these	  countries	  can	  apply	  interest	  is	  that	  the	  Western	  
legal	  structure	  has	  had	  a	  great	  impact	  on	  their	  legal	  systems,	  and	  the	  same	  approach	  
may	  not	  apply	  to	  other	  Islamic	  countries.	  Although	  this	  is	  true,	  there	  is	  still	  Article	  6	  of	  
the	  CISG,	  which	  formulates	  safety	  for	  Islamic	  countries,	  should	  they	  decide	  to	  avoid	  
application	  of	  Article	  78	  of	  the	  CISG.	  Article	  6	  of	  the	  CISG,	  which	  provides	  that	  ‘the	  
parties	  may	  exclude	  the	  application	  of	  this	  Convention	  or	  .	  .	  .	  derogate	  from	  or	  vary	  the	  
effect	  of	  any	  of	  its	  provisions,’	  exemplifies	  the	  fundamental	  principle	  of	  freedom	  of	  
contracts	  given	  to	  the	  parties.	  	  
III.	  The	  Community	  That	  Would	  Probably	  Overcome	  (I)	  and	  (II)	  
It	  is	  the	  duty	  of	  this	  group	  –	  the	  community	  that	  is	  aware	  and	  in	  support	  of	  accession	  –	  
to	  further	  facilitate	  accession	  to	  the	  CISG.	  It	  could	  be	  achieved	  by	  raising	  greater	  
awareness	  and	  knowledge	  of	  the	  CISG	  through	  the	  use	  of	  the	  CISG	  database.	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
749	  Article	  226	  of	  Egyptian	  Civil	  Code	  reads:	  	  
‘When	  the	  object	  of	  an	  obligation	  is	  the	  payment	  of	  a	  sum	  of	  money	  of	  which	  the	  amount	  is	  known	  at	  
the	  time	  when	  the	  claim	  is	  made,	  the	  debtor	  shall	  be	  bound,	  in	  case	  of	  delay	  in	  payment,	  to	  pay	  the	  
claimant,	  as	  damages	  for	  the	  delay,	  interest	  .	  .	  .	  ’	  
750	  Egypt,	  Iraq,	  Syria	  and	  Mauritania	  are	  parties	  to	  the	  CISG.	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database	  accommodates	  over	  2,900	  cases	  and	  1,500	  full	  texts	  of	  commentaries.	  
Besides,	  one	  of	  the	  main	  functions	  of	  the	  CISG	  Advisory	  Council,	  where	  a	  jurisdiction	  
has	  not	  ratified	  it,	  is	  to	  encourage	  and	  help	  them	  to	  adopt	  and	  implement	  it.	  More	  in-­‐
depth	  analysis	  and	  comparative	  study	  of	  the	  two	  legal	  systems	  (the	  CISG	  and	  Iranian	  
law)	  would	  also	  enable	  Iran	  to	  overcome	  any	  apprehension	  over	  the	  anti-­‐Islamic	  
element	  of	  the	  CISG.	  An	  investigation	  into	  the	  compatibility	  of	  the	  CISG	  with	  Iranian	  
law	  has	  shown	  that	  the	  two	  legal	  systems	  are	  by	  and	  large	  similar,	  and,	  where	  there	  
are	  differences,	  sufficient	  principles	  can	  be	  found	  within	  Iranian	  law	  to	  bridge	  the	  gap.	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Appendix	  A	  
Author’s	  Correspondence	  with	  Mr	  Castellani	  
	  
Date:	  4	  July	  2011	  
	  
Dear	  Mr	  Castellani,	  
	  
I	  am	  a	  PhD	  student	  at	  Durham	  Law	  School,	  University	  of	  Durham.	  I	  am	  doing	  my	  
research	  on	  the	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  Contract	  for	  the	  International	  Sale	  of	  
Goods	  (CISG)	  under	  supervision	  of	  Professor	  Thomas	  Allen.	  The	  focus	  of	  my	  research	  is	  
on	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  CISG	  with	  specific	  interest	  in	  its	  impact	  on	  developing	  countries.	  
	  
I	  have	  read	  the	  report	  of	  your	  interview	  regarding	  Brazil	  and	  the	  CISG,	  at	  
http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/castellani2.html	  ,	  which	  I	  found	  very	  
interesting.	  I	  would	  like	  to	  know	  if	  you	  would	  be	  able	  to	  answer	  a	  question	  that	  I	  have	  
about	  developing	  countries	  and	  the	  CISG.	  
	  
The	  UNCITRAL	  web	  pages,	  at	  
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_status.html	  
,	  show	  that	  many	  developing	  countries,	  especially	  in	  Africa	  and	  Asia,	  have	  not	  ratified	  
the	  CISG.	  Therefore,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  ask	  you	  why,	  from	  your	  perspective	  in	  UNCITRAL,	  
developing	  nations	  have	  been	  much	  more	  reluctant	  to	  ratify	  the	  CISG	  than	  the	  
developed	  nations,	  given	  that	  the	  preamble	  to	  CISG	  refers	  to	  the	  development	  of	  a	  
New	  International	  Economic	  Order	  and	  importance	  of	  developing	  trade	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
equality	  and	  mutual	  benefit.	  
	  
Your	  answer	  is	  very	  much	  appreciated.	  You	  can	  contact	  me	  at	  
mona.ahadi@durham.ac.uk	  and/	  or	  the	  address	  below.	  
	  







Durham	  Law	  School	  
Durham	  University	  
29/30	  Old	  Elvet	  
DH1	  3HN	  
	  
Email	  from	  Mr	  Castellani	  to	  Author	  Dated	  5	  July	  2011	  
	  
Dear	  Mona	  Ahadi,	  
	  
Thank	  you	  very	  much	  for	  your	  kind	  and	  interesting	  e-­‐mail.	  
	  
I	  am	  glad	  to	  reply	  to	  your	  query,	  though	  on	  a	  personal	  basis	  only.	  In	  other	  words,	  “the	  
views	  expressed	  herein	  are	  those	  of	  the	  author	  and	  do	  not	  necessarily	  reflect	  the	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views	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  or	  those	  of	  UNCITRAL.”	  
	  
Your	  observation	  about	  the	  low	  rate	  of	  adoption	  of	  the	  CISG	  in	  developing	  countries	  is	  
correct.	  Indeed,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  correlation	  between	  economic	  development	  and	  
the	  adoption	  of	  the	  CISG:	  for	  instance,	  while	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  20	  richest	  
economies	  of	  the	  world	  are	  parties	  to	  the	  CISG,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  20	  poorest	  are	  
not.	  
	  
However,	  that	  relation	  is	  not	  universal.	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  the	  CISG	  enjoys	  greater	  
support	  in	  Central	  and	  Latin	  America	  than	  in	  Gulf	  countries,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  
average	  income	  in	  many	  States	  in	  the	  latter	  group	  is	  higher	  than	  that	  of	  those	  in	  the	  
former.	  Other	  sub-­‐regions	  that	  are	  seeing	  quick	  economic	  growth,	  such	  as	  South	  East	  
Asia,	  also	  have	  limited	  CISG	  participation.	  
	  
The	  question	  comes	  thus	  to	  whether	  the	  cause	  for	  such	  trends	  rests	  in	  the	  CISG	  or	  is	  
more	  in	  general	  related	  to	  participation	  in	  international	  trade	  law	  reform.	  To	  that	  end,	  
it	  might	  be	  possible	  to	  use	  as	  a	  litmus	  test	  the	  Convention	  on	  the	  Recognition	  and	  
Enforcement	  of	  Foreign	  Arbitral	  Awards,	  1958	  (the	  New	  York	  Convention).	  The	  pattern	  
of	  adoption	  of	  that	  treaty	  is	  somehow	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  the	  CISG,	  taking	  into	  account	  
the	  difference	  in	  the	  number	  of	  State	  parties	  (the	  New	  York	  Convention	  has	  145	  State	  
parties	  while	  the	  CISG	  has	  76).	  
	  
Indeed,	  certain	  aspects	  might	  be	  specific	  to	  the	  CISG:	  for	  instance,	  certain	  jurisdictions	  
might	  follow	  closely	  legal	  developments	  in	  England	  and	  therefore	  be	  prevented	  from	  
adopting	  the	  CISG	  by	  the	  position	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  with	  respect	  to	  that	  text.	  
However,	  my	  conclusion	  is	  that	  those	  factors	  preventing	  broader	  adoption	  of	  the	  CISG	  
in	  developing	  countries	  impede	  the	  adoption	  of	  other	  trade	  law	  texts	  as	  well.	  
Such	  factors	  may	  include	  lack	  of	  capacity	  and	  expertise,	  given	  that	  trade	  law	  is	  a	  highly	  
technical	  topic.	  Moreover,	  trade	  law	  reform	  is	  seldom	  perceived	  as	  a	  priority	  on	  the	  
legislative	  reform	  agenda.	  Legislative	  capacity	  is	  often	  directed	  to	  other,	  more	  visible	  
sectors	  such	  as	  environmental	  law	  or	  human	  rights,	  often	  endowed	  with	  significant	  
resources	  in	  terms	  of	  implementation	  of	  treaty	  obligations.	  Trade	  law	  reform	  remains	  
thus	  marginal	  in	  the	  technical	  assistance	  to	  international	  law	  reform	  arena.	  
	  
Finally,	  the	  fracture	  between	  the	  public	  and	  the	  private	  aspects	  of	  international	  trade	  
law	  may	  also	  be	  a	  contributing	  factor.	  At	  the	  global	  level,	  the	  WTO	  is	  not	  promoting	  
trade	  law	  reform	  in	  the	  field	  of	  private	  commercial	  relations.	  Where	  such	  support	  was	  
available,	  eg	  in	  the	  case	  of	  ICSID	  indirect	  support	  to	  the	  promotion	  of	  the	  adoption	  of	  
the	  New	  York	  Convention,	  the	  results	  seem	  evident.	  At	  the	  regional	  level,	  certain	  
regional	  economic	  integration	  organisations	  do	  not	  always	  coordinate	  their	  law-­‐
making	  activities	  with	  global	  standards,	  thus	  introducing	  a	  further	  element	  of	  fracture.	  
The	  above	  analysis	  should	  be	  complemented	  with	  the	  consideration	  of	  factors	  relevant	  
at	  the	  regional	  and	  sub-­‐regional	  level.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  illustration	  of	  such	  factors,	  I	  am	  
attaching	  a	  short	  note	  on	  trade	  law	  reform	  in	  Africa.	  (See	  attached	  file:	  547–563	  
Castellani.pdf)	  
	  








Luca	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ADOPTION	  OF	  THE	  CISG	  IN	  IRAN	  
1.	  How	  familiar	  are	  you	  with	  the	  CISG?	  
a.	  Not	  Familiar	  At	  All	  	   	   b.	  Slightly	  Familiar	  	   	  	  	  	  	  c.	  Fairly	  Familiar	  
d.	  Quite	  Familiar	  	   	   	  e.	  Very	  Familiar	  
2.	  How	  important	  are	  international	  sales	  transactions	  to	  your	  company?	  
a.	  Not	  At	  All	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  b.	  Slightly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  c.	  Moderately	  	  
d.	  Very	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  d.	  Extremely                     e.	  Not	  Applicable   	  
3.	  In	  the	  event	  that	  Iran	  decides	  to	  ratify	  the	  CISG,	  would	  you	  oppose	  or	  support	  its	  
ratification?	  	  
a.	  Strongly	  Oppose	  	   	   	  b.	  Inclined	  to	  Oppose	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  c.	  Neither	  
c.	  Inclined	  to	  Support	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  d.	  Strongly	  Support	  







4.	  Are	  you	  available	  for	  interview?	  
a.	  Yes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  b.	  No	  
	  
List	  of	  Academics/	  Lawyers,	  Business	  Community	  and	  Government	  Officials	  
Contacted	  With	  Regard	  to	  the	  CISG	  Inside	  Iran	  in	  Author’s	  Fieldwork	  
	  
Academics/	  Lawyers	  
Key	  Person	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Date	  of	  Sending	  Q	   	  Replied	  to	  Q	   	  Interviewed	  
Hossein	  Safai	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  No	   	   	  Yes/Face	  to	  Face	  
Morteza	  Adel	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	  	   	  Yes	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  No	  
Rabia	  Eskini	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  Yes	   	   	  Yes/Face	  to	  Face	  
	  
Government	  Officials	  
Name	  of	  Organisation	  	  	  	  Date	  of	  Sending	  Q	   	  Replied	  to	  Q	   	  Interviewed	  
Iran	  Chamber	  of	  	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  No	   	   	  Directed	  me	  
Commerce,	  Industries	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  to	  TPOI	  
and	  Mines	  
Ministry	  of	  	   	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  No	   	   	  No	  
Commerce	  
Trade	  Promotion	  	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  No	   	   	  Yes/Phone	  
Organisation	  of	  Iran	  
(TPOI)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  	  
Business	  Community	  
Name	  of	  Company	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Date	  of	  Sending	  Q	   	  Replied	  to	  Q	   	  	  	  	  Interviewed	  
Ahwaz	  Pipe	  Mills	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  No	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  No	  
Alborz	  Investment	  	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  No	   	   	   	  No	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Name	  of	  Company	  	  	  	  	  	  Date	  of	  Sending	  Q	   	  Replied	  to	  Q	   	  Interviewed	  
Almahdi	  Aluminium	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  03	  Dec	  2011	  	   	   	  No	   	   	   	  No	  
Company	  
Amirkabir	   	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  No	   	   	   	  No	  
Petrochemical	  Company	  
Arak	  Petrochemical	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  No	   	   	   	  No	  
Company	  
Bahman	  Group	   	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  No	   	   	   	  No	  
Bandar	  Imam	   	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  No	   	   	   	  No	  
Petrochemical	  
Company	  
Behpakhsh	  Company	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  No	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  No	  
Behran	  Oil	   	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  No	   	   	   	  No	  
Company	  
Borzouyeh	  Petrochemical	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  	  No	   	   	   No	  
Company	  
Chadormalu	  Mining	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  No	   	   	   	  No	  
and	  industrial	  
Company	  
Darou	  Pakhsh	   	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	  	   	  Yes	   	   	   	  No	  
Esfahan	  Steel	  	   	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	  	   	   	  No	   	   	   	  No	  
Company	  
Fars	  and	  Khuzestan	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	  	   	  No	   	   	  	   	  No	  
Cement	  Company	  
Gole-­‐e-­‐Gohar	  Iron	  	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  No	   	   	   	  No	  
Ore	  Company	  
Heavy	  Equipment	  	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  No	   	   	   	  No	  
Production	  Company	  
Iran/Aluminium	  	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  No	   	   	   	  No	  
Company	  
Iran	  Dairy	  Industries	  	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  No	   	   	   	  No	  
Company	  




Iran	  Khodro	  Company	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  No	   	   	   	  No	  
Iran	  Khodro	  Diesel	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  No	   	   	   	  No	  
Iran	  Khodro	  	   	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  No	   	   	   No	  
Investment	  	  
Development	  
Iran	  Khodro	   	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  Yes	   	   	   	  No	  
Khorasan	  Company	  
Iran	  Power	  Plant	  	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  No	   	   	   	  No	  	  
Projects	  Management	  	  
Company	  
Iran	  Tractor	  	   	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  No	   	   	   	  No	  
Manufacturing	  
Company	  
Islamic	  Republic	  of	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  No	   	  	   	  	   	  No	  
Iran,	  Shipping	  Lines	  
Company	  
Khark	  Petrochemical	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  No	   	   	   	  No	  
Company	  
213	  
Name	  of	  Company	  	  	  	  	  	  Date	  of	  Sending	  Q	   	  Replied	  to	  Q	   	  Interviewed	  
Khorasan	  Steel	  	  	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  No	   	   	   	  No	  
Complex	  
Khouzestan	  Steel	  	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  No	   	   	   	  No	  
Company	  
Marun	  Petrochemical	  	  	  	  	  	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  No	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  No	  
Complex	  
Mega	  Motor	   	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  Yes	   	   	   	  Yes/Face	  
Company	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  to	  Face	  
Mehrcam	  Pars	  	   	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  No	   	   	   	  No	  
Company	  
Mobarakeh	  Steel	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  No	   	   	   	  No	  
Company	  
National	  Iranian	  	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  No	   	   	   	  No	  
Copper	  Industries	  
Company	  
National	  Iranian	  Oil	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  No	   	   	   	  No	  
Company	  
National	  Petrochemical	  	  	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  No	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  No	  
Company	  
Pakhshe	  Razi	  	   	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  No	   	   	   No	  
Company	  	  
Pars	  Khodro	   	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  No	   	   	   No	  
Pars	  Petrochemical	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  No	   	   	   No	  
Company	  
Pasargad	  Oil	  	   	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  No	   	   	   	  No	  
Company	  
Petrochemical	  	   	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  Yes	   	   	   	  No	  
Industries	  	  
Investment	  Company	  
Sadid	  Industrial	  	  	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  No	   	   	   	  No	  
Group	  
Saipa	   	   	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	  	   	   	  No	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  No	  
Saipa	  Diesel	   	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  No	   	   	   	  	  No	  
Sapco	   	   	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  No	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  No	  
Shahid	  Bahonar	  Copper	  	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  No	   	   	   	  	  No	  
Industries	  Company	  
Shahid	  Tondgooyan	  	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  Yes	   	   	   	  No	  
Petrochemical	  	  
Company	  
Tabriz	  Petrochemical	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  No	   	   	  	   	  No	  
Company	  
Tidewater	  Company	  	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	  	   	   	  No	   	   	   	  No	  
Middle	  East	  	  
Marin	  Services	  Plc	  
Zagros	  Petrochemical	   	  03	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  No	   	   	   	  No	  
Company	  






List	  of	  Business	  Communities	  Contacted	  With	  Regard	  to	  the	  CISG	  Outside	  Iran	  in	  
Author’s	  Fieldwork	  
	  
Name	  of	  Company	  	  	  	  	  	  Date	  of	  Sending	  Q	   Replied	  to	  Q	   	  	  Interviewed	  
Behpakhsh	  Europe	  	   	  14	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  No	  	   	   	   	  No	  
Office	  in	  Germany	  
Iranian	  Trade	  	   	   	  14	  Dec	  2011	   	   	  No	   	   	   	  No	  
Association	  in	  
San	  Diego,	  USA	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